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The [Pirate] Code is more of what you would call guidelines than ac-
tual rules.
- Barbossa, Pirates of the Caribbean
1
Each year, over 65,000 criminal defendants are sentenced in the
federal courts; about 1,200 are sentenced each week.2 Since 1984, Con-
gress has required sentences to be determined according to a strict and
detailed set of Sentencing Guidelines. On January 12, 2005, in United
States v. Booker,3 the Supreme Court declared this sentencing system
unconstitutional. The Justices left many questions unanswered regarding
how the lower courts should treat defendants sentenced under the prior
regime and how to sentence defendants in the future. These issues occu-
pied much of the attention of federal courts during 2005. The Tenth Cir-
cuit alone rendered two en banc decisions and some 226 panel decisions
(as of this writing), addressing how to deal with defendants who were
sentenced before Booker was decided. Nationwide, this retrospective
question produced a four-way circuit split and literally thousands of
panel decisions. And it will require many more decisions to figure out
how to apply Booker moving forward.
I. THE BOOKER DECISION
The Booker decision is described in detail in an article elsewhere in
this issue,4 and I will not go over the same ground. The Supreme Court
delivered two different opinions in the case, both by five to four majori-
ties, with the dissenters to each opinion joining the majority in the other.
In one opinion, written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that
the Sentencing Guidelines violate a criminal defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment right to trial by jury insofar as they permit imposition of a sentence
on the basis of facts found by a judge, if the sentence exceeds the maxi-
t Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; B.A., Michigan State University,
1976; J.D., University of Chicago Law School, 1979. Thanks to Michelle Spak for assistance with
the empirical research and chart preparation.
1. Pirates of the Caribbean: The Curse of the Black Pearl (Walt Disney Pictures 2003).
2. See, e.g., UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SELECTED 2004 SOURCEBOOK
TABLES 14, 27 (2004), http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2004/selected_2004.pdf (65,043 defendants
were sentenced in fiscal year 2004).
3. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
4. Peter A. Jenkins, Requiring the Unknown or Preserving Reason: United States v. Gon-
zalez-Huerta and the Tenth Circuit's Compromise Approach to Booker Error, 83 DENY. U. L. REV.
815 (2006). See also, Amanda Farnsworth, Comment, United States v. Booker: How Should Con-
gress Play the Ball?, 83 DENY. U. L. REV. 579 (2005).
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mum that would be justified on the basis solely of facts found by the jury
or admitted by the defendant (with the exception of the fact of a prior
conviction).5 In the other opinion, written by Justice Stephen Breyer, the
Court remedied this constitutional violation by rendering the Guidelines
"effectively advisory.",6  According to this opinion, it is permissible to
enhance a sentence on the basis of judge-found facts so long as the dis-
trict judge has discretion to impose a sentence either higher or lower than
the Guidelines range, on the basis of broad statutory factors.7 Under this
new system, sentences continue to be subject to appellate review, but
variances from the Guidelines will be reversed only if the resulting sen-
tence is "unreasonable." 8
There are two ways to read these opinions. According to one view,
which I call "Booker maximalism," district courts are liberated to sen-
tence criminal defendants in accordance with the judge's sense of indi-
vidualized justice, with the Guidelines merely taken into "consideration"
for what they are worth. In such a system, the Guidelines are like the
Pirate Code in the movie Pirates of the Caribbean: more what you would
call guidelines than actual rules. According to the other view, which I
call "Booker minimalism," not much has changed in practical effect.
5. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 755-56 (Stevens, J.).
6. Id. at 757 (Breyer, J.).
7. The Guidelines provide seven factors to be considered in imposing a sentence:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed -
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to
provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical
care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentences and the sentencing range established for -
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of de-
fendant as set forth in the guidelines-
(i) issued by the Sentencing Commission... subject to any amendments made to
such guidelines by act of Congress... ; and
(ii) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), are in effect on the date the defen-
dant is sentenced; or
(B) in the case of a violation of probation or supervised release, the applicable guide-
lines or policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission ... taking into ac-
count any amendments made to such guidelines or policy statements by an act of
Congress...;
(5) any pertinent policy statement -
(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission ... subject to any amendments made to
such policy statement by an act of Congress...; and
(B) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), is in effect on the date the defendant
is sentenced.
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar re-
cords who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000).
8. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756-66 (Breyer, J.).
THE BOOKER MESS
District courts continue to be required to calculate the Guidelines sen-
tence, which is presumed to be reasonable, and must justify any variance
from the Guidelines sentence on the basis of the particulars of the case;
appellate courts will ensure that they do not get too far out of line. The
former version sees Booker as a sea change in sentencing; the latter as a
modest adjustment. In this Foreword, I will address three questions, one
empirical, one doctrinal, and one normative:
(1) What has been the effect of Booker on sentencing? In this, I will
focus particularly on the Tenth Circuit.
(2) Are the Booker decisions coherent as a matter of constitutional
doctrine?
(3) Has Booker improved the sentencing process as a practical mat-
ter?
II. EFFECT
To determine the effect of Booker on sentencing (so far), I will ex-
amine two different types of statistics. First, I will look at the results of
so-called "pipeline cases," to see how many resulted in a significant
change of sentence as a result of applying Booker. Pipeline cases are
cases in which the defendant was sentenced prior to Booker but the case
was not yet final, usually because it was on appeal. Because the Su-
preme Court held that the Booker decision must be applied to all cases on
direct review, 9 the pipeline cases had to be reconsidered, because in all of
them the district court treated the Guidelines as mandatory. Second, I
will look at cases where the defendant was sentenced after the Booker
decision to see whether and how the district courts are employing their
new-found sentencing discretion.
The Courts of Appeals split four ways on how to deal with pipeline
cases.' o Some circuits vacated all sentences and remanded to the district
courts for resentencing. This imposed a high cost on the district courts,
U.S. Attorneys, public defenders, marshals, and prison authorities, be-
cause under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, resentencing entails an
actual sentencing hearing (not just briefs), with counsel for both sides
and the defendant in attendance." Escorting an incarcerated defendant
from prison to a court, which may be hundreds of miles away, presents
serious security issues and costs. Other circuits partially remanded the
cases to district court to determine whether resentencing would be neces-
sary. This was a practical solution, but difficult to justify in legal terms.
Other circuits, including the Tenth, examined each case individually to
9. Id. at 769 (Breyer, J.).
10. Those interested in more detail or citations regarding the split should consult Jenkins,
supra note 4; see also Farnsworth, supra note 4.
11. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i).
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determine whether a remand was needed, based on whether there was
anything in the record that indicated that the district judge believed the
sentence was excessive (or inadequate) or that the facts would warrant a
variance from the Guidelines sentence. These circuits further divided
according to the legal standards to apply to this inquiry.
The Tenth Circuit, as of this writing, has decided 226 pipeline
cases. 12 That may not sound like a lot of cases, but ours is a small cir-
cuit. Those 226 cases contributed to about an 11% increase in the num-
ber of criminal appeals, as compared to the preceding year. Nationwide,
that would translate into a considerable increase in the burden on already
overworked defense counsel, prosecutors, judges, and court staff. What
was the result? As illustrated in Figure 1, the Tenth Circuit reversed the
sentence in 32% of the pipeline cases and affirmed in 68%.
Figure 1
These aggregate numbers, however, obscure some important differ-
ences among the pipeline cases. In some of these cases, the defendant
had lodged an objection to the constitutionality of sentencing under the
Guidelines; these cases were reviewed to determine whether the error in
sentencing method was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 3 Generally
speaking, these were affirmed only if the district judge had made some
affirmative indication that he would sentence at the same or a higher
level if the Guidelines were not mandatory, 14 or the judge sentenced
12. This and all other Tenth Circuit statistics in this section are based on my own count of the
cases.
13. United States v. Labastida-Segura, 396 F.3d 1140, 1142-43 (10th Cir. 2005).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Serrano-Dominguez, 406 F.3d 1221, 1223-24 (10th Cir. 2005).
Tenth Circuit Overall Reversal Statistics:







above the minimum specified by the Guidelines range, which indicated
that the judge would not use his Booker discretion to go lower.' 5 In other
cases, the defendant did not make a relevant objection; these cases were
reviewed for plain error.16  Generally, these were reversed where the
evidence in support of sentence enhancements was contested and prob-
lematical,' 7 there were significant mitigating circumstances,' 8 or (the
most common situation) the district judge had expressed misgivings
about the justice of the sentence.' 9 The differences in these standards
proved to be significant. Some 58% of the harmless error cases were
reversed, as compared to only 15% of the plain error cases.
A further difference relates to the type of error. In slightly fewer
than half of the cases, the sentence had been enhanced on the basis of
judge-found facts. These were cases of "constitutional Booker error." In
slightly more than half, the sentence was based entirely on the facts
found by the jury or admitted by the defendant, and on prior convictions.
These cases involved no constitutional error at all, but they were none-
theless inconsistent with Booker, because the remedial opinion in Booker
rendered the Guidelines advisory. The error of treating the Guidelines as
mandatory (an error committed in every case, because it was not error
prior to Booker) is called "non-constitutional Booker error.",20 The rever-
sal rate for pipeline cases involving constitutional error was 40%, while
that for non-constitutional error was only 24%.
The four permutations of these case types exhibited dramatically
different reversal rates, ranging from a reversal rate of 70% for constitu-
tional error reviewed for harmlessness to a reversal rate of 7% for non-
constitutional error reviewed for plain error. Figure 2 shows the differ-
ences. The nature and direction of these differences are precisely what
one would predict. But the magnitude is nonetheless interesting, because
it shows that standards of review make a serious difference.
But reversal rates are just the first part of the story. What matters to
defendants is whether their sentences were actually changed. To deter-
mine that, we must look at what happened to the cases that were reversed
and remanded. As of this writing, 44 of the 73 defendants whose sen-
tences were reversed by the Tenth Circuit for Booker error have been
resentenced. Of these, 32% of the defendants received the same sentence
15. See, e.g., United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 876 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Paxton, 422 F.3d 1203, 1207 (10th Cir. 2005).
16. United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 732 (10th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Dazey, 403 F.3d 1147, 1178-79 (10th Cir. 2005).
18. See, e.g., United State v. Trujillo-Terrazas, 405 F.3d 814, 821 (10th Cir. 2005).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 403 F.3d 1188, 1199-1200 (10th Cir. 2005).
20. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 731-32.
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they received the first time. On the other hand, 27% had their sentenced
reduced by over 40%. Figure 3 sets forth the results.
2
1
Again, these aggregate statistics obscure the differences between
types of cases. In cases reviewed for harmless error, almost half- 46/o-
of the defendants received the same sentence they received the first time.
Figure 4 shows these results. In cases reviewed for plain error, every
sentence was changed, and 54% were reduced by more than 40%, as
shown in Figure 5.
In sum, taking into account sentences affirmed by the Tenth Circuit
and those in which the same sentence was imposed on remand, the result
of the pipeline litigation was that 16% of defendants saw reductions in
their sentences. That is not a large number, but it is undoubtedly of great
significance to the individuals involved.
Let us turn, then, to post-Booker sentencing results. Even before
Booker, the Guidelines permitted district judges to "depart" from the
Guideline ranges, either up or down, in narrow and carefully defined
circumstances.22 Most downward departures were at the request of the
prosecutor, often for cooperation. Others were at the instigation of the
judge, usually because the judge concluded that the Guidelines range, for
some reason, failed to reflect the true seriousness of the offense. The
question is whether the new-found discretion of judges to vary from the
Guidelines has had much effect. I will focus on variances and departures
not requested by the prosecution because those are the ones that reflect
Booker's expansion of judicial discretion.23
In the two years prior to Booker, nationwide, 71% of defendants
were sentenced within the Guidelines range. Twenty-two percent re-
ceived a downward departure at the behest of the prosecution. Only 6%
received downward departures at the instigation of the district judge, and
0.78% received upward departures at the judge's instigation. After
Booker (between Jan. 12 and Dec. 21, 2005), the rate of within-
Guidelines sentencing declined from 71% to 62%. The rate of judge-
instigated downward departures or variances more than doubled, from
6% to 13%. But Booker was a double-edged sword: the number of
judge-instigated upward departures also increased significantly, from
0.78% to 1.35%. Figure 6 shows the numbers. (Note that these results
come from the district courts. The Courts of Appeals have so far decided
only a handful of post-Booker non-pipeline sentencing appeals. What we
21. Note that none of these new sentences has yet gone through appellate review. It is possi-
ble that some will be held to be unreasonable. The effect of appellate review is almost certainly to
reduce the amount of change in sentencing, though it is impossible to predict by how much.
22. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. K (2005),
http://www.ussc.gov/2005guid/gl2005.pdf.
23. Statistics in this section come from UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SPECIAL
POST-BOOKER CODING PROJECT 16-18 (Jan. 5, 2006), http://www.ussc.gov/Blakely/
PostBooker_120105.pdf. They are current as of December 21, 2005.
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are seeing, then, is a product of the culture of the district courts in the
various circuits rather than of appellate decisions.).
Evaluating How Booker Affected the Rate
of Departures and Variances Nationwide
M Sentenced within the Guidelines Range
M Gov't Sponsored Downward Departures
Pre-Booker 2003-20004 El Non-Gov't Sponsored Downward
6% 0.78% Departures / Variances






The changes in the Tenth Circuit have been less dramatic than in the
nation as a whole. The Tenth Circuit district courts were significantly
more Guidelines-compliant than the national average prior to Booker,
and have exercised their Booker discretion less aggressively than their
counterparts in other circuits, in both downward and upward directions.
The percentage of within-Guidelines sentences in the Tenth Circuit de-
clined from 72% to 66% -- two thirds of the average national change.
The percentage of downward departures and variances instigated by the
district judge went from 5% to 10%, and the percentage of upward de-
partures and variances went from 0.61% to 0.84%. Figure 7 illustrates
this information.
As the following charts indicate, district courts in the various cir-
cuits have responded quite differently to Booker. Figure 8 shows the
difference in downward departures and variances. Figure 9 shows only
the difference in judge-instigated downward departures and variances.
In every circuit, there has been an increase in downward departures
and variances. But the difference between circuits is striking. The dis-
trict courts of the Tenth Circuit, always more Guidelines-compliant than
the national norm, experienced less change than courts in most other
circuits. The Fifth and the Eleventh showed a similar pattern to the
Tenth. The First Circuit went from being about average in Guidelines-
compliance to being the second most deviant of all Circuits. The Sec-
ond, which was always far more Guidelines-variant than the other cir-
cuits, became even more so. Interestingly, the Ninth, which was more
variant than the national average before Booker, became a little less vari-
2006]
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Evaluating How Booker Affected the Rate of
Departures and Variances in the Tenth Circuit
M Sentenced within the Guidelines Range
Pre-Booker 2003-20004 M Gov't Sponsored Downward Departures
5% 0.61% 7 E Non-Gov't Sponsored Downward
2200 720 Departures / Variances
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Figure 9
ant than the national average after the decision. It exhibited the smallest
percentage change of any circuit in the number of departures and vari-
ances after Booker. It is as if the district judges in the Ninth Circuit sen-
tence without much regard to whether the law grants them discretion.
The Seventh, which was one of the most Guidelines-compliant under the
old regime, soared to fourth place among the variant after Booker. This
is the converse of the Ninth.
Upward departures and variances are much rarer, but as Figure 10
shows they too exhibit a striking difference among the circuits. The dis-
trict courts in the Tenth Circuit, which were below the national average
in departures under the pre-Booker system, showed little inclination to
change. This suggests that the district courts in the Tenth Circuit tend to
adhere to the Guidelines whether they have to or not, and whether the
defendant or the prosecution would benefit. The district courts in the
First Circuit, by contrast, which showed the greatest percentage increase
in propensity to sentence below the Guidelines range, also showed by far
the greatest percentage increase in propensity to sentence above the
Guidelines range. This suggests that, after Booker, the district courts in
the First tend to flex their discretion to vary from the Guidelines more
than the national average both in favor of defendants and in favor of the
prosecution. The Second Circuit, which exhibited higher-than-average
levels of downward departures before Booker and the nation's highest
levels of downward departures and variances after Booker, has been well
below the national norm in upward departures and variances, both before
and after the decision. This suggests that discretion in the Second Circuit
Non-Government Requested Downward Departures
Pre- and Post-Booker
Circuit Courts of Appeals
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Figure 10
is principally exercised in favor of the defendant. The Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits, by contrast, are below the national norm for post-Booker
downward departures and variances, but are second and third highest in
post-Booker upward departures and variances. They are thus the pro-
prosecution yin to the Second Circuit's pro-defendant yang.
One clear effect of Booker, then, is to produce a greater degree of
regional non-uniformity in sentencing practices.
The overall effect on sentence length, so far, has been negligible.
After Booker, the average length of sentence has been about the same as
before.24 On the other hand, in the years before Booker, there had been a
persistent and significant annual increase in the length of sentences. As
Figure 11 shows, this increase came to a halt in 2005, presumably
(though not certainly) as a result of the courts' increased discretion under
Booker.
It is hard to evaluate the magnitudes of these changes. The effects
have been larger than I personally would have guessed; but, the effects
have surely been more modest than the most hopeful enthusiasts for
Booker wanted. The lack of effect on sentence length must be particu-
larly disappointing to those who hoped that an end to mandatory Guide-
lines sentencing would produce lower sentences.
24. Statistics regarding average length of sentences come from id. at 13-15.
Upward Departures Pre- and Post-Booker
Circuit Courts of Appeals
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III. CONSISTENCY AND COHERENCE
The Booker opinions, taken in tandem, do not get high marks for
consistency or coherence. If that seems a presumptuous thing for an
inferior court judge to say about the product of his superiors, I take com-
fort in the fact that eight of the nine Justices agree with me that either the
Sixth Amendment holding or the remedial holding is wrong, and that the
two do not fit together. Five Justices joined the Sixth Amendment hold-
ing, and four of those five dissented from the remedial holding. The four
dissenters from the Sixth Amendment holding, plus one, formed the ma-
jority for the remedial holding. As Figure 12 shows, only one Justice
thought the two parts of the opinion could be squared, and she did not
write an opinion explaining why.
The most striking feature of the Booker decision is that the remedy
bears no logical relation to the constitutional violation. The violation,
according to the Stevens majority, is that judges were permitted to make
factual findings that properly were the province of the jury. The remedy
according to the Breyer majority, however, was to give judges more
power than they had previously. The jury verdict is no more consequen-
tial after Booker than it was before, but now the district judge can thumb
his nose (within the bounds of reasonableness) at Congress's determina-
tion regarding the appropriate sentence for offenses of that type and cir-
cumstance. If there were a right to "sentence by judicial discretion" in
the Constitution, the Booker decision would be on the money. How it
serves to enforce "trial by jury" is another matter. Yet somehow, a case
based on the proposition that judges were given too much power to sen-
tence based on facts not found by a jury was transmogrified, as if al-
2006]
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chemically, into a holding that they should have more discretion to disre-
gard sentencing ranges set by Congress.
Justices in the Majority






All the things that troubled Sixth Amendment purists about the pre-
Booker Guidelines system are unchanged. Under the pre-Booker Guide-
lines system, defendants could be sentenced to additional years in prison
for so-called "uncharged conduct" - crimes that were neither charged in
the indictment nor proven to the jury. For example, a defendant con-
victed of a drug offense could be sentenced to extra months in prison if
the judge concluded he had carried an illegal firearm, even if the firearms
offense was never mentioned during the trial. But the same is true after
Booker, the only difference being that district judges have an extra dollop
of discretion to sentence above or below the resulting Guidelines range.
Indeed, under the pre-Booker Guidelines system, defendants could even
be sentenced to additional years in prison for committing crimes on
which they were acquitted by the jury (the theory being that acquittal on
a reasonable doubt standard is not inconsistent with guilt under a pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard, which is all the Guidelines required
for enhancements). For example, in one Tenth Circuit case, the jury
found that the defendant had possessed 50-500 grams of methampheta-
mine, and that he had not possessed more than 500 grams; nonetheless,
the district judge sentenced him on the basis of his own finding that the
defendant possessed over 1200 grams.25 But defendants can still be sen-
tenced on the basis of acquitted conduct after Booker, again with the sole
difference being an increase in judicial discretion to go above or below
the resulting range.26 Trial by jury has no greater role in sentencing than
it did before Booker.
Indeed, and still more remarkably, the Booker remedial majority
held that district judges must have discretion to treat the Guidelines as
25. United States v. Magallanez, 408 F.3d 672, 682 (10th Cir. 2005).
26. See id. at 685.
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"advisory" even in cases where the Sixth Amendment was in no way
involved. Slightly more than half of the criminal defendants (based on
statistics from Tenth Circuit pipeline cases) were sentenced entirely on
the basis of the jury verdict, the defendant's admissions, and prior crimi-
nal history. Under the Stevens majority opinion, these sentences were
entirely constitutional under the Sixth Amendment. Yet under the
Breyer remedial opinion, these sentences became violations of the Sen-
tencing Reform Act, as reinterpreted by the Court. District courts now
have discretion to vary from the Guidelines even in cases where it would
not violate the Constitution to obey the Guidelines.
One might interpret the remedial holding as a pragmatic attempt by
supporters of the Guidelines system, four of whom dissented from the
Stevens majority, to patch together a workable sentencing system as
close to the Guidelines as was possible under the circumstances. Re-
sponsibility for the inconsistency between violation and remedy, accord-
ing to this theory, must lie with the remedial majority, which was unwill-
ing to accede to the force of a Sixth Amendment holding with which they
disagreed. But this is not the whole story.
The inconsistency cannot be blamed solely on the remedial major-
ity. The Sixth Amendment majority opinion itself contains the seeds of
this incoherence. According to that opinion, fully discretionary sentenc-
ing is permitted under the Sixth Amendment. This is explicitly acknowl-
edged at least three times in the opinion. If the statutory penalty applica-
ble to the crime of distributing five kilograms or more of cocaine is ten
years to life (as it is27), the district judge under a discretionary sentencing
system could set the sentence anywhere between ten years and life, based
on the judge's perception of such factors as the severity of the crime, the
defendant's prospects for rehabilitation, the effects on the victims, the
defendant's ties to the community or family responsibilities, or whatever
other factors he deems relevant. In making these discretionary judg-
ments, the court perforce would consider facts beyond those found by the
jury. This, the Stevens majority said, comported with the Sixth Amend-
ment: "when a trial judge exercises his discretion to select a specific sen-
tence within a defined range, the defendant has no right to a jury deter-
mination of the facts that the judge deems relevant., 28 Indeed, the Court
could hardly say otherwise: this was the system in place when the Sixth
Amendment was adopted, which prevailed in the federal courts from the
Founding until enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, and
which is used in a majority of states even today, without anyone ever
suggesting a conflict with the Sixth Amendment. Yet the Booker Court
never explained how such a system could be squared with its interpreta-
tion of the requirements of the Sixth Amendment. If a sentence can be
27. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2000).
28. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 750 (Stevens, J.).
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based on judge-found facts under a discretionary system, why does the
defendant care if his sentence is based on judge-found facts under a man-
datory Guidelines system? From the defendant's perspective, the Guide-
lines system gives no less authority to the jury, but is less arbitrary, more
predictable, with more due process, than a fully discretionary system.
Under the Guidelines, the defendant has the right to know the factual
basis for the sentence, to present evidence, and to challenge the sentence
if the enhancement facts are not proven by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. A fully discretionary system provides none of these protections.
Because the Sixth Amendment majority reaffirmed the constitution-
ality of discretionary judging, it left itself wide open to a remedial hold-
ing that enhanced judicial discretion rather than eliminating judicial fact-
finding. Justice Breyer's remedial majority simply took the Sixth
Amendment majority's unexplained concession regarding discretionary
sentencing to its logical conclusion. The remedial opinion reasoned that
the Guidelines could remain in force so long as they were not formally
mandatory. To be sure, the Sixth Amendment content of the holding was
leached out of the remedy, but that was a logical consequence of a Sixth
Amendment holding that attempted to paper over so gaping a doctrinal
hole.
IV. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Few legal observers have praised the Booker opinions, at least in
tandem, for their logical and doctrinal quality. But many have welcomed
the decision as a pragmatic adjustment that may ameliorate some of the
more objectionable features of the prior Guidelines system. It is difficult
to evaluate the pragmatic effects of a decision without taking sides on
contentious issues. I shall simply set forth the most common criticisms
of the Guidelines and ask to what extent Booker is responsive to them,
without necessarily implying agreement with the criticisms (though I do
agree with some of them). My point is that even from the perspective of
critics of the Guidelines system, Booker offers at best a modest pallia-
tive.
It must be remembered that the Guidelines were originally the
product of a remarkable cross-ideological consensus. Liberal members
of Congress criticized the prior discretionary sentencing system for being
arbitrary and discriminatory, suspecting that punishment depended more
on the race of the defendant, the place of the offense, and the tempera-
ment of the judge than on the legitimate characteristics of the crime or
the defendant. Conservative members of Congress suspected that "soft
on crime" federal judges were using their sentencing discretion to mete
out insufficiently punitive sentences. Advocates of the Guidelines sys-
tem were united in the view that the prior discretionary system violated
principles of the rule of law. The Guidelines were intended to achieve
greater uniformity and fairness.
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But not long after they were enacted, the Guidelines began to attract
serious criticism, which became more vehement as years went by. Many
critics, especially federal judges, argued that the rigidity of the Guide-
lines prevented judges from sentencing defendants in accordance with
the justice of the particular case. 29 Others complained that the Guide-
lines were excessively complex and confusing, consuming vast resources
in litigation, and incomprehensible to defendants or other people in-
volved in the system. 0 Many pointed to particular anomalies in the
Guidelines, such as the much-denounced treatment of a gram of crack as
equivalent to 100 grams of cocaine for purposes of setting the level of
punishment.3' Others objected to the fact that defendants could receive
increased sentences for offenses other than the crime for which they were
convicted - and even for offenses for which they were acquitted by the
jury. Perhaps most insistently, many critics complained simply that sen-
tences under the Guidelines were excessive.32  How has Booker re-
sponded to these criticisms?
A. Rigidity
There is no doubt that Booker has ameliorated the rigidity of the
Guidelines system. District judges now have the freedom to consider
factors previously deemed out of bounds, and thus to avoid some of the
more evident miscarriages of justice under the Guidelines. But as the
empirical portion of this article suggests, the degree of this increased
flexibility may be less significant in practice than in theory. Only in
about 7% of cases, nationwide, have district judges exercised their new-
found discretion to sentence below the Guideline ranges.
No one can predict how appellate courts will interpret the "reason-
ableness" requirement, but it stands to reason that as appellate precedents
pile up, the amount of district court discretion will gradually be reduced.
One important question, not yet addressed by the Tenth Circuit, is
whether Booker discretion allows district judges to vary from Guidelines
ranges on the basis of generic objections to the policy choices embodied
in the Guidelines, or whether - as the Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit recently held - Booker discretion "was meant to operate only within
29. See, e.g., KATE STITH & JOSE CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN
THE FEDERAL COURTS (1998); Marc L. Miller, Domination & Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sen-
tencers, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1211, 1236-37 (2004).
30. See, e.g., Ronald F. Wright, Complexity and Distrust in Sentencing Guidelines, 25 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 617 (1992).
31. See, e.g., David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV.
1283 (1995). Many other anomalies are discussed in Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity: The Normative
and Empirical Failure of the Federal Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 85 (2005).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Brewer, 899 F.2d 503, 513 (6th Cir. 1990) (Merritt, C.J., dis-
senting) (describing the Guidelines as "a prescription for injustice because district judges can no
longer prevent the imposition of inappropriately harsh sentences"); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING &
GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT 156-75 (1991).
2006]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
the ambit of the individualized factors spelled out in Section 3553(a). ' 33
If the First Circuit's interpretation prevails, Booker discretion will be less
significant than many district courts now assume.
The sentencing statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), treats the Guidelines
range as one of a number of factors the district judge should consider in
sentencing. But there are procedural and institutional considerations,
built into the structure of sentencing, that nudge district judges in the
direction of Guidelines compliance. Judges are required in every case to
perform the Guidelines calculations and to "take them into account when
sentencing." 34 The Guidelines range is widely regarded as presumptively
reasonable 35 - and district judges must give cogent reasons if they intend
to sentence outside the Guidelines. This has the psychological, if not the
legal, effect of establishing the Guidelines range as more than just one
factor among many. In practical effect, the Guidelines continue to be the
benchmark for responsible judging, with variances only for unusual
cases. Moreover, and more speculatively, appellate review may coerce
virtual Guidelines compliance in the ordinary run of cases. Variances
from the Guidelines are often appealed, and when they are appealed re-
ceive serious scrutiny; but as of this writing, no appellate court has yet
reversed a within-Guidelines sentence for being unreasonable. These
considerations will not prevent a determined district judge from doing
what seems just, but it surely makes Guidelines compliance the path of
least resistance.
B. Complexity
With respect to the arcane complexity of the Guidelines, Booker
only makes matters worse. District courts still will need to go through
the complex task of calculating the Guidelines ranges, and appellate
courts still will hear appeals challenging those calculations. Then, as a
result of Booker, on top of the Guidelines calculations district judges will
have to consider the statutory factors and make judgments about vari-
ances; appellate courts will have to review these judgments for reason-
ableness. At first, this discretionary superstructure may seem relatively
intuitive and simple, but over time, precedents governing the exercise of
Booker discretion will develop in a common law-like fashion, and these
precedents will constitute an increasingly intricate body of law governing
sentencing, which must be consulted in addition to the body of law inter-
preting the Guidelines.
33. United States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53, 62 (1st Cir. 2006).
34. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 767.
35. United States v. Kristl, No. 05-1067, 2006 WL 367848, at *2-3 (10th Cir. Feb. 17, 2006);
United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Williams, No. 05-5416,
2006 WL 224067, at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2006); United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th
Cir. 2005); United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Guerrero-




Booker does nothing to eliminate the substantive anomalies associ-
ated with the Guidelines. To be sure, as of this writing, some twenty-
four district courts have used their Booker discretion to refuse to apply
the 100:1 crack-cocaine discrepancy.36 But two courts of appeals have
reversed such decisions.37 Unless other courts of appeals or the Supreme
Court go the other way, or Congress acts, the discrepancy will remain.
D. Sentences Based on Uncharged and Acquitted Conduct
As already noted, Booker does nothing to protect defendants from
receiving enhanced sentences based on judicial findings that they com-
mitted uncharged offenses, or even offenses for which they were acquit-
ted by the jury. A district judge who refused to take uncharged or acquit-
ted conduct into account in calculating the Guidelines range would pre-
sumably be reversed, and whether Booker discretion would extend to a
categorical refusal to enhance sentences based on such conduct is an
open question.
E. Excessive Sentencing
Booker might eventually have the effect of reducing the length of
sentences, for better or worse. Early indications are that district judges
far more often exercise their discretion downward than they do upward.
In the first year of post-Booker sentencing, however, there has been no
change in the average length of sentences.
But consider Judge Paul Cassell's analysis of the problem. He ar-
gues, in an article in the Stanford Law Review, that Guidelines sentences
as a whole reasonably reflect societal judgments regarding appropriate
punishment, and that the most egregious cases of excessive sentences
result not from the Guidelines but from the stacking up of statutory
minimums.38 Judge Cassell recently handed down an opinion sentencing
a defendant to fifty-five years in prison for a first offense of drug distri-
bution while carrying a firearm. Despite his view that the sentence was
grossly excessive, he held that it was required under statutory mini-
mums.3 9 Judge Cassell argues that the best way to reform the sentencing
36. Gary Fields, Judges Show More Lenience on Crack Cocaine, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2006,
at 2A.
37. Pho, 433 F.3d at 64; United States v. Clark, No. 05-4274, 2006 WL 60273 (4th Cir. Jan.
12, 2006); cf United States v. Gipson, 425 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that the district court
did not act unreasonably in applying the 100:1 ratio); but cf United States v. Williams, No. 05-
11594, 2006 WL 68559 (1 1th Cir. Jan. 13, 2006) (affirming below-Guidelines sentence in a crack
case on the basis of the individual circumstances, where the value of the crack involved was $350
and the Guidelines range was 188-235 months imprisonment).
38. Paul G. Cassell, Too Severe?: A Defense Of The Federal Sentencing Guidelines (And A
Critique of Federal Mandatory Minimums), 56 STAN. L. REV. 1017 (2004).
39. United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1261 (D. Utah 2004). The decision was
affirmed by the Tenth Circuit. United States v. Angelos, 433 F.3d 738 (10th Cir. 2006).
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system would be to keep the Guidelines intact, but to repeal all statutory
minimums.
And also consider the politics of sentencing. Prior to Booker, there
was a significant movement for sentencing reform. Such conservative
organizations as the Heritage Foundation, in an effort led by former At-
torney General Edwin W. Meese, and Prison Fellowship, led by Chuck
Colson, have joined more liberal organizations, such as the American
Constitution Society, in efforts to reduce sentences that they consider
excessive. But now, after Booker, attention in Congress has reverted to
whether federal judges have too much discretion and whether they will
be soft on crime. The principal statutory lever Congress has to combat
lenient discretionary sentencing - now that Booker has made the Guide-
lines advisory - is the enactment of more, and more draconian, statutory
minimums. If Judge Cassell is correct that mandatory minimums are the
principal cause of excessive sentencing, and if Congress responds to
Booker by enacting more mandatory minimums, we may have purchased
a small increase in discretion and a marginal amelioration of the Guide-
lines' excesses at the price of exacerbating the worst aspect of the sen-
tencing system.
CONCLUSION
I am inclined to think that a modest increase in the discretion of dis-
trict judges, exercised judiciously, could enhance justice. In this sense, I
welcome the Booker result, even though I cannot endorse its reasoning.
But it was more important to take a serious look at the statutes governing
sentencing. This is a matter for Congress. I fear that Booker, by putting
forward an extravagant claim of constitutional principles coupled with an
anemic and self-contradictory remedy, may have set back the cause of
reform, to relatively little purpose.
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Interpreting recent Supreme Court precedent, the Tenth Circuit in Peo-
ples v. CCA Detention Centers held that a federal prisoner confined in a
privately run prison may not bring a Bivens suit against the employees of
a private prison for violations of his constitutional rights when alterna-
tive state-law causes of action are available. The author first reviews the
Supreme Court's evolving Bivens jurisprudence and turns next to an
overview of the Tenth Circuit's opinion. Third, the author argues that,
despite the Tenth Circuit's new approach, putative constitutional claims
brought under state-law theories of recovery will often be "re-
federalized" producing uniform federal liability rules and federal juris-
diction. The author concludes that should the Supreme Court truly wish
to end the practice of implying causes of action from the Constitution, it
must reconsider a whole host offederal common law and jurisdictional
doctrines-a course of action the Court may find unpalatable.
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INTRODUCTION
In what may become a landmark prisoner's rights ruling, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Peoples v. CCA Deten-
t Lecturer of Law, University of Kansas School of Law. B.A., University of Kansas 1995;
M.A., University of Colorado 1999; J.D., University of Michigan School of Law 2002. 1 am espe-
cially grateful to Jonathon E. Boatman, Esq.; Professor Bridgette Carr; Professor Jack F. Preis; and
Jeffrey L. Stowell, Esq. for their helpful thoughts and comments. Additionally, many thanks are due
to my wife Emily for her editorial help and continual support. I also note that I was employed by the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals when Peoples v. CCA Detention Centers was argued. This article
reveals no confidential information and reflects no one's views but my own.
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tion Centers' held that a federal prisoner confined in pre-trial detention in
a privately run prison operating under contract with the United States
Marshal Service may not bring a Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcot-
ics Agents2 claim against the employees of the federal-contractor prison
for violations of his Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights when alternative
state-law causes of action are available.3 The Peoples case raises several
concerns. As the dissent notes, it is at least questionable whether the
majority opinion: (a) conforms with Supreme Court precedent, (b) prop-
erly rejects the principle of parallelism between prisoner's rights in pub-
licly and privately run prisons, (c) appropriately denigrates the uniform-
ity of federal rights, and (d) deters future constitutional violations in pri-
vately run prisons.4 Moreover, given the growth in the use of privately
run federal prisons,5 decisions such as Peoples, which, absent diversity,
deprive federal prisoner plaintiffs of a federal forum for putative consti-
tutional claims, may well foist portions of the substantial costs of pris-
oner litigation onto the state courts.6 Finally, the Peoples case also raises
the issue of federalization of putative constitutional tort claims, which is
the focus this article.
Many jurists and scholars have leveled challenges to the propriety
of implying federal causes of action directly under the Constitution since
the Supreme Court first decided Bivens.7 Many have argued that imply-
ing the Bivens cause of action directly from the Constitution violates
1. 422 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2005). Indeed, just prior to the publication of this article, the
Fourth Circuit adopted the Tenth Circuit's approach to Bivens actions brought against employees of
privately run federal prisons. Holly v. Scott, No. 05-6287, 2006 WL 60276, at *9 (4th Cir. Jan 12,
2006) (adopting Peoples).
2. 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding that federal agents acting under color of federal law may be
found liable for monetary damages for violations of the Fourth Amendment). Conventionally speak-
ing a Bivens action is the federal equivalent of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. See generally ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 523-44 (2d ed. 1994); SHELDON H. NAHMOD ET AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS 16-22 (1995).
3. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1108.
4. Id. at 1108-13 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
5. See Richard Harding, Private Prisons, 28 CRIME & JUST. 265, 340-41 (2001) (concluding
private prisons will continue to exist and grow in the United States not replacing public prisons, but
competing with them and stimulating improvement of the total prison system); Clifford J. Rosky,
Force, Inc.: The Privatization of Punishment, Policing, and Military Force in Liberal States, 36
CONN. L. REV. 879, 902-03 (2004); Peter J. Duitsman, Comment, The Private Prison Experiment: A
Private Sector Solution to Prison Overcrowding, 76 N.C. L. REV. 2209, 2218 (1998) ("The number
of inmates in private prisons is expected to grow thirty percent per year.").
6. See generally Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1557 (2003)
(discussing the efficacy of the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act in reducing costs of prisoner litigation
in the federal courts).
7. See, e.g., Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring);
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 31-54 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); John C. Jeffries, The Right-
Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 89-90 (1999); Thomas W. Merrill, The
Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 52 (1985); Thomas S. Schrock &
Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Common Law, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1117, 1135-38
(1978). But see Richard H. Fallon & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitu-
tional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1822 (1991) (praising the Court's decision to hold indi-
vidual officers liable for constitutional violations as genius).
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principles of separation of powers.8 Several commentators have noted
that the ability to imply causes of action is simply beyond the powers
conferred upon the federal courts altogether.9 Others have noted a host
of pragmatic concerns that arise from implying causes of action directly
under the Constitution.'l Given these many concerns, the Court has been
loath to expand the scope of the Bivens cause of action since 1980.11
Indeed, the Court's post-1980 Bivens jurisprudence may be fairly charac-
terized as a "slow death" of the implied constitutional cause of action.'
2
In this article, I argue that the Peoples opinion illustrates that the
Court's slow-death approach to the Bivens claim does not attain the goal
of ending federal-court-created liability rules for constitutional torts. I
contend that putative constitutional tort claims brought by federal prison-
ers in privately run prisons under state-law theories of recovery are often
embedded with federal issues capable of conferring a federal liability
rule and federal jurisdiction. I proceed as follows: Part I provides a brief
outline of the Court's slow-death methodology to eliminating the Bivens
cause of action; Part II reviews the opinion in Peoples; and, Part III con-
siders two quandaries lurking in Peoples. First, many putative constitu-
8. In Carlson, Justice Rehnquist states:
In my view, it is 'an exercise of power that the Constitution does not give us' for this
Court to infer a private civil damages remedy from the Eighth Amendment or any other
constitutional provision. The creation of such remedies is a task that is more appropri-
ately viewed as falling within the legislative sphere of authority.
Carlson, 446 U.S. at 34 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 250 (1979)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("[U]ntil Congress legislates otherwise as to employment standards for its
own staffs, judicial power in this area is circumscribed. The Court today encroaches on that bar-
rier."); Merrill, supra note 7, at 19-24 (arguing that inferring causes of action violates the principle
of separation of powers); Schrock & Welsh, supra note 7, at 1127-28 (same).
9. See, e.g., Malesko, 534 U.S. at 75 (Scalia, J., concurring ) ("Bivens is a relic of the heady
days in which this Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of action - decreeing them
to be 'implied' by the mere existence of a statutory or constitutional prohibition."); Schrock &
Welsh, supra note 7, at 1127 (arguing that the power ofjudicial review does not include the power to
infer causes of action).
10. See, e.g., Bivens, 403 U.S. at 411-12 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 428 (Black, J., dis-
senting) (asserting that Bivens would "choke" the courts with lawsuits and prognosticating that a
Bivens remedy would open the door for frivolous suits that would inevitably delay an already slow
path of justice); Jeffries, supra note 7, at 101-02 (arguing that Brown v. Board of Education would
never have been decided if school districts had been subject to money damages and that constitu-
tional rights would have stagnated); Schrock & Welsh, supra note 7, at 1146-71 (considering a
detailed list of "realists" concerns).
11. The Malesko court noted:
In 30 years of Bivens jurisprudence we have extended its holding only twice, to provide
an otherwise nonexistent cause of action against individual officers alleged to have acted
unconstitutionally, or to provide a cause of action for a plaintiff who lacked any alterna-
tive remedy for harms caused by an individual officer's unconstitutional conduct.
Malesko, 534 U.S. at 70.
12. See generally Matthew G. Mazefsky, Note, Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko:
Unmasking the Implied Damage Remedy, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 639, 661-62 (2003) (concluding that
Malesko marks the final throws of the cause of action implied directly under the Constitution);
Mariana Claridad Pastore, Comment, Running From the Law: Federal Contractors Escape Bivens
Liability, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850, 867-69 (2002) (same); Andrea Robeda, Note, The Death of
Implied Causes ofAction: The Supreme Court's Recent Bivens Jurisprudence and the Effect on State
Constitutional Tort Jurisprudence: Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 33 N.M. L. REV. 401
(2003) (same).
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tional torts pursued as state-law claims may be subject to preemption
under the government contractor doctrine, which provides a federal li-
ability rule and an avenue back to federal court. Second, many putative
constitutional claims that are filed under state-law theories of recovery
will incorporate a constitutional rule as the standard of care, which is
sufficient under the "necessary construction test" to gain federal subject
matter jurisdiction. Finally, I argue that the Court's slow-death approach
to the Bivens cause of action achieves its goal of ending the era of im-
plied constitutional causes of action in form only. In substance, many of
these putative constitutional actions will be "re-federalized." I conclude
that, if the Court truly wishes to end "the heady days in which [it] as-
sumed common-law powers to create causes of action,"1 3 it must recon-
sider a much broader scope of jurisdictional and federal common law
doctrines; a prospect it may find unattractive.
I. THE SLOW DEATH OF BIVENS V. SIX UNKNOWN FEDERAL NARCOTICS
AGENTS
14
In Bivens, the Supreme Court held that a "violation of [the Fourth
Amendment] by a federal agent acting under color of his authority gives
rise to a cause of action for damages consequent upon his unconstitu-
tional conduct."'15  Mr. Bivens had alleged that federal agents, under
color of federal law, illegally restrained him, searched his home, and
arrested him.' 6 The lower courts dismissed Mr. Bivens' action, agreeing
with the defendants' argument that Mr. Bivens' proper remedy lay in a
state-law trespass claim.'
7 The Supreme Court reversed.1
8
The Bivens Court rejected the notion that the protections afforded
under the Fourth Amendment are strictly co-extensive to those found
under state law.' 9 Indeed, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment is
an independent check upon federal power consistently applied through-
out the country, which "is not tied to the niceties of local trespass
laws."20  Moreover, the Court held that the interests protected under
state-law trespass and invasion of privacy doctrines and those interests
protected under the Fourth Amendment may be inconsistent with, or
even hostile to, each other.2 1 For example, the Court noted that to bring a
state-law trespass claim the plaintiff must show that he did not allow the
13. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 75 (Scalia, J., concurring).
14. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). For a fuller discussion of the Bivens cause of action, Professor
Chemerinsky provides a thorough review. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 523-44.
15. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.
16. Id.
17. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 409 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1969); Bivens v.
Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 276 F. Supp. 12 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
18. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 390.
19. Id. at 392-94.
20. Id. at 393-94.
21. Id. at 394.
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defendant into the home. 22 But the Court reasoned that an officer "who
demands admission under a claim of federal authority stands in a far dif-
ferent position" from the typical trespasser.23 As a result, the Court con-
cluded that, in most cases, a mere invocation of authority by a federal
official will cause the average citizen to allow the official access to the
home, rendering trespass doctrine an ineffective remedy against abuses
of federal power.24
Finally, the Court held that the provision of monetary damages was
the appropriate remedy for a violation of Fourth Amendment rights.25
The Court acknowledged that it lacked a statutory basis for providing
this remedy and that "the Fourth Amendment does not in so many words
provide for its enforcement by an award of money damages for the con-
sequences of its violation."26  Nevertheless, the Court held that it could
imply such a cause of action directly from the Constitution when three
conditions were met. First, the implication is appropriate when there is a
federal statute (viz., 42 U.S.C. § 1983) granting a general right to sue for
constitutional violations.27 Second, the implication is appropriate when
there are no special factors counseling hesitation, such as making a claim
upon the federal fisc, weighing against extending a cause of action.28
Third, the implication is appropriate when there is no explicit congres-
sional declaration stating that money damages may not be awarded for
constitutional violations caused by federal agents.29
Despite the expansive language in Bivens itself, the Court has held
that a Bivens action lies against federal officers for money damages on
only two other occasions.30 In Davis v. Passman,31 the Court held that
plaintiff could bring a cause of action for monetary damages for viola-
tions of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.32 In Carlson v.
Green,33 the Court held that a federal claim lies against federal prison
officials for violations of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of
the Eighth Amendment.34
22. Id. at 394.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 395.
26. Id. at 396.
27. Id. (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)). What the Court means by "general
right to sue" in this context is far from clear. Section 1983 is limited to actions against state offi-
cials. See, e.g., Wheedlin v. Wheller, 373 U.S. 647, (1963) (holding federal agents are not liable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Thus, at the time Bivens was decided there was not a general right to sue
federal agents for constitutional violations, merely a general right to sue state agents.
28. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396.
29. Id. at 396-97.
30. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
31. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
32. Id. at 243-44.
33. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
34. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 20.
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Faced with a series of rebukes concerning the appropriateness of
implying causes of action directly under the Constitution, the Court,
since Carlson, has restricted the scope of Bivens claims.35 In Chappell v.
Wallace,36 issued just three years after Carlson, the Court refused to hear
a Bivens action brought by military personnel who, lacking any remedy,
alleged that the unconstitutional actions of their superior officers injured
them.37 Harkening to the limitations upon implying causes action first
laid out in Bivens itself,38 the Court held that a special factor counseled
hesitation in hearing a Bivens claim in such circumstances: namely "the
unique disciplinary structure of the Military Establishment and Congress'
activity in the field., 39 The Court, in United States v. Stanley,40 later
reaffirmed that a Bivens action is unavailable against members of the
military "whenever the injury arises out of activity 'incident to [military]
service.'"41
In addition to refusing to hear military claims, the Court now
broadly allows Congress to create alternative federal remedies to a
Bivens action.42 In Bush v. Lucas,4 3 the Court declined to hear a Bivens
claim alleging First Amendment violations brought by government em-
ployees when they had access to alternative "comprehensive procedural
and substantive provisions giving meaningful remedies against the
United States."44 Relying on the notion, introduced in Passman45 and
Carlson,46 that Congress can create alternative remedies to a Bivens
claim, the Bush Court ruled that the congressionally installed administra-
tive system could supplant a Bivens cause of action.47 The Bush Court,
however, went one step further than the Passman and Carlson decisions.
In Passman and Carlson, the Court reasoned that alternative congres-
sionally created remedies to a Bivens action were acceptable as long as
they were "viewed as equally effective" to a Bivens claim. 48 The Court
in Bush, by contrast, found a congressionally created alternative remedy
sufficient to bar a Bivens action, even though the administrative
scheme's "remedies do not provide complete relief for the plaintiff, '49
35. See cases cited supra note 7.
36. 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
37. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 303-04.
38. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396 (citing "no special factors counseling hesitation").
39. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304.
40. 483 U.S. 669 (1987).
41. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 681 (citing the "incident to service" test from Feres v. United States,
340 U.S. 135, 144 (1950)).
42. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
43. 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
44. Bush, 462 U.S. at 367.
45. Passman, 442 U.S. at 248.
46. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18-20.
47. Bush, 462 U.S. at 386.
48. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 19; Passman, 442 U.S. at 248.
49. Bush, 462 U.S. at 388. See also David C. Nutter, Note, Two Approaches to Determine
Whether an Implied Cause of Action Under the Constitution is Necessary: The Changing Scope of
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so long as Congress "provide[d] meaningful remedies." 50 Following this
same tack, the Court in Schweiker v. Chilicky51 barred Bivens claims filed
by disabled social security beneficiaries who lacked monetary relief for
emotional distress due to delays in receiving their Social Security bene-
fits. 52 As in Bush, the Court relied upon Congress' creation of alterna-
tive, although not equivalent, administrative relief to prohibit the Bivens
claim. 3
The Court further limited who may be a proper defendant in a
Bivens action in FDIC v. Meyer.54 Here, the Court held that the logic of
Bivens itself-which is founded upon individual, not agency, liabil-
ity--does not support hearing Bivens claims against federal agencies.5 5
The Meyer Court concluded that "[i]f we were to recognize a direct ac-
tion for damages against federal agencies, we would be creating a poten-
tially enormous financial burden for the Federal Government. 5 6 As the
Bivens Court itself held that such a result should counsel hesitation in
implying a cause of action directly under the Constitution, 7 the Meyer
Court took this potential fiscal impact as a ground for barring a Bivens
claim.
58
Although the Court has spent fifteen years chipping away at the
edges of the Bivens cause of action, prior to Correctional Services Cor-
poration v. Malesko,59 the following generalizations could be made about
the Court's Bivens jurisprudence. First, a Bivens claim was considered a
free-standing, generally implied, cause of action independent of state
law.60  Second, the Court considered it fundamental that federally em-
ployed agents be subject to uniform rules, be it under Bivens or a con-
gressionally created alternative for constitutional violations.61 Third, a
the Bivens Action, 19 GA. L. REV. 683, 694 (1985) (contending that after Davis and Carlson the
Court abandoned the "equally effective" approach).
50. Bush, 462 U.S. at 386.
51. 487 U.S. 412 (1988).
52. Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 424-25.
53. Id. at 429 ("Congress... has addressed the problems created by state agencies' wrongful
termination of disability benefits" through the creation of administrative remedies).
54. 510 U.S. 471 (1994).
55. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 473.
56. Id. at 486 (internal citation omitted).
57. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396 (noting that in the instant case, "we are not dealing with a ques-
tion of 'federal fiscal policy .... '").
58. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 486.
59. 534 U.S. 61 (2001).
60. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392-94; Robeda, supra note 12, at 405; Pastore, supra note 12, at 854;
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 526-31. At least one commentator finds that a Bivens remedy is still
"generally" available post-Malesko. See Erwin Chemerinsky & Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1983
Litigation: Supreme Court Review, A Round Table Dialogue, 19 TOURO L. REV. 625, 678 (2003)
(Professor Chemerinsky asserting: "[A]lthough the Court is continuing to narrow Bivens, it is not
overruling or signaling an overruling of Bivens. The core of Bivens is that if a federal officer violates
a constitutional right, there is generally a remedy available. That has not been overturned.").
61. See Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 424-29 (finding uniform and comprehensive administrative
relief available); Bush, 462 U.S. at 368 (same); Carlson, 446 U.S. at 23 ("the liability of federal
officials for violations of citizens' constitutional rights should be governed by uniform rules.");
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Bivens claim could only be brought against individual defendants-not
agencies of the federal government.62 Fourth, although the Court had
only explicitly approved of Bivens actions for violations of the Fourth
Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, the
courts of appeals considered the Bivens action generally available for any
constitutional violation.63 Fifth, a Bivens action was not appropriate
when Congress provided meaningful, alternative forms of relief, even if
that relief did not provide plaintiffs with complete satisfaction. 64 Finally,
Bivens claims were precluded in the absence of affirmative action by
Congress when there were special factors counseling hesitation.65 These
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 393-94 (holding that the Fourth Amendment "is not tied to the niceties of local
trespass laws.").
62. See Meyer, 510 U.S. at 471. Some consider this focus upon individual liability an ingen-
ius means of skirting sovereign immunity and like doctrine. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 7, at 1822
(praising the Court's decision to hold individual officers liable for constitutional violations as gen-
ius). Others, however, see this focus on individual liability as little more than form over substance.
See Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public Officials'Individ-
ual Liability Under Bivens, 88 GEO. L. J. 65-7 (1999) (arguing that as a result of governmental
indemnification and government-provided defense individuals are not in practice liable under
Bivens). Given that the Department of Justice's Constitutional and Specialized Tort Branch is de-
voted to defending federal officers against Bivens suits at public expense, Pillard's point is a strong
one. See http://www.usdoj.gov/civil/brochure/brochure.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2006). Moreover,
the key premise of the Meyer decision-that individual, not agency, liability is the key to deter-
rence-runs contrary to the fundamental tort principle of respondeat superior, as well as common
sense. Compare Meyer, 510 U.S. at 485 ("It must be remembered that the purpose of Bivens is to
deter the officer.") with DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 907 (2000) (considering, in the context
of justifying the respondeat superior rule, that "the best deterrence is to impose liability upon the
employer, who will then seek to avoid his own liability by exercising his considerable control over
employees to discourage their torts.").
63. See Carlson 446 U.S. at 23 (Eighth Amendment); Passman, 442 U.S. at 228 (Fifth
Amendment); Bivens, 403 U.S. at 388 (Fourth Amendment). The lower courts, however, have heard
Bivens claims for a broader set of constitutional violations. See, e.g., Switzer v. Coan, 261 F.3d 985,
990 (10th Cir. 2001) ("Plaintiffs allegations of unconstitutional delegation of Article III authority to
law clerks and staff attorneys in pro se proceedings would appear to state [a Bivens] claim."); Ruff v.
Runyon, 258 F.3d 498, 499 (6th Cir. 2001) (remanding a Ninth Amendment Bivens claim);
Hammond v. Kunard, 148 F.3d 692, 694-95 (7th Cir. 1998) (upholding a Sixth Amendment Bivens
claim against a qualified immunity challenge); National Commodity and Barter Ass'n v. Archer, 31
F.3d 1521, 1527 (10th Cir. 1994) ("We likewise hold that if claims of violations of First ...
Amendment rights are proven, then a Bivens remedy may be afforded to the plaintiffs for recovery of
damages for such constitutional wrongs.").
64. See Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 424-29; Bush, 462 U.S. at 368, 386-88. This alternative
remedy doctrine raises many issues, which are beyond the scope of this article but worthy of note.
See, e.g., Susan Brandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 SO. CAL. L. REV.
289 (1995) (arguing that Bivens stands for the proposition that judicial enforcement of constitutional
rights through monetary damages should not depend on action by Congress); Betsy J. Grey, Preemp-
tion of Bivens Claims: How Clearly Must Congress Speak?, 70 WASH. U. L. Q. 1087 (1992) (argu-
ing that Bivens actions are available except where Congress clearly states its intent to supersede
them); Gene R. Nichol, Bivens, Chilicky, and Constitutional Damages Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 1117,
1129 (1989) ("It is surprising, as I have indicated, that Bivens decisions, while employing the form
of constitutional interpretation, concede a willingness to be reversed by Congress"); Walter E.
Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1552-53
(1972) ("[W]here the judiciary independently infers remedies directly from constitutional provisions,
Congress may legislate an alternative remedial scheme which it considers equally effective in en-
forcing the Constitution and which the Court, in the process of judicial review, deems an adequate
substitute for the displaced remedy.").
65. See Nichol, supra note 64, at 1142-53 (critiquing the Court's "special factors" approach).
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factors included: (a) potential direct claims upon the federal fiSC; 6 6 and
(b) the potential to interfere with the unique nature of the military.67
The Supreme Court's recent Malesko decision may further limit the
general availability of the Bivens action dramatically.68 Mr. Malesko, a
federal prisoner living in a privately run halfway house, had a heart con-
dition that entitled him to use the elevator to access his fifth floor room
despite the general policy requiring inmates to use the stairs. 69 One eve-
ning upon his return, an employee of the halfway house required him to
climb the stairs, which resulted in Mr. Malesko suffering a heart attack.70
Mr. Malseko then brought a Bivens suit alleging Eighth Amendment
violations against the halfway house, which was run by a private corpo-
ration under contract with the United States Bureau of Prisons.71 The
Court held that such a suit could not be brought against federal contrac-
tors who operate prisons, providing three rationales for its decision.72
First, the Court stated that the purpose of a Bivens action is to deter
individual federal officers from committing constitutional violations-
73not governmental agencies or corporate entities. Relying heavily on
Meyer, the Court held that "threat of suit against an individual's em-
ployer was not the kind of deterrence contemplated by Bivens.' '74 Rea-
soning by analogy to Meyer, the Malesko Court stated that if corporate
defendants were available for suit under Bivens, prisoner plaintiffs would
focus their suits against the corporate employer and not the individual
directly responsible for the injury.75 The Court concluded that the logic
of Meyer foreclosed hearing a Bivens action against a corporate entity.76
While this no-entity-liability principle was seemingly sufficient to
decide the case, the Court went on to provide two more rationales for its
decision. 77 The second factor provided by the Malesko Court as ground-
66. Meyer, 5 10 U.S. at 486; Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396.
67. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
The courts of appeals have relied upon several other special factors to bar a Bivens action. See, e.g.,
Beattie v. Boeing Co., 43 F.3d 559, 563 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that "that the predominant issue of
national security clearances amounts to such a special factor counseling against recognition of a
Bivens claim in this case.").
68. See, e.g., Mazefsky, supra note 12 (concluding that Malesko marks the final throws of the
cause of action implied directly under the Constitution); Robeda, supra note 12 (same); Pastore,
supra note 12 (same). But see Chemerinsky & Schwartz, supra note 60, at 678 (stating that Malesko
does not overrule the core holding of Bivens).
69. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 64.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 63.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 71.
74. Id at 70; see also Meyer, 510 U.S. at 485 ("If we were to imply a damages action directly
against federal agencies.. . there would be no reason for aggrieved parties to bring damages actions
against individual officers. [T]he deterrent effects of the Bivens remedy would be lost.").
75. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 71.
76. Id.
77. There is a strong argument to be had that these following two rationales, then, are merely
obiter dicta.
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ing for its ruling was the need to maintain parity between the remedies
afforded prisoners at privately operated facilities and those at govern-
ment-operated facilities (the "symmetry principle").78 Thus, the Court
rejected Mr. Malesko's Bivens claim against the private prison, at least in
part, because federal prisoners incarcerated in federally run facilities do
not have plaintiff's contemplated remedy. 79 That is to say, because fed-
eral prisoners in government-run facilities may not bring a Bivens suit
against the guard's employer (i.e., the United States or the Bureau of
Prisons) federal prisoners in privately run prisons may not bring Bivens
suits against their corporate jailors. 80 If such an asymmetry is to be im-
posed, the Court reasoned that Congress was better positioned to impose
it.
8 '
Finally, the Court reasoned that the existence of alternative reme-
dies precluded a Bivens claim (the "alternative-relief principle").8 2 The
Court pointed to two alternative remedies available to Mr. Malesko. 3
The Court first stated, unexceptionally given its prior case law in Bush
and Chilicky, that the possibility of administrative relief within the Bu-
reau of Prisons (i.e., alternative, congressionally created, administrative
relief) precludes a Bivens claim.8 4 In a move that was quite exceptional
given its rulings in Bivens and Carlson which reject the notion that state
torts sufficiently protect constitutional interests, the Court stated that Mr.
Malesko's claim was quintessentially one for negligence and, thus, a
state-law tort claim was available to remedy his constitutional claim.8 5
The Court's over-determination of its holding in Malesko has only
fostered confusion. Even assuming each Malesko factor (i.e., the no-
entity-liability principle, the symmetry principle, and the alternative-
relief principle) is sufficient standing alone to bar a Bivens claim, 86 the
Malesko decision raises the further question of whether the existence of
alternative federal remedies, alternative state-law remedies, or both
78. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 71-72.
79. Id. at71.
80. Id. at 72.
81. Id.
82. Id. (finding that Mr. Malesko was not "confronted with a situation in which claimants in
[his] shoes lack effective remedies.").
83. Id. at 72-74.
84. Id. at 74; see also 28 C.F.R. § 542.10; Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 413 (holding that the exis-
tence of alternative federal remedies is sufficient, standing alone, to bar a Bivens suit); Bush, 462
U.S. at 368 (same).
85. Compare Malesko, 534 U.S. at 73 with Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 23 (1980) ("the
liability of federal officials for violations of citizens' constitutional rights should be governed by
uniform rules.") and Bivens, 403 U.S. at 393-94 (holding that the Fourth Amendment "is not tied to
the niceties of local trespass laws.").
86. There are good reasons to make this assumption. See Meyer, 510 U.S. at 484-85 (holding
that the no-entity-liability principle, standing alone, is sufficient to bar a Bivens action); Schweiker,
487 U.S. at 421 (holding that the federal alternative relief principle, standing alone, is sufficient to
bar a Bivens action); Bush, 462 U.S. at 388-90 (same).
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barred Mr. Malesko's Bivens claim. 87 If Malesko, properly understood,
endorses the view that the existence of a state-law remedy standing alone
precludes a Bivens action against a private defendant, then the Malesko
Court has radically departed from its past Bivens jurisprudence.88 This
issue is of particular importance in Bivens suits against employees of
privately run federal prisons because in such suits Malesko's no-entity-
liability principle and the symmetry principle are inapposite. 89  More-
over, given that the Bureau of Prisons' administrative remedies are avail-
able only to persons under its authority, 90 a suit brought by a federal pre-
trial detainee who is under the authority of the U.S. Marshal Service
would test whether the existence of a state-law remedy standing alone
forecloses a Bivens action against employees of a federal contractor run-
ning a private prison.
II. PEOPLES V. CCA DETENTION CENTERS9'
The Tenth Circuit faced just such a perfect storm of facts in Peo-
ples. In a case of first impression in the federal courts of appeals post
Malesko,92 the Tenth Circuit held that the existence of a state-law remedy
87. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 72 (presenting both sets of alternative remedies as grounds for
barring a Bivens claim).
88. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text. Indeed, prior to Malesko, the Courts of
Appeals regularly heard Bivens claims against private defendants acting under color of federal law
without a determination that plaintiff lacked a state-law alternative remedy. See, e.g., Vector Re-
search, Inc. v. Howard & Howard Attorneys P.C., 76 F.3d 692, 698 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that a
Bivens claim may be brought against a private actor if the defendant was acting under color of fed-
eral law); Schowengerdt v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 823 F.2d 1328, 1337 (9th Cir. 1987) (same);
Reuber v. United States, 750 F.2d 1039, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (same); Dobyns v. E-Systems, Inc.,
667 F.2d 1219, 1222-23 (5th Cir. 1982) (same); Heinrich ex rel. Heinrich v. Sweet, 62 F. Supp. 2d
282, 308 (D. Mass. 1999) (same). The First Circuit, pre-Malesko, appears to assume that such an
action is appropriate. See Gerena v. Puerto Rico Legal Serv., Inc., 697 F.2d 447, 449 (1st Cir. 1983).
Prior to Malesko, three courts of appeals had declined to answer whether a plaintiff may assert a
Bivens claim against a private actor. See DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger Silas Mason Co., Inc., 844
F.2d 714, 720 n.5 (10th Cir. 1988); Morast v. Lance, 807 F.2d 926, 930-31 n.5 (11th Cir. 1987);
McNally v. Pulitzer Publ'g Co., 532 F.2d 69, 75-76 (8th Cir. 1976). Notably, prior to Malesko, only
the First Circuit, in dicta, had stated that "[w]hile federal officers may, at times, be subject to suit for
unconstitutional behavior... there is no cause of action against private parties acting under color of
federal law or custom." Fletcher v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 496 F.2d 927, 932 n.8 (1st
Cir. 1974). As is illustrated above, however, the First Circuit appeared to reject this dicta by 1983.
See Gerena, 697 F.2d at 449. In any event, no circuit predicated the existence of a Bivens claim
upon the absence of a state-law remedy.
89. This question was specifically reserved by the Court. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 65 ("the
parties agree that the question whether a Bivens action might lie against a private individual is not
presented here."). In fact, both parties to the Malesko case assumed that a Bivens action would lie
against employees of privately run prisons, which may have affected the Court's decision. See Brief
of Petitioner, Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) (No. 00-860), 2001 WL 53566, at
* 13; Brief of Respondent, Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) (No. 00-860), 2001
WL 883679 at *8, *12.
90. 28 C.F.R. § 542.10 (2001) (Bureau of Prisons administrative remedies "do[ ] not apply to
inmates confined in other non-federal facilities").
91. 422 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2005).
92. But see Agyeman v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 390 F.3d 1101, 1104 (9th Cir. 2004) (assuming
in dicta that plaintiff may bring a Bivens claim against a guard at a privately run, federal, pretrial,
detention center); Sanusi v. INS, 100 Fed. Appx. 49, 52 n.3 (2d Cir. 2004) (unpublished) (remanding
the question). Two District Courts have substantively addressed the issue. See Sarro v. Cornell
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standing alone forecloses a Bivens action against employees of a federal
contractor running a private prison.
93
Peoples is a consolidated appeal combining two suits, both brought
pro se by Mr. Peoples in the District of Kansas.94 In the first case ("Peo-
ples T'), 95 Mr. Peoples brought a Bivens claim alleging that, while being
held in pretrial detention, staff at the privately run prison failed to protect
him from other inmates after he repeatedly requested protection.96 As a
result of the staff's failure to protect him, Mr. Peoples contends that other
inmates beat him with padlocks, chains, and full soda cans.97 Mr. Peo-
ples clearly states an Eighth Amendment violation sufficient to survive a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion if he has a means of
bringing the cause of action.98  Under the Eighth Amendment, prison
officials have an obligation to protect prisoners from attack by other
prisoners.99 As the Supreme Court has held, a "prison official's 'deliber-
ate indifference' to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate vio-
lates the Eighth Amendment." 100  As such, if Mr. Peoples had been
housed in a government-run prison, these allegations would have given
rise to a Bivens claim. 0' The district court in Peoples I reasoned, how-
ever, that because Mr. Peoples was housed in a privately run facility and
a state-law tort claim was available, Malesko precluded a Bivens ac-
Corrs., Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d 52, 63 (D.R.I. 2003) (holding that existence of a state-law remedy
standing alone does not foreclose a Bivens action against employees of a federal contractor running a
private prison); see also Jama v. INS, 343 F. Supp. 2d 338, 362 (D.N.J. 2004) (adopting Sarro). At
the time this article was written, there apparently was no scholarly treatment of this issue.
93. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1103 ("Therefore, we will not imply a Bivens cause of action for a
prisoner held in a private prison facility when we conclude that there exists an alternative cause of
action arising under ... state ... law against the individual defendant for the harm created by the
constitutional deprivation.").
94. Id. at 1093. Mr. Peoples did obtain counsel for his appeal of Peoples L
95. Peoples v. CCA Detention Ctrs., No. Civ.A. 03-3129-KHV, 2004 WL 74317 (D. Kan.
Jan. 15, 2004) (Vratil, J.) (unpublished) [hereinafter Peoples 1].
96. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1093-94.
97. Id. at 1094.
98. The court notes that because Mr. Peoples is a pretrial detainee, his claim is technically a
Fifth Amendment due process claim. Id. at 1094 n. 1. Nevertheless, because the standard is the same
under either the Fifth or Eighth Amendment, the court, for ease of reference, refers to this failure to
protect claim as an Eighth Amendment violation. Id. I follow the court in this regard.
99. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (citation omitted, alteration omitted). For
the purposes of this article, I will assume that federal contractors, and their employees, act under
color of federal law when operating a federal prison. See Rosborough v. Mngt. & Training Corp.,
350 F.3d 459, 460-61 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding, in light of Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S.
61, 72n.5 (2001) and Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 413 (1997) (holding that a 42 U.S.C. §
1983 plaintiff may sue privately employed prison guards because they are state actors operating
under color of state law). Neither the Tenth Circuit nor the District Courts in Peoples address the
element of acting under color of federal law. But given the strong parallels between a Bivens and §
1983 action, there is good reason to believe that these courts would apply the Fifth Circuit's Rosbor-
ough approach in the Bivens context.
100. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828.
101. See, e.g., Benefield v. McDowall, 241 F.3d 1267 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that deliberate
exposure of federal inmate housed in a federally run penitentiary to risk of harm at hands of other
inmates violates the Eighth Amendment giving rise to a Bivens claim).
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tion 10 2 The district court, therefore, dismissed the claim for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction.
In the second case ("Peoples i/,),'03 Mr. Peoples alleged three
Bivens claims.' 4 The first claim arose out of the thirteen months he
spent in administrative segregation on the direct order of the Marshal
Service, who considered him a flight risk. 05 Mr. Peoples did not receive
written notice of the reason for his segregation upon his request and he
was not allowed a hearing on his segregation status for five months,
which he contended violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights.1
0 6
Mr. Peoples also alleged that while in segregation he lacked sufficient
access to legal materials and that his phone calls to his attorney were
monitored, both of which he contended violated his due process rights.'0 7
The district court in Peoples II rejected the notion that Malesko bars a
Bivens suit against employees of a privately run prison, but nevertheless
dismissed all three due process claims on the merits for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.1
0 8
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit first held that the Peoples I district
court erred in treating as jurisdictional the issue of whether the existence
of a state-law relief precludes a Bivens action.'0 9 The circuit relied pri-
marily on Bell v. Hood l in its jurisdictional analysis."' In Bell, the
Supreme Court held that complaints seeking to recover directly under the
Constitution raise a federal question sufficient to ground subject matter
jurisdiction, excepting two scenarios. 12  The Tenth Circuit concluded
that neither exception set forth in Bell applied."13  First, the court as-
sumed without discussion that the Peoples complaints were not artfully
pleaded merely to gain federal jurisdiction. 14 Second, the court quickly
dispensed with the notion that Mr. Peoples' complaints were insubstan-
tial." 5 The court concluded, then, that Bell directly controlled and ad-
102. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1094.
103. Peoples v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. 02-3298, 2004 WL 2278667 (D. Kan. Mar. 26, 2004)
(Murgia, J.) (unpublished) [hereinafter Peoples 11].
104. Id. at *1.
105. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1094.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1095.
109. Id. at 1095-96. Judge Ebel, who generally dissents from the majority's opinion, concurs
in this aspect of the majority's decision. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1108 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
110. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
111. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1095.
112. Bell, 327 U.S. at 681-82.
113. See Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1096.
114. Id. at 1095 (holding that complaints that "clearly appear[ ] to be immaterial or made solely
for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction" should be dismissed under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction).
115. Id. at 1095 (discussing insubstantiality of the complaint); see also Bell, 327 U.S. at 682-
83 (holding that complaints that are "wholly insubstantial and frivolous" should be dismissed under
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
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monished litigants not to conflate the lack of a cause of action with lack
of federal subject matter jurisdiction."
6
Next, the Tenth Circuit held "that there is no implied private right of
action for damages under Bivens against employees of a private prison
for alleged constitutional deprivations when alternative state ... causes
of action for damages are available to the plaintiff."'"17 The circuit rec-
ognized that this holding was in tension with the Supreme Court's Carl-
son decision.18 Nevertheless, by adopting something akin to a last-in-
time rule, which may be a questionable interpretive tool,' 19 the Tenth
Circuit reasoned that given the Supreme Court's evolving Bivens juris-
prudence it was most prudent to resolve ambiguities among the Court's
decisions by relying upon its most recent pronouncements on the topic
made in Malesko.120 The circuit concluded that "the purpose of Bivens is
only 'to provide an otherwise nonexistent cause of action against indi-
vidual officers alleged to have acted unconstitutionally [as in Carlson],
or to provide a cause of action for a plaintiff who lacked any alternative
remedy [as in Davis].' ' 121 As a consequence, the Tenth Circuit held that
the existence of an alternative state-law remedy bars a Bivens claim
against employees of federal contractors.
122
The court next turns its attention, sua sponte, to the existence of al-
ternative state-law claims for Mr. Peoples' Bivens suits.123 First, it holds
that Mr. Peoples could have brought his Eighth Amendment, failure-to-
protect claim under Kansas common law as prison guards owe a duty of
reasonable care to safeguard a prisoner in their custody from attack by
116. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1095-96 n3. See also Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction and
Merits, 80 WASH. L. REv. 643, 643 (2005) (arguing that federal courts err by treating factual ele-
ments of substantive federal causes of action, such as an interstate commerce or employee numer-
ousity requirement, as going to the jurisdiction of the federal court). Although a full discussion of
this issue is beyond the scope of this article, there is reason to think that the Tenth Circuit's jurisdic-
tional analysis is wrong-headed given its case-by-case implication approach. Here, the court dis-
misses Mr. Peoples' claims without considering the merits of his claim or the merits of an affirma-
tive defense. The dismissal of Mr. Peoples' claims walk and talk like a common law plea in abate-
ment not a demurrer, corresponding more to a FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) motion than to a FED. R. CIV.
P. 12(b)(6). Cf Wasserman, supra, at 649-53 (discussing the "first phase" of litigation where juris-
dictional questions are properly addressed).
117. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1101.
118. Id.
119. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) ("[I]t is [the Supreme] Court's preroga-
tive alone to overrule one of its precedents.").
120. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1102.
121. Id. at 1101 (quoting Malesko, 534 U.S. at 70). It is worth noting that the Tenth Circuit
chose not to refer to this text from Malesko as a holding, but rather referenced it as "statements."
This suggests, perhaps, that even the Tenth Circuit considers Malesko's presentation of the alterna-
tive-remedy principle as obiter dicta. Nevertheless, from the Tenth Circuit's point of view, the status
of this rationale as dicta is immaterial. See Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214, 217 (10th Cir.
1996) ("[T]his court considers itself bound by Supreme Court dicta almost as firmly as by the
Court's outright holdings, particularly when the dicta is recent and not enfeebled by later state-
ments.").
122. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1101.
123. Id. at 1103.
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other inmates.1 24 The court then considers Mr. Peoples' Fifth Amend-
ment, monitoring-of-his-phone-conversations claim. 125  The Tenth Cir-
cuit again concludes that a Kansas cause of action, this time implied
from criminal statutory prohibitions, exists to remedy the alleged in-
jury. 126 The court then dismissed both claims for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted because Mr. Peoples had alternative
state-law causes of action.1
27
The Tenth Circuit cryptically treats Mr. Peoples two remaining
Fifth Amendment claims (viz., improperly being held in segregation and
inadequate access to the courts). The court states that it "need not even
look to state law causes of action because we agree with the District
Court that Mr. Peoples's allegations ... do not rise to the level of a con-
stitutional violation.' 28  The court then proceeds to consider these
Bivens claims on their constitutional merits and dismisses them under
Rule 12(b)(6). 129 The court, however, does not state whether an alterna-
tive state-law cause of action exists for these claims nor does it state
whether these Bivens claims, although failing on the merits, were appro-
priately brought as Bivens actions.1 30 One suspects that the Tenth Circuit
took this approach precisely because Kansas law does not provide an
alternative tort remedy for these Fifth Amendment violations. 3' While
this lack of clarity does not offer direction to future litigants or the lower
courts, it appears fair to summarize the court's holding as producing a
doctrine where Bivens suits must be reviewed claim-by-claim to deter-
mine whether an alternative state-law action is available. Under this
regime, Bivens claims without a state-law analogue will (presumably) be
legitimately filed and proceed to an on-the-merits review, while Bivens
claims with a state-law analogue should be dismissed for failure to state a
claim. 132
124. Id. at 1104 (quoting Washington v. State, 839 P.2d 555, 559 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992)).
125. Id. at 1105.
126. Id. at 1107-08 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4001 to -4002 (2005)); Kan. Op. Atty.
Gen. No. 93-93 (1993)).
127. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1105; see also id. at 1108.
128. Id. at 1105.
129. Id.
130. See id. at 1113 (Ebel, J., dissenting) (discussing this point).
131. Proving a negative is always difficult, but the author of this article diligently searched for
an alternative Kansas remedy to the improper administrative detention and inadequate access to the
courts claims against a private actor. The closest conceivable action to the administrative detention
claim would be a false imprisonment claim. See Brown v. State, 927 P.2d 938, 940 (Kan. 1996)
(providing elements of false imprisonment). The author was unable to unearth a Kansas-law ana-
logue to the access to the courts claim.
132. The dissent strongly critiques this approach. "Thus, what we have here under the majority
opinion is a framework where some, but not all, due process violations should be brought as Bivens
actions and some should be brought as state-law tort suits." Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1113 (Ebel, J.,
dissenting). Such an approach is "an intensely fact-driven endeavor," id. at 1112, that is inappropri-
ate given that the doctrinal inquiry here is whether a cause of action exists, providing "yet another
reason why the majority's reasoning is flawed." Id. at 1113.
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Assuming that the Peoples court 133 correctly reads Malesko to com-
mand this result, the Tenth Circuit faces a prima facie Supremacy Clause
problem. 134  Under the traditional understanding of a Bivens claim as a
free-standing cause of action independent of state law, 135 it could appear
that the circuit has employed a "reverse preemption" doctrine whereby a
state-law claim preempts a federal Bivens claim. That it to say, one
could read Peoples as holding that the plaintiff had two Bivens claims
that were preempted by the existence of Kansas tort claims. Of course,
such a reverse preemption theory is doctrinal heresy.1
36
While the court does not address this issue directly, the better read-
ing of Peoples illustrates that the Tenth Circuit avoids this prima facie
Supremacy Clause problem. The court achieves this result by implicitly
rejecting the traditional understanding of the Bivens claim. 137 Instead of
viewing Bivens as implied generally, the circuit views Bivens actions as
implied claim-by-claim. This understanding is first evidenced during the
court's claim-by-claim analysis of whether analogous state-law actions
exist. The court concludes each of these analyses by rendering a claim-
specific ruling on whether to imply a Bivens cause of action. 138  This
claim-by-claim approach is further evidenced during the court's discus-
sion of the Malesko symmetry principle. 139 The Tenth Circuit recognizes
that under its ruling federal prisoners incarcerated in privately run pris-
ons lack a remedy (i.e., a Bivens suit against individual officers) that is
available to federal prisoners held in government-run facilities. 140 While
recognizing this as violating Malesko's symmetry principle, the court
states, "it was not created by this decision."'14' "An implied right," the
133. The reader will excuse this little joke.
134. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Au-
thority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.").
135. See supra note 60.
136. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 395 (1971)
("For just as state law may not authorize federal agents to violate the Fourth Amendment, neither
may state law undertake to limit the extent to which federal authority can be exercised."); M'Culloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 427 (1819) ("It is of the very essence of supremacy to remove all obsta-
cles to its action within its own sphere, and so to modify every power vested in subordinate govern-
ments, as to exempt its own operations from their own influence."); Roberts v. Roadway Express,
Inc., 149 F.3d 1098, 1105 (10th Cir. 1998) ("If [Defendant] means to argue that Colorado's Work-
ers' Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy for all work-related injuries including emo-
tional distress caused by violations of the [federal] civil rights laws, that argument is readily dis-
posed of by the Supremacy Clause.").
137. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text (outlying the traditional understanding).
138. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1105 ("Therefore, because Kansas law gives rise to a cause of action
for damages for the injuries Mr. Peoples suffered as the result of the alleged deprivation of his
Eighth Amendment rights, we will not imply an additional cause of action directly under the Consti-
tution in Peoples I."); Id. at 1108 ("We conclude, then, that Mr. Peoples could have brought suit
under Kansas law [for the alleged unlawful monitoring of his phone calls]. Therefore, we will not
imply a Bivens claim as to this allegation.").
139. Id. at 1103.
140. Id. at 1102.
141. Id. at 1103.
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court goes on to explain, "by definition, is created by the courts and can-
not exist until it is judicially announced.' 42
In essence, the Tenth Circuit's view is that a Bivens cause of action
only springs into existence when no alternative remedy is available.
Prior to that moment, the federal cause of action simply does not exist.
The presence of alternative state-law relief, then, does not preempt plain-
tiff's federal Bivens action under the Tenth Circuit's view, but rather the
existence of the state-law relief fails to provide a condition precedent for
the creation of the Bivens action by implication. Thus, state-law reme-
dies do not displace the federal Bivens action under the circuit's view
because in those cases where alternative state-law remedies exist there
simply is no federal cause of action to displace.
While the court appears to avoid the Supremacy Clause problem, it
is unclear exactly why Bivens claims with a state-law analogue should be
dismissed as a procedural matter. While the court does make clear that
such dismissals are not jurisdictional, 43 it fails to address whether the
existence of alternative state-law claims acts as an element of plaintiffs
claim or an affirmative defense. Neither choice is attractive. On the one
hand, there appears to be little authority to treat the lack of an alternative
state-law action as an element of the Bivens claim.'44 On the other hand,
if the existence of an alternative state-law claim is an affirmative defense
the reverse preemption problem rears its ugly head again, because but for
the state-law defense plaintiff would have a federal cause of action.
Moreover, an affirmative defense can be waived, 145 potentially leaving a
federal court with the unsavory duty of litigating a "non-existent" federal
cause of action.
Given the increasingly complex legal analysis imposed by the Peo-
ples regime coupled with the possibility for dismissal without the court
addressing the merits of a plaintiffs claim, it may be appropriate for
district courts to exercise their discretion to dismiss putative Bivens
claims without prejudice when they conclude that alternative state-law
causes of action bar the claim, 46 allowing prisoner plaintiffs to refile
their claims under the state-law theory. Indeed, dismissal without preju-
dice seems especially appropriate here as the overwhelming majority of
prisoner-plaintiffs proceed pro se. 14 7 Of course, this ability to refile as-
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1095-96.
144. See, e.g., Morgan v. United States, 323 F.3d 776, 780 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding post Male-
sko that "the elements of a Bivens claim [are properly pleaded] by alleging a violation of his consti-
tutional rights by agents acting under the color of federal law.").
145. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
146. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2).
147. See Lois Bloom & Helen Hershkoff, Federal Courts, Magistrate Judges, and the Pro Se
Plaintiff, 16 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 475, 479-80 (2002) ("The majority of prison-
ers proceed pro se in these actions [civil prisoner constitutional rights litigation]-ninety-six percent
according to a recent survey.").
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sumes that the statute of limitations will not have run, which would sty-
mie any such attempt. Nevertheless, most state saving statutes would
provide prisoner-plaintiffs an additional window of opportunity to refile
a state claim if the statute of limitations had run while the Bivens claim
was pending as long as the first dismissal is entered without prejudice. 148
The difficulties created by the majority's application of Malesko do
not end here. Judge Ebel, while recognizing that this was a hard case,
strongly dissents and calls for the Supreme Court to take up the issue of
Bivens suits against employees of federal contractors.149 He begins his
analysis by arguing that the majority opinion fails to give Carlson its
due. 50 Judge Ebel argues that Supreme Court precedent does not treat
alternative causes of action as fungible, but rather requires that alterna-
tives to a Bivens action be alternative constitutional causes of action.1
5'
Next, Judge Ebel contends that the majority violates the Malesko sym-
metry principle, because a Bivens action against staff is available to fed-
eral prisoners in government-run facilities but not in privately run facili-
ties. Also, in Judge Ebel's view, the majority violates the traditional par-
allelism between a Bivens action and a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, because
a § 1983 action against staff members is available to state prisoners held
in private prisons but a Bivens action is not available to federal prisoners
incarcerated in private facilities. 52  Fourth, Judge Ebel asserts that the
majority, contrary to the Court's directives in Bivens and Carlson, ren-
ders the enforcement of federal rights non-uniform by making a Bivens
action contingent upon the vagaries of state law. 53 Finally, Judge Ebel
148. For instance, under Kansas law:
If any action be commenced within due time, and the plaintiff fail in such action other-
wise than upon the merits, and the time limited for the same shall have expired, the plain-
tiff, or, if the plaintiff die, and the cause of action survive, his or her representatives may
commence a new action within six (6) months after such failure.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-518 (2005). In Kansas, examples of such judgments "not on the merits"
include: denial of class certification for lack of numerosity, Waltrip v. Sidwell, 678 P.2d 128, 133
(Kan. 1984); dismissal for failure to file an amended petition following a partially successful motion
for a more definite statement, Barrett v. Porter, 408 P.2d 574 (Kan. 1965); dismissal without preju-
dice, Cox v. Trousdale, 27 P.2d 298 (Kan. 1933); and dismissal for voidable service of process,
Goldsberry v. Lewis, 574 P.2d 566 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978).
149. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1108 n.2 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 1108-10.
151. Id. at 1109.
152. Id. at lllO-12.
153. Id. at 1112-13. The District of Rhode Island, in rejecting the claim-by-claim approach
later adopted by the Tenth Circuit, offered this further critique:
[W]hile Malesko indicates that the existence of state law remedies may be a factor to be
considered, in applying Bivens, state law remedies cannot be construed as a manifestation
of Congressional intent to preclude the application of Bivens. Indeed, making the federal
remedies available to a federal prisoner at a privately operated institution contingent upon
whether there are adequate alternative state law remedies would require a case by case
analysis of state law and would cause the availability of a Bivens remedy to vary accord-
ing to the state in which the institution is located, a result that Bivens, itself sought to
avoid.
Sarro v. Cornell Corrs., Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d 52, 63 (D.R.I. 2003).
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warns that the majority's opinion will fail to deter future constitutional
violations.1
54
III. LATENT FEDERAL QUESTIONS
Although Judge Ebel raises strong points, I will assume that the ma-
jority correctly construes Malesko as holding that the existence of a state-
law remedy standing alone forecloses a Bivens action against employees
of a federal contractor running a private prison. 55 Nevertheless, even if
cases such as Mr. Peoples' are henceforth espoused under state-law theo-
ries of recovery, many will contain a federal question sufficient to re-
federalize the liability rule and provide for federal jurisdiction. This path
back to a federal question proceeds via two independent routes: the gov-
ernment contractor doctrine and the necessary construction test.
A. The Government Contractor Doctrine
Assuming the Tenth Circuit correctly interprets Malesko as fore-
closing a Bivens action against employees of a federal contractor running
a private prison when a state-law alternative action exists,156 the govern-
ment contractor doctrine provides an independent ground for re-
federalizing prisoner constitutional claims against employees of privately
run federal prisons. 157 The Peoples court does not address this issue.
1 58
Nonetheless, future prisoner plaintiffs in positions similar to Mr. Peoples
may find themselves subject to a federal liability rule in a federal forum
and possibly in a double bind-unable to bring a Bivens claim because of
154. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1113 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
155. But see Sarro, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 63 (holding that Malesko does not mandate this result).
156. Peoples v. CCA Detention Ctrs., 422 F.3d 1090, 1103 (10th Cir. 2005) ("Therefore, we
will not imply a Bivens cause of action for a prisoner held in a private prison facility when we con-
clude that there exists an alternative cause of action arising under ... state ... law against the indi-
vidual defendant for the harm created by the constitutional deprivation.").
157. For general discussions of the government contractor doctrine see: Kenneth G. English,
Note, Government Complicity and a Government Contractor's Liability in Qui Tam and Tort Cases,
33 PUB. CoNT. L.J. 649 (2004) (critiquing government contractor doctrine as economically ineffi-
cient); Mazefsky, supra note 12, at 659-61 (discussing the government contractor doctrine as it is
addressed in Malesko); Sean Watts, Note, Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. and the Government
Contractor Defense: An Analysis Based on the Current Split Regarding the Scope of the Defense, 40
WM. & MARY L. REv. 687 (1999) (arguing for Congressional action to resolve doctrinal confusion
in this area); Jack M. Sabatino, Privatization and Punitives: Should Government Contractors Share
the Sovereign's Immunities From Exemplary Damages?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 175 (1997) (critiquing the
extension of government immunities to institutions such as private prisons under the government
contractor doctrine); Ronald A. Cass & Clayton P. Gillette, The Government Contractor Defense:
Contractual Allocation of Public Risk, 77 VA. L. REv. 257 (1991) (providing an economic analysis
of the government contractor doctrine); A.L. Haizlip, The Government Contractor Defense in Tort
Liability: A Continuing Genesis, 19 PUB. CoNT. L.J. 116 (1989).
158. Apparently the Tenth Circuit at one point considered a discussion of the government
contractor doctrine. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1108 n. 13 ("As we discussed above, the government
contractor doctrine is not applicable because there is nothing in the record indicating that the Mar-
shal Service specifically ordered the monitoring of Mr. Peoples's calls to his attorney."). But the
opinion lacks any "discussion above." Presumably, the court decided a full discussion of govern-
ment contractor doctrine imprudent in this opinion.
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the existence of an alternative state-law remedy yet finding their state-
law remedy preempted by federal common law.
The Supreme Court's leading government contractor doctrine case
is Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 5 9 where the Court held that fed-
eral common law preempts state-law tort actions against independent
contractors who manufacture munitions for the federal government. In
Boyle, a copilot of a Marine Sikorsky helicopter drowned following its
crash into the Atlantic. His estate brought a successful state-law tort
claim against Sikorsky, contending that the outward-opening escape
hatch was ineffective in an underwater crash and that its handle was ob-
structed by other equipment. 60 The Court overturned the jury verdict on
the grounds that the government contractor defense, as a matter of fed-
eral common law, preempted the state-law claim. 
161
The Court reasoned that federal common law preempts state law
where there is a uniquely federal interest and there is a significant con-
flict between federal policy and the operation of state law.1 62 The Court
found these criteria met in Boyle. The Court noted that without govern-
ment-contractor immunity "the contractor will [either] decline to manu-
facture the design specified by the government, or it will raise its
price.''163 Next, the Court feared that the threat of state-law liability
would interfere with the Government's legitimate balancing of safety
features against military efficacy in designing war materiel! 64 The Court
then fashioned a three-prong test to determine when a defendant has suc-
cessfully asserted a defense under the government contractor doctrine.
To wit, state-law liability for design defects in military equipment is pre-
empted by federal common law when: (1) the United States approved
reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to those
specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United States about the
dangers in the use of the equipment that were known to the supplier but
not to the United States. 1
65
The lower federal courts have since split on the scope of the federal
contractor doctrine outside of the military supplier context. 66 A minor-
ity of courts refuse to apply the doctrine outside of military procurement
cases.' 67 A majority of courts, however, apply the government contractor
159. Boyle, 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
160. Id. at 503.
161. Id. at 512.
162. id. at 507-08.
163. Id. at 507.
164. Id. at 511.
165. Id. at 512.
166. See Hazel Glenn Beh, The Government Contractor Defense: When Do Governmental





doctrine in any scenario that satisfies the Boyle three part test.' 68 As the
Eleventh Circuit noted, the history of the government contractor doctrine
and its general rationale lend support to the conclusion that it would be
illogical to limit the availability of the doctrine solely to military contrac-
tors. 169 To this end, the doctrine has been applied to cases involving
"manufacturers of letter sorting equipment for the United States Postal
Service; postal vehicles; ambulances; military air conditioners; army
surplus tree-trimming belts; service contracts for the Department of En-
ergy; a security guard service for a federal building; and the Environ-
mental Protection Agency."' 7 °
While the Supreme Court has not definitively held that the govern-
ment contractor doctrine applies to private prisons, the Malesko Court
suggested that it would. In a footnote citing Boyle, the Court stated,
"Where the government has directed a contractor to do the very thing
that is the subject of the claim, we have recognized this as a special cir-
cumstance where the contractor may assert [federal preemption]. The
record here would provide no basis for such a defense.' 171 Thus, it ap-
pears that the Court, given an appropriate set of facts, would find the
government contractor doctrine applicable to suits brought by prisoners
held in privately run federal prisons. Indeed, the lower courts in the
Malesko litigation assumed that the government contractor doctrine
could apply and gave the argument full consideration.
72
Moreover, privately run federal prisons are currently attempting to
use the government contractor doctrine as a bar to prisoner plaintiffs'
state-law claims. Recently the Southern District of New York, sitting in
diversity, considered a suit brought by two former female federal prison-
ers against a privately run federal prison alleging sexual misconduct by
the prison's guards. 173  The plaintiffs brought two state-law causes of
action-negligent hiring and retaliation.
74
The private prison moved for summary judgment, inter alia, on the
grounds that it was entitled to government contractor immunity. 75 The
District Court assumed that the doctrine was applicable outside of the
168. Id.
169. Burgess v. Colo. Serum Co., 772 F.2d 844, 846 (11th Cir. 1985). See also Brown v.
Nationsbank Corp., 188 F.3d 579, 588-89 (5th Cir. 1999) (extending the doctrine to protect persons
from state-law liability when they in good faith assist the Government in law enforcement opera-
tions); Boruski v. United States, 803 F.2d 1421, 1430 (7th Cir. 1986) (applying the doctrine in "ci-
vilian relationships" where "a contractor has acted in the sovereign's stead and can prove the ele-
ments of the defense.").
170. Beh, supra note 166, at 432.
171. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 n.6 (2001); see also Mazefsky, supra note
12, at 659-61 (discussing the government contractor doctrine as it is addressed in Malesko).
172. Malesko v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 229 F.3d 374, 382 (2d Cir. 2000), rev'd on other grounds,
534 U.S. 61 (2001).
173. Adorno v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
174. Adorno, 312 F. Supp. 2d at 505.
175. Id.
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military supplier context, but it held that, given the facts in the instant
case, the private prison could not satisfy the three-part Boyle test.'76
In August 2005, the District Court for the District of Columbia
heard a similar argument. In Ibrahim v. Titan Corp.,17 7 Iraqi nationals
who were held in a privately run federal prison in Iraq brought common
law suits against the operator of the prison. Among other defenses, the
private prison argued that the plaintiffs' common law claims were pre-
empted by the government contractor doctrine. 178  The court held the
doctrine applicable to private prisons, but as in the New York case, held
that the facts did not support a finding that the Boyle three-prong test was
met. 1
79
Given that the federal courts currently apply the government con-
tractor doctrine to claims brought against privately run federal prisons,
many federal inmates who are denied a Bivens claim against guards on
the basis that an alternative state-law claim exists may find they lack a
viable state-law claim as well. The Peoples case itself provides a prime
example. Recall, Mr. Peoples brought a Fifth Amendment due process
claim arising out of his thirteen months of administrative segregation.
This segregation was imposed by order of the Marshal Service, not by a
discretionary act of the private prison. 80 If Mr. Peoples had brought this
claim under a state-law theory of recovery such as false imprisonment,'
8'
his claim would have been highly susceptible to the assertion of the gov-
ernment contractor doctrine because, as the Malesko Court put it, the
Government "directed [the private prison] to do the very thing that is the
subject of the claim.' ' 8 2 Indeed, the three-prong Boyle test, at least based
upon the scant factual background provided in the Peoples opinion,
should be met here. First, the Government, by ordering the administra-
tive segregation, approved a reasonably precise course of conduct. Sec-
ond, the private prison followed those instructions. Third, the Marshal
Service was, presumably, aware of the constitutional implications of
unjustifiably holding a pretrial detainee in administrative segregation.'
83
176. Id. at 521; see Scainetti v. United States ex rel. Federal Bureau of Prisons, No. 01 Civ.
9970 (SHS), 2002 WL 31844920, *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2002) (unpublished) (noting that the
Southern District of New York previously faced nearly identical government contractor arguments
and applied nearly the same reasoning); Norwood v. Esmor Inc., No. 95 Civ. 8281 (LAP), 1997 WL
65913, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 1997) (unpublished).
177. 391 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2005).
178. Ibrahim, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 16.
179. Id. at 17.
180. Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1093.
181. See Brown v. State, 927 P.2d 938, 940 (Kan. 1996) (providing elements of false impris-
onment); see also supra note 131.
182. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 74 n.6.
183. See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988). The reader will note
a slight rephrasing of the Boyle test here given the change in context from ordering a product to
ordering a course of conduct, which the author intends as mere change in the form of-not the sub-
stance of-the Boyle test. Courts applying the test in the prison context adopt a similar formulation of
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Hence, claims such as Mr. Peoples's administrative segregation claim, if
brought under a state-law theory of recovery, would likely be preempted
under the government contractor doctrine.
This conclusion should not be overstated. As the Tenth Circuit has
made clear in other contexts, "[t]he government contractor defense ...
[only applies] when the [contractor] has conformed to reasonably precise
specifications established or approved by the government."' 8 4 The Sec-
ond Circuit has suggested this same principle applies in privately run
prison cases as well. "The government contractor defense only shields a
[privately run federal prison] from claims arising out of its actions where
the government has exercised its discretion and judgment in approving
precise specifications to which the contractor must adhere."'8 5  Given
that the government contractor defense is essentially a claim that "[t]he
Government made me do it,' 8 6 it is not surprising that both the Southern
District of New York and the District of Columbia District Courts have
denied attempts by employees of privately run prisons to invoke the gov-
ernment contractor doctrine absent specific evidence that the Govern-
ment ordered the course of action bringing rise to the lawsuit. But this is
not to say that the doctrine could never be successfully invoked in cases,
such as Peoples, where the Government did specifically order the con-
duct giving rise to the suit.
Further, it is unclear what effect the preemption of state-law claims
under the government contractor doctrine would have on the availability
of a Bivens suit under the Peoples analysis. The Tenth Circuit adjudi-
cated Mr. Peoples's administrative segregation claim on its constitutional
merits. 187 The court thereby avoided the need to discuss preemption un--
der the government contractor doctrine. Assuming there was an alterna-
tive state-law theory of recovery for the administrative segregation claim,
such as false imprisonment,188 the court's analysis leaves a significant
question unanswered: if such a state-law false imprisonment claim were
preempted by the federal contractor doctrine, would an alternative state-
law remedy be rendered unavailable, giving rise to a Bivens claim? Al-
ternatively, if the government contractor doctrine is merely an affirma-
tive defense 1 9 to an otherwise generally available state-law claim, wouldan alternative state-law claim be available (but unmeritorious) and hence
the test. See, e.g., Malesko v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 229 F.3d 374, 382 (2d Cir. 2000), rev'd on other
grounds, 534 U.S. 61 (2001).
184. Ellis v. Consol. Diesel Elec. Corp., 894 F.2d 371, 372 n.2 (10th Cir. 1990).
185. Malesko, 229 F.3d at 382.
186. In re Joint E. & S. Dist. N.Y. Asbestos Litig., 897 F.2d 626, 632 (2d Cir. 1990).
187. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
188. See Brown, 927 P.2d at 940 (providing elements of false imprisonment).
189. See Snell v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 107 F.3d 744, 746 (9th Cir. 1997) ("The [gov-
ernment] contractor defense is an affirmative defense") (note omitted); but see Ryan v. Dow Chemi-
cal Co., 781 F. Supp. 934, 944-45 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting the considerable confusion as to whether
Boyle lays down a "defense" or a "standard of liability.").
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a Bivens claim inappropriate? If the former is the Tenth Circuit's ap-
proach, then the case-by-case analysis regarding the implication of
Bivens claims has become even more complicated and fact intensive (and
hence unworkable) than Judge Ebel describes in his dissent.' 90 If the
latter is the Tenth Circuit's approach, then prisoner plaintiffs such as Mr.
Peoples are stuck in a double bind-the alternative state-law claim bars a
Bivens claim yet the government contractor doctrine preempts their state-
law claim. Either approach appears unseemly.
Finally, the Peoples approach will not relieve the federal courts of
the burden of sorting through this conundrum, because the presentation
of the government contractor defense provides grounds for removal un-
der 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). Although the well-pleaded complaint rule
generally limits jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to federal questions
raised in the complaint (i.e., federal defenses do not give rise to federal
jurisdiction under § 1331),' 9' the constitutional grant of federal jurisdic-
tion provides a broader scope of federal question jurisdiction than is
found under § 133 1.192 As the Court has noted, Congress invoked this
broader scope of constitutional federal question jurisdiction by enacting
§ 1441(a)(1), which allows defendants, acting under color of federal au-
thority, to remove to federal court on the basis of a federal defense, con-
trary to the dictates of the well-pleaded complaint rule. 93  Generally
speaking, a private defendant may remove under § 1442(a)(1) if it: (a)
demonstrates that it acted under the direction of a federal officer; (b)
raises a federal defense to plaintiffs' claims; and (c) demonstrates a
causal nexus between plaintiffs' claims and acts it performed under color
of federal office.' 9 4  Following this line of analysis, numerous federal
courts have allowed private defendants to remove to federal court on the
basis of the Boyle federal contractor doctrine. 195 Thus, Peoples may send
190. See Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1112 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
191. See Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986) (stating that the
well-pleaded complaint rule is an interpretation of § 1331, not of Article III); Louisville & Nashville
Rail Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (establishing the rule).
192. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 (prescribing the limits of subject matter jurisdiction for the federal
courts); see Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738, 822-23 (1824) (holding that any
federal "ingredient" is sufficient to satisfy the Constitution's federal question jurisdiction parame-
ters), for a discussion on federal question jurisdiction, as a matter of Constitutional law, jurisdiction
"arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States," is quite broad.
193. Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136 (1989) ("The removal statute itself.., serves to
overcome the 'well-pleaded complaint' rule which would otherwise preclude removal even if a
federal defense were alleged.").
194. See generally 14C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3727 (3d ed. 1998).
195. See, e.g., McAboy v. IMO Indus., No. C05-124L, 2005 WL 2898047, *3-*5 (W.D. Wash.
Oct. 27, 2005) (slip op.); In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d 442, 446-51
(E.D.N.Y. 2004); Carter ex. rel. Estate of Carter v. Acands, Inc., No. 3:02-CV-00009 2002 WL
31682352, *3-*5 (E.D. Tex. June 27, 2002) (unpublished); Good v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc.,
914 F. Supp. 1125, 1127-28 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Guillory v. Ree's Contract Serv. Inc., 872 F. Supp. 344,
346 (S.D. Miss. 1994); Crocker v. Borden, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 1322, 1327 (E.D. La. 1994); Akin v.
Big Three Indus., 851 F. Supp. 819, 823 (E.D. Tex. 1994); Pack v. AC & S, Inc., 838 F. Supp. 1099,
1103 (D. Md. 1993); Fung v. Abex Corp., 816 F. Supp. 569, 573 (N.D. Cal. 1992); but see Kristina
[Vol. 83:3
WHYBIVENS WON'T DIE
many federal-prisoner plaintiffs out in search of a state-law theory of
recovery only to have many of these plaintiffs (assuming the courts es-
chew the double-bind difficulty outlined above) return to federal court
with a federal standard of liability.
B. The Necessary Construction Test
It is not only defendants, however, who may assert that putative
constitutional claims brought under the auspices of a state-law theory of
recovery raise federal issues. Under the Peoples decision, many plain-
tiffs' claims may raise substantial issues of federal law in their state-law
theories on the face of the complaint by invoking the Constitution as the
standard of care. Under the jurisdictional doctrine famously espoused in
Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co.19 6 and recently reaffirmed in
Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufac-
turing,197 if a state law claim necessarily requires the resolution of a sub-
stantial issue of federal law, then the state-law claim will arise under 28
U.S.C. § 1331. Given that many state-law tort claims brought by federal
prisoner plaintiffs against defendants acting under color of federal law
will look to the constitutional standard as the appropriate duty of care,
these suits may well fall within the scope of Smith and Grable & Sons,
once again re-federalizing these claims.
The Court has established two independent tests for meeting the
§ 1331 grant of jurisdiction. The Court has long held that a suit arises
under § 1331 if federal law creates the plaintiff's cause of action. 98 As
this understanding of § 1331 was forcefully put forward by Justice
Holmes, this view is oft referred to as the "Holmes test." The majority of
federal-question-jurisdiction cases find their way into federal court by
satisfying the Holmes test. 199 The Holmes test, however, best operates as
a rule of inclusion not exclusion (i.e., it provides a sufficient, but not
necessary, ground for federal question jurisdiction).20 0 Federal question
jurisdiction can also arise under § 1331 if vindication of the plaintiff's
state-law cause of action necessarily requires the construction of a sub-
stantial issue of federal law ("the necessary construction test"). 20 1 While
L. Garcia, The Boyle Festers: How Lax Causal Nexus Requirements and the "Federal Contractor
Defense" are Leading to a Disruption of Comity under the Federal Officer Removal Statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), 46 EMORY L.J. 1629 (1997) (critiquing the practice of allowing private parties
to remove to federal court by coupling the federal contractor doctrine and § 1442(a)(1)).
196. 255 U.S. 180, 199 (1921).
197. 125 S. Ct. 2363, 2367 (2005).
198. Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257,260 (1916).
199. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 808.
200. See T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.); see also
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9 (1983).
201. Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2366-68; Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 808-09; Smith, 255 U.S.
at 199; see also Lumen N. Mulligan, Note, No Longer Safe at Home: Preventing the Misuse of
Federal Common Law of Foreign Relations as a Defense Tactic in Private Transnational Litigation,
100 MICH. L. REv. 2408, 2415 (2002) (employing the moniker "necessary construction test" for this
font of federal question jurisdiction).
2006]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:3
the Supreme Court instructs that the necessary construction test should
be applied with caution as this realm of jurisdiction lies at the outer
reaches of § 1331,202 and that the imbedded question of federal law must
be substantial,0 3 the Court itself and the courts of appeals continue to
apply the doctrine.2 4
Indeed, for nearly one hundred years, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized that federal question jurisdiction will lie over state-law claims that
raise significant federal issues, of which the Smith case is the classic ex-
ample.20 5 In Smith, a stockholder sued in federal court to enjoin his cor-
poration from purchasing bonds issued pursuant to the Federal Farm
Loan Act.206 The plaintiffs theory of the case was that such a purchase
would constitute a breach of fiduciary duty under Missouri law because
the corporation could only purchase bonds "authorized to be issued by a
valid law" and that the Federal Farm Loan Act was unconstitutional.20 7
Although the plaintiff pursued a state-law cause of action, the Court held
202. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 810.
203. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808 (1988) (holding that
plaintiffs right to relief must necessarily depend upon the "resolution of a substantial question of
federal law"); Smith, 255 U.S. at 199 (holding that cases that present issues merely colorable as
federal or unreasonably relying upon federal law are not proper grounds for federal question jurisdic-
tion).
204. See, e.g., Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2368 (taking federal question jurisdiction over a
quiet title action as resolution of the state-law claim required a determination of whether the Internal
Revenue Service had given adequate notice of sale); U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d
383, 388-91 (3d Cir. 2002) (taking federal question jurisdiction over malicious prosecution claim
that required the construction of federal maritime law); Greenberg v. Bear, Steams & Co., 220 F.3d
22, 25-27 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding federal question jurisdiction lies in case to overturn arbitration
award based upon negligent interpretation of federal law); Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d
540, 542-43 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding federal question jurisdiction lies in case involving state tort
claim that could affect foreign mining industry, because the case implicated significant foreign
policy considerations); Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. FlowData, Inc., 986 F.2d
476, 477-79 (Fed Cir. 1993) (taking federal question jurisdiction over state-law business tort when
ownership of federal patent was the decisive issue); Garvin v. Alumax of S.C., Inc., 787 F.2d 910,
911-15 (4th Cir. 1986) (finding federal question jurisdiction over state tort claim against manufac-
turer and owner of a ship loader because plaintiffs ability to proceed in the face of a state law im-
munity defense turned on plaintiffs asserted claim that the immunity defense was preempted by the
Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act); W. 14th St. Commercial Corp.
v. 5 W. 14th Owners Corp., 815 F.2d 188, 192-96 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding federal question jurisdic-
tion over claim for declaratory judgment that defendant breached a lease in violation of the Federal
Condominium and Cooperative Abuse Relief Act even though that Act provided no federal cause of
action); see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 194, § 3564; Note, Mr. Smith Goes to Federal Court:
Federal Question Jurisdiction over State Law Claims Post-Merrell Dow, 115 HARv. L. REv. 2272,
2291-93 (2002) [hereinafter Mr. Smith] (arguing that the necessary construction test should be
delimited by the principles of comity between federal and state courts and unique federal compe-
tency); Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and Fed-
eral Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and "'The Martian Chronicles, " 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1788-94
(1992) (providing a thorough analysis of the necessary construction test). This is not to say that the
application of this doctrine is without confusion or frustration. See Almond v. Capital Props., Inc.,
212 F.3d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 2000) ("The Supreme Court has periodically affirmed this basis for juris-
diction [i.e., the necessary construction test] in the abstract .... occasionally cast doubt upon it,
rarely applied it in practice, and left the very scope of the concept unclear.").
205. Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2367.
206. Smith, 255 U.S. at 195.
207. Id. at 198.
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that if on the face of the complaint plaintiffs right to relief depends upon
the construction of a significant issue of federal law, then federal ques-
tion jurisdiction arises under the predecessor statute to 28 U.S.C. §
133 1.208 In so doing, the Court found that a plaintiff could avail himself
of a federal forum on a state-law theory of recovery without being di-
verse from the defendant because plaintiffs Missouri cause of action
necessarily required the court to pass upon the constitutionality of a fed-
eral act.
Despite the potential for the necessary construction test to be the
exception that swallowed the rule, the Supreme Court has not "treated
'federal issue' as a password opening federal courts to any state action
embracing a point of federal law. ' 20 9 Indeed, it has consistently held that
the necessary construction test "must be read with caution."210 To this
end, the Court has required that the imbedded federal issue in the state-
law claim be a substantial one in order to invoke federal question juris-
diction under the necessary construction test.2 1 Further, the Court re-
cently clarified that presenting a substantial federal issue imbedded in a
state-law cause of action is not sufficient for jurisdiction to arise under §
133 1.2 12 The federal courts must also consider congressional intent be-
fore taking jurisdiction under the necessary construction test.213 As the
Court put it, "the federal issue will ultimately qualify for a federal forum
only if federal jurisdiction is consistent with congressional judgment
about the sound division of labor between state and federal courts gov-
erning the application of § 133 1.,,214
While these limitations on the application of the necessary construc-
tion test are considerable, many putative constitutional torts, such as
those in the Peoples case, could be re-federalized under the necessary
construction test. Consider again Mr. Peoples's Fifth Amendment due
process claim arising out of his thirteen months of administrative segre-
gation. If Mr. Peoples had brought this claim under a state-law theory of
recovery such as false imprisonment,1 5 it may well have raised an actu-
ally disputed and substantial issue of federal law.216
208. Id. at 199; see also Kaighn Smith, Jr., Federal Courts, State Power, and Indian Tribes:
Confronting the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule, 35 N.M. L. REV. 1, 10 (2005) (discussing Smith).
209. Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2368.
210. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 809.
211. See Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2367; City of Chi. v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S.
156, 164 (1997); Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808 (1988); Merrell
Dow, 478 U.S. at 814; Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 27-28; Gully v. First Nat'l Bank in Meridian,
299 U.S. 109, 117-18 (1936); Smith, 255 U.S. at 199; Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569
(1912).
212. See Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2367.
213. See Mr. Smith, supra note 204, at 2290-91 (foreshadowing the Grable & Sons Court's
comity discussion).
214. Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2367; see also Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 8.
215. See Brown, 927 P.2d at 940 (providing elements of false imprisonment).
216. Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2368.
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Under Kansas law, for example, false imprisonment may be brought
to remedy "any unlawful physical restraint by one of another's liberty,
whether in prison or elsewhere., 217 Thus, a necessary element for plain-
tiff to prove is that defendant acted unlawfully. In many states, it is set-
tled that to bring a claim of false imprisonment against a defendant act-
ing under color of law, plaintiff must prove that defendant violated the
constitutional standard of care set by the Fourth Amendment.218 In these
states, then, because an element of the state-law false imprisonment
claim necessarily requires the court to make a determination of whether
defendant's actions comported with the strictures of the Fourth Amend-
ment, a substantial federal issue will be raised.219 Moreover, this neces-
sary construction of constitutional law is not unique to false imprison-
ment claims against defendants acting under color of law; many putative
constitutional torts brought under other state-law theories will raise simi-
lar questions of constitutional law. 220  Of course, mere reference to fed-
eral law as part of a state-law claim is insufficient to implicate federal
question jurisdiction under the necessary construction test.221 Similarly,
ministerial application of federal law in a state-law analysis is insuffi-
cient to invoke federal question jurisdiction under § 1331 pursuant to the
217. Arceo v. City of Junction City, 182 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1086 (D. Kan. 2002) (quoting
Gariety v. Fleming, 245 P. 1054, 1055 (Kan. 1926)).
218. See, e.g., Exparte Duvall, 782 So. 2d 244, 246-48 (Ala. 2000) (holding state-law torts of
assault, unlawful arrest, false imprisonment and conspiracy barred as a matter of law because officer
met the Fourth Amendment's probable cause standard when detaining plaintiff); Susag v. City of
Lake Forest, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 269, 278-79 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that state-law claims of
battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false imprisonment fail as a matter of law
because plaintiff "did not meet his burden of producing evidence showing they used physical force
against or exerted authority over him that resulted in a 'seizure' under the Fourth Amendment.");
State v. Hall, 716 A.2d 335, 337 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998) (holding existence of constitutional
probable cause bars state-law claim of false imprisonment); Sanducci v. City of Hoboken, 719 A.2d
160, 166 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1998) (dismissing plaintiff's state-law false imprisonment claim
because defendant met the constitutional probable cause standard); Renk v. City of Pittsburg, 641
A.2d 289, 293 (Pa. 1994) (false imprisonment plaintiff must show that defendant's actions were
unlawful, which often amounts to whether defendant acting under color of law had probable cause).
One must not mistakenly find, however, that because a defendant is liable for a state-law false im-
prisonment claim that defendant is necessarily liable under the Fourth Amendment. Baker v.
McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146-47 (1979) ("Just as '[m]edical malpractice does not become a consti-
tutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner,' false imprisonment does not become a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment merely because the defendant is a state official.").
219. In other states this issue is an affirmative defense. See, e.g., Miller v. City of Jacksonville,
603 So. 2d 1310, 1312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Broughton v. State, 335 N.E.2d 310, 315 (N.Y.
1975) (noting that under New York law, "U]ustification may be established by showing that the
arrest was based on probable cause."). In these jurisdictions, a privately employed federal prison
guard may well have a sufficient federal defense to remove to federal court under 28 U.S.C. §
1442(a)(1). See supra Part Il1.A.
220. See, e.g., Exparte Duvall, 782 So.2d at 246-48 (holding state-law torts of assault, unlaw-
ful arrest, and conspiracy barred because officer acted with probable cause); Susag, 115 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 278-279 (holding that plaintiff's claims of battery and intentional infliction of emotional
distress fail because defendant acted with probable cause).
221. See, e.g., Barbara v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 99 F.3d 49, 53-55 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding
federal approval of Stock Exchange rules insufficient to take federal question jurisdiction in a state-
law tort case); Greenblatt v. Delta Plumbing & Heating Corp., 68 F.3d 561, 570-71 (2d Cir. 1995)
(holding mere reference to federal labor laws that endorse collective bargaining agreements insuffi-
cient to take federal question jurisdiction over a contract claim).
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necessary construction test. 222 But in cases where the constitutionality of
defendant's conduct will be a central element of a plaintiffs state-law
cause of action, the federal question is substantial.223
Furthermore, hearing putative constitutional claims brought by fed-
eral prisoners in federal court under the necessary construction test
would not displace the congressionally mandated division of labor be-
tween the state and federal courts. 2 24  When state-law causes of action,
like those under consideration here, incorporate federal law as control-
ling an element of the claim, these claims are categorized as hybrid
causes of action.225 Prior to Grable & Sons, some courts of appeals held
the existence of a federal private right of action as the definitive factor
for divining congressional intent on the propriety of taking federal ques-
tion jurisdiction over hybrid claims.226 Grable & Sons, however, makes
clear that the existence of a federal private right of action is not required
before taking federal question jurisdiction under the necessary construc-
tion test.227  Rather, the relevant question is whether taking jurisdiction
over the claim "would . . . materially affect, or threaten to affect, the
normal currents of litigation., 228 This boils down to a gate-keeping func-
tion. The Court will not allow the necessary construction test to flood
the federal courts, absent specific congressional approval or diversity,
with suits that are traditionally the exclusive reserve of the state courts.229
Following the Grable & Sons decision, the lower courts, while being
222. See, e.g., Dunlap v. G&L Holding Group, Inc., 381 F.3d 1285, 1291-93 (11 th Cir. 2004)
(holding federal law requiring certain banking contracts to be in writing insufficient to take federal
question jurisdiction over a contract claim); Bailey v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 965, 968 (6th Cir. 1995)
(holding that referencing a federal table of drugs insufficient to take federal question jurisdiction
over a state statutory claim).
223. See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814 n.12 (noting jurisdiction was appropriate in Smith
because the federal issue raised was a constitutional one); Smith, 255 U.S. at 199 (holding plaintiff's
state-law claim, which necessarily requires inquiry in to constitutionality of federal act, arises under
28 U.S.C. § 1331); Almond v. Capital Prop., Inc., 212 F.3d 20, 22-24 (1st Cir. 2000) (taking federal
question jurisdiction and noting that the federal interest is high where "important constitutional
issues" are presented and low "where a state tort claim merely incorporate[s] a federal fault stan-
dard."); Arthur R. Miller, Artful Pleading: A Doctrine in Search of Definition, 76 TExAS L. REV.
1781, 1788 (1998) ("In Smith, the decision as to the constitutionality of the federal act would deter-
mine the continued vitality of the statute [and] all federal programs or conduct that were based on
the statute."). But see Mr. Smith, supra note 204, at 2288 (critiquing this constitutional law versus
statutory law dichotomy).
224. See Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2368 (imposing this requirement for taking jurisdiction
under the necessary construction test).
225. See Pauline E. Calande, Note, State Incorporation of Federal Law: A Response to the
Demise of Implied Federal Rights ofAction, 94 YALE L.J. 1144,1148-57 (1985) (discussing creation
of hybrid state law claims).
226. See, e.g., Zubi v. AT&T Corp., 219 F.3d 220, 223 n.5 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding the federal
courts may not take federal question jurisdiction over state-law claims absent a federal private right
of action). See also TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618, 622 n.2 (6th Cir. 2000); Sparta
Surgical Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 1998); PCS 2000
LP v. Romulus Telecomm., Inc, 148 F.3d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 1998); Seinfeld v. Austen, 39 F.3d 761,
764 (7th Cir. 1994); Rogers v. Platt, 814 F.2d 683, 688 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
227. Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2369-70.
228. Id. at 2371.
229. Id.
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careful not to open the doors of the federal courts to claims traditionally
heard in the state courts, have injected a new-found life into the neces-
sary construction test.
230
In the context of federal prisoner litigation, federal jurisdiction un-
der the necessary construction test as delineated in Grable & Sons ap-
pears especially appropriate because this litigation has long taken place
in federal court and Congress clearly envisions that the federal courts
will bear the brunt of federal prisoner litigation. Prior to the passage of
the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act 231 ("PLRA") in 1996, excluding ha-
beas corpus claims, the federal courts heard upwards of 40,000 prisoner-
plaintiff civil suits a year-approximately one-fifth of the overall civil
federal docket.2 32  While the PLRA has limited the number of prisoner
suits on the federal docket significantly, it has not altered the underlying
fact that prisoner litigation is primarily conducted in the federal courts-
with approximately seventy-five percent of all prisoner civil litigation
taking place in a federal forum.233 While Congress has sought to limit
the flood of perceived frivolous prisoner litigation, it has done so with
the clear intention that the federal courts will retain jurisdiction over
these claims. For example, the PLRA's limitations on prisoner suits are
limited to federal claims over which the federal courts could take federal
question jurisdiction. 234 Moreover, Congress has enacted numerous
other devices to control litigation by prisoner plaintiffs-from summary
dismissal of frivolous cases 235 to discovery rules23 6-that further evi-
dence that it envisions taking federal jurisdiction over large amounts of
prisoner litigation in the federal courts. Further, as the Court in Carl-
230. See Broder v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 418 F.3d 187, 194-96 (2d Cir. 2005) (applying
Grable & Sons and taking jurisdiction over state-law contract claim that required construction of
federal cable television law because taking this jurisdiction would not upset the flow of litigation in
state and federal courts); Municipality of San Juan v. Corporacion Para El Fomento Economico De
La Ciudad Capital, 415 F.3d 145, 148 n.6 (1 st Cir. 2005) (applying Grable & Sons and taking juris-
diction over state-law contract claim that required construction of HUD regulations); Hayes v.
American Airlines, Inc., No. 04CV323 1 CBAJMA, 2005 WL 2367623, *3-*4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27,
2005) (unpublished) (applying Grable &Sons and taking jurisdiction over state-law unjust enrich-
ment claim because taking this jurisdiction would not upset the flow of litigation in state and federal
courts); In re Zyprexa Products Liability Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 170, 172-73 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(applying Grable & Sons and taking jurisdiction over state-law restitution claim); Mr. Smith, supra
note 204 at 2292-93; Redish, supra note 204, at 1793 (arguing that federal question jurisdiction over
hybrid claim should lie to "increase the level of state-federal judicial interchange in the shaping and
development of the relevant federal statute.").
231. Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-66 to 1321-77 (Apr. 26, 1996)
(codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523; 18 U.S.C. §§ 3624, 3626; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1915, 1915A; 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1997-1997h (2005)).
232. Schlanger, supra note 6, at 1557 (this includes both state and federal prisoner suits).
233. Id. at 1573 n.52 ("a very gross estimate might be that about a quarter of what prison and
jail officials think of as inmate litigation is currently filed in state court.").
234. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(d) (2005) ("The limitations on remedies in this section shall not apply to
relief entered by a State court based solely upon claims arising under State law.").
235. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (2005) (screening prisoner cases for frivolousness prior to serving
defendant).
236. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(l)(E)(iii) (no required disclosures in prisoner-plaintiff cases).
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son237 noted, Congress has approved of the Bivens cause of action (albeit
after the fact) as a complementary theory of recovery to the Federal Torts
Claims Act.238 In furtherance of this congressional acceptance of federal
jurisdiction over Bivens claims, Congress created the Constitutional
Torts Branch of the Department of Justice, which defends these actions
exclusively in federal court. 239 As these factors illustrate, there should be
little concern that taking federal jurisdiction over putative constitutional
torts espoused under a state-law theory of recovery "would ... materially
affect, or threaten to affect, the normal currents of litigation" envisioned
by Congress.240
Under Grable & Sons, then, many putative constitutional claims
filed by federal prisoners espousing a state-law theory of recovery may
be re-federalized. These hybrid cases will often raise substantial issues
of constitutional law and taking federal jurisdiction over them will not
materially alter the balance of federal-court versus state-court litigation.
In so doing, courts will in effect employ a uniform federal standard of
care and a federal forum will be accessible-as is the case for claims re-
federalized under the government contractor doctrine. In substance,
then, the goals the Bivens Court set out-uniform rules of liability en-
forceable in a federal court-will often be advanced in putative constitu-
tional tort litigation against federal actors, even as the form of the Bivens
action withers.241
CONCLUSION
There can be little doubt that the current Supreme Court considers
implying federal causes of action from federal statutes or the Constitu-
tion beyond its powers.242 The Tenth Circuit in its Peoples decision
237. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19-20 (1980).
238. The Federal Torts Claim Act is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2005). As part of the
Senate Report, Congress considered the interaction of the FTCA and Bivens:
[A]fter the date of enactment of this measure, innocent individuals who are subjected to
raids ... will have a cause of action against the individual Federal agents and the Federal
Government. Furthermore, this provision should be viewed as a counterpart to the Bivens
case and its progenty [sic ], in that it waives the defense of sovereign immunity so as to
make the Government independently liable in damages for the same type of conduct that
is alleged to have occurred in Bivens (and for which that case imposes liability upon the
individual Government officials involved).
S. REP. No. 93-588 at 3 (1973).
239. See Pillard, supra note 62, at 66 n.6 (discussing the numbers of Bivens suits filed and
their defense).
240. Grable & Sons, 125 S. Ct. at 2371.
241. See Carlson, 446 U.S. at 23 ("[T]he liability of federal officials for violations of citizens'
constitutional rights should be governed by uniform rules."); Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Nar-
cotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 393-94 (1971) (holding that the Fourth Amendment "is not tied to the
niceties of local trespass laws."). See also supra Part I discussing slow death of the Bivens cause of
action.
242. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Bivens is
a relic of the heady days in which this Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of action
- decreeing them to be 'implied' by the mere existence of a statutory or constitutional prohibition");
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grasps the Court's directive and takes it (nearly) to its logical conclusion
by foreclosing a Bivens action against employees of a federal contractor
running a private prison when an alternative state-law action exists.243
Nevertheless, this victory for the opponents of implied federal causes of
action may be Pyrrhic. As I endeavored to illustrate above, many puta-
tive constitutional claims brought by federal prisoner plaintiffs under
state-law theories of recovery may be re-federalized either as a matter of
federal common law, under the government contractor doctrine, or pur-
suant to Byzantine jurisdictional doctrine, via the necessary construction
test.
All this is to illustrate a broader point. Sharply distinguishing be-
tween federal common law and implied rights of action for the purpose
of eliminating the latter is impracticable as these concepts differ only as a
matter of degree, not as a matter of kind.244  First of all, most scholars
consider the Bivens action to be merely a species of federal common
law, 245 rendering the federal common law versus implied cause of action
distinction moot. Even if one does not consider Bivens an instance of
federal common law, numerous scholars have argued that there is no
meaningful difference between the "legitimate" practice of inferring a
federal liability rule sufficient to confer federal question jurisdiction
without congressional pre-approval as a matter of federal common law
246
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001) (abandoning the power of federal courts to imply
federal causes of action from statutes).
243. Peoples v. CCA Detentions Ctrs., 422 F.3d 1090, 1105 (10th Cir. 2005).
244. See Merrill, supra note 7, at 4-6 (contending that federal common law and implied causes
of action differ only as a matter of degree).
245. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 405 (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (noting that the federal common law in Bivens arose not directly from the Constitution,
but rather from the combination of the Court's historical ability to provide a remedy for the violation
of individual liberties and an interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1331); Grey, supra note 64, at 1104
("Most commentators contend that the Constitution does not require the Bivens remedy, but rather
that it is a creature of federal common law"); Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal
Rights, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1128, 1172-73 (1986); Merrill, supra note 7, at 48-49 (considering
whether federal courts may decide implied remedies "in the manner of 'a common law tribunal')
(quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983)); Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword, Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 23-25 (1975) (concluding that the Bivens action is a species of
federal common law).
246. The Court clearly accepts federal common law as a legitimate practice. See, e.g., Boyle v.
United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 527 (1988) (adopting federal common law liability rule for fed-
eral military contractors to state products liability action); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91,
99-100 (1972) (adopting federal common law liability rule regarding interstate nuisance); Zschernig
v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (holding, as a matter of federal common law, that an Oregon statute
that required probate courts to evaluate the normative value of foreign political systems, under the
guise of reciprocity, before transferring property to foreign next of kin invalid as an intrusion upon
the federal government's exclusive right to conduct foreign affairs even though the president and
Congress had failed to act); Banco de Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 438 (1964)
(adopting federal common law liability rule for issues involving foreign affairs); Clearfield Trust Co.
v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943) (adopting federal common law liability rule that one
who seeks to raise laches as defense against United States in suit to recover payment on forged
commercial paper must prove actual damage resulting from United States' delay in notifying of
forgery); D'Oench, Dubme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 461-62 (1942) (adopting federal common-
law rule that one who makes fraudulent note to bank later insured by FDIC may not raise a claim of
lack of consideration in FDIC action to enforce note); Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek
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and the "illegitimate" practice of inferring a federal liability rule suffi-
cient to confer federal question jurisdiction without congressional pre-
approval by inferring a cause of action.247
The Peoples case proves this point. Under the Peoples regime, the
implied Bivens cause of action against employees of private federal pris-
ons is expunged from the federal courts in form only, not in substance.
Uniform federal rules of liability will come to govern many constitu-
tional violations committed by privately employed custodians of federal
prisoners by other means. The slow death of the Bivens cause of action,
then, has only made application of these uniform federal judge-made
rules conceptually more difficult to apply; it does not eliminate them.
Should the Supreme Court truly desire to end the substance-not merely
the form--of the implied federal cause of action, it may well need to
excise huge swathes of federal common law and fonts of jurisdiction.
But such a pill may be too bitter to swallow.248
Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938) (adopting federal common law liability rule regarding water
ways).
247. See, e.g., George D. Brown, Letting Statutory Tails Wag Constitutional Dogs - Have the
Bivens Dissenters Prevailed?, 64 IND. L. J. 263, 266 (1989) (concluding that "all forms of judicial
lawmaking by federal courts - whether presented as constitutional adjudication, statutory interpreta-
tion or federal common law - are essentially the same and should be placed under the general rubric
of federal common law."); Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99
HARV. L. REV. 881, 889-90 (1986) (concluding that there is no meaningful difference "between the
creation of federal common law and the ordinary interpretation of federal enactments"); Merrill,
supra note 7, at 4-6.
248. See, e.g., Donald L. Doemberg, Juridical Chameleons in the "New Erie" Canal, 1990
UTAH L. REV. 759, 810-11 (1990) (contending that federal common law must exist to implement the
Constitution and federal legislation); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, ch. 6; Henry J. Friendly, In
Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383 (1964). But see
Thomas W. Merrill, The Judicial Prerogative, 12 PACE L. REV. 327, 356-57 (1992) (concluding that
because federal common law has no principled limits it must be abandoned).
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LET'S TALK ABOUT SEX DISCRIMINATION: THE TENTH
CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN DICK V. PHONE DIRECTORIES Co.
INTRODUCTION
The term "sexual harassment" popularly conjures an image of a
dedicated but vulnerable young woman who is working in a male-
dominated field. Under the threat of firing, she is forced to endure late-
night sexual rendezvous in a dimly lit high-rise office with her predatory
male boss. While striking, this image represents only one facet of what
Congress and the Supreme Court considers sexual harassment.
Today, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),'
the broad federal statutory scheme that addresses discriminatory em-
ployment practices, sexual harassment encompasses claims with no tan-
gible economic loss to the victim and is no longer limited to traditional
man-woman relationships. Since the Supreme Court decided the seminal
case Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services2 in 1998, same-sex hostile
work environment harassment claims are actionable under Title VII.3 A
sexual hostile work environment claim alleges that the conditions of the
plaintiff's work environment are altered due to severe and pervasive sex-
ual harassment by co-workers.4 Under Oncale, a plaintiff bringing a
sexual hostile environment claim must meet two requirements. First, the
harassment must be severe enough to discriminate.5 Second and most
importantly, the discrimination must be "because of... sex."6 The "be-
cause of sex" language demands that the discrimination against an em-
ployee must be motivated by her sex. If this element is not met the plain-
tiff has not been the victim of sex discrimination in violation of Title VII,
regardless of how unpleasant her work environment is.7 Oncale's em-
phasis on this causation element in sexual harassment cases has resulted
in a very limited scope of interpretation for same-sex harassment issues.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently
addressed same-sex harassment for the first time in Dick v. Phone Direc-
tories Co. 8 In Dick, the Tenth Circuit held that a same-sex sexual har-
assment hostile work environment claim satisfies the "because of sex"
requirement if the plaintiff proves that her harasser's actions were moti-
1. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (West 2005).
2. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
3. Oncale, 523 U.S.at 78.
4. See Meritor Sav. Bank FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
5. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81.
6. Id. at 78.
7. See Taken v. Okla. Corp. Comm'n, 125 F.3d 1366, 1369 (10th Cir. 1997).
8. 397 F.3d 1256 (2005).
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vated by sexual desire.9 This contrasts with other circuits, which have
alternatively required a showing that the same-sex harasser is a homo-
sexual in order to satisfy the "because of sex" requirement. 10 This article
will analyze the Tenth Circuit's holding in light of other Circuits' ap-
proaches, and will demonstrate why, within the restrictive confines of
Oncale, the Tenth Circuit's approach best articulates the goals of Title
VII: prevention and deterrence of harassment in the workplace.11 The
article will further argue that the Supreme Court's narrow definition of
the term "because of sex" in Its Oncale decision fails to adequately pre-
vent all types of sex discrimination.
Part I of this article will examine the unusual roots of the sexual
harassment doctrine, focusing on the development of the hostile work
environment claim. Part II will explore Oncale and its progeny. Part III
will summarize the facts and the holding of Dick. Part IV will first ar-
gue that although superficially, Oncale expanded the scope of Title VII
by expressly recognizing same-sex harassment claims, its emphasis on
causation actually limits the scope of sexual harassment claims. Despite
this restriction, the Tenth Circuit found the broadest possible interpreta-
tion of Oncale in Dick. Finally, Part IV will conclude with the argument
that a broader interpretation of "sex" under Title VII is needed to address
work-place harassments that remain unpunishable under Oncale's cur-
rent guidelines.
I. SEXUAL HARASSMENT DEFINED
Title VII states that it is "an unlawful employment practice for an
employer ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."' 12 The
House of Representatives added the term "sex" to the enumerated list of
prohibited discriminatory motives in the eleventh hour of debate on the
bill, in an attempt to defeat the entire amendment the day before it
passed. 13 Because of the last-minute nature of the amendment, there was
very little legislative history to aid the courts in interpreting what consti-
tutes discrimination based on sex.' 4 In addition, there was no clear legis-
lative intent to prohibit any kind of sex discrimination in the workplace,
9. Dick, 397 F.3d at 1264. The Tenth Circuit also noted that Oncale provides that the infer-
ence of sexual harassment can be drawn without showing the harasser was motivated by sexual
desire when the issue does not involve "explicit or implicit proposals of sexual activity." Id. at 1263.
10. Id. at 1264.
11. Julie A. Seaman, Form and (Dys)function in Sexual Harassment Law: Biology, Culture,
and the Spandrels of Title VII, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 321,432 (2005).
12. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (West 2005).
13. See Linda Kelly Hill, The Feminist Misspeak of Sexual Harassment, 57 FLA. L. REv. 133,
144-45 (2005).
14. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
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and the term was virtually meaningless in the early years after Title VII
was passed. 15
Initially, "sexual harassment" had no relationship with the vague
idea of "sexual discrimination" that was theoretically prohibited by Title
VII. 16 In fact, the term "sexual harassment" was coined outside the legal
spectrum by the feminist group Working Women United, who defined
sexual harassment as "the treatment of women workers as sexual ob-
jects."'17 While accurate, this definition failed to define any disparate
treatment of women and therefore, remained outside the aegis of Title
VII.'
8
A. Feminism and the Importance of Gender
Feminists have long controlled the theory of sexual harassment.' 9
In the simplest terms, feminists initially argued (and continue to do so
today) that there is a disparate level of male power in society because
males control gender roles. 20  Today, conventional sexual harassment
wisdom accepts as true that sex and gender are two separate ideas.2, Sex
is considered a product of nature, while gender is a function of culture.22
Sex refers to the biological nature of men and women, while gender is a
fabricated social construct that suggests the biological differences be-
tween men and women dictate the societal role each must play.23 Femi-
nists focus on this notion of gender as a fictional construction and assert
that gender and gender roles have been created by men for the purpose of
subordinating women.24 This male control over gender has resulted in a
pervasive patriarchal "gender hierarchy" in the workplace.25 Within this
framework of unequal power, feminists view sexually harassing practices
as a means to subordinate women, and therefore, discriminate against
them.26 Feminists, in their definition of sexual harassment, focus on har-
assment based on one's gender.
1. Catharine MacKinnon
Professor Catharine MacKinnon, described as one of the foremost
architects of the sexual harassment doctrine,27 is credited for bringing
15. See Hill, supra note 13, at 144-45.




20. See Seaman, supra note 11, at 358.
21. See Katherine Franke, The Central Mistake in Sexual Discrimination Law: The Disaggre-
gation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1995).
22. See id.
23. See Seaman, supra note 11, at 356, 358.
24. See id at 358.
25. See Hill, supra note 13, at 140.
26. See id, at 155.
27. See Seaman, supra note 11, at 421.
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sexual harassment under the auspices of Title VII by expressly highlight-
ing the discriminatory consequences of sexual harassment.28 She defined
sexual harassment as, "the unwanted imposition of sexual requirements
in the context of a relationship of unequal power., 29 By naming women
as subordinates in the gender-based disparate power structure of the
American workplace, Professor MacKinnon was able to cast the neces-
sary discriminatory hue over sexual harassment.3 °
Armed with this definition, Professor MacKinnon defined two types
of sexual discrimination. The first she called quid pro quo: where an
employer conditions employment benefits on sexual favors. 31 Here, Pro-
fessor MacKinnon was able to identify the sex discrimination easily:
only women are being forced to provide sexual favors in return for what
should be a natural employment right.32 Second, she found sexual dis-
crimination existed in a "hostile work environment., 33 She viewed this
as a counterpart to a quid pro quo claim because working in an environ-
ment filled with "pervasive intimidation, ridicule, and insult" served to
subordinate women at the hands of their male counterparts. 34 Professor
MacKinnon found sexual discrimination in quid pro quo cases through
men expressly using their superior gender role to exert power over
women, while she found sexual discrimination in a hostile environment
because she saw in such instances men implicitly wielding sex "differ-
ences" as a subordinating power over their female co-workers.35
B. The Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment Claim
While a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim is unique to sex-
specific offenses and fairly straightforward in its requirements, the sexual
hostile work environment claim is more ambiguous. The formal legal
recognition that a hostile environment could be a type of sexual harass-
ment was a later development that arose from two distinct logical argu-
ments. First, the doctrine grew from Professor MacKinnon's feminist
argument that a hostile work environment had the same discriminatory
effect as the "classic" quid pro quo sexual harassment case.37 Second,
previous to the express judicial recognition of the sexual hostile envi-
ronment claim, it was widely recognized that a racial discrimination
claim based on hostile work environment was actionable.38 The sexual
28. See Hill, supra note 13, at 145.
29. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 1 (1979).
30. See Hill, supra note 13, at 146.
31. MAcKINNON, supra note 29, at 32.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 2.
34. Id.
35. See Hill, supra note 13, at 146.
36. See Seaman, supra note 11, at 417.
37. See id.
38. See id.
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hostile environment claim developed in part as a logical analogy to this
accepted standard.39
1. The Gender Subordination Argument
A Quidpro quo sexual discrimination case casts the injury in terms
of concrete choices a woman must make: comply with her supervisor's
demands for sexual favors, or suffer an adverse employment action.40 A
hostile work environment claim, on the other hand, presents a more sub-
tle type of injury--one that affects an employee's performance, the like-
lihood of her advancing, or even the chances of her choosing to remain at
her position.41 Professor MacKinnon and other feminists argued that
despite the ambiguity, a hostile environment created from an "an aggre-
gation of words and conduct ... [had the effect of] exclud[ing] or con-
trol[ing] the victim or victims, often through humiliation or fear. 'A2 In
addition, because men remain in the dominate position in the gender hi-
erarchy of the workplace, it is women that suffer the harassment. 43 This
disparate treatment creates a discriminatory result from the harassment.
44
2. The Racial Harassment Analogy
The first hostile environment harassment claim was recognized by
federal courts in Rogers v. EEOC.45 In Rogers, the plaintiff claimed her
employer, an optometrist, treated patients preferentially according to
their race.46 In a now familiar holding, the Fifth Circuit held that the
phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" is necessarily an
expansive concept; one that should be interpreted broadly.47 Within such
a broad interpretation, the court went on to find that "[working in an at-
mosphere permeated with] extreme racial . . . bigotry or ridicule impli-
cated a 'term or condition' of employment sufficient to trigger Title VII
protection regardless of whether a tangible employment action was
taken."' 8
Soon after Rogers, various appellate courts extended this reasoning
to a sexual hostile work environment claim.49 However, while both ra-
cial and sexual hostile environment claims needed to demonstrate that
the harassment was severe enough to interfere with the terms or condi-
tions of employment, this threshold was much more ambivalent in the
39. See id.
40. See id at 422.
41. See id.
42. Id. at 424.
43. See Hill, supra note 13, at 145.
44. See id.
45. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
46. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 240.
47. Id. at 238.
48. Seaman, supra note 11, at 417.
49. See Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11 th Cir. 1982).
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sexual context.50 Some courts complained that the same sexual behavior
that may be unwelcome in one context could be perfectly appropriate in
another.5' Others expressed concern about the subjective nature of the
sexual claim, noting that it largely depended on the singular interpreta-
tion of "harassment" by the victim. 52 These concerns combined to make
the threshold for determining whether a claim for sexual hostile envi-
ronment existed higher than its racial harassment counterpart. 3
3. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson
54
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the Supreme Court first en-
dorsed the viability of a hostile work environment sexual harassment
claim by enlisting both the feminist reasoning as well as the logical anal-
ogy of the racial hostile environment claim.5 The resulting broad read-
ing of Title VII was similar to the interpretation in Rogers,56 but also
focused exclusively on the paradigmatic dominant man versus victimized
woman sexual harassment case, therefore embracing the feminist frame-
work of a gender based hierarchy. 7
Meritor involved Plaintiff Mechelle Vinson, who worked as a teller
at the Defendant bank. During her four year employment, it was undis-
puted that Ms. Vinson was promoted from teller to head teller to assistant
branch manager based on merit alone. 8 However, after Ms. Vinson was
fired for taking an excessively long sick leave, she brought suit against
her former employer, claiming that during her four year employment, she
was subjected to more or less constant sexual harassment by her supervi-
sor, Mr. Taylor, and that this harassment created a hostile work environ-
ment.5 9 Her allegations included repeated touching and fondling, many
occasions of sexual intercourse (to which Ms. Vinson allegedly acqui-
esced for fear of losing her job), and episodes where Mr. Taylor followed
her into the women's restroom and exposed himself to her.60
During trial, Mr. Taylor denied all allegations, but the trial court
never endorsed either party's story.6' Instead, the court held that even if
Ms. Vinson's version of the facts were true, she did not experience sex-
ual discrimination under Title VII because she did not suffer a tangible
economic lOSS. 62 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
50. See Seaman, supra note 11, at 419.
51. See id. at 420.
52. See id.
53. Id.
54. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
55. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66-67.
56. Id.
57. See Hill, supra note 13, at 148.
58. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 59-60.
59. See id at 60.
60. Id.
61. Id at 61.
62. See id.
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cuit reversed.63 Relying on a previous holding of a case6 it had recently
decided, the court found that it was possible to find sexual discrimination
based on sexual behavior that created a hostile work environment. 65 The
Supreme Court affirmed, using various justifications for locating a hos-
tile environment claim.66
The Court in Meritor pointed toward the language of Title VII it-
self.67 It held that "the phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment' evinces a congressional intent 'to strike at the entire spectrum
of disparate treatment of men and women' in employment., 68 This is
similar to the language the Fifth Circuit used in Rogers.69 The broad
interpretation of the "terms and conditions" language in Title VII under-
lined the Court's acceptance of the racial harassment analogy. 70 How-
ever, the Court's presumption of a male harasser and a female victim
demonstrated that the Court was also embracing MacKinnon's male sub-
ordination framework.71
II. ONCALE V. SUNDOWNER OFFSHORE SERVICES 72 AND SAME-SEX
HARASSMENT
A. Brief Overview of Same-Sex Claims Between Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson73 and Oncale
Meritor left many questions unanswered, including whether hostile
environment same-sex harassment claims were actionable under Title
VII. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Oncale, Circuits ap-
proached the problem in various ways. In Doe v. City of Belleville,74 the
Seventh Circuit held that the presence of a hostile environment sufficed
to establish a valid claim under Title VII even if the harasser and the
harassed were of the same sex. 7 5 Doe involved sixteen-year-old twin
boys who were routinely harassed by their co-workers at a cemetery.76
H. Doe, one of the plaintiffs, was routinely called a "bitch" and asked
63. Id. at 62.
64. The Court of Appeals relied on Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943-44 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(finding an actionable sexual harassment claim based on the finding of a hostile work environment).
65. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 62.
66. Id. at 63.
67. Id. at 64.
68. Id. (quoting Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978)
(citation omitted)).
69. See Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238 ("[T]he phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment' in Section 703 [of Title VII] is an expansive concept which sweeps within its protective ambit
the practice of creating a working environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimina-
tion.").
70. See Hill, supra note 13, at 148.
71. Id.
72. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
73. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
74. 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997).
75. Doe, 119 F.3d at 577-78.
76. Id. at 566.
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whether he was a boy or a girl.77 After enduring months of taunts such
as these and repeated threats of assault, both twins quit after a co-worker
grabbed H. Doe's testicles in order to "finally find out if H was a girl or a
guy.",78 The Seventh Circuit found the claim actionable, noting that the
act of grabbing another's testicles must be related to sex regardless of
either party's sex.7 9 Such a low standard for establishing the causal ele-
ment has been referred to as a "sex per se" standard, because if some-
thing was even remotely sexual, it was considered as satisfying the cau-
sation requirement. 80 The Seventh Circuit specifically stressed that the
most important test under Title VII was not why the victim has been har-
assed, but whether the conditions of his or her work environment has
been altered.81
In addition, it is significant that the Seventh Circuit considered ref-
erences to the victim's gender as satisfying the causation requirement.82
This suggests that the Seventh Circuit considered the term "sex" under
Title VII to include both one's biological sex as well as one's gender. In
Doe, the victim was not harassed because he was a male, but because he
failed to meet the appropriate gender stereotype of a male.83
The Fifth Circuit approached the issue differently and held in Gar-
cia v. Elf Atochem North America,84 that Title VII addressed only sex
discrimination against women.85 Specifically, the Fifth Circuit found
that a male employee's claim that his male supervisor at a Texas chemi-
cal plant sexually harassed him were not colorable under Title VII. 86 The
Court reasoned that the purpose of Title VII was to prevent discrimina-
tion against women only, and therefore did not support claims of same-
sex harassment.
8 7
B. The Oncale Decision
The Supreme Court resolved this circuit split in 1998 when it ad-
dressed the issue of same-sex harassment in Oncale. Oncale involved a
male plaintiff, Joseph Oncale, who worked as a roustabout with an all-
male eight-man crew on an oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico.8 8 During
the course of his employment, co-workers subjected Mr. Oncale to se-
77. Id. at 576-77.
78. Id. at 577.
79. Id at 580.
80. See Hill, supra note 13, at 151.
81. Doe, 119 F.3d at 578.
82. Id. at 577 ("In view of the overt references to H.'s gender and the repeated allusions to
sexual assault, it would appear unnecessary to require any further proof that H.'s gender had some-
thing to do with this harassment; the acts speak for themselves in that regard.") (emphasis added).
83. See id.
84. 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994).
85. See, e.g., Garcia, 28 F.3d at 451-52.
86. Id. at 451-52.
87. Id.
88. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 77.
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vere and ongoing sexually-related humiliations, including having a bar of
soap inserted into his anus while forcibly restrained and threats of rape.89
The District Court, acting under the guidelines of Garcia, found that Mr.
Oncale had no claim, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.90
Justice Scalia, writing for the unanimous majority, found that Title
VII's prohibition of discrimination "because of sex" applies to both men
and women.91 Scalia admitted that while same-sex harassment cases
were "assuredly not the principal evil Congress was concerned with
when it enacted Title VII," it was nonetheless within the scope of Title
VII to cover "comparable" evils as well.92 The "critical" issue, according
to Scalia, was whether the harassment resulted in discrimination; namely,
if "members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or condi-
tions of employment to which members of the other sex are not ex-
posed., 93  In other words, Scalia held that the essential determination
under a Title VII claim was not whether harassment had occurred, but
whether the harassment occurred because of the sex of the victim.94
The majority opinion went on to define various "evidentiary routes"
of finding an inference of discrimination because of sex. First, it noted
that such an inference was "easy to draw" in a typical male-female situa-
tion because such circumstances usually involve explicit or implicit pro-
posals of sexual activity and similar proposals would not be made to
members of the same sex.95 Scalia suggested that the same "chain of
inference" would be available in same-sex harassment claims if the ha-
rasser was a homosexual.96
89. See Jennifer A. Drobac, The Oncale Opinion: A Pansexual Response, 30 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 1269, 1273 (1999).
90. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 77.
91. Id. at 78 (citing Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669,
682 (1983)).
92. Id. at 79.
93. Id. at 80 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., con-
curring)).
94. Despite this new express recognition of causation, the Court nonetheless reiterated the
importance of the requirement that the harassment be sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to create
an objectively hostile work environment - that is, behavior so egregious that it rises well above
routine interactions between members of the opposite sex. Id. at 81. Scalia noted that, taken to-
gether, these two requirements would effectively prevent Title VII from becoming a "general civility
code" for the workplace. Id. In fact, this emphasis of severity has been echoed in numerous cases
involving Title VII discrimination claims. See, e.g., Dick v. Phone Directories Co., 397 F.3d 1256
(10th Cir. 2005); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2001); Shepherd v.
Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998 (7th Cir. 1999).
95. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
96. Id. Scalia also defined two other "evidentiary routes" that can be used to determine that
the discrimination was based on sex. He found that a showing that the harasser was motivated by
"general hostility" to his or her sex in the same workplace could satisfy the requirement that the
discrimination occurred because of sex. Id. Finally, one can satisfy this causal element by showing,
through direct comparative evidence, that the harasser treated men and women differently in a
mixed-sex workplace. Id. at 81.
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Oncale deviated from previous Title VII rulings in that it empha-
sized the intent of the harasser in finding causation in a discrimination
claim.97 Under Oncale, it was no longer enough to merely find that a
hostile work environment that was sexual in nature existed, as the Sev-
enth Circuit had done in Doe. 98 In fact, the same day the Court issued its
Oncale opinion, it vacated the Seventh Circuit's holding in Doe.99 Under
the new Oncale regime, the hostile environment must be present because
of the victim's sex; the harassment need not have any sexual overtones as
long as it is motivated by the victim's sex.
100
C. Circuit Interpretations of Oncale
Faced with the explicit requirement that a plaintiff bringing a same-
sex harassment claim must show his harasser's motivation stemmed from
the plaintiffs sex, the Circuits have differed only slightly in interpreting
the first evidentiary route of Oncale's holding. The Seventh Circuit, in
Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp.,101 found that in order for a plaintiff to
demonstrate that she was discriminated against because of his sex, the
plaintiff needed to bring evidence that suggested that the harasser was a
homosexual. 10 2 In Bibby v. Philadelphia Coca Cola Bottling Co.,' °3 the
Third Circuit held differently, stating that in order to satisfy the "because
of sex" element, the victim need only prove that the harasser sexually
desired her.' °4 The Third Circuit reasoned that such a showing was more
than enough for a reasonable jury to deduce that the sexual discrimina-
tion was motivated by the victim's sex. 10 5 Finally, some circuits have
used a combination of both - requiring that the plaintiff show "credible
evidence" that the harasser was a homosexual and that the harasser sexu-
ally desired the plaintiff.
10 6
III. DICK V. PHONE DIRECTORIES Co. 1
07
In Dick v. Phone Directories Co., the Tenth Circuit followed the
Third Circuit's lead, finding that a plaintiff in a same-sex hostile work
environment harassment claim could satisfy the first evidentiary route
articulated in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services'0 8 by demonstrat-
ing that her harasser was motivated by sexual desire.'0 9 This differs from
97. See Hill, supra note 13, at 159.
98. See id. at 160-61.
99. Id.
100. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79-80.
101. 168 F.3d 998 (7th Cir. 1998).
102. Shepherd, 168 F.3d at 1009.
103. 260 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2001).
104. Bibby, 260 F.3d at 262.
105. Id.
106. See LaDay v. Catalyst Tech., Inc., 302 F.3d 474, 478 (5th Cir. 2002).
107. 397 F.3d 1256 (10th Cir. 2005).
108. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
109. Dick, 397 F.3d at 1264.
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the Seventh and the Fifth Circuits' holdings that the plaintiff mush fur-
nish "credible evidence" that her harasser is a homosexual." 0
A. Facts
In Dick, the plaintiff, Ms. Diane Dick, worked as a sale representa-
tive in the Vernal, Utah office of Defendant Phone Directories Company
(PDC). I l l After approximately three years, Ms. Dick's immediate super-
visor was fired, and PDC hired Ms. Laura Bills as the Vernal office man-
ager and Ms. Dick's immediate supervisor.1 2 Ms. Dick alleged that Ms.
Bills and her co-workers began to sexually harass her about a month after
Ms. Bills was hired, and that this harassment continued for about six
months. "
3
Ms. Dick claimed the harassment was spearheaded by Ms. Bills and
three female coworkers. 1 4 Ms. Dick's allegations of the harassment
included episodes where one of her co-workers, Ms. Camie Hinkle,
would approach Ms. Bills and another female co-worker from behind
and make "sexual gestures with her body toward them.""' 5 Ms. Hinkle
would also place her foot in Ms. Bills' lap and say, "Yo buff b*tch. How
does that feel? Yo, buff b*tch. You like that."'"1 6 Ms. Hinkle also hung
a replica of a penis from the ceiling and brought a pillow into the office,
on which she and other co-workers would kneel when making references
to oral sex.17
However, the only gestures directed toward Ms. Dick involved two
attempts by Ms. Hinkle to pinch Ms. Dick's breasts, but Ms. Dick told
her to "get away" from her.'18 In addition, Ms. Hinkle once shoved a
replica of a penis in Ms. Dick's face while they were visiting a novelty
sex shop over the lunch hour. 1 9 Other allegations include another co-
worker pointing to a collection of stuffed cats on Ms. Dick's desk and
saying she had a "pussy;" another questioning Ms. Dick about a sex toy
used by lesbians; and the fact that Ms. Dick was repeatedly referred to as
"Ivanna Dick" or "Granny Dick" on a regular basis.
120
At trial, the district court granted summary judgment for PDC re-
garding Ms. Dick's Title VII hostile work environment same-sex har-
assment claims because Ms. Dick had failed to prove the harassment was
110. See id. at 1265.
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because of her sex. 12 ' The district court required Ms. Dick to show that
there was both credible evidence that her harassers were homosexual and
that they were motivated by sexual desire in order to meet Oncale's first
evidentiary route.1 22 The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that a showing
that Ms. Dick's harassers were motivated by sexual desire was enough to
satisfy the causation requirement.
23
B. Holding
The Tenth Circuit noted all three "evidentiary routes" laid out in
Oncale, and concluded that Ms. Dick relied on the first route in making
her case, which required a showing that her harassers sexually desired
her. 124 The court ceded that at "first blush," the first evidentiary route
suggests the requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate that her harasser
was a homosexual. 25 In eliminating this requirement, the court noted
that the first route clearly encompasses conduct that is motivated by sex-
ual desire. 26 It arrived at this conclusion because the Oncale Court pref-
aced its discussion of the other two evidentiary routes by explicitly stat-
ing that they do not require a showing of sexual desire. 127 It stated, "[i]t
directly follows, then, that the Court considered conduct that was moti-
vated by sexual desire to meet the requirements under the first eviden-
tiary route.'
2 8
The Tenth Circuit asserted that a plaintiff need not demonstrate that
her harasser is a homosexual in order to establish that the harassment was
motivated by sexual desire. 129 It reasoned that often, a heterosexual ha-
rasser may nonetheless propose sexual activity with a victim in a harass-
ing manner.1 30 In such circumstances, there would be no corroborating
evidence beyond the harassment itself that the harasser was a homosex-
ual, yet the harassment would still be a result of the harasser's sexual
desire.' 3' The Court noted that in such situations, proving the sexual
orientation of a person could be extremely difficult.
32
Despite this holding, the question still remained whether Ms. Dick
had provided a genuine issue of material fact as to whether her harassers
were motivated by sexual desire. 33 The Court initially noted that the
district court, in granting summary judgment to PDC, relied heavily on
121. Id. at 1262.
122. See id. at 1264.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1264; see also supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
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evidence that Ms. Dick was harassed because her co-workers disliked
her.134 Such evidence included statements from Ms. Dick's own deposi-
tion to the effect that she thought her co-workers would just do "things
like that" to upset her.135
The Tenth Circuit, however, reasoned that while the evidence could
support a finding that Ms. Dick was harassed because she was not liked,
a reasonable jury could also find that she was harassed because of sexual
desire. 136 As evidence, the Court cited the incidents wherein Ms. Hinkle
attempted to pinch Ms. Dick's breasts, as well as Ms. Hinkle's same-sex
advancements toward Ms. Bills (placing her foot in her lap), which could
suggest that any advances made toward Ms. Dick were also a result of
sexual desire. 137
While the Tenth Circuit did find that a question of material fact ex-
isted as to whether Ms. Dick was sexually harassed, it was equally quick
to point out that the question of whether the harassment was "severe or
pervasive enough" to qualify as discrimination under Title VII had yet to
be answered. 138 Therefore, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's
decision that her harassment was not based on sex because the court used
the wrong test, and remanded the case for a determination of whether the
discrimination was based on sex, as well as whether the harassment was
severe enough to create an abusive work environment. 1
39
IV. ANALYSIS
It is difficult to find much leeway in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services's 140 holding. 141 Indeed, despite the variations in the different
circuit interpretations of the first evidentiary route, they all share the
same underlying element, which is a showing that the harasser was moti-
vated by sexual desire. 142 Some circuits, in order to find sexual desire,
additionally require that the plaintiff show that the harasser is a homo-
sexual. 143  By avoiding this additional requirement, the Tenth Circuit
established in Dick v. Phone Directories Co.'A a more practical and
theoretically stable burden of proof than its sister circuits.145
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1266.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1267.
140. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
141. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80-81 (outlining the possible ways a same-sex plaintiff could prove
discrimination because of sex.).
142. See id at 80.
143. See Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1009 (7th Cir. 1999); LaDay v. Cata-
lyst Tech. Inc, 302 F.3d 474, 478 (5th Cir. 2002).
144. 397 F.3d 1256 (10th Cir. 2005).
145. See Drobac, supra note 89, at 1278-81.
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This Part will first explain the limitations that Oncale's holding
placed on same-sex harassment claims by focusing on the causation ele-
ment of the harassment claim. It will then illustrate why, within the
framework of such limitations, the Tenth Circuit's approach to Oncale's
first evidentiary route most adequately meets Title VII's broad goals.
This is because first; a showing of the harasser's homosexuality is both
difficult to prove and is inconclusive of a finding that the harasser sexu-
ally desired the victim. Second, the Tenth Circuit's broad interpretation
of the facts set a low standard to satisfy the controversial causation re-
quirement and shifts the focus back to the effects of the harassment
rather than its cause. Finally, this Part will suggest a further method to
expand the reach of Oncale's holding to the greatest number of same-sex
claims by implicitly including the social construction of gender within
the meaning of "because of sex."
A. The Limitations in "Because of Sex"
On its face Oncale purports to expand Title VII by expressly recog-
nizing same-sex harassment claims. 146 However, several authors have
argued that Oncale's emphasis on causation actually severely limits the
scope of sexual hostile work environment claims, both same-sex and
otherwise. 147 One example of Oncale's restrictive effect on same-sex
claims can be seen in the final result of Oncale itself. 148 On remand,
Joseph Oncale found his case had been rendered toothless because his
harassers were not homosexual, and thus were not motivated by sexual
desire. 149 The other two evidentiary avenues-a showing of hostility to
all men in general and that men and women were treated disparately-
were also closed to Mr. Oncale, because he worked on an all-male oil
platform.
150
Jennifer Drobac, in her article The Oncale Opinion: A Pansexual
Response, went further, looking beyond the final result in Oncale and
asserting that an entire subsection of sexual harassment claims-not only
same-sex harassment claims-exist that are arguably no longer action-
able under Oncale.151 She argued that Oncale invalidated claims wherein
workplace behavior such as hanging nude pictures of women every-
where, was sexual harassment. 15 2 Such behavior pre-Oncale was found
to be actionable under Title VII because it created a barrier to women in
the workplace by sending a message that women do not belong, and can
146. Id. at 1279.
147. See Hill, supra note 13, at 160; Drobac, supra note 89, at 1270.
148. See Hill, supra note 13, at 162.
149. Id. Note that in the Fifth Circuit, a plaintiff bringing a same-sex harassment suit must
furnish "credible evidence" that his harassers are homosexual. See supra note 106 and accompany-
ing text.
150. Hill, supra note 13, at 162.
151. Drobac, supra note 89, at 1277.
152. Id.
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only belong if they are willing to subvert to the gender stereotype hang-
ing on the wall. 53 Ms. Drobac reasoned that these claims were action-
able because it was the behavior itself that discriminated and an inquiry
into the motivation of the harasser was unnecessary.l
5 4
B. Why the Tenth Circuit's Approach Best Satisfies Title VII's Goals
The Supreme Court has held that the two main goals of Title VII are
to prevent and remedy employment discrimination in the workplace.
155
In addition, the Court has suggested that Title VII aims to encourage
employees to bring sexual harassment complaints to their employer's
attention. 156 By making the elements of a sexual harassment claim more
difficult to meet in Oncale, the Court failed to effectuate these previously
articulated goals. However, the Tenth Circuit adopted a broad interpre-
tation of Oncale's requirements, and in so doing, was able to better sat-
isfy Title VII's goal of addressing all types of employment discrimina-
tion than the circuits who strictly interpreted Oncale.
1. The Dangers of Requiring a Showing of Homosexuality
The requirement that the plaintiffs of a same-sex harassment case
show that their harassers were homosexual can have unjust results, some
of which were emphasized in the final result of Oncale itself.157 Other
problems with such a requirement include the possibility that only bona
fide homosexuals could ever be found guilty of sexual harassment in
same-sex cases. 158 In reality, many self-proclaimed heterosexuals "may
find erotic and sexually stimulating the same-sex sexual advances and
aggressions [such as those] committed against Joseph Oncale.' 59
A second problem with such a requirement, one that the Tenth Cir-
cuit articulated clearly, is that proving homosexuality is often very diffi-
cult.' 60 In illustrating the problems associated with discerning what ex-
actly constitutes credible evidence of homosexuality, one author cited a
case where a woman discovered, after twenty-five years of marriage to a
man, that she was a lesbian. 16' Alternatively, people who appear more
masculine or feminine than "traditional" gender stereotypes dictate may
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1276.
155. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998).
156. See Ann M. Henry, Comment, Employer and Employee Reasonableness Regarding Re-
taliation Under the Ellerth/Faragher Affirmative Defense, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 553, 568.
157. See supra notes 148-50.
158. Drobac, supra note 89, at 1280.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1280-81; see also supra Part III.B (discussing the Tenth Circuit's justifications in
eliminating the requirement that the harasser be homosexual).
161. Drobac, supra note 89, at 1280-81.
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be more susceptible to erroneously being labeled a homosexual when in
fact they are not.
1 62
These examples demonstrate that limiting actionable same-sex
claims that follow Oncale's first evidentiary route to those that can fur-
nish credible evidence that the harasser is a homosexual exclude an array
of potential claims. Under such a requirement, it is possible for same-sex
harassers who are not homosexual to avoid liability. In addition, the
ambiguity of people's sexuality often makes finding credible evidence a
very difficult task. By eliminating such a requirement, the Tenth Circuit
broadened the scope of same-sex harassment suits that are actionable
through Oncale's first evidentiary route.
2. A Return to the Seventh Circuit's "Sex Per Se" Standard?
The Court's approach in Oncale has been characterized as one that
fundamentally rejected the Seventh Circuit's "sex per se" standard,
which was articulated in Doe v. City of Belleville.163 While the Seventh
Circuit found any sexual conduct satisfied the causal requirement of Title
VII's "because of sex" language, the Oncale Court stressed a much more
stringent causation requirement.164 The former standard allowed the Sev-
enth Circuit to focus on the harassment itself, rather than the superfluous
question of why the harassment was perpetrated in the first place. 65 In
addition to rejecting the requirement that the plaintiff offer credible evi-
dence that her harasser is a homosexual, the Tenth Circuit, with its ex-
pansive interpretation of the facts in determining whether the harassment
was motivated by sexual desire, was able to reconcile the Seventh Cir-
cuit's emphasis on the effects of the harassment with the tougher causa-
tion requirement in Oncale.
Specifically, the Court interpreted seemingly mild incidents as in-
dicative of sexual desire. 66 This includes the "same-sex sexual conduct"
that Ms. Bills and Ms. Hinkle engaged in around the workplace.167 It
also includes Ms. Hinkle's attempts to touch Ms. Dick's breasts.168 It is
significant that the Tenth Circuit found harassing behavior that was mo-
tivated by sexual desire in acts that merely suggest sexual desire because
it mirrors the language used by the Seventh Circuit in Doe.169 Such a
162. Id. at 1281.
163. Hill, supra note 13, at 151-52; see also supra Part II.A (discussing the Seventh Circuit's
opinion in Doe).





169. Compare Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 580 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Frankly, we find
it hard to think of a situation in which someone intentionally grabs another's testicles for reasons
entirely unrelated to that person's gender.") with Dick, 397 F.3d at 1266 ("Ms. Hinlde touched, on
more than one occasion, one of the most intimate parts of Ms. Dick's body-an act seldom carried out
without some sort of sexual motivation.").
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holding makes meeting Oncale's causal requirement of the first eviden-
tiary route more plausible in the Tenth Circuit than in other circuits.
This intimates that in the Tenth Circuit, a similar "sex per se" stan-
dard as the now-defunct one the Seventh Circuit employed in Doe is pre-
sent. Granted, there are several differences. The most notable is that
under Oncale, it is necessary to demonstrate the harasser's motivation by
sexual desire, and a mere showing of sexually-related conduct is not
enough to satisfy Title VII.'70 However, the Tenth Circuit reconciled this
new requirement with the Seventh Circuit's broad causal standard by
finding that any sexual conduct 71 could be indicative of harassment mo-
tivated by sexual desire. Instead of finding conduct that is sexual in na-
ture satisfies the causal requirement, the Tenth Circuit found that any
conduct indicative of sexual desire satisfies the causal requirement.
1 72
The low Tenth Circuit standard for satisfying the causal requirement
allows for more focus on effects of the harassment itself. Thus, a court
can take the time to examine thoroughly a much more pertinent question:
how severe and pervasive is the harassment? This is a more desirable
outcome because the material question becomes one of whether harass-
ment occurred in the first place, not why the harassment occurred. This
is consistent with a main Title VII goal: avoiding harm to protected
classes in the workplace. 73 By focusing on the effects of the behavior in
question rather than the reason why it is happening, courts are more able
to address any harm that discriminating behavior may inflict.
C. Beyond Sex
This article has argued that the Tenth Circuit interpreted Oncale's
language in an expansive way.' 74 However, it is possible to further ex-
pand Oncale to reach the greatest number of harassment victims. 175 To-
day, there remain many sex discrimination claims that are not directly
causally linked to the victim's biological sex-and are therefore not ac-
tionable under Title VII-but still result in an undeniably hostile envi-
ronment. Often these people are harassed because of their perceived
gender role or their sexual orientation. 176
170. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
171. "Sexual conduct," as used by the Tenth Circuit in Dick, refers to conduct that is sugges-
tive of sexual intercourse. See Dick, 397 F.3d at 1266 ("The record contains sufficient evidence
from which a jury could find that her harassers' conduct was motivated by sexual desire .... [For
example,] Ms. Hinkle and Ms. Bills engaged in same-sex sexual conduct with other people in the
workplace .. .[and] Ms. Hinkle allegedly rubbed Ms. Bills' crotch while asking Ms. Bills if she
liked it .....
172. Id.
173. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999) ("The statute's 'primary
objective' is 'a prophylactic one'; it aims, chiefly, 'not to provide redress but to avoid harm."').
174. See supra Part III.B (discussing the Tenth Circuit's analysis in Dick).
175. See supra Part IV.A (discussing various writers' criticisms of the Oncale opinion).
176. See Drobac, supra note 89, at 1280-84.
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This remainder of this article will argue that Oncale's decision to
define the word "sex" to only include one's biological sex and not one's
gender has resulted in limiting potential sexual harassment claims. It
will demonstrate how this narrow definition conflicts with the underlying
arguments for the sexual harassment doctrine as well as the Court's pre-
vious sexual harassment jurisprudence. Finally, it will suggest that a
broader interpretation of "sex" may create some actionable claims which
involve discrimination based on one's sexual orientation.
One of the strongest criticisms of Oncale stems from its narrow in-
terpretation of the word sex.17 7 Oncale's narrow interpretation of what
constitutes discrimination based on sex implies that the term "sex" refers
only to biological sex.178 The inherent danger in such a holding is that
while the Supreme Court may not choose to recognize discrimination
because of one's gender as sex discrimination, it is nonetheless true that
our culture has been conflating one's biological sex to one's gendered
behavior for centuries. 179 Same-sex harassment often occurs because the
harasser takes issue with the victim's failure to meet his or her traditional
gender role, and not his or her biological sex in the strictest sense.1
80
1. Conflict with Historical Arguments
By implicitly assuming in Oncale that all men are masculine and all
women are feminine, Justice Scalia effectively eliminated harassment
claims by effeminate men or masculine women. 18' Such a narrow inter-
pretation is at odds with both of the underlying arguments that originally
supported the recognition of a hostile environment sexual harassment
claim. First, feminists aimed to eliminate gender-based stereotyping.'
82
Feminists understood differences existed between men and women on a
physiological level, but resented (and continue to resent) the assumption
that such physical differences automatically resigned women to inferior
societal roles. 183 The sex of women was never the issue, it was the gen-
der roles that they were expected to fill because of their sex.' 84 By de-
claring that the harasser must have issue with the actual sex of the victim,
177. See id. at 1269.
178. See id. (arguing that the Oncale Court never used the word "gender," whereas in previous
opinions, it used "sex" and "gender" interchangeably); see also Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 ("The critical
issue, Title VII's text indicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous
terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed.") (quoting
Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)). This suggests that the
Oncale court believes that the only pertinent motivation for harassment is one's biological sex.
179. See Drobac, supra note 89, at 1281.
180. See id, at 1281-82.
181. Id.
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the Court fails to address motivations that might stem from disgust at a
victim's failure to meet traditional gender roles. 
8 5
Second, Oncale relied on an analogy to racial harassment in finding
that same-sex sexual harassment was viable under Title VII.186 In con-
doning the use of this racial analogy in the context of same-sex sexual
harassment, Justice Scalia wrote that, "in the related context of racial
discrimination in the workplace we have rejected any conclusive pre-
sumption that an employer will not discriminate against members of his
own race." 187 As Scalia himself recognized, it is entirely possible that a
racial harasser may use racial epithets against people of several races,
and still be guilty of racial discrimination. 188 In light of this reliance on
such an analogy, it is illogical to claim that a male sexual harasser who
harasses men based on their gender is not actionable under Title VII. 18 9
In such a situation, the environment, such as one inundated by racial epi-
thets, is still hostile even though it is more likely the harasser was moti-
vated by the victim's gender rather than his or her sex.
2. Conflict with Precedent
Not only does the narrow interpretation of sex in Oncale fail as a
policy matter, it seriously conflicts with another of the Supreme Court's
own cases, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 90 In Price Waterhouse, the
plaintiff Ann Hopkins was denied a partnership in an accounting firm
based in part on her failure to act "feminine."' 9' The Supreme Court, in
an opinion written by Justice Brennan, found that her claim was action-
able, because she was able to fulfill the "because of sex" requirement by
showing that her employer relied on gender-based considerations in com-
ing to its decision regarding her promotion. 92 Justice Brennan wrote,
"Congress' intent to forbid employers to take gender into account in
making employment decisions appears on the face of the statute."'
193
This strongly suggests that Justice Brennan thought that gender consid-
erations were included in the word "sex' in Title VII.
In addition to embracing gender in the definition of sex, the Price
Waterhouse majority specifically decried the need for the plaintiff to
185. See Drobac, supra note 89, at 1281-82. See also Franke, supra note 21, at 34-35. Ms.
Franke, one of the leading feminist scholars today, has argued that in addition to reinforcing the
"gender hierarchy" in the workplace, sexual harassment has a dual aim: to produce masculine (het-
ero)sexual men, and feminine (hetero)sexual women. Id. Therefore, according to Ms. Franke's
paradigm, individuals of either gender who refuse or fail to conform to stereotypes can be victims of
sexual harassment. Id.
186. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78-79.
187. Id. at 78.
188. See Drobac, supra note 89, at 1279.
189. Id.
190. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
191. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235.
192. Id. at 241-42.
193. Id. at 239.
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identify a "precise causal role" in the discriminatory action. 94 The Court
supported its broad definition of causation by noting that Congress re-
jected an amendment that would prohibit discrimination "solely because
of" sex. 195 This conflicts with Oncale's explicit emphasis on causation.
3. Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation?
Courts across the country agree that discriminating based on one's
sexual orientation is "a noxious practice, deserving of censure and op-
probrium," and is "morally reprehensible."' 196 However, Congress has
repeatedly rejected attempts to amend current legislation to include a
cause of action for discrimination based on sexual orientation.197 A leg-
islative solution may be difficult to attain at this point in time.
However, many of the claims that legislation forbidding discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation would address can potentially become
actionable through a broad interpretation of the term sex. This is because
at least in part, gay men and women are discriminated against because
they fail to meet the gender stereotypes that their sex requires them to
meet.' 98 Although such a solution does not address the entire spectrum
of discrimination based on sexual orientation, it potentially provides re-
dress to gay men and women who are harassed largely because they fail
to act in a sufficiently feminine or masculine manner.
CONCLUSION
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services'99 limits the ability of many
to bring same-sex hostile work environment suits although it purported to
expand Title VII. However, under the Tenth Circuit's broad interpreta-
tion of the first evidentiary route in Dick v. Phone Directories Co.,200 the
same-sex plaintiff has a better chance of successfully combating work-
place sexual harassment. Despite this step forward, there remain other
methods for effectively addressing all sexual discrimination in the work-
place, but it would require the Supreme Court to take a more expansive
approach to the term "sex" under Title VII than it articulated in Oncale.
Katherine Roush*
194. Id. at 241.
195. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
196. Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 265 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Simon-
ton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000) and Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe Inc., 194
F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999)) (internal quotations omitted).
197. See, e.g., Bibby, 260 F.3d at 265.
198. See Franke, supra note 21, at 35.
199. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
200. 397 F.3d 1256 (10th Cir. 2005).
* J.D. Candidate, May 2007, University of Denver Sturm College of Law.
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ERISA's CASUALTIES: FORMER EMPLOYEES DUPED INTO
EARLY RETIREMENT-WITH FRIENDS LIKE ERISA WHO
NEEDS ENEMIES?
INTRODUCTION
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA")
is a federal statutory scheme that regulates most voluntary group pension
and health plans in private industry.2 One of the main purposes of
ERISA is to "promote the interests of employees and their beneficiaries
in employment benefit plans ' 3 and protect against private sector mis-
management of employee benefit plans.4
However, ERISA provides only limited remedies compared to pre-
viously available state law remedies.5 Essentially, ERISA permits the
recovery of benefits and possible attorney fees, but does not allow for
extra contractual or punitive damages, and precludes a trial by jury.6 As
construed, this comprehensive scheme, enacted for the benefit of em-
ployees, has turned out to shield employers and insurers more than those
it was designed to protect.7  In one commentator's opinion, Congress
must have been "asleep at the switch" when it stated that "ERISA's pre-
dominant purpose is to be the protection of the rights of beneficiaries of
medical and retirement plans while simultaneously eliminating tradi-
tional remedies.",
8
This article discusses the split among eight circuits as to the treat-
ment of a particular class of ERISA claimants who sometimes lack even
the limited remedies available under ERISA - former employees who
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
2. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Health Plans & Benefits, Employee Retirement Income Security Act
- ERISA, http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/health-plans/erisa.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2006); ERISA
covers both employee pension plans and employee welfare plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(l)-(3) (2000).
3. Ryan W. Greene, The Evolving Standard for ERISA Preemption of State Law Under
Recent United States Supreme Court Precedent, FIND LAW, July 1, 1999,
http://library.findlaw.com/1999/JulI/126249.html. More than 85% of American workers have
private health insurance plans that are affected by ERISA. Id.
4. Id. (noting that in 1963 when the Studebaker Automotive plant closed its doors, it left
over 10,000 employees without pension benefits because the plan was inadequately funded).
5. Hon. William M. Acker, Jr., Can the Courts Rescue ERISA?, 29 CUMB. L. REv. 285,287,
295 (1998) (noting that extra-contractual damages and jury trials are unavailable under ERISA); see
Drinkwater v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 846 F.2d 821, 825 (1st Cir. 1988); Blake v. Unionmutual Stock
Life Ins. Co. of Am., 906 F.2d 1525, 1526 (1 th Cir. 1990).
6. Acker, supra note 5, at 295 (noting that since Congress did not mention whether disputes
were to be resolved by a jury or judge, this left the courts to decide whether jury trials are appropri-
ate in ERISA actions, the courts have determined that they are not available); see, e.g., Adams v.
Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., 149 F.3d 1156, 1158 (10th Cir. 1998).
7. Acker, supra note 5, at 287 (noting that the "real beneficiaries of ERISA, if any, turn out
to be the fiduciaries, the administrators, the employers and the insurers.").
8. Id. at 295.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W RE VIEW
claim that their termination was fraudulently induced to deprive them of
more valuable benefits than had they remained employed. Five circuits
avoid the prospect of a remediless wrong by allowing the "but for" test
for standing under ERISA,9 while the other three preclude defrauded
retirees from seeking redress based on claims of fraudulent inducement
into early retirement with inferior benefits.'l
Part I of this article offers a general background as to the purpose of
ERISA and an interpretation of its two forms of preemption: conflict and
complete. Part II discusses the split among the circuits as to the issue of
standing for former employees to sue under ERISA, and how the Tenth
Circuit has sided in its recent decision of Felix v. Lucent Technologies,
Inc. 1" Part III addresses the Tenth Circuit's Felix decision and its reason-
ing for siding with the minority view. Part IV addresses the lack of
remedies for former employees and suggests what Congress and the Su-
preme Court might do to make ERISA more true to its original purpose.
This article concludes by underscoring the particular unfairness to former
employees and no doubt unintended benefits to employers who mistreat
their workers.
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
"Congress enacted ERISA to 'protect . . . the interests of partici-
pants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries' by setting out
substantive regulatory requirements for employee benefit plans and 'to
provide for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Fed-
eral courts.""' 12 The central purpose of ERISA is to provide a "uniform
regulatory" scheme covering employee pension and welfare plans.
13
Toward that end, ERISA includes expansive conflict preemption provi-
sions "to ensure that employee benefit plan regulation would be 'exclu-
sively a federal concern.""' 14 As construed, ERISA provides the sole
remedy for those with standing to sue under it.' 5 ERISA involves two
preemption provisions' 6 and the distinction between the concept of com-
9. Felix v. Lucent Tech. Inc., 387 F.3d 1146, 1159 (10th Cir. 2004) (stating the First, Sec-
ond, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits allow former employees to gain standing to sue under ERISA
while using a "but for" test for standing); see also Adamson v. Armco Inc., 44 F.3d 650, 654-55 (8th
Cir. 1995); Swinney v. Gen. Motors Corp., 46 F.3d 512, 518-19 (6th Cir. 1995); Mullins v. Pfizer,
Inc., 23 F.3d 663, 667-68 (2d Cir. 1994); Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 14 F.3d 697, 702-03 (1st Cir.
1994); Christopher v. Mobil Oil Corp., 950 F.2d 1209, 1220-21 (5th Cir. 1992).
10. Felix, 387 F.3d at 1159; see also Raymond v. Mobil Oil Corp., 983 F.2d 1528, 1535 (10th
Cir. 1993); Sanson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 966 F.2d 618, 619 (11th Cir. 1992); Mitchell v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 896 F.2d 463, 466 (10th Cir. 1990); Santon v. Gulf Oil Corp., 792 F.2d 432, 433 (4th Cir.
1986).
11. 387 F.3d 1146 (10th Cir. 2005).
12. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)
(2000)).
13. Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 208.
14. Id. (citing Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981)).
15. Id. at 208-209.
16. Felix v. Lucent Tech. Inc., 387 F.3d 1146, 1153-54 (10t' Cir. 2004).
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plete preemption under Section 502(a) and Section 514's "conflict pre-
emption" is critical to understanding courts' application of the preemp-
tion doctrine.
17
Judicial construction of available remedies has resulted in very lim-
ited remedies for claims subject to ERISA. While many courts have
recognized this injustice, they profess helplessness to do anything about
it. 18 Contrary to ERISA's original purpose, it has become an "impene-
trable shield[] that insulate[s] plan sponsors from any meaningful liabil-
ity for negligent or malfeasant acts committed against plan beneficiar-
ies." 19 Ironically, the courts that interpret this statute are exempt from
ERISA.2°
Judges have been decrying the restriction of available remedies and
lack of deterrents to misbehaving insurers and employers, but they do no
more than appeal to Congress to restrain the law.2' In the Ninth Circuit's
Olson v. General Dynamics Corp.,22 Judge Reinhardt, recognizing that
ERISA preempted plaintiffs state law claims, found the plaintiffs lack
of a federal or state remedy unfortunate.23 Judge Reinhardt noted that
prior to the passage of ERISA, the plaintiff would have been entitled to
state remedies for his fraud and misrepresentation claims; unfortunately,
his lack of remedy is not unique. 24
More recently, in Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila,25 the United States
Supreme Court held that the respondent's state claims fell within the
scope of Section 502(a) of ERISA, and therefore were completely pre-
empted, justifying removal to federal court.26 Justice Ginsburg notes with
concern that "virtually all state remedies are preempted," and since very
few federal remedies are available, a "regulatory vacuum exists. 27
However, Congress has taken no action.
17. Id.
18. See Olson v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 960 F.2d 1418, 1423-25 (9th Cir. 1991) (Reinhardt,
J., concurring); Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 222 (Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., concurring).
19. Difelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 456 (3d Cir. 2003) (Becker, J., concur-
ring).
20. "The provisions of this [title] [ERISA] shall not apply to any employee benefit plan if...
a governmental plan ... or a church plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(l)-(2) (2000); see 29 U.S.C. §
1002(32)-(33) (2000).
21. See Sanson 966 F.2d at 623 (Birch, J., dissenting); Difelice, 346 F.3d at 452; Aetna
Health, 542 U.S. at 222.
22. 960 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1991).
23. Olson, 960 F.2d at 1423.
24. Id.
25. 542 U.S. 200 (2004).
26. Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 222.
27. Id
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A. Section 51428 Conflict Preemption Under ERISA
Section 514 provides in pertinent part that ERISA "shall supersede
any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan covered by ERISA.,,29 A State law relates to an
ERISA plan "if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan
' 30
and is therefore preempted unless it falls within an exception of Section
514.31 This broadly-worded provision has been repeatedly observed as
"clearly expansive" by the Supreme Court,32 stretching and contracting
like a rubber band.33 However, the Court has also simultaneously recog-
nized that the "term 'relate to' cannot be . . . 'extend[ed] to the furthest
stretch of its indeterminacy' or else 'for all practical purposes preemption
will never run its course.', 34 Essentially, preemption means "that once
state remedies are eliminated, ERISA provides the only remedy, which is
either a pallid remedy or no remedy.,
35
Judge Becker of the Third Circuit has taken notice of the mischief
that ERISA's broad preemption brings, noting that:
Lower courts have struggled to maintain some semblance of equity
notwithstanding the enormous breadth of the preemption test.., the
price of all this has been descent into a Serbonian bog wherein judges
are forced to don logical blinders and split the linguistic atom to de-
cide even the most routine cases.
36
ERISA remedies pale in comparison to state law claims that are now
preempted for relating to a plan.37  Courts, in determining whether a
State law is related to ERISA, and is thus preempted, look to the objec-
tives of ERISA and the nature and effect the state law has on the ERISA
plans.38
This type of federal preemption under Section 514 is a defense and
cannot by itself establish federal question jurisdiction. Thus, it is not
sufficient to authorize removal to the federal court system.39 On the other
28. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2000).
29. Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 141 (2001).
30. Id. (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983)).
31. Some courts have recognized an exception to Section 514 ERISA conflict preemption
occurs when the "state law has only a tenuous, remote, or peripheral connection with covered plans,
as is the case with many laws of general applicability." Felix, 387 F.3d at 1154.
32. Id. at 1153.
33. Acker, supra note 5, at 289 (noting that "[a] survey of cases indicates that the words
'relate to' stretch and contract like a rubber band").
34. Felix, 387 F.3d at 1153 (citing Eglehoff, 532 U.S. at 146).
35. Acker, supra note 5, at 287 (calling ERISA preemption "super duper preemption" because
ERISA affords plaintiffs either pallid remedies or no remedies).
36. Difelice, 346 F.3d at 454. "A Serbonian bog is a mess from which there is no way of
extricating oneself." Id. at 454 n. 1.
37. Jayne E. Zanglein, Closing the Gap: Safeguarding Participants'Rights by Expanding the
Federal Common Law ofERISA, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 671, 671 (1994).
38. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 147.
39. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987).
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hand, Section 502(a),40 as discussed below, provides a civil enforcement
cause of action that completely preempts a state cause of action seeking
the same relief.41 Thus, a claim falling within the scope of 502(a) pre-
sents a federal question providing grounds for removal.42 If the plaintiff
moves to remand, the defendant will only need to show a substantial
federal claim.43
B. Section 502(a) Complete Preemption under ERISA
The preemptive reach of ERISA's civil enforcement provision, Sec-
tion 502(a), is powerful. 44 When state laws are preempted under Section
514, remedies may be available under Section 502(a).45 ERISA provides
a federal cause of action under Section 502(a) which contains six subsec-
tions that determine who can bring a civil action. 6 In Metropolitan Life
v. Taylor,47 the Court held that ERISA Section 502(a) converts state
causes of action into federal claims "for the purposes of determining the
propriety of removal. 48  ERISA's civil enforcement mechanism has
"extraordinary preemptive power" that "converts an ordinary state com-
mon law complaint into one stating a federal claim as an exception to the
well-pleaded complaint rule. ' 49  Claims falling within the scope of
ERISA Section 502(a) are thus removable to federal court.5 °
Defendants (employers, administrators, or fiduciaries) want ERISA
to govern the claims against them because of ERISA's severely limited
or absent remedies. 51 However, the plaintiff-employee would rather pro-
ceed under a state law theory that "provides what ERISA was supposed
to provide. 52 When complete preemption does not apply, federal district
40. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2000).
41. Giles v. Nylcare Health Plans, Inc., 172 F.3d 332, 336-37 (5th Cir. 1999). Section 502(a)
provides a cause of action to any plan beneficiary or participant to recover benefits due under the
terms of the pension plan, to enforce rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify rights to future
benefits under the terms of the plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2000).
42. Giles, 172 F.3d at 337. The Court further expanded the doctrine of complete preemption
in Aetna Health Inc., v. Davila, stating "where no legal duty (state or federal) independent of ERISA
or the plan terms is violated, then the suit falls 'within the scope of' ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B)... then
the individual's cause of action is completely preempted by ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B)." Felix, 387 F.3d
at 1155 (citing Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004)).
43. Giles, 172 F.3d at 337.
44. Section 502(a) provides a cause of action to any plan beneficiary or participant to recover
benefits due under the terms of the pension plan, to enforce rights under the terms of the plan, or to
clarify rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2000).
45. Remedies available under ERISA are liquidated damages, benefits owed to the participant
under the terms of the plan, enforcement of rights under the plan, to clarify future benefits, equitable
relief, and to enforce provisions of the plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
46. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
47. 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
48. Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 201; see also Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557,
560 (1968).
49. Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 209 (quoting Metro. Life, 481 U.S. at 65-66).
50. Metro. Life, 481 U.S. at 66; Giles, 172 F.3d at 337.
51. Acker, supra note 5, at 287.
52. Id.
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courts are without removal jurisdiction. 3 Therefore, they cannot resolve
any dispute regarding conflict preemption, and must remand to state
court, where the preemption issue can be determined. 54 It is likely the
court will dismiss state law claims under Section 514. In a diversity ac-
tion, the federal court could determine that there was no complete pre-
emption under Section 502(a), and then also dismiss state law claims as
preempted by Section 514.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON FORMER EMPLOYEE ERISA STANDING
The split among the circuits appears to rest principally upon their
interpretations of the Supreme Court's discussion of who is a "partici-
pant" with standing to sue under ERISA in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
v. Birch. 56 A plaintiff must be within the statutory definition of "partici-
pant" to fall within the scope of Section 502(a)(1) - (3), in order to bring
a suit under ERISA.57 Former employees must qualify as participants to
file suit for fraudulent inducement into early retirement, in hopes of re-
storing the benefits they would have been entitled to.58 In Firestone, the
Court observed that a former employee can only gain participant stand-
ing if they have a "reasonable expectation of returning to covered em-
ployment or who have a colorable claim to vested benefits ...."59
The majority of circuits have interpreted Firestone broadly, not as
the only way for a plaintiff to have standing to sue, but as one avenue.
60
Looking at congressional intent and the original purposes of ERISA, the
majority of circuits feel that a grave injustice would be served if Fire-
stone were narrowly interpreted as the only way a plaintiff could be a
participant. 61  In contrast, the minority circuits narrowly interpret Fire-
stone to hold that participant status is both a question of subject matter
jurisdiction and standing, finding that Section 502 gives the court juris-
diction only if plaintiffs standing as participant is as defined in Fire-
stone.
62
53. Felix, 387 F.3d at 1158.
54. Id.; see also Metro. Life, 481 U.S. at 63 (noting that a state cause of action that is pre-
empted by ERISA and within the scope of 502(a) of ERISA might fall within the Avco rule); Warner
v. Ford Motor Co., 46 F.3d 531, 534 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that Section 514 does not create a
federal cause of action itself); Giles, 172 F.3d at 336 (holding that state claims that are not within the
scope of 502(a), even if preempted are not removable).
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000).
56. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
57. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 117-18; see 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(1)-(6) (2000).
58. Felix, 387 F.3d at 1158.
59. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 117 (internal quotes omitted) (quoting Saladino v. I.L.G.W.U. Nat'l
Ret. Fund, 754 F.2d 473, 476 (2d Cir. 1985)).
60. See, e.g., Swinney v. Gen. Motors Corp., 46 F.3d 512, 518 (6th Cir. 1995).
61. See Swinney, 46 F.3d at 518; Christopher v. Mobil Oil Corp., 950 F.2d 1209, 1221 (5th
Cir. 1992).
62. See Felix, 387 F.3d at 1160 n. 14 (holding that the "requirement of [section] 502 is 'both a
standing and a subject matter jurisdictional requirement."') (citing Santon v. Gulf Oil Corp., 792
F.2d 432,434 (4th Cir. 1986)); see also Miller v. Rite Aid Corp., 334 F.3d 335, 340 (3d Cir. 2003).
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. As former employees who are voluntarily terminated from their
employment based on their employer's and plan administrator's misrep-
resentations, they cannot achieve participant standing under ERISA to
file a claim.63 Since the plaintiffs are no longer employees, they cannot
recover for benefits owed to them or enforce their rights under the plan,
nor do they have any right to future benefits.64 Therefore, to recover
benefits that they would have received had they not been fraudulently
induced into retirement, they must achieve participant status via another
avenue. 65 A "but for" test for standing has been accepted by the majority
of circuits.66 This test is based upon the theory that "but for" the defen-
dant's wrongful actions, the plaintiffs would have still been participants
under the plan.67 However, circuits are split over whether plaintiffs have
standing to bring a cause of action under ERISA by making a "but for"
claim.
68
A. The Majority View: Fraud Confers "But For" Test for Standing Un-
der ERISA
Five circuits now permit former employees to sue under ERISA, if
plaintiffs can make a "but for" claim for standing through allegations of
premature termination of employment induced by employer fraud.69
In Christopher v. Mobil Oil Corp. ,70 the plaintiff was unable to
achieve standing to sue because he could not show a colorable claim for
vested benefits or a reasonable expectation of returning to covered em-
ployment.7' The Fifth Circuit felt that Firestone could not "reduce the
standing question to a straightforward formula applicable in all cases."
72
It added, "[this] seems particularly so in cases involving allegations of
discharge. 73 Rather, the court observed, "it would seem more logical to
say that but for the employer's conduct alleged to be in violation of
ERISA, the employee would be a current employee with a reasonable
",74expectation of receiving benefits ....





68. Id. (noting the Fourth, Eleventh, and Tenth Circuits are in the minority and have rejected
the "but for" exception in determining participant standing).
69. Felix, 387 F.3d at 1159 (noting that the "First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Eight Circuits
have held that former employees may sue under ERISA if they make a 'but for' claim of this sort").
70. 950 F.2d 1209 (5th Cir. 1992) (dealing with the issue of former employees who claimed
deprivation of benefits through fraudulent inducement to retire).
71. Christopher v. Mobil Oil Corp., 950 F.2d 1209, 1221 (5th Cir. 1992); see Firestone, 489
U.S. at 101.
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In Vartanian v. Monsanto Co.,75 the First Circuit held that former
employees have standing to sue under ERISA if they can show that "but
for" their employer's wrongful conduct, they would have been a partici-
pant for purposes of standing.76 The Vartanian court held that an em-
ployee who was denied a reasonable opportunity to make an informed
decision about when to retire, as a result of his supervisor's misrepresen-
tations and the fact that he received benefits, could not "be used to de-
prive him of 'participant' status .... ,,7 Determining that the former em-
ployee had standing to sue under ERISA, the First Circuit notes that the
Supreme Court's discussion of Firestone states that the "term 'partici-
pant' was developed outside of the 'standing' context and therefore, does
not mandate a finding" that one who is not a participant because no
longer employed, has no standing to seek relief.
78
Examining the legislative history of ERISA, the Vartanian court
noted Congress' intent that the federal courts would "construe the Act's
jurisdictional requirements broadly in order to facilitate enforcement of
its remedial provisions . . . . ,,79 To find that the plaintiff lacked standing
to sue under ERISA would "frustrate Congress's intention to remove
jurisdictional and procedural obstacles to such claims," and deprive an
employee of standing "even where the employer's breach of fiduciary
duty takes the form of misrepresentations that induced the employee to
retire and receive the payment of benefits. 80
The Second Circuit, in Mullins v. Pfizer, Inc. 81 following the view
of the First and Fifth Circuits, adopted this same exception in the case of
former employees.82 The court held that it was "more consistent with
legislative intent to afford standing in the present context[,]" and fur-
thermore, that to "hold otherwise would have the anomalous effect of
allowing a fiduciary 'through its own malfeasance to defeat the em-
ployee' s standing."
83
75. 14 F.3d 697 (1st Cir. 1994).
76. Vartanian, 14 F.3d at 702.
77. Id. at 703.
78. Id. at 701 (citing Christopher, 950 F.2d at 1221 ("Firestone ... [cannot] be read to reduce
the standing question to a straightforward formula applicable in all cases.")).
79. Id. at 702 (noting that "[t]he enforcement provisions have been designed specifically to
provide ... participants and beneficiaries with broad remedies for redressing or preventing viola-
tions of the [Act].") (citing S. REP. No. 93-127, at 3 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4639,4871).
80. Id. (noting that a holding like this "would enable an employer to defeat the employee's
rights to sue for a breach of fiduciary duty by keeping his breach a well guarded secret until the
employee receives his benefits or, by distributing a lump sum ...before the employee can file
suit.").
81. 23 F.3d 663 (2d Cir. 1994).
82. Mullins, 23 F.3d at 668. The former employee in Mullins voluntarily retired because of
material misrepresentations by his plan administrator. Id. at 665.
83. Id. at 668 (agreeing with the First Circuit in its determination that the "basic standing
issue is whether the plaintiff is 'within the zone of interests ERISA was intended to protect[]"').
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The Eighth Circuit joined the majority view in Adamson v. Armco,
Inc.8 4 The Eighth Circuit recognized the plaintiffs standing when "'but
for the employer's conduct alleged to be in violation of ERISA,' the em-
ployee or former employee would be a plan participant.,
85
In Swinney v. General Motors, Corp.,86 the Sixth Circuit held that
"so long as a former employee would have been in a class eligible to
become a member of the plan but for the fiduciary's alleged breach of
duty, he 'may become eligible' for benefits under the plan and is there-
fore a 'participant' . . . for the purposes of standing. 87
Acknowledging the Tenth and Fourth Circuit holdings that a "per-
son who terminates his right to belong to a plan cannot be a 'participant'
in the plan, 88 the Swinney court adhered to the proposition that ERISA
was not intended to allow a "fiduciary to circumvent his ERISA-imposed
fiduciary duty in this manner., 8 9 The Swinney court also found that in
rejecting the "but for" tests for standing, the minority courts interpret the
Supreme Court's Firestone decision "too strictly,"90 observing that while
Firestone, although it provides guidance, "is not necessarily disposi-
tive."9'
B. The Minority View Rejects "But For" Test for Standing
The Tenth Circuit is illustrative of the minority view, rejecting the
"but for" claim and requiring former employees to have either an expec-
tation of returning to covered employment, or a "colorable claim to
vested benefits" to achieve participant status under the statute.92 The
Tenth Circuit's reasoning in its earlier decisions of Mitchell v. Mobil Oil
Corp.93 and Raymond v. Mobil Oil Corp.94 foretold its rejection of the
"but for" exception. The court found the early retiree in Mitchell without
participant standing under ERISA Section 502(a), reversing the jury's
finding of fraud and damages awarded.95 The court held that the defini-
tion of "participant" does not include former employees who received a
84. 44 F.3d 650, 654-55 (8th Cir. 1995) (adopting this exception in Howe v. Varity Corp., 36
F.3d 746 (8th Cir. 1994)).
85. Adamson, 44 F.3d at 654.
86. 46 F.3d 512 (6th Cir. 1995).
87. Swinney, 46 F.3d at 519.
88. Id. at 518 (recognizing that without this exception a "fiduciary could defeat an employee's
standing to bring an ERISA action by duping him into giving up his right to participate in the plan").
89. Id. at 519.
90. Id. (reemphasizing that Firestone should not be interpreted to "reduce the standing ques-
tion to a straightforward formula").
91. Id. at 518.
92. Felix, 387 F.3d at 1159.
93. 896 F.2d 463 (10th Cir. 1990).
94. 983 F.2d 1528 (10th Cir. 1993).
95. Mitchell, 896 F.2d at 474. The Tenth Circuit set aside a jury verdict of "$405,962.76 in
back-pay damages; $86,000 as compensation for the 20% reduction in Mr. Mitchell's lump-sum
benefit; and, $96,740.82 in front-pay damages." Id. at 466.
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lump-sum payment of all that had vested at the time they left covered
employment.
96
While Mitchell did not specifically reject a "but for" test, it rejected
a very similar argument--"'that Mobil's violation of ERISA entitled
[him] to additional benefits which he would have received had Mobil's
[misrepresentations regarding the] amendments to the Plan not com-
pelled him to retire [early]."' 97 The Mitchell court determined that, not-
withstanding the fraudulent conduct of the defendant, the plaintiff lacked
standing to sue under ERISA because he did not have a colorable claim
to vested benefits, and had neither sought reinstatement nor had expecta-
tions of returning to covered employment.98
Following Mitchell, the Raymond court determined that Raymond
had no claim for vested benefits because he had received all plan benefits
to which he was entitled at the time of retirement. Therefore, Raymond
lacked standing to sue under ERISA, regardless of the wrongdoings of
his employer.99 In its holding, the court stated, "'[tfo say that but for
Mobil's conduct, plaintiffs would have standing is to admit that they lack
standing and to allow those who merely claim to be participants to be
deemed as such."' 100
In the Eleventh Circuit's Sanson v. General Motors Corp.,101 the
plaintiff argued that "but for" GM's fraudulent misrepresentations, he
would have continued his employment and therefore should be consid-
ered a participant with standing to sue under ERISA.10 2 The Sanson
court held that the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations related to San-
son's retirement benefits available under GM's plan, and therefore were
preempted under Section 514.103 Because the plaintiff did not satisfy
ERISA's definition of participant, he had no claim under it either, re-
gardless of whether or not a remedy would be available.
1 4
In Stanton v. Gulf Oil Corp.,1°5 the Fourth Circuit, in its rejection of
the "but for" exception, held that the effect of allowing a "but for" test
would be to "impose participant status on every single employee who but
for some future contingency may become eligible."'0 6 The court noted
96. Id at 474.
97. Felix, 387 F.3d at 1160 n.13 (quoting Mitchell, 896 F.2d at 474).
98. Id.
99. See Raymond, 983 F.2d at 1531, 1533.
100. Felix, 387 F.3d at 1160 (quoting Raymond, 983 F.2d at 1536).
101. 966 F.2d 618 (1l th Cir. 1992).
102. Sanson, 966 F.2d at 619.
103. Id. at 621.
104. Id. (relying on a restrictive interpretation of 502(a)). In Pilot Life, the Court stated that an
inadequate remedy under ERISA is an insufficient reason to overcome the express language of the
statute. Id. at 622.
105. 792 F.2d 432 (4th Cir. 1986).
106. Stanton, 792 F.2d at 435 (stating that "[n]either caselaw nor other provision of ERISA
supports such a reading of 'participant[].').
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that neither case law nor ERISA supported such an interpretation of "par-
ticipant," holding that the protections of ERISA are tied to current par-
ticipants only.' 07
In rejecting a "but for" test for standing, the minority circuits leave
plaintiffs without a remedy at both the state and federal level. 10 8 Lacking
participant status, plaintiffs will not be permitted to bring an ERISA
claim, and at the same time, will find their state law claims preempted
because they are "related to" their plan.
III. ERISA, COMPLETE PREEMPTION, AND FELIX V. LUCENT
TECHNOLOGIES, INC. '09
In Felix v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., the Tenth Circuit unques-
tionably rejected the concept of a "but for" test for standing that allows
former employees to file suit under ERISA as participants. As discussed
below, this decision may leave former employees without a remedy in
either state or federal court.
A. Facts
Plaintiff Aaron Felix worked for Lucent Technologies' Oklahoma
City Works ("OKCW") manufacturing facility." 0 Lucent decided to sell
its manufacturing facilities, including OKCW, or merge them with simi-
lar companies."' On February 19, 2001, Lucent offered, pursuant to a
memorandum agreement with The International Brotherhood of Electri-
cal Workers ("IBEW"), a new benefits package to its retirement-eligible
employees who elected to retire early-a payment equal to 110% of their
termination allowance, plus a "special pension benefit" of $11,000.112
For those employees who were not retirement-eligible, Lucent offered to
"provide a transactional leave of absence by adding five years to the age
and/or service to make the employee pension-eligible .... ,113 Any em-
ployees who wished to accept this offer had to do so by May 29, 2001,
and leave employment on June 30, 2001.14 On several occasions, Lu-
cent representatives stated that this offer was a "one-time, non-
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Raymond, 983 F.2d at 1531, 1533; Sanson, 966 F.2d at 621; Mitchell, 896 F.2d
at 474; Stanton, 792 F.2d at 435.
109. 387 F.3d 1146 (10th Cir. 2005).
110. Felix, 387 F.3dat 1151-52.
111. Id. at 1151.
112. Id. (desiring to make OKCW more attractive to prospective buyers or merging companies,
Lucent decided to reduce the number of its long-term employees; $11,000 represents the amount the
employee was entitled to under a pending National Labor Relations Board award against Lucent).
113. Id.
114. Id. Lucent distributed written material and held many meetings at OKCW during which
Lucent representatives outlined the benefits being offered. Id.
2006]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
negotiable, final offer that was a take-it-or-leave it proposal" and that
there would be no additional offers of any additional benefits. 15
In reliance upon the representations that this was a "take-it-or-leave-
it" one-time offer and that delaying retirement "would not gain the em-
ployee[s] additional benefits" in the future, Felix and over one thousand
other eligible employees accepted the offer and retired effective June 30,
2001.1 16 Subsequently, Celestica, Inc. agreed to take over the operations
of OKCW and hire its remaining employees on November 30, 2001.
Contrary to the representations Lucent had made prior to May 29, 2001,
Lucent offered a new benefits package to retirement eligible employees
on October 1, 2001.117 This package was identical to the previous offer
with one exception: it contained an additional payment of a "special one-
time pension benefit" of $15,000." 
Plaintiffs brought a class action suit in state court for fraud claming
that they relied on Lucent's intentional misrepresentations that encour-
aged Plaintiffs to retire early and accept the lower benefits package. 19 In
making the decision to retire early, they had no opportunity to discover
the truth regarding the misrepresentations until after they had received
their vested benefits. 2° The Plaintiffs requested damages for the addi-
tional $15,000 benefit that was later offered to retirement-eligible em-
ployees and the value of an additional year of service that was lost by
accepting June 30, 2001 as a retirement date.'
2 '
Lucent removed the case to federal court under the complete pre-
emption doctrine of Section 502 of ERISA 122 and moved to dismiss for
failure to state a claim.1 23 Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand, asserting
lack of complete preemption and, therefore, lack of federal question sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. 2 4 Plaintiffs, only seeking damages for state law
fraud and not seeking an ERISA remedy, appealed.12 5
115. Id. This was reiterated in a newsletter distributed by IBEW on Mar. 21, 2001, in which the
union president flatly stated, "1 assure you there will not be any additional incentives for retirement."
Id. at 1152.




120. Id. at 1150, 1152.
121. Id. at 1152. (alleging that a "significant number of plaintiffs with a short time to their
respective anniversary dates lost an additional year of service by accepting the June 30th retirement
date." Arguing each year was worth approximately $4,000 in the "special pension payment plus a
reduction in the amount of the respective pension over the life of each pension"). Id. at 1152 n.3.
122. Id. at 1150 (removing based on both ERISA and the Labor Management Relations Act
("LMRA")).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1152.
125. Id. at 1150 (appealing only the motion to dismiss not the motion to remand).
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B. Tenth Circuit's Analysis
The appeal focused on the issue of whether the Plaintiffs' state law
claims fell within the scope of Section 502(a) and were therefore com-
pletely preempted, thereby justifying removal.1
26
To exercise proper removal jurisdiction under Section 502 of
ERISA, it must be determined that the Plaintiffs have standing as a "par-
ticipant or beneficiary" under the terms of their plan, in order to enforce
their rights under the plan. 127 ERISA defines participant in pertinent part
as: "[A]ny employee or former employee of an employer, or any member
or former member of an employee organization, who is or may become
eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan
which covers employees of such employer.'
28
Interpreting this definition in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Bruch,129 the Supreme Court held that a former employee participant
must show a "colorable claim to vested benefits" or an expectation to
return to covered employment and fulfill eligibility requirements. 3 ° The
Court defined "'colorable claim' to vested benefits" as including situa-
tions where: (1) the plaintiff will "prevail in a suit for benefits," or (2)
fulfill eligibility requirements in the future.131
The Felix plaintiffs did not contend that they were entitled to addi-
tional benefits under their plan.' 32 They argued instead that they were
"fraudulently induced to take early retirement," and sought money dam-
ages from their former employer (the difference in benefits received and
those that would have been received had they not been duped into retir-
ing when they did).' 33 The Felix court held that because Plaintiffs were
not claiming that they were (or were likely to become) eligible for addi-
tional benefits under the terms of their plan, or that vested benefits were
improperly withheld, but rather asked for damages based on their em-
ployer's fraud, their state law fraud claims did not fall within Section
502(a). 1 4 Therefore, the Tenth Circuit panel held that under the well-
pleaded complaint doctrine, preemption under Section 514, a defense to
Plaintiffs' state law claims, alone will not support removal.
135
126. Id.
127. Id. (defining beneficiary as a "person designated by a participant, or by the terms of an
employee benefit plan, who is or may become entitled to a benefit thereunder"); see 29 U.S.C. §
1002(8) (2000)).
128. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (2000).
129. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
130. Felix, 387 F.3d at 1159; see Raymond v. Mobil Oil Corp., 983 F.2d 1528, 1533 (10th Cir.
1993).
131. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 117-18.
132. Felix, 387 F.3d at 1159.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1162-63.
135. Id. at 1158.
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In sum, the Court found that the Felix Plaintiffs lacked a "colorable
claim for vested benefits,"'' 36 and had no reasonable expectation for re-
turning to covered employment, because they did not seek reinstatement
either by contractual right or theory. 137
C. The Tenth Circuit's Rejection of the "But For" Test for Standing
Under ERISA Leaves Open Uncomfortable Possibilities
Ironically, the Tenth Circuit's rejection of Lucent's argument of
complete preemption' 38 was to Lucent's benefit.' 39  The Tenth Circuit
criticized the "but for" circuits as "mistakenly assum[ing] that [removal]
jurisdiction depends only on the traditional notion of 'standing,"' holding
that the ability to sue under Section 502(a) involved "both standing and a
subject matter jurisdictional requirement."'
' 40
The court also relied on its prior holdings in Mitchell v. Mobil Oil
Corp.,l41 Raymond v. Mobil Oil Corp.,l42 and Boren v. Southwestern Bell
Telephone Co., Inc. 143 Like those cases, the Felix plaintiffs received all
plan benefits to which they were entitled at the time of their retirement
and, therefore, had no "'colorable claim' that additional benefits had
'vested' or 'will vest." ' 144 The court pointed out that in Raymond, it held
that the "receipt of the full extent of [plaintiffs'] vested benefits' was a
crucial fact."' 145 Absent a claim for benefits, Plaintiffs are merely seeking
damages based on their fraud and misrepresentation claims, not "vested
benefits improperly withheld."' 146 To allow this "but for" test for ERISA
standing, the court reasoned, would be tantamount to allowing those who
"merely claim to be participants to be deemed as such."' 14 7 Having re-
136. Id; see Raymond, 983 F.2d at 1536.
137. Felix, 387 F.3d at 1162.
138. Id. at 1159-61 ("but for [Lucent's] wrongful actions, [Plaintiffs] would have been entitled
to the additional benefits under the plan")
139. Id. at 1159.
140. Id. at 1160 (noting the "'express grant of federal jurisdiction in ERISA is limited to suits
brought by certain parties outlined in § 502"') (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vaca-
tion Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 21 (1983)).
141. Mitchell v. Mobil Oil Corp., 896 F.2d 463 (10th Cir. 1990).
142. Raymond v. Mobil Oil Corp., 983 F.2d 1528 (10th Cir. 1993).
143. Boren v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., Inc., 933 F.2d 891 (10th Cir. 1991); Felix,
387 F.3d at 1159.
144. Felix, 387 F.3d at 1160.
145. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
146. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (rejecting a "but for" test for ERISA standing when
noting there is no controlling case law or statutory language that supports a "but for" exception "to
find ERISA standing where plaintiff is not technically entitled to additional benefits under the pen-
sion plan").
147. Id. Additionally, the court observed that its holdings in Mitchell and Raymond were con-
sistent with its prior decision in Boren, 933 F.2d 891 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding improperly withheld
vested benefits.) Following Raymond the court held that the plaintiff in Alexander v. Anheuser-
Busch Cos. a former employee, who did not have a reasonable expectation of returning to his em-
ployment, would only have standing only if he could show a "colorable claim for vested benefits."
Felix, 387 F.3d at 1160. Because the plaintiff's pre-existing medical condition was plainly excluded
by his plan, he could not show that he had a colorable claim and, therefore, lacked standing to sue
under ERISA. Id. (citing Alexander, 990 F.2d at 539 (10th Cir. 1993)).
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jected this argument in both Mitchell and Raymond, the court refused it
again. 148 Aware that this decision left open the "uncomfortable possibil-
ity" that plaintiffs, while lacking standing to sue under ERISA, may "be
preempted in state court under [Section] 514 from asserting a state claim,
leaving them with no remedy," the court did not consider that outcome a
concern of the federal judiciary, asserting that the "unavailability of a
remedy under ERISA is not germane to a preemption analysis.'
149
IV. ANALYSIS
Felix v. Lucent Technologies, Inc. 150 is the latest decision in a tril-
ogy of Tenth Circuit opinions that reject the "but for" test for standing
under ERISA with regard to former employees fraudulently induced into
early retirement. 5 ' As a result, these former employees who lack stand-
ing to sue under ERISA Section 502(a) may find their state claims pre-
empted under Section 514 conflict preemption, leaving them without any
remedy. 152  Having received benefits on termination, no longer em-
ployed, and without expectations of returning to covered employment,
early retirees do not qualify as participants under ERISA. By rejecting
the "but for" test for standing, they are precluded from filing a claim in
federal court, thereby requiring their case to be remanded back to state
court where they will be on a collision course with the broad sweep of
ERISA conflict preemption. The impact of these decisions leaves former
employees with no recourse in either federal or state court. The same
result could occur in an action based on diversity jurisdiction.'53
A. Lack ofan ERISA Remedy Does Not Affect Conflict Preemption at the
State Level
The Tenth Circuit acknowledges the plaintiffs lack of remedy as a
"valid concern," but not one for the federal judiciary. 154 This point of
view is consistent with its prior decisions in which the Tenth Circuit has
noted that "the unavailability of a remedy under ERISA is not germane
to preemption analysis."'155 Mitchell is a particularly bothersome opinion
in that it allows the wrongdoings of employers and plan administrators to
148. Felix, 387 F.3d at 1160.
149. Id. at 1162 (citing Cannon v. Group Health Serv. of Okla, Inc., 77 F.3d 1270, 1274 (10th
Cir. 1996)).
150. 387 F.3d 1146 (10b Cir. 2005).
151. See Mitchell v. Mobil Oil Corp., 896 F.2d 463, 466 (10th Cir. 1990); see Raymond v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 983 F.2d 1528-29 (10th Cir. 1993).
152. Felix, 387 F.3d at 1162 (noting that this opinion "leaves open the uncomfortable possibil-
ity that Plaintiffs may lack standing to sue under ERISA but will then be preempted in state court
under § 514 from asserting a state claim, leaving them with no remedy"); see Houdek v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 879 P.2d 417 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that plaintiff's state law fraud claims were
preempted for relating to an ERISA plan, leaving no remedy).
153. See supra Part III.B.
154. Felix, 387 F.3d at 1162.
155. Id. (citing Cannon v. Group Health Serv. of Okla., Inc., 77 F.3d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir.
1996)).
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go unchecked as long as the employee receives all of the lesser benefits
to which they were entitled when duped into early termination. While
courts are aware that their interpretation of the preemption clause "leaves
a gap in remedies within a statute intended to protect participants in em-
ployee benefits plans," this lack of remedy did affect their analysis.1
56
The Tenth Circuit justified this harsh result with its interpretation of
congressional intent.' 57 The court notes that Congress intended the civil
enforcement mechanisms of ERISA "to be exclusive, and the 'policy
choices reflected in the inclusion of certain remedies and the exclusion of
others under the federal scheme would be completely undermined if
ERISA-plan participants ... were free to obtain remedies under state law
that Congress rejected in ERISA. ' ' '" 58 Seemingly attempting to sugarcoat
the grim outcomes afforded by this decision, the court points out that this
lack of a remedy is not as bad as it may initially appear.159 In some fac-
tual situations, plaintiffs may be able to bring a cause of action under
other subsections of 502(a) that are not of issue in the instant case; for
example, cases regarding a breach of a fiduciary duty, or claims for equi-
table relief under the catch all provision of 502(a)(3). 160 However, with
Felix, it appears that the court is unwilling to "second-guess" Congress'
policy decisions, even in light of the harsh outcome or in the threat of
preemption of the plaintiffs state claims.1
6'
In Cannon v. Group Health Serv. of Okla., Inc.,162 a holding consis-
tent with its earlier decisions, the Tenth Circuit was not persuaded that
ERISA should not be allowed to preempt state causes of action if no al-
ternative remedy is available. 63 Recognizing that this is an issue of first
impression, the Cannon court noted that no case law supports the idea
that "an exception to ERISA's express preemption clause exists when
ERISA provides no remedy."' 64 Once again asserting a refusal to rewrite
ERISA, the court noted that although the Supreme Court has not ad-
156. Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1333 (5th Cir. 1992) ("While we are
not unmindful of the fact that our interpretation of the preemption clause leaves a gap in remedies
within a statute intended to protect participants in employee benefits plans, the lack of an ERISA
remedy does not effect preemption analysis").
157. Felix, 387 F.3d at 1162.
158. Id. at 1162-63 (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987)).
159. The court in Raymond stated that an argument could "certainly be made that the fraud
claims plaintiffs have made in this case are such 'laws of general applicability' thus falling within
the recognized exception to ERISA preemption. Raymond v. Mobil Oil Corp., 983 F.2d 1528, 1538
n.14 (10th Cir. 1993). However, upon remand the Colorado Court of Appeals held the fraud claims
preempted by ERISA, leaving the former employees without a remedy. Houdek v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
879 P.2d 417, 421 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
160. Felix, 387 F.3d at 1163.
161. Id. (refusing to second-guess Congress' policy choices and holding Plaintiffs are not
participants within the scope of 502(a)(1)).
162. 77 F.3d 1270 (10th Cir. 1996).
163. Cannon, 77 F.3d at 1272.
164. Id. at 1274 (noting that this is a case of first impression about whether ERISA may pre-
emption state common law claims if no alternative remedy is available under ERISA; however, this
fact had no bearing on the court's analysis of preemption).
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dressed this issue, the Tenth Circuit has - the fact that a state law claim
may be preempted does not "necessarily mandate that there be an ERISA
remedy."'165  Furthermore, the "proper focus for preemption analysis
should be on the nature of the claim for relief, not whether a particular
plaintiff has a potential remedy under ERISA."' 66  Finally, the Tenth
Circuit insisted that "Congress, and not this court, is the appropriate fo-
rum for such policy arguments."'
' 67
B. "Uncomfortable" Possibilities: Wronged Plaintiffs Left Without
Remedies
Other jurisdictions have held that ERISA preempts state law claims
even if the plaintiff is left without a remedy. 168 One court noted that a
lack of remedy does not preclude ERISA application and "ERISA pre-
empts state law claims even if the plaintiff is left without a remedy."'
' 69
This line of judicial opinions paves the way for particularly bleak results.
In a dissenting opinion in Sanson v. General Motors Corp. 170 Judge
Birch argued the case represented the "point at which the preemption tide
should be stayed.' 171 Judge Birch acknowledged that the Sanson opinion
"favors a finding of preemption,"'' 72 but was troubled by the contradic-
tion between the underlying purpose of ERISA, to protect employees and
beneficiaries and the decisions that are being implemented by the
courts. 17 3 He stated, "A finding of preemption in this case not only fails
to further any such protective policy, it conceivably offers an unscrupu-
lous employer a method of avoiding employee benefit 'burdens' .... and
stands the entire statutory scheme on its proverbial head.' 74  Perhaps
verbalizing the thoughts of many other judges, Judge Birch noted that he
finds it "difficult to comprehend, in a common sense way, how a law
enacted to protect the very class of individual into which the appellant
squarely fits can be construed to deny him such a preexisting remedy."'
' 75
This judicial construction is "disappointingly pernicious to the very goals
165. Id.; see Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1333 (5th Cir. 1992) ("The
lack of an ERISA remedy does not affect a pre-emption analysis."); see Cromwell v. Equicor HCA
Corp., 944 F.2d 1272, 1276 (6th Cir. 1991) ("Nor is it relevant to an analysis of the scope of federal
preemption that appellants may be left without a remedy."); see Hospice of Metro Denver, Inc., v.
Group Health Ins., 944 F.2d 752, 755 (10th Cir. 1991) ("We are aware that preemption normally is
not dependent on the availability of ERISA remedies.").
166. Cannon, 77 F.3d at 1275.
167. Id. at 1274.
168. See Zanglein, supra note 37, at 673.
169. Id. (citing Dockter v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 91-56029, 1993 WL 55150, at *2 (9th Cir.
March 3, 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 310 (1993)).
170. 966 F.2d 618 (1lth Cir. 1992).




175. Id. at 623 n.2.
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and desires that motivated" what Congress set out to accomplish in the
first place. 176
Another case with a harsh outcome is Olson v. General Dynamics
Corp.177 Here, the Ninth Circuit found that because the Supreme Court
has interpreted ERISA's preemption provision so broadly, it was "diffi-
cult to see how Olson's fraud claim could be found not to 'relate to' an
employee benefit plan."'' 78  In his concurrence, Judge Reinhardt noted
that: "[b]ecause of the passage of ERISA, Olson is left without a remedy.
Unfortunately his fate is not unique."'
179
In Aetna Health Inc., v. Davila,180 acknowledging that the Court's
decision was consistent with governing case law, Justice Ginsburg joined
the decision of the Court, but at the same time joined the "'judicial cho-
rus urging that Congress and [this] Court revisit what is an unjust and
increasingly tangled ERISA regime."",181  Noting that plaintiffs "ad-
versely affected by ERISA-proscribed wrongdoing cannot gain make-
whole relief,"' 82 Justice Ginsburg, appealed to Congress for "fresh con-
sideration" of the availability of damages and remedies under ERISA." 3
As illustrated above, the ERISA statute, initially designed to safe-
guard employee retirement benefit plans, has, "all too frequently, been
used to deprive employees of rights they previously enjoyed under state
law . . ,,184 Allowing employers to engage in outright fraud without
legal consequences - so long as the former employees received all bene-
fits that had vested by the time of their departure, it is of no moment that
they were told a lie to get them to retire early mocks that purpose.
C. The Former Employee Fraud Cases Present a Conflict Ripe for Su-
preme Court Resolution
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue of whether the
"but for" test for standing will afford former employees participant
standing under ERISA. Whether the Supreme Court will side with the
176. Acker, supra note 5, at 285 (citing Sanson, 966 F.2d at 625 (Birch, J., dissenting)).
177. 960 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1991).
178. Olson v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 960 F.2d 1418, 1421 (9th Cir. 1991).
179. Id. at 1423 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
180. 542 U.S. 200 (2004).
181. Davila, 542 U.S. at 222. (quoting Difelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 453
(3d Cir. 2003) (Becker, J., concurring)) (alteration in original).
182. Id. (noting a "regulatory vacuum" exists where "virtually all state law remedies are pre-
empted ").
183. Id. at 223. "[The] 'gaping wound' caused by the breadth of preemption and limited reme-
dies under ERISA, as interpreted by this Court, will not be healed until the Court 'start[s] over' or
Congress 'wipe[s] the slate clean."' Id. (quoting Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83, 106, 107 (2nd Cir.
2003)). "The vital thing ... is that either Congress or the Court act quickly, because the current
situation is plainly untenable." Id (quoting Difelice, 346 F.3d at 467).
184. Zanglein, supra note 37, at 713.
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majority or minority views depends on how it views its own Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Birch185 decision.
If the Court narrowly construes the definition of participant, as ap-
plied to former employees, to include only those with either a reasonable
expectation of returning to covered employment or a colorable claim to
vested benefits, the minority view will likely be validated.186 However, if
the Court adopts a more expansive concept of participation, former em-
ployees would not be deprived of participant standing and status to sue
under ERISA.1
87
The Court has had the opportunity to interpret the definition of par-
ticipant under ERISA in Firestone. The Court, in a sense, rejected the
"but for" test for standing by holding that one can only be a participant
under the definition provided by the statute, if she has a reasonable ex-
pectation of returning to covered employment, or if she can show a col-
orable claim to vested benefits. 88 This would seem to exclude all former
employees, fraudulently induced into early retirement, that have received
their benefits, even though those benefits were results of misrepresenta-
tion.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Varity Corp. v. Howe' 89 addresses
former employees who claimed to be defrauded. 190 The Varity plaintiffs
were considered participants or beneficiaries under the plan and were
suing for equitable relief to redress a fiduciary violation. 19' At first
glance it looks like the Supreme Court might be amenable to a "but for"
test, however, this case is qualitatively different in several respects. The
principal differences are: (1) the plaintiffs were reinstated as participants
in their plan; (2) the plaintiffs had a colorable claim for vested benefits
because they did not receive the benefits promised; and (3) the plaintiffs
brought their cause of action under ERISA Section 502(a)(3) for a breach
of fiduciary duty. 1
92
D. Finding Justice for Defrauded Employees
The plight of these fraud victims, stranded without a remedy, vio-
lates the basic principle: for every wrong there is a remedy. Current ju-
dicial opinions subvert the original purpose of ERISA - to protect em-
ployee rights and provide a uniform regulatory scheme for employee
185. 489 U.S. 101 (1989)
186. See Felix v. Lucent Techs., 387 F.3d 1146, 1159 (10th Cir. 2004).
187. Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 14 F.3d 697, 703 (1st Cir. 1994).
188. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 117.
189. 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
190. Varity, 516 U.S. at 494 (noting that the district court found that Varity and Massey, acting
as ERISA fiduciaries had harmed the plan's beneficiaries through deliberate deception).
191. Id. at 507 (noting that Varity concedes that plaintiffs are participants or beneficiaries).
192. Id. at 494-95 (noting the district court ordered Massey to reinstate its former employees
into its own plan); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2005).
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welfare and pension plans.193 It does not seem possible that by enacting
ERISA, Congress intended to allow a wrongdoer to profit from his
wrongdoing; however, this is precisely what is happening in the case of
many former employers fraudulently induced into early retirement.
1 94
This is a serious anomaly that demands a solution and is "begging for
congressional or judicial repair."'
95
1. Congressional Reform
The most direct paths through ERISA's preemption thicket would
be congressional amendments.' 96 Congress should narrow Section 514
preemption to allow state remedies where employer/plan administrator
wrongdoing is involved. There should be no preemption when an em-
ployer/plan administrator manipulates the plan, or misrepresents to its
employees the benefits that will or will not be available to them in the
future, thereby inducing employee reliance. Congress "must exempt from
ERISA's preemption provision unfair claims practices regulated by state
insurance law, tort claims of fraudulent misrepresentation, and tort
claims of negligence relating to the administration of an employee bene-
fit plan."'
197
Additionally, Congress can rectify the lack of remedies available to
former employees by modifying ERISA to permit remedies under Sec-
tion 502 in situations involving extra-contractual and punitive dam-
ages.' 98 This would allow former employees to recover the benefits they
would have been entitled to, had they not been lied to. Without these
modifications to ERISA, the wrongdoings of employers, plan administra-
tors, and insurers will not be adequately deterred. 99
Many members of the judiciary are urging a congressional fix.
Judge Becker, in Difelice v. Aetna, ordered the clerk of the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals to send his concurrence to the Solicitor of the Depart-
ment of Labor, urging congressional reform of ERISA.2 °° Judge Becker
is concerned that ERISA's failure to change with the times has "rendered
it incapable of protecting employees;" therefore, Congress must act
193. See Zanglein, supra note 37, at 713
194. See Id.
195. Robert Simpson, Note and Commentary, Another Trip into the Great Swamp: The Seventh
Circuit's Preemption of Illinois Unclaimed Property Act under ERISA, 7 CONN. INS. L.J. 227, 229
(2000).
196. Jane D. Bailey, Tenth Circuit Survey: ERISA Preemption, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 473, 473
(1997) (stating "[a]ny court forced to enter the ERISA preemption thicket sets out on a treacherous
path.") (quoting Gonzales v. Prudential Ins. Co., 901 F.2d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1990)).
197. Zanglein, supra note 37, at 713.
198. Id. at 722.
199. Id.
200. Shannon P. Duffy, Becker Calls on Congress, Justices to Fix ERISA, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 16, 2003, at I (noting Judge Becker sent his opinion to the Senate Committee
on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, the House Committee on Education of the Workforce,




without haste in attempting to "prevent further injustice.' Judge
Becker acknowledges that ERISA included a detailed plan for its protec-
tion of pension plans; however, it has fallen short in its protection of wel-
fare plans, particularly health insurance.2 °2 He notes that although wel-
fare plans are subject to less regulation than pension plans, ERISA's pre-
emption provisions apply equally to both welfare and pension plans,
203
resulting in a complete bar from state law for many workers' claims that
relate to their health insurance. 204 Judge Becker finds it "unlikely that
Congress intentionally created this so-called 'regulatory vacuum,' in




The courts cannot rewrite ERISA, but they can examine congres-
sional intent more closely. Allowing a fraud-feasor protection from
fraud is not a way to make benefits more widely available, and this is
surely not an original congressional intent.20 6 Congress originally in-
tended that courts should adopt broad remedies to restore ERISA viola-
tions, while providing "'the full range of legal and equitable remedies
available in both state and federal courts .... ,,,207 A look at legislative
history shows that Congress intended federal courts "'to shape legal and
equitable remedies to fit the facts and circumstances of the cases before
them, even though the remedies may not be specifically mentioned in
ERISA itself."'
20 8
Because of the lack of remedies available to plaintiffs, a growing
minority of courts have found an "insufficient relationship between the
claim and an ERISA plan to trigger preemption, thus leaving state law
remedies [intact]., 20 9  Additionally, some courts have even fashioned
common-law ERISA remedies that duplicate the preempted state law
remedy.
210
The Court needs to rethink its interpretation of ERISA's preemption
provisions, and could reconsider that its prior holdings all allow for the
possibility of recovering compensatory damages. 211 The Supreme Court





206. See Zanglein, supra note 37, at 718
207. Id. (quoting H.R.REP. No. 93-533 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4655).
208. Id. (quoting H.R. REP NO. 101-247,pt.1. (1989)).
209. Acker, supra note 5, at 290; see, e.g., Taoumajian v. Frailey, 135 F.3d 648, 656 (9th Cir.
1998); Forbus v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 30 F.3d 1402, 1407 (11 th Cir. 1994).
210. Acker supra note 5, at 290; see Cisneros v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of America, 134 F.3d 939
(9th Cir. 1998); Ingersoll Rand v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990).
211. Duffy, supra note 200 (discussing Judge Becker's concurrence in Difelice, 346 F.3d 442
(2003)).
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needs to take a more active role "in reconciling conflicts between the
circuits and in filling in the congressionally created interstices by some
consistent, fair and logical jurisprudence.
212
3. State Action
ERISA's Savings Clause exempts from conflict preemption those
213
state laws, whether statutory or decisional, that regulate insurance.
States can pass laws that regulate insurance without falling victim to
214ERISA preemption. Additionally, state legislatures can pass laws that
regulate insurance to make relief more widely available. "[B]ecause
most areas of insurance 'relate to' employee benefit plans in some way
and would fall under general ERISA preemption, the Insurance Savings
Clause was necessary to avoid preemption of all state insurance laws.',
215
This is not a new remedy but allows more rights by proscribing what
insurers can and can not do.216 State laws can provide that health insur-
ance must provide a certain set of requirements.217 This can help make
ERISA less harsh.2 18 States should enact legislation to make the appel-
late process more hospitable for plaintiffs.
State insurance regulators have already taken action to impose pol-
icy changes and pass regulations that will allow claimants new rights.219
California recently announced that it would fine UnumProvident (the
nation's largest disability insurer) $8 million, require the company to
reopen more than 26,000 California cases, and that it alter its policies in
the state to provide for "greater consumer protections., 220 For example,
California plans to require UnumProvident to change its language in all
new California policies, and "force the company to remove limitations
on benefits for 'self reported' conditions such as migraine
headaches. ,,221
Without legislative reform at the federal or state level, Congress'
original intent to safeguard the rights of employees participating in
ERISA plans will be undermined, and in many cases, plaintiffs will be
left without a remedy. In addition, California will require Unum to re-
212. Acker, supra note 5, at 286; see Davila, 542 U.S.at 208 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
213. 29 U.S.C.S. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2005) (stating in the Insurance Savings Clause that no part
of ERISA "shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which
regulates insurance, banking, or securities"); see Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S.
329, 336 n.l (2003).
214. Matthew 0. Gatewood, The New Map: The Supreme Court's Guide to Curing Thirty
Years of Confusion in ERISA Savings Clause Analysis, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 643,648 (2005).
215. Id. at 649.
216. See id.
217. Id. at 648.
218. See id.
219. See Peter G. Gosselin, State Fines Insurer, Orders Reforms in Disability Cases, L.A.





strict its usage of a twenty four-month limitation on benefits for "mental
and nervous conditions., 222 The California State Insurance Department
has stated that it will discuss these new requirements with other disability
insurers and will "take regulatory action against those who refuse to
adopt the policy changes.
223
CONCLUSION
In rejecting the "but for" test for standing under ERISA in Felix v.
Lucent Technologies, Inc.,224 the Tenth Circuit allowed for what it
termed the "uncomfortable" possibility that former employees, defrauded
into leaving their jobs and without standing to sue under ERISA, will be
faced with loss of any remedy in state court by the expansive conflict
preemption of Section 514. As a consequence, the plan administrator or
employer may commit wrongdoings that will go unpunished in a court of
law. The majority of jurisdictions have avoided this unfair consequence
by allowing the "but for" test for standing under ERISA in situations
where a former employee is attempting to file suit.
An employee's decision to retire in the unforeseen presence of fraud
is not an informed decision and is a wrong that should be remedied in the
courts. The lack of remedy in these types of situations is ironic; ERISA
was designed to shield participant's rights, but has instead become the
employer's sword, destroying all rights regarding conduct that are
deemed to "relate to" an ERISA plan.225 ERISA was designed to protect
participants, not to provide immunity to those who would defraud
them.226
Alexa Roberts*
222. Id. (noting that UnumProvident had repeatedly been accused of wrongly categorizing
claimants as suffering from such conditions to reduce what it must pay them).
223. Id. ("What we are saying to any company operating in this area of insurance ... is it has
to stop screwing people").
224. 387 F.3d 1146 (10th Cir. 2005).
225. President Ford summed up ERISA when he signed it into law on Labor Day 1974, "This
legislation will alleviate the fears and the anxiety of people who are on the production lines or in the
mines or elsewhere, in that they now know that their investment in private pension funds will be
better protected." Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, The Broken Promise, TIME, Oct. 31, 2005,
at 32, 42.
226. See Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1329, 1333 (5th Cir. 1992).
* J.D. Candidate, May 2007, University of Denver Sturm College of Law.
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SHOULD SPECIAL EDUCATION HAVE A PRICE TAG? A
NEW REASONABLENESS STANDARD FOR COST
INTRODUCTION
The increasing cost of educating disabled children is one of the
most pressing concerns among educators today.1 According to the most
recent national study, the total spending on special education students
was $50.0 billion compared to only $27.3 billion for regular education
during academic year 1999-2000.2 Another study reported the national
average of per pupil expenditures for special education as $12,525,
which was ninety-one percent more than the general education popula-
tion per pupil expenditure of $6,556. 3 Between 1995 and 2003, the num-
ber of students classified as needing special education services jumped
from roughly 4.5 million nationwide to approximately 6.3 million, a
4thirty-eight percent increase.
A circuit split exists surrounding the best test to employ when de-
termining the most appropriate classroom placement of a special educa-
tion student under the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA).5 One of
the most controversial issues surrounding the circuit split concerns if and
how the cost of a particular placement to a school district should factor
into the decision of which learning environment is most appropriate for
the child.6 This article first provides a brief legislative history of IDEA
which has strongly influenced the emergence of the three different circuit
tests. Second, this piece describes the evolution of the three tests includ-
ing their strengths and weaknesses as well as the Tenth Circuit's recent
adoption of one of the tests in L.B. ex rel. KB. v. Nebo School District.
7
Third, it discusses the court's failure in Nebo to articulate practical stan-
dards and argues that the Tenth Circuit erred in failing to include cost as
one of its factors. Finally, this article proposes a new cost standard for
1. Telephone Interview with Pam Biscelgia, Legal Assistant, Denver Pub. Sch., in Denver,
Colo. (Dec. 16, 2005).
2. Thomas Parrish, American Inst. for Research, Accountability in Special Education Fi-
nance 4 (Apr. 11, 2003), http://www.eprri.org/Presentations/Session5.ppt; e-mail from Thomas B.
Parrish, Dir., Ctr. for Special Educ. Fin., American Inst. for Research (Dec. 19, 2005, 07:13:00
MDT) (on file with author). Prior to this study, another national study had not been conducted for
fifteen years. Id.
3. Jay G. Chambers, et. al., Total Expenditures for Students with Disabilities, 1999-2000:
Spending Variation by Disability, Report 5, Special Educ. Expenditure Project 6 (June 2003),
http://www.csef-air.org/publications/seep/national/Final SEEP Report 5.pdf
4. Nat'l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/bat (data taken from statistical table
using "Build a Table" tool provided at web site) (on file with author).
5. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1500 (2005).
6. See Theresa M. Willard, Economics and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act:
The Influence of Funding Fonnulas on the Identification and Placement of Disabled Students, 31
IND. L. REV. 1167, 1178 (1998).
7. 379 F.3d 966 (10th Cir. 2004).
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the courts to consider in placing a disabled child in the most suitable
learning environment.
I. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF IDEA
In 1975, the United States Congress enacted the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act.8 Replacing the Education for all Handicapped
Children Act of 1975, 9 Congress passed IDEA to address its increasing
concerns that disabled children did not share the same educational rights
as their nondisabled classmates.'0 Congress aimed to remedy this ineq-
uity by allocating federal funding to states that complied with the Act's
principal goal of ensuring that all disabled students receive a "free and
appropriate public education (FAPE)... in the least restrictive environ-
ment (LRE)."" In defining LRE, Congress expressed a strong prefer-
ence that disabled students obtain instruction in a "regular" education
classroom wherever possible: "to the maximum extent possible, children
with disabilities ... [must be] educated with children who are not dis-
abled .... 12 The LRE requirement would in rare circumstances permit
placements in segregated or pull-out classrooms for students with more
severe disabilities.'
3
The 1997 Amendments to IDEA had two goals: (1) "to strengthen
the [LRE] requirement," and (2) to develop and improve the role and
rights of the family in determining what that LRE should be. 14  The
IDEA mandate established procedural safeguards to both protect the
rights of the disabled and establish realistic expectations for the
schools.1 5 To better accomplish the task of identifying the most suitable
LRE for a child, the school district must write and revise what is called
8. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1500 (2005).
9. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat 773 (1975).
10. Willard, supra note 6, at 1167.
11. Brian L. Porto, Annotation, Application of 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(5), Least Restrictive
Environment Provision of Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400
et seq., 189 A.L.R. FED. 297 (2004); accord Anne E. Johnson, Evening the Playing Field: Tailoring
the Allocation of the Burden of Proof at IDEA Due Process Hearings to Balance Children's Rights
and Schools'Needs, 46 B.C. L. REV. 591, 591 (2005).
12. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A). This section of IDEA describes the statute's goal to "include"
or "mainstream" disabled children into the regular classroom:
To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities ... are educated with chil-
dren who are not disabled, and special classes, separate school, or other removal of chil-
dren with disabilities from the regular education environment occurs only when the na-
ture or severity of the disability of a child is such that education in the regular with the
use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.
Id.
13. Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1065 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that placement of a
disabled child in a segregated special education class in a public school may satisfy the LRE provi-
sion, depending on the child's needs).
14. Sarah E. Farley, Least Restrictive Environments: Assessing Classroom Placement of
Students with Disabilities Under the IDEA, 77 WASH. L. REv. 809, 816-17 (2002) (quoting 20
U.S.C. 1414(d)(l)(B)(ii) (1997) and citing S. REP. No. 105-17, at 4 (1997), H.R. REP. No. 105-95, at
3 (1997)).
15. Johnson, supra note 11, at 594.
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an "individualized education program" (IEP) for every special education
student. 16 Then, a team of parents, special educators, regular classroom
teachers, an administrator, and other service providers meet to consider
the child's present abilities and needs before designing tailored annual
learning goals and deciding the most appropriate LRE setting.
17
What IDEA failed to do, however, was to adequately fund its initia-
tive. Although Congress is authorized under the IDEA to pay for forty
percent of special education funding to the states, 19 in the state of Colo-
rado, for example, in 2004, the federal government contributed only sev-
enteen percent.20 This funding shortfall coupled with rapidly increasing
numbers of disabled students being classified has sparked an ongoing
debate.2' A central issue of that debate involves conflicting interpreta-
tions of whether cost ought to play a role in a child's LRE placement.22
Today, IDEA compliance issues such as this have divided the cir-
cuits. 23  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has not visited the topic of
IDEA mandates in over twenty years and has never decided the issue of
LRE and placement.24 In Board of Education v. Rowley,25 the Court de-
veloped a two-part test to evaluate whether a school district had met the
IDEA standard for providing a "free appropriate public education" (not
LRE) when it failed to provide a sign-language interpreter for a hearing
impaired child.26 In the first part of the test, the Court focused on
whether the district was in compliance with the procedural requirements
of IDEA.27  Since the Court determined that the district had complied
with the procedural requirement, it then had to evaluate the second
28prong.
In part two of the test, the Court assessed whether the school had
designed an IEP that afforded the student the opportunity to receive an
16. Farley, supra note 14, at 814.
17. Id. at 814-15.
18. See Willard, supra note 6, at 1179.
19. Id.
20. Telephone Interview with Charman Paulmeno, Supervisor, Grants Fiscal Mgmt. Services
Unit, Colo. Dep't of Educ., in Denver, Colo. (Dec. 19, 2005).
21. See Willard, supra note 6, at 1177.
22. Kevin D. Stanley, A Model for Interpretation of Mainstreaming Compliance Under the
Individuals with Disabilities Educ. Act: Bd. of Educ. v. Holland, 65 U. MO. KAN. CITY L. REV. 303,
310-11 (1996).
23. Farley, supra note 14, at 818-19.
24. Stanley, supra note 22, at 306-07.
25. 458 U.S. 176.
26. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 181, 206-07.
27. Id. at 207 n.27. To satisfy this requirement, the school district must prove that "the State
has adopted the state plan, policies, and assurances required by the Act ... [and] . . . created an
[individualized education program] for the child in question which conforms with the requirements
of§ 1401(19)." Id.
28. See id. at 206-07.
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appropriate education. 29 The Court determined that the hearing-impaired
child was performing above average and that the district was providing
her with personalized instruction and extra services for her needs. 30 In
concluding that the district had provided the child an appropriate educa-
tion, the Court also indicated that a sign language interpreter was not
necessary since the child was progressing well without one.3' Although
the Rowley test is not directly applicable to the issue of LRE placement,32
it did lay a foundation for the three tests that would soon emerge among
the circuits to determine a special education student's LRE.33
II. A THREE-WAY SPLIT
A. Background: LRE Provisions §§ 1212(a) & 1214
IDEA's failure to articulate a clear standard for what a school dis-
trict must do to provide an "appropriate" education for a disabled child
prompted the Supreme Court to respond in kind in the Rowley decision.
34
Conversely, IDEA's failure to offer clear standards to aid districts in
deciding what sort of placement constitutes a disabled child's LRE has
left the circuits to their own devices for three decades since the Act was
passed. " The circuits have therefore developed three distinct tests to
interpret and apply the IDEA in cases that challenge a school district's
LRE placement of a disabled child. 36 In various applications, all three
tests consider the benefits that the child receives in the regular classroom
and the potential disruption the child's presence may cause to the learn-
ing of other students in the classroom. 37 The language in two of the tests
explicitly considers cost in evaluating placement, while the language in
the other test does not.38
While the tests share several commonalities, a split exists where the
circuits have been unable to come to a consensus on which factors to use
and when to apply them.39 The circuit split translates into inconsistent
interpretation of IDEA's LRE, resulting in inconsistent placements
across the country.40 In other words, "[t]his difference could result in
29. Id. Some factors the court considered to evaluate part two of the test included how well
the handicapped student's education parallels the expectations at the corresponding regular grade
level and to see if the student is able to earn passing grades. Id. at 207 n.28.
30. Id. at 184-85.
31. Id.
32. See A.W. v. Nw. R-1 Sch. Dist., 813 F.2d 158, 163 (8th Cir. 1987).
33. See Joseph A. Patella, Missing the "IDEA ": New York's Segregated Special Education
System, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 239, 240-42 (1995).
34. See Stanley, supra note 22, at 305, 07.
35. See Willard, supra note 6.
36. Stanley, supra note 22, at 310.
37. See generally Farley, supra note 14, at 837-39 (comparing the educational benefits and
disruptive impact associated with supplementary aids and services in regular education with those of
a more segregated setting).
38. See Stanley, supra note 22, at 308-10.
39. See Farley, supra note 14, at 818-19.
40. Id. at 809-10.
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completely different placements being found 'appropriate' for the same
student. 'Al For example, a special education student from a military fam-
ily might find himself in a self-contained classroom segregated from
regular education students in one part of the country one year, and in a
mainstream education classroom with a classroom assistant and supple-
mental therapy in another state the next year.42 Similarly, where cost is a
factor at issue, the resulting disparaging placements are magnified.43
While Massachusetts has placed over sixty percent of the state's mentally
retarded population into regular mainstream classrooms, Kentucky, Ten-
nessee, Michigan, and Ohio have only mainstreamed ten percent of their
mentally retarded children.44 The inconsistent interpretations between the
three tests thus undermine the IDEA's goal of granting equal protection
to special education students across the country.45
B. The Roncker Test
In 1983, the Sixth Circuit developed the first test in Roncker v. Wal-
ter.46 The issue in Roncker surrounded whether the district's placement
of a nine year old boy with severe mental retardation and seizures was
his LRE.4 7 The district court upheld the school district's "LRE" place-
ment in a self-contained classroom with exclusively mentally retarded
students, even though the placement did not allow the child to interact
with non-disabled peers.48 On appeal, the court held that "[in] a case
where a segregated facility is considered superior, the court should de-
termine whether the services which make the placement superior could
be feasibly provided in a non-segregated setting. If they can, the place-
ment in the segregated school would be inappropriate under the Act.'49
Heeding Congress's "strong preference" for mainstreaming, the court
reasoned that IDEA mandates that disabled students receive regular
classroom instruction unless the benefits of the segregated classroom
would far outweigh those in the mainstreamed setting.50
In determining whether a school district's placement of a student is
the LRE, the court articulated three factors: (1) the benefits to the dis-
abled child of receiving regular education classroom instruction as com-
pared to those received from the special education instruction in a segre-
gated classroom; (2) the potentially disruptive impact of the disabled
child on the teacher and students in the regular classroom; and (3) the
41. Stanley, supra note 22, at 311.
42. See Farley, supra note 14, at 818-19.
43. See Stanley, supra note 22, at 310-11.
44. Id. at 311.
45. See id.
46. 700 F.2d 1058; Willard, supra note 6, at 1172.
47. See Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1060.
48. Id. at 1061.
49. Id. at 1063.
50. Id.
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cost of mainstreaming. 51 To evaluate the cost factor, the court consid-
ered whether the expense of such extensive supplemental aid required for
the child to be mainstreamed was so significant that it would mean taking
away funding that other district students also needed.52 The court indi-
cated that it retained some discretion in deciding "whether one program
is excessively expensive in comparison to another." 53 However, in its
holding, the court did not directly discuss the issue of cost and failed to
articulate a clear standard for assessing whether one program is too ex-
pensive or not.54
Following the Sixth Circuit's lead, the Eighth Circuit adopted the
Roncker test in A. W v. Northwest,55 stressing the cost factor in its hold-
ing that placing the student in a mainstreamed classroom was not feasible
due to the expense.56 Because the child's handicap was so severe, the
court concluded that the child was not benefiting from mere observation
of other students in the mainstream classroom.57 More importantly, pro-
viding the child's education in a regular setting would require the costly
hiring of a specially trained teacher for this one student in the school.58
Citing Roncker's suggestion that cost is "a proper factor to consider since
excessive spending on one handicapped child deprives other handicapped
children," 59 the court upheld the district's placement because the minimal
benefit of the child's placement in the mainstream setting was out-
weighed by the "reduction in unquestioned benefits to other handicapped
children which would result from an inequitable expenditure of the finite
funds available. 6°
Additionally, the Fourth Circuit approved the Roncker test in
Devries v. Fairfax County School Board61 in 1989. There, the court up-
held a vocational placement over the seventeen-year-old autistic boy's
local high school even though it was a segregated placement and thirteen
miles away.62 The court applied Roncker's reasoning: "In a case where
the segregated facility is considered superior, the court should determine
whether the services which make that placement superior could be feasi-
bly provided in a non-segregated setting. If they can, the placement in




53. Id. at 1066.
54. See id. at 1059-64.
55. 813 F.2d 158 (8th Cir. 1987).
56. See A.W., 813 F.2d at 163.
57. A. W.. 813 F.2d at 161-62.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 163.
60. Id. at 162-63.
61. 882 F.2d 876, 878-80 (4th Cir. 1989).
62. Devries, 882 F.2d at 880.
63. Id. at 879 (quoting Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063).
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C. The Daniel R.R. Test
Six years after the Roncker decision, the Fifth Circuit developed an
alternative test for LRE in Daniel R.R. v. State Board of Education.
64
Here, the court pointed to the statutory language of IDEA's LRE defini-
tion as the basis for its two-part evaluation of special education services:
To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities ... are
educated with children who are not disabled, and special classes,
separate schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities
from the regular educational environment occurs only when the na-
ture or severity of the disability of a child is such that education in
regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services can-
not be achieved satisfactorily.
65
The first part of the inquiry investigates whether the child could re-
ceive an FAPE in the regular classroom setting.66 If a regular classroom
is not possible and the school intends to place the child in a more restric-
tive classroom, the second part seeks to ensure that the child is still
placed in the LRE.6 7
Under the first prong of the test, the court assesses four factors: (1)
whether education in the regular classroom can be achieved successfully
with the incorporation of "supplementary aids and services;" (2) the
benefits to the child in achieving goals on her IEP in the regular class-
room; (3) the overall experience and benefits to the child in the main-
stream setting as compared to the segregated classroom situation; and (4)
the impact that the child's disability would have on the regular classroom
including the other students' abilities to learn and the teacher's ability to
effectively teach without disruption.68
The court in Daniel R.R. upheld the school district's decision to re-
move Daniel, a six-year-old boy with Down's Syndrome to a self-
contained classroom, because application of the factors in the first prong
of the test indicated that this would be to his benefit and the benefit of
other students.69  The court concluded that the regular kindergarten
teacher made "genuine and creative efforts to reach Daniel, devoting a
substantial - indeed, a disproportionate - amount of her time and di-
vert[ing] much of her attention away from the rest of the students. 70
Finding that the child's handicap had impeded his development, the court
64. 874 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1989).
65. 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (2005); Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1048. "The term 'supplementary aids
and services' means aids, services, and other supports that are provided in regular education classes
or other education-related settings to enable children with disabilities to be educated with nondis-
abled children to the maximum extent appropriate." 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (2005).
66. Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1048.
67. Id. at 1050.
68. Id. at 1048-49.
69. Id. at 1050.
70. Id.
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concluded that he was unable to benefit academically. 71 Furthermore, the
court determined that the benefits of the special education classroom
outweighed the only benefit of the regular classroom-which was inter-
action with nondisabled peers.72 Finally, the court felt that the child's
presence in the classroom was disruptive to the other children, especially
given the disproportionate amount of time the teacher had to spend on
him.
73
Having determined that the child could not successfully receive in-
struction in a mainstreamed classroom under the first prong of the test,
the court then moved to the second prong to ensure that the child would
still be properly placed in his LRE.74 The court considered whether the
school district, in placing the child in a self-contained setting, had com-
plied with IDEA by taking immediate steps to include the child in main-
streamed activities such as gym, art, or lunch to the maximum extent
possible.75 Under the second prong of the test, the court found that the
school district had indeed taken appropriate and timely steps to main-
stream the student by including him with regular education students for
recess and lunch.76
In addition, the Fifth Circuit in Daniel R.R. chose not to include cost
as an explicit factor in its test." However, the court may have left open
the possibility that cost might be relevant on occasion in its suggestion
that the Daniel R.R. factors were not "an exhaustive list. '78 In its only
mention of cost, the court cited Roncker, but quickly dismissed it as a
non-issue in Daniel R.R., since neither party broached the issue.79
The Third Circuit was next to apply the Daniel R.R. test in Oberti v.
Board of Education,8 0 noting that the language in the two-pronged test
more closely connected to the wording in IDEA.8' Specifically, the court
approved how the test stressed the importance of mainstreaming "to the
maximum extent appropriate" and required IEPs to address "each child's
specific needs."8 2 In 1991, the Eleventh Circuit also adopted the Daniel
R.R. test in Greer v. Rome City School District.8 3 Subsequently, as the
courts reviewed more and more cases, they began articulating and de-
lineating more specific standards for each of the factors in the test.84 For
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1050-51.
73. Id. at 1051.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1051.
77. Id. at 1049 n.9.
78. Id. at 1048.
79. Id. at 1049 n.9.
80. 995 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 1993).
81. Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1215.
82. Id.
83. 950 F.2d 688, 696 (11 th Cir. 1991).
84. See generally Farley, supra note 14, at 825-28.
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example, where the school district had not made a good faith effort to
actually provide supplemental services or include the student in a main-
stream class at all, the district court in Girty v. School District of Valley
Grove8 5 held that the school district failed factor one of prong one.86 The
court found that the school district had not made "reasonable" efforts to
accommodate the child in a regular education classroom.87
To date, the Second Circuit has not formally adopted one test over
the others, although in Briggs v. Board of Education,88 the court over-
turned a district court decision relying on Roncker.89 However, in Mavis
v. Sobol,90 the Second Circuit was one of the first courts to identify that a
correlation between the student's level of disruption (factor three) and
the level of supplemental aids potentially exists (factor one) in Daniel
R.R. 91 Because the school district had not shown that the student in the
case had been adequately provided with aids known to reduce disruptive
tendencies, the court held that the school district failed the third factor of
the Daniel R.R. test, and therefore, could not "rely on Emily's asserted





D. The Rachel H. Test
In Sacramento City Unified School District v. Rachel H. , the Ninth
Circuit combined features of the Roncker and the Daniel R.R. tests to
produce the last major test, commonly referred to today as the Rachel H.
test.94 At issue in Rachel H. was the appropriate placement of a moder-
ately retarded eleven-year-old. 95 The district's proposal split her time
between regular and special education classes, while the parents advo-
cated for a full-time regular education placement. 96 Holding for the par-
ents, the district court did not adopt one of the two earlier tests outright-
and did so without any explanation.97 Instead, it identified the four key
factors as being: (1) the "educational benefits" in a regular classroom
with additional "aids and services" compared to the benefits in the spe-
cial education classroom; (2) "the nonacademic benefits" of working
with non-disabled students; (3) whether the student's presence creates a
negative or disruptive impact on the instruction and learning process of
85. 163 F. Supp. 2d 527 (W.D. Pa. 2001).
86. Girty, 163 F. Supp. 2d at 534-36.
87. Id. at 534-35.
88. 882 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1989).
89. Farley, supra note 14, at 827 n. 198.
90. 839 F. Supp. 968 (N.D.N.Y. 1993).
91. Farley, supra note 14, at 828.
92. Mavis, 839 F. Supp. at 991.
93. 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994).
94. Stanley, supra note 22, at 312.
95. Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1400.
96. Id.
97. Farley, supra note 14, at 829.
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the regular education students; and (4) the cost required to provide the
supplemental aids and services to include the child.98
The school district argued that the four factors indicated that inclu-
sion was the LRE for the moderately retarded girl.99 The court con-
cluded that (1) with the aid of supplemental services, Rachel could re-
ceive a satisfactory education in the regular classroom;' 00 (2) the child's
self esteem would improve in the mainstream setting; (3) she was not
disruptive to the learning environment; 10 and finally, (4) the court found
that the district had not met its burden to prove excessive cost of the in-
clusion.
102
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld the lower court's decision and
officially adopted the four factors as the appropriate test. 0 3 In its evalua-
tion, the court emphasized that the district had failed to provide any evi-
dence whatsoever that the cost of educating the student in the regular
classroom was considerably more expensive than the district's place-
ment.13 4 The court further noted that the district's estimate of cost was
inflated and inaccurate:
By inflating the cost estimates and failing to address the true com-
parison, the District did not meet its burden of proving that regular
placement would burden the District's funds or adversely affect ser-
vices available to other children. Therefore, the court found that the
cost factor did not weigh against mainstreaming Rachel.
10 5
Since Rachel H., one district court in the Seventh Circuit has ap-
plied but not adopted the Rachel H. test.10 6 Additionally, the Ninth Cir-
cuit has further clarified and distinguished the meaning of the first factor
from the other circuit tests in Seattle School District v. B.S.10 7 In B.S. the
court approved a broad interpretation of the phrase "educational benefit"
to mean "academic, social, health, emotional, communicative, physical
and vocational needs."'' 0 8 Where the child's severe emotional disorder
had resulted in several hospitalizations, the court held that the regular
classroom was an inappropriate placement despite the student's strong
academic performance, because the child did not receive any nonaca-
98. Bd. OfEduc. v. Holland, 786 F. Supp. 874, 878 (E.D.Cal. 1992).
99. Holland, 786 F. Supp. at 884.
100. Id. at 880.
101. Id. at 882-83.
102. Id. at 883-84.
103. Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1404 (noting "this analysis directly addresses the issue of the appro-
priate placement for a child with disabilities").
104. Id. at 1402.
105. Id.
106. D.F. v. Western Sch. Corp., 921 F. Supp. 559 (S.D. Ind. 1996).
107. 82 F.3d 1493, 1500 (9th Cir. 1996).
108. B.S., 82 F.3d at 1500.
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demic benefits. 0 9 Thus, the court indicated that the scope of "educa-
tional benefit" should include more than mere "academic benefit."' 10
III. TENTH CIRCUIT ADOPTS THE DANIEL R.R. TEST IN L.B. EXREL. K.B.
V. NEBO SCHOOL DISTRICT"'
The circuit feud continues with the Tenth Circuit's recent adoption
of the Daniel R.R. test." 2 The Third, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits also
remain loyal to this test.1 3 The Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits con-
tinue to follow Roncker, and the Ninth and Seventh Circuits employ the
Rachel H. test. 14 In L.B. ex rel. K.B. v. Nebo School District, the Tenth
Circuit upheld the LRE placement of an autistic student in a private pre-
school supplemented heavily by thirty-five to forty hours of one-on-one
home instruction, in spite of the disproportionately high costs. 15 How-
ever, on remand, the court seemed to dismantle its own argument that
cost was irrelevant when it directed the district court to consider the rea-
sonableness of costs and placements in deciding how to reimburse the
parents for their expenses. 1 6 Perhaps, the court's own contradiction
suggests that the Daniel R.R. test is fine in theory but not in practice.
In Nebo, the plaintiffs-appellants had an autistic preschool-aged
child.' 17 The school district devised an IEP as required under IDEA and
placed the child in a preschool with a population consisting of more than
fifty percent handicapped students."18 Although the district had consid-
ered a mainstream placement, it identified the more restrictive preschool
as the best option for the autistic child." 9 However, the school district
did offer to increase the percentage of non-disabled students in the
child's classroom for her benefit.1 20 The district justified its placement
because the school taught special skill levels, many of which would have
met the goals and needs in the child's IEP.
121
Additionally, the school planned to provide the child with speech
and occupational therapy sessions for several hours each week, and as
many as fifteen hours of behavioral therapy. 22 However, although both
parties recognized the need for behavior therapy, appellants argued that
their daughter would only be able to master her IEP goals with thirty-five
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. 379 F.3d 966 (10th Cir. 2004).
112. Nebo, 379 F.3d at 977.
113. Stanley, supra note 22, at 310.
114. Id.
115. Nebo, 379 F.3d at 979, 968-69.
116. Id.





122. Id. (the specific type of behavioral therapy was called Applied Behavioral Analysis).
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to forty hours of it per week. 123 The forty hours also included ten main-
stream hours at the preschool.1 24 Unhappy with the district's placement,
the appellants opted instead to unilaterally enroll their daughter in a pri-
vate preschool at their own expense for those ten hours, and they pro-
ceeded to hire at-home behavioral therapists to complete the remaining
thirty hours.
125
Appellants then requested a due process hearing for reimbursement
of the cost of the ABA instruction. 26 The hearing officer determined
that the school district's IEP and proposed fifteen hours of supplemental
aids and services constituted the appropriate LRE under IDEA. 127 Alleg-
ing violations of IDEA, appellants next filed a complaint in the United
States District Court in the District of Utah against the district for failing
to place their daughter in her LRE. 128 The parties filed cross-summary
judgment motions, and the district court held for the school district.
29
On appeal, the appellants again argued that the district court erred in
concluding that the school district had correctly identified their daugh-
ter's LRE. 130 Overturning the decisions of the hearing officer and the
district court, the court concluded that the preschool with disabled stu-
dents was not the child's LRE.
13 1
In Nebo, the Tenth Circuit carefully decided to adopt the Daniel
R.R. test. Reflecting on the Rachel H. test, the court noted that this test
shared much in common with the Daniel R.R. test, but that Rachel H.
differed because it considered cost in addition. 132 The court summarized
this distinction: "These circuits' LRE tests acknowledge the fiscal reality
that school districts with limited resources must balance the needs of
each disabled child with the needs of other children in the district."' 13 3 In
declining to adopt the Roncker approach, the court criticized Roncker as
appositive only "in cases where the more restrictive placement is consid-
ered a superior educational choice. This feature makes the Roncker test
unsuitable in cases where the least restrictive placement is also the supe-
rior educational choice."' 134 Seeking to adopt a test that the circuit could
use in any situation, the court approved the Daniel R.R. test.' 35 In apply-
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 968-69.
126. Id. at 969.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 970.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 974-75.
131. Id. at 975.
132. Id. at 976.
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ing the test, the court also emphasized that the list of factors was not ex-
haustive and concluded that no factor by itself was dispositive.'
36
In its analysis of the first factor of the Daniel R.R. test, the court
found by a preponderance of the evidence that the benefits the child real-
ized from the private mainstream preschool outweighed those she would
have derived from public preschool. 37 The record revealed that the child
was actually the most advanced student academically in her mainstream
classroom using the supplemental aids and assistance. 138 However, the
court reasoned that since the child's needs were almost entirely social,
her LRE was more likely the private mainstream setting. 39 The nonaca-
demic benefits significantly outweighed those she could have received at
the public school.14 0 Finally, while the child struggled with some behav-
ioral problems, the court concluded such outbursts did not disrupt the
regular classroom. 141
Additionally, in discussing its adoption of the Daniel R.R. test, the
court stated it would not consider cost as a factor in this case since the
school district had not raised it as an issue: "[b]ecause costs are not at
issue in this case, however, this court adopts and applies . . .only the
non-cost factors ....,,4 This language suggests that if the court deter-
mined that cost was an issue in a case, it would invoke cost as factor in
its decision. 143 However, with as much as $63,800 at stake out of the
district's maximum preschool budget of $400,000, cost was certainly a
relevant issue.144 In fact, despite an explicit directive that cost was ir-
relevant in this case, in the final paragraph of the opinion the court re-
manded the case to the district to decide what expenses should be reim-
bursed to the family. 1
45
IV. ANALYSIS
Each of the three circuit tests brings a unique approach to identify-
ing a child's LRE. However, all three tests share two factors: (1) the
benefits to the disabled child and (2) the child's potential disruption to
other students in the classroom. 46 Cost has proven to be the most con-
troversial factor both in terms of whether its application is appropriate
and what test to use.' 47 Many courts have consistently stressed that cost
alone is generally not a strong enough reason to determine a disabled
136. Id.





142. Id. at 977.
143. See id.
144. Id. at 972-73.
145. Id. at 979.
146. Farley, supra note 14, at 820, 823-24, 829-30.
147. See generally Stanley, supra note 22, at 310-11.
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child's LRE. 148 On the other hand, balancing the placement's benefits to
the child against the potential disruption to the other children, is also
insufficient if the cost places an undue burden on the district and in turn,
the other students' education in the district. 49 Accordingly, none of the
tests alone are ideal, such that if the Supreme Court decides to hear a
case on this issue, it should harness the best elements from each test to
design an improved version.
In adopting the Daniel R.R. test, like many of the previous circuits,
the Tenth Circuit in KB. v. Nebo School District 50 did not articulate
practical standards for the two common factors to aid in subsequent ap-
plications. The Nebo court's failure to adequately consider cost in its
initial LRE analysis coupled with its brief mention of reimbursement at
the last minute also signified the court's realization that excluding cost
from the test is fine in theory, but not in practical application. The bene-
fits and disruption factors when weighed against cost create a new rea-
sonableness standard that the Supreme Court should adopt.
A. An Interpretation ofNebo's Application of the Two Common Factors
1. Factor One: Benefits to the Disabled Child of the Mainstream
Classroom
The Nebo court, in adopting the Daniel R.R. test, chose to consider
the academic and nonacademic benefits separately for purposes of analy-
sis. 51 This distinction was noteworthy because it allowed for a more
detailed analysis and recognized that academic performance is not the
only measure of a child's progress. 52 In evaluating the benefits to the
autistic child, the court considered both the impact of the non-disabled
students in the mainstream setting and the supplemental aids and services
to the child. 53 The court's analysis was lacking in two respects. First,
the court did not offer specific criteria to assist later courts in applying
the factors. Second, it did not outline a practical method to assess how
much of the benefit could be attributable to the mainstream environment
versus the supplemental aids and services. The consequence of not hav-
ing explicitly outlined criteria is that there is no practical way to evaluate
how much supplemental support is required to achieve maximum benefit.
148. Willard, supra note 6, at 1178-79.
149. See generally Stanley, supra note 22, at 317.
150. 379 F.3d 966 (10th Cir. 2004).
151. Nebo, 379 F.3d at 977-78.
152. Farley, supra note 14, at 838. A child with mental retardation, for example, may achieve
few if any academic benefits from the mainstream experience but will likely benefit tremendously
from the social interaction and mobility. Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1049 (5th
Cir. 1989). The Rachel H. court added the language, "in a regular classroom, supplemented with
appropriate aids and services" as a more specific point of comparison to the academic benefits the
child will receive in the special education classroom. Bd. of Educ. v. Holland, 786 F. Supp. 874,
878 (E.D. Cal. 1992).
153. Nebo, 379 F.3d at 978.
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Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit's reasoning in Nebo that the aca-
demic benefits to the autistic child were more superior in the private
mainstream classroom than they would be in the public classroom is not
persuasive. 54 The court emphasized that the child was the most aca-
demically advanced student in the mainstream classroom. 55 The court
apparently assumed that the larger numbers of lower performing students
in the public school would directly correlate with a decline in her aca-
demic performance in such a classroom. 56 This reasoning is flawed be-
cause advanced learners who would benefit from the opportunity to be
challenged are present in every classroom, and yet the school district is
not able to move them to another classroom. 157 In fact, tracking students
according to ability has been proven to be detrimental to students' self
esteem and performance. 158 Rather, students function best in heteroge-
neous environments.
159
The court also failed to articulate a standard for attributing the aca-
demic benefits of a "mainstream" placement. The public preschool
classes contained more than fifty percent special education students in a
classroom. 60 Previously, the school district expressly offered to reduce
the ratio of disabled students in the autistic child's class. 16 1 Many "regu-
lar" classroom populations are also comprised of as many as thirty or
forty percent special education students. 62 Furthermore, those regular
education classrooms were taught by a teacher who likely has no back-
ground in special education instruction unlike the teachers specially
trained to work with handicapped students at the public preschool.
63
Although the evidence demonstrated that the autistic child had been suc-
cessful in her mainstream classroom, the court failed to discern how
much of her progress was attributable to the thirty-five to forty hours of
one-on-one instruction she received a week-and how much was influ-
enced by the presence of additional non-disabled students. 64 The court
seemed to ignore this reality altogether given the fact that she spent only
ten hours a week at the private preschool. 
65
With regard to the nonacademic benefit, the court's rationale was
more convincing. It focused on the child's specific disability in the area
of social interactions and reasoned that the mainstream classroom, in
154. Nebo, 379 F.3d at 978.
155. Id.
156. See id.
157. Telephone Interview with Kristy Hurt, Special Education Teacher, Skinner Middle
School, Denver Pub. Sch., in Denver, Colo. (Nov. 2, 2005).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Nebo, 379 F.3d at 968.
161. Id.
162. Hurt, supra note 157.
163. Id.
164. See Nebo, 379 F.3d at 968, 978.
165. Id. at 968.
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surrounding her with non-disabled students with normal mannerisms,
provided a more effective social learning environment for her. 166 The
court further identified the presence of role models and a more suitable
gender ratio to support its conclusion.1 67 Interestingly, as almost a caveat
to this decision, the court qualified its analysis of the benefits and quoted
a case from the Third Circuit:
This court does not mean to imply that only an exclusively main-
stream environment meets the IDEA's LRE mandate for all children.
School officials are not required to provide an exclusively main-
stream environment in every case, and partial integration may well
constitute the provision of an LRE to the 'maximum extent appropri-
ate.'
168
The court seemed to imply that it would not always decide in favor of a
mainstream placement, almost as if realizing the potential ramifications
of this decision as precedent.
The Tenth's Circuit's conclusion that the child with autism would
benefit from the private mainstream classroom was accurate with regard
to her social benefit but less apparent as to her academic benefit. The
Court failed to articulate how necessary or beneficial the extra thirty-five
to forty hours of supplemental services were to the child. 169 In fact, it did
not even mention these additional supports in its application of the
Daniel R.R. test.170 The Nebo court's decision would have been more
effective if it had distinguished the benefit of interacting with non-
disabled peers from the benefit of the supplemental behavioral therapy.
2. Factor Two: Potential Disruption in the Regular Classroom
Whereas the aim of the "benefits" factor centers around the poten-
tially positive effects on the child in question, the "disruption" factor
focuses more intently on the potentially negative effects on the other
regular education students in the classroom and the teacher in the place-
ment decision. The Second Circuit has identified a relationship between
the amount of supplemental aids and services provided to a child and
how disruptive a child is; with the use of supplemental aids and services
there may be less disruption.' 71 The Nebo court failed to provide specific
guidelines to comprehensively account for disruption to the regular stu-
166. Id. at 978.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 978 n.17 (quoting T.R. v. Kingwood Bd. of Educ., 205 F.3d 572, 579 (3d Cir.
2000)); Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1045).
169. See Nebo, 379 F.3d at 977-79.
170. See id.
171. Mavis v. Sobol, 839 F. Supp. 968, 991 (N.D.N.Y. 1993).
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dents as well as the teacher, and guidelines to evaluate appropriate levels
of services required to achieve minimal disruption. 
172
The Nebo court upheld the parents' request for thirty-five to forty
hours of behavioral therapy as a necessary supplemental aid. The court
did so because the child demonstrated significant progress-not because
it identified forty hours as a limit to how many hours the child needed. It
is true that the school district must attempt to implement "positive behav-
ior strategies, interventions, and supports to address the behavior" before
placing a student with behavior problems in a more restrictive environ-
ment. 73 However, it would have been more helpful to later courts if the
Tenth Circuit had established criteria for determining if the child could
function with fewer supplemental hours.
The Tenth Circuit also did not articulate a standard for when a "dis-
ruption" could infringe on the other students' learning in the class.174 In
general, the courts have not offered guidance in this area, other than to
say that the school must demonstrate a reasonable attempt to offer effec-
tive supplements calculated to remedy the disruption. 75 The Nebo court
acknowledged that the autistic child "had some behavioral problems such
as tantruming," but was quick to discount them, indicating that this be-
havior did not seem problematic in the regular classroom. 7 6 It is diffi-
cult to know why the court determined that tantrums were not possibly
disruptive.
The Nebo court further failed to devise a standard to address the as-
pect of disruption involving the teacher's ability to instruct the class de-
spite the presence of the disabled child.' 77 The Fifth Circuit in Daniel
R.R. held that "although regular education instructors must devote extra
attention to their handicapped students, we will not require them to do so
at the expense of their entire class. 178 In contrast, the Nebo court did not
incorporate this language in its holding on this issue and did not mention
at all whether the child's behavior was or was not disruptive to the
teacher's ability to instruct the other students.'79
Overall, the Nebo court simply did not offer a clear justification for
how or why it decided to dismiss disruption as a non-issue in this case.
Had it followed the Second Circuit, the Nebo court might have found a
correlation between the autistic child's minimal disruptions in the main-
stream setting and the significant number of hours of extra therapy both
172. See Nebo, 379 F.3d at 978.
173. Farley, supra note 14, at 839.
174. See Nebo, 379 F.3d at 978.
175. Farley, supra note 14, at 839.
176. Nebo, 379 F.3d at 978.
177. See generally Stanley, supra note 22, at 315-16.
178. Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1051.
179. See Nebo, 379 F.3d at 978.
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in and outside the school day that she received. 80 Unlike the child in the
Second Circuit case who had not benefited from extensive or effective
supplemental aids and services and was therefore disruptive to the other
students and the teacher,' 81 the child in Nebo was at the opposite end of
the spectrum having received so many hours of one-on-one therapy. 82 It
is only possible to speculate whether she would have been more disrup-
tive with fewer hours of support. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit's cur-
sory analysis of the disruption factor, only three sentences in length,
failed to identify any useful guidelines for future decisions.' 
83
B. Accounting for Cost
Whether and, more importantly, how cost should factor into the
equation continues to be a source of significant debate. 84  The Roncker
court acknowledged the financial burden that mainstreaming a child may
impose on a school district. 85 Although subsequent applications of the
Daniel R.R. test have factored cost, the language of the test itself as de-
lineated by the Fifth Circuit makes no mention of cost. 186 Furthermore,
the Rachel H. test recently marked a return to a consideration of cost.
87
However, the opinion offers little guidance on whether this factor should
be weighed as heavily as the benefits and disruption factors. 1
88
The Tenth Circuit mistakenly failed to consider cost in the Nebo de-
cision. Generally, other circuits have applied cost as a factor in two dif-
ferent ways. 89 First, some courts have balanced the costs of educating
one child against the educational and financial needs of other children in
the district.' 90 Second, some courts allow school districts to use cost as a
defense when balancing the cost of a placement against the appropriate-
ness of that placement. '9'
1. Four Reasons Why Cost Should Be a Factor
First, costs of educating special needs children have increased dra-
matically in the past three years. 92 Those expenditures are more likely
180. See Mavis, 839 F. Supp. at 989-91.
181. Id. at 991.
182. Nebo, 379 F.3d at 978.
183. Id.
184. See generally Willard, supra note 6, at 1177-78.
185. See Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983).
186. Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 697 (11 th Cir. 1991). See Daniel R.R., 874
F.2d at 1049-50.
187. Holland, 786 F. Supp. at 879-80.
188. See id
189. Willard, supra note 6, at 1178.
190. E.g., Greer, 950 F.2d at 697.
191. See, e.g., Roncker, 700 F. 2d at 1064. See Willard, supra note 6, at 1178.
192. Biscelgia, supra note 1. Nationally, the percentage of K- 12 special education enrollments
continued to rise every year from 1976 until 1997, with a proportional increase of nineteen percent
from 1987-1998. Thomas P. Parrish, Special Education - At What Cost to General Education?, The
CSEF Resource, Winter 1999-2000, Ctr for Special Educ. Finance,
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due to increased enrollment of special education students and a decrease
in federal funding, rather than a function of an actual increase in per pu-
pil special education expenditures.1 93 The Tenth Circuit failed to account
for this practical reality in its decision.
Second, the link between special education placement and the abil-
ity of the school to qualify for supplemental funding creates a financial
incentive for schools to place students in more restrictive environment.
94
A recent study examined the relationship between state formulas that
distribute funds based on school district placements and the state's use of
restrictive placements for children with disabilities. 95 While states that
had the highest number of self-contained placements used funding for-
mulas based on placements, states with the lowest number of segregated
placements did not fund according to placement. 196 This study may indi-
cate that school districts have a real incentive to classify more students as
"special ed," since doing so means receiving additional state funding. 197
Decisions like Nebo produce an even more compelling reason for dis-
tricts to classify more students as "special ed" since the estimated costs
of the autistic child's supplemental aids and service constituted as much
as $63,800, approximately one-sixth of the district's total preschool
budget.' 98
Third, the courts have interpreted legislative intent to imply that
cost should be a relevant consideration in LRE placement. In noting that
IDEA directs the states to determine "priorities for providing a free ap-
propriate public education to all handicapped children," the court in Bar-
nett v. Fairfax County School Board. 199 indicated that Congress intended
for the court to balance the needs of a disabled child against competing
economic realities.2 °°
http://www.ldonline.org/ld indepth/specialeducation/at whatcost.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2006).
In Vermont, a legislative commission set up in 1998 reported that cost-containment must become a
state-wide priority because increased expenditures are not sustainable. Id. California's special
education population has nearly doubled from 1990 to 1999. Id. (quoting Amy Pyle, Davis Asked to
Help End Special Education Funding Dispute, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 1, 1999, at A3.). An analysis of
nine school districts over more than twenty years reveals that general education expenditures had
plunged from eighty to fifty-nine percent with special education gains from four to seventeen per-
cent. Id.
193. Parrish, supra note 2, at 3. Recent studies in New York revealed that ninety percent of
increased special education funding correlated with higher enrollments. Id. at 2. A study in Wiscon-
sin indicated that virtually all revenue increases for special education had resulted from higher
enrollments as well. Id.
194. Willard, supra note 6, at 1181.
195. Willard, supra note 6, at 1184.
196. Id.
197. See generally id.
198. Nebo, 379 F.3d at 973.
199. 927 F.2d 146, 154 (4th Cir. 1991).
200. Barnett, 927 F.2d at 154 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(3) (1991) (current version at 20
U.S.C. § 1412 (2005))).
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Fourth, there is a practical limitation to how much a school can af-
ford in order to pursue the maximum benefits for the child.20 ' Even be-
fore the development of the circuit tests, the Supreme Court in Rowley
implied a limit to special needs costs: "to require ... the furnishing of
every special service necessary to maximize each handicapped child's
potential is ... further than Congress intended to go.
202
Accordingly, cost is a practical issue facing school districts that
Congress and the Supreme Court have acknowledged to be a relevant
concern.
2. Two Standards the Courts Have Articulated Relating to Cost
Although most circuits agree cost cannot be ignored altogether, its
role as a factor in placement decisions has been the subject of much de-
bate.203 No one wants to tell a special needs child she does not deserve a
quality education, but the courts have been clear that the most expensive
placement is not always the most appropriate for a number of reasons.2 °4
The courts have tended to analyze cost in two different ways.205 One
approach balances cost for one child against the costs of educating other
children.20 6 The second approach weighs the cost of a child's placement
against the appropriateness of the placement itself.
20 7
a. Balancing the Costs of One Child Against the Needs of the
Others
The courts adopting this method seem to recognize the realities of
IDEA as a largely unfunded mandate.208 A study conducted in the 1990s
concluded that "the cost of educating disabled students . .. is threatening
the ability of the educational institution to educate nondisabled students
in many districts and, therefore, is placing the entire public education
edifice potentially at risk., 20 9 The state of Colorado paints a bleak pic-
ture of this reality. The Colorado Department of Education has reported
that the federal government provides only seventeen percent of the requi-
site special education funding required for such students in Colorado
schools, with local dollars responsible for the bulk of expenditures cover-
ing seventy percent and only eleven percent coming from the state.21
201. See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 199 (1982).
202. Id.
203. Willard, supra note 6, at 1178; Stanley, supra note 22, at 310-11.
204. See generally Stanley, supra note 22, at 316-17.
205. Id. at 310-11.
206. Id. E.g., Greer, 950 F.2d at 697.
207. Stanley, supra note 22, at 310-11.
208. Biscelgia, supra note 1.
209. Parrish, supra note 2, at I (quoting Bruce Meredith & Julie Underwood, Irreconcilable
Differences? Defining the Rising Conflict Between Regular and Special Education, 24 J.L. & EDUC.
195, 213 (1995).
210. Paulmeno, supra note 20.
[Vol. 83:3
2006] L.B. EX REL. K.B. V. NEBO SCHOOL DISTRICT 783
Accordingly, some courts have created a balancing test that consid-
ers the cost of the disabled student's education against the needs of other
students in the district.211 In Greer v. Rome City, the court articulated
this standard: "when the cost of educating a handicapped child in a regu-
lar classroom is so great that it would significantly impact the education
of other children in the district, then education in a regular classroom is
not appropriate., 212 The Eighth Circuit, adopting the Roncker test in
A. W. v. Northwest, applied a variation of the test which compares instead
the disabled child's expenses against the expenditures for other disabled
children, excluding impacts on the general education population.213 The
court agreed with the district court's finding that:
[T]he severity of the child's handicap was such that the interaction
with non-handicapped students would ... require removal of a
teacher from the state facility to provide the student with a properly
certified teacher. Due to limited available funding, the teacher would
not be replaced at the state school. Thus, the program provided to the
other handicapped students would be adversely affected by the in-
creased student/teacher ratio. The court concluded the benefit to the
student from mainstreaming was insufficient to justify a reduction in
benefits to other handicapped children; the parents' proposed place-
ment in the district would have resulted in a disproportionate expen-
diture of available funds.214
The school district in Rachel H. made a similar argument. Accord-
ing to the district, her placement would result in over a $100,000 loss in
state funding for special education funding unless she was placed in spe-
cial education classes for at least fifty-one percent of the day.215 Ulti-
mately, the Rachel H. court was not persuaded by the school district's
argument.216 In holding for the parents, the court reasoned that the cost
of mainstreaming her was not significant.217 It also refused to place her
in a more restrictive setting that would not offer her the benefits she
could reap in a regular classroom, despite the financial burden potentially
imposed on the district, and ultimately other disabled students.
21 8
In its LRE placement analysis, the Nebo court deliberately ignored
cost as a factor on the grounds that the district claimed it was not at issue
in its original decision-making process. 219 The court ignored cost even
though the expense of educating the autistic child in the regular class-
211. Greer, 950 F.2d at 697.
212. Id.
213. A. W., 813 F.2d at 163-64.
214. Leslie A. Collins & Perry A. Zirkel, To What Extent, If Any, May Cost be a Factor in
Special Education Cases?, 71 ED. L. REP. 11, 22 (1992); A. W., 813 F.2d at 160-63.
215. Holland, 14 F.3d at 1402, 1404.
216. Id. at 1404.
217. Id. at 1402.
218. Id. at 1402, 1404.
219. Nebo, 379 F.3d at 977.
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room with the forty hours of supplemental aids and services equated al-
most one sixth of the district's entire preschool budget of $400,000, and
even though both the district and the parents' expert indicated that only
twelve to fifteen hours of additional support for the child would have
likely accommodated her. 220 The court did point out that in some cir-
cuits, "LRE tests acknowledge the fiscal reality that school districts with
limited resources must balance the needs of each disabled child with the
needs of other children in the district," but drew the unlikely conclusion
that costs are simply not an issue in this case.22'
In acknowledging the discrepancy in the cost to educate the child in
comparison to the remainder of the budget to provide for all other special
needs children, the Nebo court seemed to follow the Rachel H. court.222
The school in A. W. identified a specific need and argued that holding for
the one child would specifically deprive the other special needs chil-
dren.223 A. W. can be distinguished from Rachel H. and Nebo in that in
A. W., the school district specifically identified how placement in the
LRE for the handicapped plaintiff would deprive other disabled children
from the appropriate student-teacher ratio.224 Whereas the Rachel H. and
Nebo court considered a nebulous dollar figure, the A. W court con-
fronted concrete inequity. Perhaps that resulted in the different holding.
b. Cost as a Defense: Balancing Cost Against the Appropriate
Placement
Like the courts in the previous section suggested, the Roncker court
concluded that cost is an appropriate factor because excessive spending
on one disabled child can withhold needed funds from other handicapped
students.225 However, Roncker applied a slightly different standard.226
The court permitted school districts to use cost as a defense provided that
the district could prove that it had allocated its funds to render services to
the child along an appropriate continuum of different placements. 227 The
court held that the school's individual education program committee
must choose from a continuum of ten different possible LREs when
evaluating a particular student.28 At the same time, the court in
220. Id. at 973.
221. Id. at 977.
222. Nebo, 379 F.3d at 979; Holland, 14 F.3d at 1402; see generally Willard, supra note 6, at
1183-84.
223. A. W., 813 F.2d at 161-62; Nebo, 379 F.3d at 979; Holland, 14 F.3d at 1402, 1404.
224. Id.
225. Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063.
226. Id. at 1062.
227. Id. at 1063.
228. Id.; see also Harley A. Tomey, III, IEP: Individualized Education Program The Process,
Virginia Department of Education, http://www.ldonline.org/ld indepth/iep/iep_process.hml (last
visited Jan. 28, 2006). The continuum ranges from option 1 that offers direct instruction and/or
consultation services within the regular classroom, to option three providing direct instruction within
the regular classroom and content instruction in a special education classroom, to option seven
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Roncker, refused to consider cost or the merits of an alternative place-
ment when the child had never been placed in a fully mainstreamed set-
ting.229 Although the Daniel R.R. test does not emphasize cost as a fac-
tor, its first factor is similar to this approach in requiring that a school
demonstrate it took sufficient steps to accommodate the child's needs in
the regular classroom before removing her.23°
This second approach to a cost analysis mirrors the language of that
IDEA which mandates states provide a "free and appropriate education"
to all handicapped children. 231 As the court in Rowley indicated, "appro-
priate" does not require a school to completely optimize these services,
as long as the child is benefiting educationally from the program in
place. 232 The courts have often considered cost when weighing two dif-
ferent placement or service options. If a second service or placement
option exists that would also provide a free and appropriate education at
a lower price, the courts have sometimes opted for such an alternative.233
At issue in Barnett was whether a center placement for a hearing
impaired student was an acceptable alternative to a placement in her
neighborhood school that did not offer the appropriate services to meet
the child's special needs.234 Although the neighborhood school was truly
the LRE, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the center school could best
meet the child's needs.235 Rather than evaluate cost in terms of other
students in the district, the court here considered cost against the appro-
priate placement in determining that the center placement was "appropri-
ate" even though it was not the best possible education the school district
236could offer with unlimited funding.
Similarly, in Detsel v. Board of Education,237 the court declined to
provide a severely handicapped child with close supervision by a highly
trained nurse due to the excessive burden of cost.238 In Clovis Unified-
School District v. California Office of Administrative Hearings,239 the
court considered two different placements, a residential home costing
$50,000 and a psychiatric facility costing $150,000.240 In finding for the
offering separate private day school for students with disabilities, to option ten, a hospital setting.
Id.
229. Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063.
230. DanielR.R., 874 F.2d at 1048.
231. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) & (a)(5)(A).
232. Bd. ofEduc. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 198-201 (1982).
233. Clevenger v. Oak Ridge Sch. Bd., 744 F.2d 514, 517 (6th Cir. 1984) (finding that where
two placements are proposed, but only one is appropriate, cost is irrelevant and therefore, should not
factor into the decision).
234. Barnett, 927 F.2d at 154.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. 820 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1987).
238. Detsel, 820 F.2d at 588.
239. 903 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1990).
240. Clovis Unified Sch. Dist. v. Cal. Office of Admin. Hearings, 903 F.2d 635, 639 (9th Cir.
1990).
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school district's recommendation of the residential home, the court ac-
knowledged a limit that a district must spend to adequately meet a child's
special needs.24'
The Tenth Circuit in Nebo had two placement options much like the
cases discussed above, both of which were arguably appropriate on the
242hoeoncontinuum, as required by Roncker and IDEA. In fact, homebound
placement is actually the ninth most restrictive environment which is
where the child spent most of her instructional time with the forty hours
243of one-on-one instruction in the parent's preferred placement.
In applying this cost analysis to the Nebo decision, it is first neces-
sary to determine whether the autistic child had the opportunity to be
mainstreamed to the fullest amount possible.244 At first glance, the court
said she did not because the public preschool placement was not the
LRE.245 However, the answer to this question is more complicated and
somewhat more difficult given the split-nature of her time, which actu-
ally closely parallels the district court's placement in Roncker that the
appellate court rejected.246 Unlike the parents in Roncker who were
unhappy with the placement in a segregated setting at another school
coupled with transportation to a mainstream setting midday for lunch and
integration, the autistic child's parents in Nebo favored the split-time
arrangement with the additional time in what was primarily a homebound
setting.247 In fact, although homebound placement is actually the ninth
most restrictive placement option, it was where she spent most of her
instructional time with the forty hours of one-on-one instruction in the
parent's preferred placement. 248 This intensive forty-hour training plusthe private school tuition presented a much costlier option.249
The child's alternative placement proposed by the school district is
actually a LRE in that it offered ten hours of instruction in a setting with
approximately half non-disabled students with support from trained
therapists for ten to fifteen hours a week, including some on campus and
some at home hours. 250 This option is also much more cost efficient than
the private school, and had the Roncker, Detsel, Clovis or Barnett courts
decided this case, it might have come out differently.
241. Collins & Zirkel, supra note 214, at 23.
242. Nebo, 379 F.3d at 976, 978.
243. Biscelgia, supra note 1.
244. Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1065 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
245. Nebo. 379 F.3d at 977-78.
246. Id. at 972-73; Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063.
247. Nebo, 379 F.3d at 968; Roncker 700 F.2d at 1059, 1061.
248. Nebo, 379 F.3d at 972-73; Tomey, supra note 228.
249. Nebo, 379 F.3d at 972-73.
250. Id. at 968.
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In the end, the school district erred in not arguing cost as its de-
fense.25' On appeal, the school district's special education director
claimed that "cost never entered into [its] decision to provide services"
and that the district "never said it would not provide a particular service
solely because of cost concerns. 252 Although cost is never the only rea-
son to decline services, it is a factor that should not be ignored by the
Tenth Circuit or a school district.253 To pretend cost is irrelevant is to
deny other children the services they deserve without an all-out court
battle and to pretend that some placements are just as effective without
all the bells and whistles.
C. A New Reasonableness Standard for Cost: The Beetle, Not the Cadil-
lac of Placement
The courts cannot continue to ignore the practical realities of im-
plementation issues in the classroom coupled with the economic realities
of an unfunded mandate. The last time the Supreme Court spoke directly
on the issue in Rowley was over two decades ago.254 The court at that
time was cognizant that "to require . . . the furnishing of every special
[education] service necessary to maximize each handicapped child's po-
tential is ... further than Congress intended to go. '255 In other words, in
terms of practical application, the Court's holding implies that it would
be impossible to arm every special needs child with the "Cadillac place-
ment" on the continuum of services.256 A more appropriate and realistic
placement to strive for would be the "Volkswagon beetle placement."
257
The beetle is a metaphor for the quality of placement a school district can
be expected to deliver.258 The idea of IDEA is to ensure that the special
education students have the supplemental services-the gas, if you
will-they need to drive a beetle.259
Ultimately, the beetle represents a "reasonableness" standard which
would enable districts to "use cost as a defense against 'unreasonable'
demands, provided a continuum of appropriate [placement] options are
available to children with disabilities. ' 260 The courts must of course use
tailored judgment for each individual child since what may be a reason-
251. Biscelgia, supra note 1.
252. Nebo, 379 F.3d at 972-73.
253. Willard, supra note 6, at 1178-79.
254. See generally Rowley, 458 U.S. 176.
255. Id at 199.
256. Biscelgia, supra note 1.
257. Id. All too often, by the time cases like this one get appealed, the child is already experi-
encing such high achievement that removal seems inappropriate even though the supplementary
services are excessive. Id. Somewhere the courts need to draw the line between achievement and
exceptional achievement. Id.
258. Biscelgia, supra note 1.
259. Id.
260. Janet R. Beales, Special Education: Expenditures and Obligations, Policy Study No. 161,
Reason Foundation, Los Angeles, Cal. (July 1993) available at
http://www.rppi.org/education/ps16l.html.
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able or even an essential demand for one child could be unreasonable for
another child. 26' Additionally, a reasonableness standard such as this
should sidestep placing a specific limitation on price; rather, in deter-
mining appropriate placement, the district and the court should balance
the academic and nonacademic benefits to a student against the necessary
supplemental services required to prevent disruption in the regular class-
room and the costs of providing those services.262 The price tag will in-
evitably depend on the costs of the necessary supplements and services
that will enable the child in the beetle to function adequately in the
LRE.263
Indirect support for such a reasonableness standard also comes from
the Supreme Court's guidance in Florence County School District v.
Carter264 and Burlington v. Department of Education265 on a related cost
issue-private school tuition reimbursement to parents who have unilat-
erally withdrawn their child from a public school placement and enrolled
her in a private school.266 Citing to those decisions, the Nebo court indi-
cated that the parents were entitled to receive reimbursement for "the
reasonable cost of the services provided to [their daughter] in support of
her mainstream preschool education.', 267  However, in addressing the
issue of reimbursement, the Nebo court tried to argue that it was a com-
pletely separate issue from cost and its relation to LRE:
Whereas the issue of the allegedly unreasonable cost of [the autistic
child's behavioral therapy] was not presenttd to the district court in
the context of LRE, it was presented in the context of equitable con-
siderations under Burlington and Carter. As a consequence, in the
latter context this issue has not been waived.
268
Nevertheless, the end result of reimbursement is actually just the same as
cases decided under Rachel H. or Roncker-the district loses the money
that could have gone to support other special needs children. 269 The sub-
stantive debate surrounding cost and reimbursement is the same even if
the school district did not procedurally raise the issue of cost in district
court.270 The Tenth Circuit's decision to disguise cost as reimbursementin the final page of the opinion demonstrates further that the court, in
261. Id. at 33.
262. Id. at 24; Mavis, 839 F. Supp. at 991 (emphasizing that a strong correlation exists between
the amount of supplemental aids and services provided and how disruptive a child is).
263. Biscelgia, supra note 1.
264. 510 U.S. 7 (1993).
265. 471 U.S. 359 (1985).
266. See Florence, 510 U.S. at 11, 15.
267. Nebo, 379 F.3d at 978.
268. Id. at 979.
269. See generally Willard, supra note 6.
270. Biscelgia, supra note 1.
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deciding not to consider cost in the analysis section, later realized that
practically speaking, cost was at issue.27'
Interestingly, in articulating criteria for the lower court to evaluate
the reasonableness of the reimbursement cost, the Nebo court relied on
the Supreme Court's suggestion in Burlington and Carter.2 72 Although
reimbursement may be a different issue, there is a significant amount of
overlap. Thus, these Supreme Court decisions and Nebo can inform the
development of a new reasonableness test for cost and LRE placement.
The Nebo court reiterated two sub-factors, identical to the two addressed
by different circuits at length in the preceding two sections.273 First, the
court asked the district court to consider whether the reimbursement for
two school years would "impose a disproportionate burden on Nebo's
preschool budget., 274  Second, the court directed the lower court to
evaluate the cost and the appropriateness of placement on remand:
[T]he district court should consider equitable factors such as whether
[the autistic child] needed forty hours of [behavioral therapy] per
week in order to succeed in her mainstream classroom. In consider-
ing this equitable factor, the district should give due deference to [the
expert's] fmding that [the child] needed only twenty to thirty hours of
at-home [therapy].
275
Unintentionally, the Nebo court's discussion of reimbursement
frames the proposed reasonableness standard.276 Unlike the theoretical
constructs of the court's opinion and its failure to spell out clear stan-
dards for the benefits, disruption and cost factors, the Tenth Circuit es-
sentially charged the district court with assessing the benefits and costs
of placement.277
In application, since the district court's remanded opinion has not
been released, it is only possible to speculate as to how the Nebo decision
and LRE placement might have come out differently had the court ap-
plied its own standards for reasonableness. In its initial decision, the
Nebo court upheld the "Cadillac placement" in placing the child in a pri-
vate mainstream preschool and providing her with forty hours of one-on-
one instruction (the Cadillac of class size).278 The mainstream school
placement and the forty hours of supplemental aids and services did
come with a hefty price tag of up to $63,800 annually.
279
271. Nebo, 379 F.3d at 978-79.
272. Id.





278. See generally id. at 970.
279. Id. at 973.
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A more reasonable placement would have considered the two sub-
factors as suggested by the Nebo court.280 First, based on cost alone, it is
likely that the cost of tuition at approximately $60,000 annually plus
reimbursement for two previous years at $120,000 would impose a sig-
nificant hardship on the district's ability to fund services for other dis-
abled children out of a budget of $400,000.81
Second, a consideration of cost as it relates to the appropriateness of
the placement identifies a possible alternative "beetle placement" in lieu
of the parents' "Cadillac placement." A Nebo expert testified that the
child had shown significant progress with only twenty hours over a four-
month period.282 Since this autistic child was the most academically ad-
vanced in a class of regular non-disabled students, such a high level of
performance suggests that the supplemental services required to keep her
from being disruptive and enable her growth were perhaps over the
top.
283
While the district erred in placing her at the public preschool where
she might regress under the potential negative influence of other disabled
children's behavior and mannerisms, 284 an alternative, more reasonable
placement exists. This alternative ("beetle") placement would continue
placement at the private school with only twenty hours of behavioral
therapy a week since expert testimony indicated that she had been suc-
cessful during a four-month period with this amount of support. Accord-
ingly, this placement balances the excessive cost of the personal instruc-
tion tutoring against both costs to other children and the cost of her
placement against its appropriateness.
CONCLUSION
With the cost of special education continuing to rise, the Tenth Cir-
cuit and others will continue to face more and more cases concerning
285cost as an issue. The Nebo court was unable to ignore cost altogether
because of its practical realities. Most courts have recognized a need to
evaluate LRE placement with cost in mind. The Nebo court's discussion
of reimbursement alluded to two sub-factors many circuits have already
considered in previous decisions. The first sub-factor is important be-
cause it forces the courts to consider how choosing the Cadillac place-
280. Id. at 979.
281. ld. at 973,978-79.
282. Nebo, 379 F.3d at 973.
283. Id. at 978.
284. Id. at 973.
285. Biscelgia, supra note 1; See Complaint at 1, 6, Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P., No.
I:05-cv-02248-WDM (10th Cir. Nov. 04, 2005). The Thompson School District in Berthoud, Colo-
rado, is appealing a hearing officer's approval of the parents' decision to withdraw their autistic
child from the district and enroll him in a residential placement private school in Boston. Id at 6.
The district and the parents disagree on the appropriate LRE placement, and cost is a major issue
since the parents are seeking $137,000 in tuition reimbursement for the private school placement.
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ment may burden the school district and ultimately reduce services of-
fered to other students in the district. The second sub-factor juxtaposes
cost with the benefits and disruption factors. The reasonableness stan-
dard does not undermine IDEA's objective to identify a child's LRE.
Rather, it reinforces the Supreme Court's interpretation of IDEA in Row-
ley that school districts are not required to provide the Cadillac to every
child. What the reasonableness standard has the power to accomplish is
bridging the abstract, theoretical approach of the circuit tests with the
practical realities that school districts face.
Ashley Oliver*
* Former teacher and J.D. Candidate, May 2007, University of Denver Sturm College of
Law. The author would like to thank Robert Anderson for his writing instruction, support for this
article, and friendship.

MCCAULEY V. HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES, INC.:
TREATMENT OF A MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS
PENDING AN ARBITRABILITY APPEAL
INTRODUCTION
Arbitration is a method of dispute resolution "involving one or more
neutral third parties who are agreed to by the disputing parties and whose
decision is binding."' The arbitration proceeding is distinct from litiga-
tion and its underlying purpose is to "encourag[e] dispute resolution
without resort to the courts."2 Arbitration is an attractive form of dispute
resolution because it "leads to the efficient resolution of disputes without
resort to the time and expense of litigation."3
Although arbitration is an efficient form of dispute resolution, a
party cannot be forced to arbitrate in the absence of an arbitration agree-
ment.4 Generally, the parties, subject to such an agreement, will choose
to arbitrate on their own. However, when a party is resolute on trying to
avoid arbitration, "a federal district court may be required to ascertain
whether an arbitration clause contained in an agreement between or
among the involved parties requires that the dispute be submitted to arbi-
tration.",5 When a party to an arbitration agreement files a motion to
compel arbitration, the federal district court will determine whether to
grant or deny the motion.
When a motion to compel arbitration is granted, the parties are re-
quired to submit to arbitration to resolve their disputes. When the mo-
tion to compel arbitration is denied, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
permits the moving party to appeal. Several issues arise in this scenario.
How should the district court, which denied the motion to compel arbi-
tration, proceed? Should the district court grant a motion to stay the pro-
ceedings pending the arbitrability appeal? Or, should the district court
deny a motion to stay and proceed with the case on the merits?
The former is in line with the purpose of arbitration-to save time
and money by avoiding litigation, but the latter has favorable arguments
as well-namely to avoid frivolous appeals in an effort to stall the litiga-
tion process. When a district court denies a party's motion to compel
arbitration, circuits are divided on whether proceedings should be stayed
1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 112 (8th ed. 2004).
2. 6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 6 (2005).
3. James R. Foley, Recent Development: Bradford-Scott Data Corp., Inc. v. Physician Com-
puter Network, Inc., 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1071, 1071 (1998).
4. 19 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 203.12 (3d ed. 2005).
5. See Foley, supra note 3, at 1071.
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during an appeal of that decision. Recently, the Tenth Circuit, in a case
of first impression, addressed this issue. In McCauley v. Halliburton
Energy Services Inc.,6 the Tenth Circuit adopted the approach of the Sev-
enth and Eleventh Circuits and held that a motion to stay proceedings in
the district court should be granted pending an arbitrability appeal.7
Part I of this article discusses the arbitration process; the Federal
Arbitration Act, the four-prong test for determining whether a court
should generally stay proceedings, the growing popularity of arbitration
in the United States, and the circuits' opposing views on whether to grant
a stay pending an arbitrability appeal. Part II of this article discusses the
recent Tenth Circuit case of McCauley v. Halliburton. Finally, Part III
presents two main arguments supporting the holding in McCauley. First,
procedurally, a stay should be granted because a district court lacks ju-
risdiction to continue with a case on the merits pending an arbitrability
appeal; and second, allowing for a stay is consistent with the FAA and
the purpose of arbitration generally. Finally, I address whether the issue
will likely reach the United States Supreme Court.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Arbitration-Alternative Dispute Resolution
Arbitration is one of several alternative processes that parties can
use to resolve disputes. The main reason parties agree to arbitrate is to
avoid the time and expenses that often accompany the litigation process.
Furthermore, unlike litigation, arbitration is private, and thus appeals to
those wishing to keep their disputes out of the public eye. Arbitration
can be defined as a private process where one or more neutrals renders a
decision after hearing arguments and reviewing evidence. 8 Generally, in
arbitration, the neutral's decision is binding unless the parties contract in
such a way as to allow for an appeal of the decision.9 However, most
often arbitration is used as a binding dispute resolution procedure.
There are several steps in the arbitration process. First, the parties
generally agree to arbitrate in the event that a dispute arises. Parties usu-
ally do so by entering into an arbitration agreement. Once a dispute
arises there are six standard stages in the arbitration process.' 0
The first step in the arbitration process is the initiation--one party
will submit a "demand" or "notice" to the other party stating that, pursu-
ant to the parties' agreement, arbitration shall be used to settle a given
dispute.' If both parties agree to arbitrate, then the parties enter the sec-
6. 413 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir. 2005).
7. McCauley, 413 F.3d at 1163.
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ond stage of the arbitration process, preparation, where the parties pre-
pare for the case.' 2 However, if one party refuses to arbitrate or honor
the arbitration agreement, the moving party may, pursuant to the Federal
Arbitration Act, file a motion to compel arbitration in any district court
with jurisdiction over the matter.' 3 If the motion is granted, the parties
are required to arbitrate and the second stage, preparation, begins. In the
preparation stage, the parties will prepare for the arbitration hearing.
14
This may include pre-hearing discovery if necessary. 5 However, if the
motion to compel arbitration is denied, the moving party may appeal the
denial of the motion to compel arbitration. 16
The third and forth stages of the arbitration process are the pre-
hearing conference and hearing.' 7 In the pre-hearing conference the par-
ties and the arbitrator deal with administrative tasks such as scheduling
the arbitration. 8 The hearing is an evidentiary-type hearing where both
parties present their evidence to the arbitrator.' 9
Finally, the fifth and sixth stages of the arbitration process are the
decision-making stage and the award stage. 0 Upon the completion of
the hearing, the arbitrator will decide the dispute. Often this is done im-
mediately upon completion of the hearing, but no more than thirty days
after the hearing.2' Once a decision is made, the arbitrator will render a
decision in the form of an award, which generally, unlike litigation, is
binding with no option for appeal.22
B. The Federal Arbitration Act
In 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act2 3 (FAA) "to
ensure that arbitration agreements would be given the same legal effect
as other contracts" 24 and "to assure those who desired arbitration and
whose contracts related to interstate commerce that their expectations
would not be undermined by federal judges, or . . . by the widespread
12. Id.
13. See infra Part I.B.
14. Id.
15. Because one of the main qualities of arbitration is the expediency of the process, often
times pre-hearing discovery in arbitration is limited. The limitations of discovery are usually estab-
lished by the arbitrator, but nonetheless, discovery in arbitration is very rarely as extensive as the
discovery process in litigation. See COOLEY, supra note 8, at 30.







23. 9 U.S.C.S. § 1 - 16 (2005).
24. Thomas G. Stenson, Punitive Damages Under the Federal Arbitration Act: Have Arbitra-
tors'Remedial Powers Been Circumscribed by State Law, 7 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 661,
661 (1992).
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unwillingness of state courts to enforce arbitration agreements. 25 Fur-
thermore, following the enactment of the FAA the United States Su-
preme Court has required courts to "rigorously enforce" arbitration
agreements.26
Under Section 4 of the FAA, a party to an arbitration agreement
may petition any United States district court, with proper jurisdiction, for
an order to compel arbitration.27 When determining the arbitrability of a
dispute, the court must decide "whether the parties agreed to arbitrate
and, if so, whether the scope of that agreement encompasses the asserted
claims., 28  If the district court is satisfied that the dispute shall be re-
solved through arbitration, the court will order the parties to proceed to
arbitration.2 9 On the other hand, if the district court denies a party's Sec-
tion 4 motion to compel arbitration, Section 16(a) of the FAA allows for
an interlocutory appeal of the order denying arbitration.30 Allowing such
an appeal demonstrates the FAA's "liberal policy favoring arbitration.',
31
Specifically, the FAA, allowing such an appeal, supports the policy fa-
voring arbitration "by permitting interlocutory appeals of orders favoring
litigation over arbitration ... ,32 Conversely, the FAA does not allow
interlocutory appeals of orders favoring arbitration over litigation in the
presence of an arbitration agreement.33
25. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13 (1984) (citing Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v.
Terminal Constr. Corp., 287 F.2d 382, 387 (2d Cir. 1961)).
26. Catherine Burnham, Recent Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 767, 769 (2005) (quoting Shearson/Am. Express,
Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987)).
27. The FAA states:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a
written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court which, save
for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under Title 28, in a civil action or in admi-
ralty of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties, for
an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such
agreement.
9 U.S.C.S. § 4 (2005).
28. MOORE ET AL., supra note 4, § 203.12 (quoting Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. C.A.
Reaseguradora Nacional, 991 F.2d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 1993)).
29. 9 U.S.C.S. § 4 (2005).
30. 9 U.S.C.S. § 16(a)(1)(C) (2005) (This section was enacted by Congress in 1988 and reads,
"An appeal may be taken from an order denying an application under section 206 of this title to
compel arbitration."). ,
31. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 (1991) (quoting Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983)).
32. MOORE ET AL., supra note 4, § 203.12 (quoting Forsythe Int'l S.A. v. Gibbs Oil Co. of
Texas, 915 F.2d 1017, 1020 (5th Cir. 1990)).
33. The rationale behind this idea goes directly to Congress' intent in enacting the FAA.
Congress desired courts to honor arbitration agreements and give then the same legal effect as other
contracts. Stenson, supra note 24, at 661. Allowing an appeal of an order favoring arbitration over
litigation, in the presence of an arbitration agreement, would undermine this purpose, as one must
assume that parties understand the implications of an arbitration agreement if they willingly form a
contract which includes such an agreement (of course, this statement is directed more towards com-
mercial contracts between parties of equal bargaining power rather than consumer contracts where
companies clearly have unequal bargaining power over consumers who, in most cases, do not choose
to enter arbitration agreements when they purchase a service or good).
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The FAA is explicit about courts enforcing valid arbitration agree-
ments, and equally explicit about allowing for an appeal of a district
court order denying a party's motion to compel arbitration. However,
the FAA does not instruct courts on whether a stay of proceedings in the
district court should be granted pending an arbitrability appeal,34 which
one can assume has led to the circuit split on this issue. Among the cir-
cuits that have addressed this issue, two dominant approaches and sup-
porting arguments have developed. The Second and Ninth Circuits re-
fuse to stay proceedings on the merits while the Seventh and Eleventh
Circuits take the position that an automatic stay should be granted pend-
ing an arbitrability appeal.
C. Stay of Proceedings Generally: The Four Prong Test
Simply put, a stay postpones or halts court proceedings and judg-
ments. 35 If a motion to stay is granted, the district court postpones pro-
ceeding with the case. However, if the motion is denied, the moving
party may appeal. Section 3 of the FAA calls for the district court to
grant a stay of proceedings when a motion to compel arbitration is
granted and the parties are ordered to arbitrate.36 However, the FAA
does not expressly address whether a stay should be granted pending an
appeal of an arbitrability determination.
Traditionally, a four-prong test has been used to determine whether
a stay should be granted pending the appeal. In Hilton v. Braunskill,
37
the Supreme Court established a four-prong test for determining whether
a stay of proceedings should be granted pending an appeal.38 The four
factors are:
[W]hether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is
likely to succeed on the merits; whether the applicant will be irrepa-
rably injured absent a stay; whether issuance of the stay will substan-
tially injure the other parties interest in the proceeding; and where the
34. See Foley, supra note 3, at 1071 (citing C.B.S. Employees Fed. Credit Union v.
Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 716 F. Supp. 307, 309 (W.D. Tenn. 1989)).
35. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1453 (8th ed. 2004).
36. The FAA states:
If any suit of proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any is-
sue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in
which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit of
proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one
of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance
with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in
proceeding with such arbitration.
9 U.S.C.S. § 3 (2005).
37. 481 U.S. 770 (1987).
38. Hilton, 481 U.S. at 776.
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public interest lies.39 This four-prong test is applied widely through-
out the federal courts, and is not limited to issues of arbitrability.
40
However, the different circuits have applied the test in different ways by
favoring some factors over others.41  For example, some circuits give
more weight to the likelihood of success on the merits, and yet other cir-
cuits allow a strong showing on one factor to compensate a weak show-
ing on another factor.42
Although the four-prong test is widely used to determine whether a
stay of proceedings should be granted, the application of the four-prong
test in the context of arbitrability is being abandoned by some circuits.
Specifically, as discussed elsewhere,43 the Seventh and Eleventh circuits
have abandoned the four-prong test, and instead have held that an auto-
matic stay should be granted pending an arbitrability appeal.
D. The Growing Popularity ofArbitration as a Dispute Resolution Pro-
cedure
Recent data suggest that arbitration is becoming an increasingly
popular form of dispute resolution in the United States."n However, ac-
cording to a 2004 study conducted by the National Arbitration Forum,
very few people use post-dispute arbitration agreements to arbitrate,
leaving pre-dispute arbitration agreements as the only real avenue for
parties to gain access to arbitration. 45 This fact, coupled with the increas-
ing popularity of arbitration, suggests that more and more arbitration
agreements are being created and used. This is very important in the
context of how courts handle arbitrability issues. Below, data is pre-
sented on the public's general awareness and knowledge about the use of
arbitration; on the use of arbitration to resolve disputes arising from con-
sumer transactions; and on the use and benefits of arbitration for resolv-
ing commercial contract disputes.
1. General Awareness and Knowledge about the Use of Arbitration
Recent data indicates that the general awareness and knowledge
about the use of arbitration is increasing.46 As an update to a 1999 study,
data from the 2004 study conducted by the National Arbitration forum
suggests that Americans are increasingly finding arbitration to be a pre-
39. Id.
40. Foley, supra note 3, at 1076.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See infra Part I.F.
44. NAT'L ARBITRATION FORUM, THE CASE FOR PRE-DISPUTE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS:
EFFECTIVE AND AFFORDABLE ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR CONSUMERS, EMPIRICAL STUDIES & SURVEY
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ferred method of dispute resolution over litigation.47 In 1999, 59% of
individuals surveyed stated that they would choose arbitration over liti-
gation in a lawsuit for monetary damages.48 In 2003, 64% of individuals
surveyed said they would choose arbitration. 9 While this is only a 5%
increase, the more astounding finding is that in 1999, 50% of individuals
surveyed felt it was worthwhile to initiate a lawsuit.5 ° In 2003, only 34%
felt initiating a lawsuit was worthwhile.5' Clearly, these figures suggest
that the general mindset concerning dispute resolution is heading away
from litigation in favor of arbitration.
2. The Use of Arbitration for Consumer Transaction Disputes
Generally speaking, consumers are increasingly favoring arbitration
for resolving consumer disputes. Although the data from the 2004 Na-
tional Arbitration Forum survey pertaining to arbitration and consumer
transactions focused on securities arbitration, it is nevertheless a telling
indicator for the trends concerning arbitration and consumer transaction
disputes. One reason why arbitration may be gaining popularity amongst
consumers is because the consumer win rate is greater in arbitration as
opposed to in court. Specifically, a 2002 report, by Professor Michael
Perino of St. John's University School of Law, contained within the 2004
National Arbitration Forum survey, states that the consumer win rate in
arbitration from 1980 to 2001 was 52.56% while the consumer win rate
in federal court in 2000 was only 32%.52 This suggests that consumers
enjoy a 20% greater win rate when they choose to resolve their disputes
using arbitration as opposed to litigation. This is a large percentile dif-
ference, and surly is enough to increase the attractiveness and popularity
of arbitration as a means of resolving consumer transaction disputes.
Moreover, and perhaps more importantly for the credibility of arbi-
tration as a dispute resolution procedure, a study surveying responses of
investor-participants to the arbitration process found that 91% of respon-
dents stated that the arbitration process was handled fairly and without
bias. This is encouraging because a process must be credible and fair if
people are going to use it with confidence. At least from this data, arbi-




49. Id. at 10.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 8.
53. Id.
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3. The Use of Arbitration for Resolving Commercial Contract Dis-
putes
Finally, there is a trend that more companies are not only beginning
to use arbitration, but that using arbitration also has substantial benefits
for these companies. A study released in October 2003 by the American
Arbitration Association (AAA), which included interviews with 254 cor-
porate general counsel, associate general counsel, and the like from over
one hundred Fortune 1000 organizations, found that arbitration is becom-
ing increasingly popular for resolving commercial contract disputes.54
Of those interviewed, 85% reported using arbitration to resolve these
types of disputes. 55 Additionally, the study found that companies relying
on arbitration or mediation to resolve disputes were more successful at
"preserving business relationships" and keeping their costs down.56 With
this, respondents indicated that, because they approached dispute resolu-
tion from a broader risk and business management perspective, they were
"stretched to the limit" 20% less than those who were less focused on
preserving relationships while settling their disputes.57
E. The Second and Ninth Circuits
The Second and Ninth Circuits have both held that there should not
be a stay of proceedings on the merits while a motion to compel arbitra-
tion is pending. The following discusses the facts, procedural history,
and rationale from both.
1. The Second Circuit: Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan
58
In Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, the plaintiffs, Motorola Credit
Corporation (Motorola) and Nokia Corporation (Nokia) sued the defen-
dants, members of the Uzan family of Turkey and the companies the
family controls, Telsim and Rumeli Telefon.59 In 1998, Motorola lent
Telsim $360 million to purchase cellular infrastructure and equipment
from Motorola Ltd., and $200 million so Telsim could acquire a national
cellular license for Turkey. 60  In subsequent years, Motorola provided
more financing for Telsim eventually totaling roughly $2 billion.61 As
collateral for these loans Motorola received a substantial portion of Tel-
sim's outstanding shares.62 Throughout the time of this financing, Mo-
54. Press Release, American Arbitration Association, Groundbreaking Study Finds Compa-
nies that Use ADR to Manage Conflicts Excel in Controlling Costs, Preserving Relationships: Play-
ing to Win Can be a Losing Strategy, Data Indicates (Oct. 15, 2003), http://www.adr.org (follow




58. 388 F.3d 39, (2d Cir. 2004).
59. Motorola Credit Corp., 388 F.3d at 42-43.
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torola signed several agreements providing that the parties agree to arbi-
trate any dispute arising under the agreement in front of a three arbitrator
panel in Switzerland, in accordance with the laws of Switzerland.63
Motorola and Nokia brought suit against the defendants on various
claims including fraud. 64 Subsequently, the district court denied the de-
fendants motion to compel arbitration and refused to stay the proceedings
pending an appeal of the denial of the motion to compel arbitration.65
Ultimately, the plaintiffs received an award of nearly $4.2 billion dollars
in compensatory and punitive damages.66 The defendants appealed
claiming several errors, including that the district court erred in not
granting the motion to compel arbitration and that the district court was
without jurisdiction to proceed with the case on the merits while the ap-
peal of the denied motion to compel arbitration was pending.67
On appeal, the Second Circuit found that the district court properly
denied the defendants' motion to compel arbitration and that the district
court was not divested of jurisdiction to proceed on the merits while the
appeal to the denial of the motion to compel arbitration was pending.68
Ultimately, the court vacated the district court's award of punitive dam-
ages and remanded for a new calculation of punitive damages.69
2. The Ninth Circuit: Britton v. Co-op Banking Group
70
In Britton v. Co-op Banking Group, the plaintiffs alleged that Lie-
bling, among other defendants, participated in a "securities fraud scheme
by selling a fraudulent tax shelter investment.' The plaintiffs pur-
chased securities from defendants, Gold Depository and Loan Company,
a Co-op Banking Group company. 72 The contract of sale for these secu-
rities included an arbitration provision.73
After filing the original complaint, the plaintiffs subsequently filed
three amended complaints.74 During the time the plaintiffs continued to
amend their complaint, Liebling attempted to informally reach a settle-
ment with the plaintiffs.75 When settlement appeared unlikely, Liebling
contacted the plaintiffs and demanded arbitration pursuant to the arbitra-
tion provision in the contract of sale for the securities.76 The plaintiffs
63. Id.
64. Id. at 44.
65. Id. at 45.
66. Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 274 F. Supp, 2d 481, 583 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
67. Motorola Credit Corp., 388 F.3d at 49.
68. Id. at 49.
69. Id. at 65-66.
70. 916 F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1990).





76. Id. at 1407-08.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
refused to arbitrate, so Liebling filed a motion pursuant to the FAA 77
seeking to compel arbitration. 78 The district court denied Liebling's mo-
tion to compel arbitration reasoning that he waived his right to arbitration
by actively pursuing litigation. 79 Liebling appealed the denial of the mo-
tion to compel arbitration, and filed a motion to stay proceedings.8 0 The
district court denied Liebling's motion for a stay of proceedings pending
his appeal to the denial of the motion to compel arbitration.8 1 During the
time Liebling was seeking arbitration and subsequently a stay of the pro-
ceedings, the plaintiffs continually pushed for discovery.8 2 Liebling re-
sisted, which ultimately resulted in a default judgment entered against
Liebling.8 3 To this, Liebling argued that, because an appeal was filed,
the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter a default judgment against
him.84
3. Analysis-Second and Ninth Circuit Holdings
The Second and Ninth Circuits hold that a motion to stay proceed-
ings should not be granted pending an arbitrability appeal. In Motorola
Credit Corp., decided in 2004, the Second Circuit followed the Ninth
Circuit's rationale and holding in Britton, decided in 1990. Therefore,
the following analysis of the Second and Ninth Circuits holdings will
focus on the rationale of the Ninth Circuit in Britton.
Judge Fletcher, writing the Britton opinion, gave two main reasons
for refusing to stay proceedings while the arbitrability appeal was pend-
ing. First, Judge Fletcher explained the general rule, filing a notice of
appeal divests the district court of jurisdiction, does not apply to an arbi-
trability appeal because the issue of arbitrability is completely independ-
ent of the merits of the case. 5 In support of this contention, Judge
Fletcher quotes Moore 's Federal Practice, which states that "where an
appeal is taken from a judgment which does not finally determine the
entire action, the appeal does not prevent the district court from proceed-
ing with matters not involved in the appeal. 8 6 Therefore, the district
court retains jurisdiction, and the court may proceed with the merits of
the case. 7
The second reason Judge Fletcher provides for refusing to stay pro-
ceedings is that allowing an automatic stay pending an arbitrability ap-
77. 9 U.S.C.S. § 4 (2005).






84. Id. at 1411.
85. Id.
86. Britton, 916F.2dat 1411 (quoting MOOREETAL.,supra note 4, § 203.11)).
87. Britton, 916 F.2d at 1412.
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peal would "allow a defendant to stall a trial simply by bringing a frivo-
lous motion to compel arbitration.' '8 Based on these two reasons, the
Ninth Circuit in Britton held that a motion to stay proceedings should not
be granted pending an arbitrability appeal.8 9 Subsequently, for identical
reasons, the Second Circuit adopted the same holding. 90
F. The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits
The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have both held that there should
be a stay of proceedings on the merits while a motion to compel arbitra-
tion is pending. The following discusses the facts, procedural history,
and rationale from both.
1. The Seventh Circuit: Bradford-Scott Data Corp. v. Physician
Computer Network, Inc. 91
In Bradford-Scott Data Corp. v. Physician Computer Network, Inc.,
the plaintiff, Bradford-Scott Data Corp. (Bradford-Scott), entered into an
agreement to distribute computer software written by VERSYSS Incor-
porated.92 Bradford-Scott and VERSYSS entered into two contracts, the
Vertical Value-Added Reseller Agreement (VAR) and the Master Li-
cense Agreement. 93 The VAR agreement contained an arbitration clause,
covering "any dispute or controversy between the parties ... relating to
this Agreement." 94 The Master License Agreement had a narrower arbi-
tration clause covering only "payments dispute[s] concerning license or
support fees." '  Subsequent to entering into the software distribution
agreement and executing the VAR and Master License Agreements,
VERSYSS was acquired by Physician Computer Network (PCN), which
offered a software package competing with the VERSYSS software
Bradford-Scott licensed.
96
Shortly after PCN acquired VERSYSS, Bradford-Scott filed suit
against PCN and VERSYSS, claiming that VERSYSS violated its obli-
gations under the Master License Agreement due to the acquisition and
subsequent conduct of PCN and VERSYSS. 97 Ultimately, the district
court concluded that the dispute was not arbitrable.98 In response, PCN
and VERSYSS appealed the arbitrability determination under Section
16(a)(1)(A) of the FAA and requested a stay of proceedings pending the
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Motorola Credit Corp., 388 F.3d 39 at 54.
91. 128 F.3d 504 (7th Cir. 1997).
92. Bradford-Scott, 128 F.3d at 504.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 505.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 504.
97. Id. at 505.
98. Id.
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appeal. 99 The district court refused to stay the proceedings. 100 However,
based on the reasons discussed in the analysis, 10' the Seventh Cicruit held
that a stay should be granted pending the arbitrability appeal.
2. The Eleventh Circuit: Blinco v. Green Tree Servicing
10 2
In Blinco v. Green Tree Servicing, Jack and Deborah Blinco, in a
putative class action, claimed that Green Tree Servicing (Green Tree)
failed to give notification of a transfer of the servicing of their loan in
violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act. 10 3 Since an arbi-
tration clause was included in the note executed by Jack Blinco, Green
Tree moved the district court to compel arbitration and to stay the litiga-
tion. 10 4 The district court denied the motion to compel arbitration and the
motion to stay.105 Pursuant to the FAA, 10 6 Green Tree appealed the de-
nial of the motion to compel arbitration.10 7 Upon Green Tree's appeal,
the district court refused to stay proceedings pending the appeal, which
resulted in Green Tree asking the Circuit Court for relief.'08 The district
court's rationale for denying the stay pending the arbitrability appeal was
that, although the appeal was not frivoulous, the district court did not
want "to set a precedent of placing cases on hold while defendants seek
interlocutory appeals of the court's order."' 09 The district court stated
that a delay of discovery and proceedings pertaining to class certification
was unnecessary, and further stated that a stay was unnecessary because
the appeal would be decided before trial."10 However, based on the rea-
sons discussed in the analysis,"' the Eleventh Circuit held that a stay
should be granted pending the arbitrability appeal.
3. Analysis-Seventh and Eleventh Circuit Holdings
On the issue of granting a stay of proceedings on the merits while
an appeal to a denied motion to compel arbitration is pending, the Sev-
enth and Eleventh Circuits held that the district court should not proceed
on the merits, and therefore grant motions to stay the proceedings. In
Blinco, a case decided in 2004, the Eleventh Circuit followed the ration-
ale and holding of the Seventh Circuit in Bradford-Scott, which was de-
cided in 1997. Thus, the analysis of the Seventh and Eleventh Circuit
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See infra Part 1.F.3.
102. 366 F.3d 1249 (1 lth Cir. 2004).
103. Blinco, 366 F.3d at 1250.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(A) (2005).
107. Blinco, 366 F.3d at 1250.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1251.
111. See infra Part .F.3.
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holdings will focus on the rationale of the Seventh Circuit in Bradford-
Scott.
In Bradford-Scott, Judge Easterbrook, writing the opinion for the
court, began by stating the district court's reason for denying a stay
pending appeal of the arbitrability determination was "untenable."
'" 2
The lower court reasoned that the denial of the motion to compel arbitra-
tion was unappealable, and therefore held that a stay of the proceedings
pending appeal should not be granted."l 3 Judge Easterbrook responded
to the lower court's decision by making note of Section 16(a)(1)(A) of
the FAA, which expressly authorizes an appeal to a denied motion to
compel arbitration.' 4 After establishing that the appeal was proper un-
der the FAA, Judge Easterbrook continued by stating that the "appel-
lant's request would fail at the outset" if the four-prong test of Hilton v.
Braunskill' 15 was used to determine whether a stay should be granted. "16
Instead, Judge Easterbrook stated that the court shall "approach the sub-
ject from a different perspective ... asking not whether appellants have
shown a powerful reason why the district court must halt proceedings,
but whether there is any good reason why the district court may carry on
once an appeal has been filed."
'"17
In essence, Judge Easterbrook announced a departure from applying
the four-prong test, and instead rationalized that the district court should
grant a stay in these cases because an appeal divests the district court of
jurisdiction over the matter. He opined, "a federal district court and a
federal court of appeals should not attempt to assert jurisdiction over a
case simultaneously. The filing of a notice of appeal.., confers jurisdic-
tion on the court of appeals and divests the district court of its
control . ,, 118
According to the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, this approach
makes sense and is in line with the purpose of arbitration. First, as Judge
Easterbrook stated in Bradford-Scott, "[c]ontinuation of proceedings in
the district court largely defeats the point of the appeal and creates a risk
of inconsistent handling of the case by two tribunals."' 19 This "inconsis-
tent handling" could lead to the worst and most inefficient outcome: "to
litigate the dispute, to have the court of appeals revise and order the dis-
pute arbitrated, to arbitrate the dispute, and finally return to the court to
have the award enforced."'' 20 An arbitration clause reflects the parties'
112. Bradford-Scott, 128 F.3d at 505.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See supra Part I.C.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. (citing Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982)).
119. Bradford-Scott, 128 F.3d at 505.
120. Id. at 506.
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intentions to avoid litigation and opt for non-judicial dispute resolution
that is faster and less expensive.' 2' Potential exposure to the "worst pos-
sible outcome" completely defeats the underlying purposes of arbitra-
tion. 12 2 Allowing for an immediate appeal under Section 16(a) of the
FAA helps to cut duplication losses and maintain the purpose and benefit
of arbitration.
Judge Easterbrook also addressed the reasons why the Second and
Ninth Circuits are incorrect for denying a stay of proceedings during an
appeal of the arbitrability determination. 12 3 The Second and Ninth Cir-
cuits first argue that because arbitrability is completely separate from the
merits of the case, it therefore does not affect any proceedings to resolve
the issue on the merits. 24 Judge Easterbrook responds to this position by
stating, "[a]n appeal authorized by section 16(a)(1)(A) presents the ques-
tion whether the district court must stay its own proceedings pending
arbitration. Whether the litigation may go forward in the district court is
precisely what the court of appeals must decide."1 25 In other words, the
issue on appeal, arbitrability, is directly related to whether the district
court can hear the case, and therefore the proceedings must be stayed.
The second reason the Second and Ninth Circuits refuse to issue
stays is because an automatic stay would allow "crafty" litigants to file
frivolous appeals to disrupt the district court. 26 Judge Easterbrook ad-
mits that this is a serious concern, but a problem easily avoided because
an appellee may ask that the frivolous appeal be dismissed. 127 He stated,
"[e]ither the court of appeals or the district court may declare that the
appeal is frivolous, and if it is the district court may carry on with the
case." 28 The Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit have made suggestions
on how to combat this problem. For example, in Abney v. United
States,129 the Supreme Court stated that policies can be put in place giv-
ing certain appeals expedited treatment as courts of appeals have the
supervisory power "to establish summary procedures and calendars to
weed out frivolous claims.'1
30 Moreover, in United States v. Hines,'
3'
the Tenth Circuit held that a frivolous appeal may be dismissed if the
district court (1) after a hearing and, (2) for substantial reasons given, (3)
found the claim to be frivolous. 32 Furthermore, the Hines court held that









129. 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
130. Id. at 662 n.8
131. 689 F.2d 934 (10th Cir. 1982).
132. Id. at 937.
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divested of jurisdiction."' 33 However, in Apostol v. Gallion,'34 the Tenth
Circuit cautioned that dismissing a motion because it is frivolous is
anomalous, and therefore must be used with restraint.
135
In summary, in contrast to the Second and Ninth Circuits, the Sev-
enth and Eleventh Circuits hold that a district court shall grant a stay of
proceedings pending an arbitrability appeal because during appellate
review, the district court is divested of jurisdiction, and therefore cannot
proceed on the merits. Moreover, although measures can be put in place
to discourage litigants from filing frivolous appeals, it is important that
courts use restraint in making such a dismissal.
II. MCCAULEY V. HALLIBURTON ENERGY SER VICES, INC.
136
A. Facts and Procedural History
Rodney McCauley is a former employee of Halliburton Energy Ser-
vices Inc.137 Mr. McCauley and Halliburton are parties to an agreement
to arbitrate all claims that fall within the scope of Halliburton's Dispute
Resolution Program (DRP).13 8 Mr. McCauley was injured while apply-
ing foam insulation to the exterior of a bulk tank owned by Hallibur-
ton.' 39 Subsequent to his injury, Halliburton decided to terminate Mr.
McCauley. 140
As a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident and Halli-
burton's subsequent action of terminating him, Mr. McCauley sued Hal-
liburton for negligence, fraud and deceit, intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, and wrongful termination. 41  Additionally, Mr.
McCauley's family brought actions for loss of consortium. 142
The United States District Court for the Western District of Okla-
homa granted Halliburton's motion to arbitrate all claims except the neg-
ligence and consortium claims.143 In denying the motion to arbitrate on
the negligence and consortium claims, the district court held that they
arose from work Mr. McCauley performed as an independent contractor
and outside the scope of his employment. 44 Subsequently, Halliburton
appealed the denial of the motion to compel arbitration as permitted by
the FAA. 14 5 Halliburton then moved the United States Court of Appeals
133. Id.
134. 870 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1989).
135. Id. at 1339.
136. 413 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir. 2005).
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for the Tenth Circuit to stay proceedings in the district court pending the
arbitrability appeal.1 46 The Tenth Circuit granted Halliburton's motion
and held that the district court was divested of jurisdiction by "Hallibur-
ton's filing of its notice of appeal."'
' 47
B. Tenth Circuit's Rationale in Reaching Its Holding
The Tenth Circuit held that an automatic stay of proceedings shall
be granted pending a non-frivolous appeal the denial of a motion to com-
pel arbitration. 148 The Tenth Circuit's holding mainly hinged on the ar-
gument by the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits that an appeal on an arbi-
trability issue divests the district court of jurisdiction, which warrants an
automatic stay. 149  In determining that this approach was sound, the
Tenth Circuit looked to its own precedent addressing divestiture. In
Stewart v. Donges,150 the Tenth Circuit held that a district court was
automatically divested of jurisdiction pending a non-frivolous appeal to
the denial of a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immu-
nity.151 In Stewart, the Tenth Circuit stated:
The divestiture of jurisdiction occasioned by the filing of a notice of
appeal is especially significant when the appeal is an interlocutory
one .... The interruption of the trial proceedings is the central reason
and justification for authorizing such an interlocutory appeal in the
first place. When an interlocutory appeal is taken, the district court
[only] retains jurisdiction to proceed with matters not involved in that
appeal. 1
52
Furthermore, the court held that "a finding of frivolousness enabled the
district court to retain jurisdiction and to proceed to trial absent interven-
tion by the court of appeal.'
153
In McCauley, the Tenth Circuit found this line of reasoning persua-
sive for two reasons. First, Section 16(a) appeals are similar to appeals
based on denial of qualified immunity because a failure to grant a stay
pending either type of appeal denies or impairs the appellant's ability to
obtain its "legal entitlement to avoidance of litigation, either constitu-
tional entitlement to qualified immunity or the contractual entitlement to
arbitration."' 54 Second, the Stewart holding is persuasive because it ad-
dresses the possible misuse of interlocutory review by allowing a district
146. Id
147. Id. at 1163.
148. Id. at 1162.
149. Id. at 1160-61.
150. 915 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1990).
151. Stewart, 915 F.2d at 573.
152. Id at 575-76.
153. Id. at 576.
154. McCauley, 413 F.3d at 1162.
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court to deny frivolous appeals and continue absent intervention by the
court of appeals.'
Relying on the divesture principle used by the Seventh and Eleventh
Circuits and the previous Tenth Circuit panel in Stewart, the Tenth Cir-
cuit held that a non-frivolous appeal to a denied motion to compel arbi-
tration warrants an automatic stay of proceedings. 116
III. ANALYSIS
The following sections will discuss whether the Tenth Circuit's
holding in McCauley v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.'57 is in line
with Tenth Circuit precedent; whether the Tenth Circuit's holding is in
line with the purpose of arbitration and the FAA; and finally, the likeli-
hood of the issue reaching the Supreme Court.
A. The Tenth Circuit's Holding and Tenth Circuit Precedent
Although this was a case of first impression in the Tenth Circuit, the
McCauley holding is in line with Tenth Circuit precedent. In addition to
relying on the rationale of the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, the Tenth
Circuit relied on past precedent by referencing Stewart v. Donges.'58 In
Stewart, the Tenth Circuit discussed the divesture principle whereby an
interlocutory appeal, such as an arbitrability appeal, divests the district
court of jurisdiction to proceed with the case on the merits.159 Based on
this argument, the Tenth Circuit in McCauley concluded that the district
court does not have jurisdiction to proceed with a case on the merits
pending an arbitrability appeal.160 So, procedurally, granting a stay is the
appropriate course of action based on the divesture principle whereby an
interlocutory appeal divests the district court of jurisdiction to continue
with the case.
B. The Tenth Circuit's Holding and the Purpose ofArbitration
Parties enter into pre-dispute arbitration agreements because arbitra-
tion is an attractive dispute resolution procedure. The attributes of arbi-
tration include: (1) allowing parties to resolve their disputes faster and
with less effort; and (2) fostering a less expensive dispute resolution
process. According to a 2004 study by the National Arbitration Forum,
78% of respondents found faster recovery in arbitration and 59.3% found
arbitration less expensive than litigation.' 6 1 With this established, it be-
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. 413 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir. 2005).
158. 915 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1990).
159. Stewart, 915 F.2d at 575-76.
160. McCauley, 413 F.3d at 1162.
161. NAT'L ARBITRATION FORUM, supra note 44, at 3.
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comes useful to determine whether a stay of proceedings pending an
arbitrability appeal corresponds with the two purposes of arbitration.
1. Resolving Disputes Faster and With Less Effort
Pending an appeal, the district court may require that the parties
proceed with the case on the merits. If the appellate court determines
that the motion to compel arbitration was properly denied by the district
court then essentially no time and effort was lost by proceeding with the
case on the merits because the parties' would have been ordered to liti-
gate regardless. However, if the appellate court decides that the district
court erred in denying the motion to compel arbitration, then proceeding
with the case on the merits is useless. In this scenario, not only have the
parties wasted their time and effort by proceeding with the litigation
process, but the district court has clogged its docket with proceedings
that are essentially nullified by the appellate court's decision. Moreover,
the parties then must arbitrate and possibly submit the issue to the district
court again to have the award enforced. 62 This situation does not pro-
vide for an efficient resolution of the issues-a main purpose of arbitra-
tion. On the other hand, if a stay of proceedings is granted pending the
arbitrability appeal, the district court may continue with other matters
and the parties can avoid wasting the time and effort of proceeding with
a case on the merits that will inevitably be ordered to arbitration.
2. Fostering a Less Expensive System
If the district court does not grant a stay of proceedings, the parties
are required to proceed with the case on the merits. Again, if the appel-
late court determines that the district court properly denied the motion to
compel arbitration then there is no consequence to not staying the pro-
ceedings. However, if the appellate court determines that the district
court erred in not granting the motion to compel arbitration then the par-
ties must incur the expenses of proceeding with the case, the expenses
associated with arbitration, and possibly the expenses of having the dis-
trict court enforce the arbitrator's award. The parties are incurring ex-
penses that would have been avoided had a stay been granted. This is
not in line with the purpose of arbitration-to resolve issues in a manner
that is less expensive than litigation.
Parties generally enter into pre-dispute arbitration agreements be-
cause they find the arbitration process attractive. The approach of the
Tenth Circuit, to grant an automatic stay, allows the parties to avoid the
162. The FAA states:
If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court shall be entered
upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration, and shall specify the court, then at any
time within one year after the award is made any party to the arbitration may apply to the
court so specified for an order confirming the award ....
9 U.S.C.S. § 9 (2005)
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time, effort, and expenses associated with litigation, which the parties
intended to avoid in the first place by entering into a pre-dispute arbitra-
tion agreement.
C. The Tenth Circuit's Holding and Congressional Intent in Enacting the
FAA
It seems logical that courts interpret a statute consistent with Con-
gress' intent when the plain language is unclear. Congress enacted the
FAA so courts would give the same legal effect to arbitration agreements
as is given to other contracts, 163 and to ensure that parties' desire for arbi-
tration would not be undermined by federal and state courts that are un-
willing to enforce arbitration agreements.1 64 In other words, Congress'
intent in enacting the FAA was to encourage the use of arbitration by
making pre-dispute arbitration agreements enforceable. While Congress'
intent is clear, the FAA remains unclear on whether to grant a stay pend-
ing an arbitrability appeal. As a result, it seems appropriate to analyze
the outcome of a district court that grants a stay pending an arbitrability
appeal and a district court that does not grant a stay in an effort to deter-
mine which approach is in line with Congress' intent in enacting the
FAA.
A district court undermines the parties' preference for arbitration by
refusing to grant a stay and ordering the parties to begin the litigation
process. If parties enter into a valid pre-dispute arbitration agreement an
assumption can be made that the parties contracted with the intention of
avoiding litigation. If a district court can order the parties to continue
with the case on merits, regardless of whether an arbitration agreement
exists, it detracts from the legal effect that courts were intended to give
arbitration agreements and discourages the use of arbitration.
In contrast, by granting a stay, a district court is acting in line with
Congress' intent in enacting the FAA. By granting a stay, a district court
is not only acknowledging the fact that an arbitration agreement should
have the same legal effect as other contracts by allowing the parties to
act in a manner consistent with their contracted preference, but also en-
couraging arbitration by not undermining the parties' preference for
avoiding litigation. Granting a stay pending an arbitrability appeal is in
line with the purpose of the FAA.
D. The United States Supreme Court
The criterion for an issue reaching the Supreme Court is stringent,
as the Court grants certiorari in relatively few cases. However, the Court
will often review an issue that is in conflict among the circuits and that is
163. See Stenson, supra note 24, at 661.
164. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13 (1984) (citing Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v.
Terminal Constr. Corp., 287 F.2d 382, 387 (2d Cir. 1961)).
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a legal issue of national importance. 165  Including the Tenth Circuit's
decision in McCauley, only five circuits have addressed the issue of
whether to grant a stay pending an appeal to an arbitrability determina-
tion. With McCauley, three circuits hold that an automatic stay should
be granted and two circuits hold that a stay should not be granted. The
issue is unresolved in five circuits, the D.C. circuit, and the federal cir-
cuit.
The issue will likely reach the Supreme Court in the future. First,
there is a clear conflict among the circuits on this issue as the five cir-
cuits that have addressed the issue are split three-to-two. Following this
pattern, the other circuits will likely be split as well. Second, as indi-
cated by the statistical data,166 arbitration is growing in popularity. As
arbitration becomes more popular, more arbitration agreements will be
created because: "Virtually all American businesses and individuals with
legal capacity to contract ... have entered into agreements that specify
arbitration as the forum for resolving most or all disputes that might arise
between the parties."'
167
Arbitration is impacting businesses and individuals alike - increas-
ingly receiving attention not only in the lower courts but in the Supreme
Court as well. For example, the Supreme Court "has decided more than
thirty arbitration cases since 1983, including ten since the turn of the
century."'168 Therefore, a strong presumption can be made that issues
dealing with arbitration are matters of national importance, and accord-
ingly, there is a strong likelihood that the particular issue addressed in
this article and perhaps many others dealing with arbitration will face
review by the Supreme Court in the future.
In the event that the issues discussed in this article reaches the Su-
preme Court, there is a strong likelihood that the Supreme Court will
adopt the Tenth Circuit's approach-in line with the purpose of arbitra-
tion and Congress' intent in enacting the FAA. Furthermore, the oppos-
ing view, refusing to grant a stay, relies heavily on the fact that it dis-
courages litigants from bringing frivolous appeals. However, there are
measures in place for combating this problem, and therefore the oppos-
ing view's argument is substantially discredited. 
169
165. See Richard J. Lazarus, Judging Environmental Law, 18 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 201, 216
(2004).
166. See supra Part I.D.
167. Stephen K. Huber, The Arbitration Jurisprudence of the Fifth Circuit, 35 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 497, 498 (2004).
168. Id. at 499.
169. See supra Part 1.F.
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CONCLUSION
In McCauley v. Halliburton Energy Services Inc.,' 70 the Tenth Cir-
cuit adopted the reasoning of the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits and held
that a non-frivolous appeal of a denied motion to compel arbitration war-
rants issuance of an automatic stay of proceedings. This is the correct
approach for several reasons. First, an appeal divests the district court of
jurisdiction over a matter. If the district court does not have jurisdiction
over the matter then the district court should not be able to proceed with
the case on the merits. Second, a main argument for not granting a stay
of proceedings is that it prevents frivolous appeals. However, the Tenth
Circuit has addressed this concern by adopting a procedure by which the
district court can deny the appeal as frivolous.
Moreover, the Tenth Circuit's approach corresponds to the purposes
of arbitration. Generally, a party's decision to enter a pre-dispute arbitra-
tion agreement reflects their desire for arbitration. By granting a stay,
the parties avoid the time, effort, and expenses associated with litigation,
and the district court may proceed with other matters while the appellate
court handles the arbitrability issue. Furthermore, based on Congress'
intent in enacting the FAA, granting a stay is appropriate. By doing so,
the district court gives full effect to the parties' contracted preference for
avoiding litigation.
Although the approach of the Tenth Circuit appears to be correct,
there is nevertheless a circuit split. As more circuits confront this issue,
the split may become more prominent, and when there is a conflict
among the circuits on an issue of national importance, such as the issue
here, it is likely the issue will reach the Supreme Court. Arbitration is
growing in popularity and increasingly making its way into the American
legal system, and as a result, the circuits and possibly the Supreme Court
will continue to face important issues pertaining to alternative dispute
resolutions procedures such as arbitration.
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REQUIRING THE UNKNOWN OR PRESERVING REASON:
UNITED STATES V. GONZALEZ-HUERTA AND THE TENTH
CIRCUIT'S COMPROMISE APPROACH TO BOOKER ERROR
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Bookert sent shockwaves throughout both the criminal justice commu-
nity and society at large. The method for sentencing all federal offenders
had been struck down as a violation of the constitutionally protected
right to a jury trial, and the Court changed the previously mandatory sen-
tencing structure into an advisory guideline.2 The Court provided that
"normal prudential doctrines" should guide the review of the now uncon-
stitutional sentences, but unfortunately that guidance was not sufficient.3
Left with the overwhelming task of reviewing the constitutionality
of each pending sentence and guided by the ambiguous and scantly de-
scribed "plain error doctrine," a significant disparity developed in the
approaches that various federal appellate courts employed. Some circuits
utilized a hard line approach to resentencing, buoyed by the textual read-
ing of plain error precedent.4 Others were more lenient and addressed
the fundamental fairness issues by remanding cases for the sole purpose
of determining if the district court would have imposed a different sen-
tence under the post-Booker structure.5 Yet even other circuits gave full
deference to the rights of defendants by presuming the mere application
of mandatory sentencing guidelines constituted prejudice.6 The several
different approaches resulted in only one clear rule-that defendants
were being treated differently based solely on geography-a situation the
original Sentencing Reform Act was expressly designed to defeat.7
Within this context, the Tenth Circuit added yet another layer to the
methods of applying Booker with its decision in United States v. Gon-
1. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). For further discussion of Booker in this issue, see Michael W.
McConnell, The Booker Mess, 83 DENV. U. L. REv. 665 (2006).
2. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 752.
3. ld. at 769.
4. See United States v. Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d 68, 78-79 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v.
Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 522 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 43 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2005) (No. 04-
9517); United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 266 (U.S. Oct.
3, 2005) (No. 05-5547); United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1300 (1lth Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 125 S. Ct. 2935 (U.S. June 20, 2005) (No. 04-1148).
5. See United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 117 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Paladino,
401 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, Peyton v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 106 (U.S., Oct. 3,
2005) (No. 04-10402); United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Coles, 403 F.3d 764, 768 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
6. See United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 548 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Barnett,
398 F.3d 516, 526 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 33 (U.S. Sept. 20, 2005) (No. 04-1690).
7. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 92 (1996).
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zalez-Huerta.8 The Tenth Circuit found that the fourth prong of plain
error review, rather than the third prong that most other circuits were
relying upon, was the proper basis for refusing to remand a sentence
based solely on prior convictions and facts admitted by the defendant. 9
Although seemingly falling in line with the other hard line circuits, such
as the First, Fifth, and Eleventh, this article perceives the Tenth Circuit's
decision as a distinct and more appropriate determination resulting from
the Supreme Court's guidance in Booker that not every sentence deserves
remand. 10
This article will analyze the Gonzalez-Huerta decision within the
context of both the sister Circuits' decisions and the brief history of the
plain error review doctrine. Part I will discuss the history of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, including the legal challenges to the mandatory
sentencing regime, and the development of the plain error doctrine. Part
II will discuss the Tenth Circuit's decision in Gonzalez-Huerta and com-
pare the decisions of the other circuits. In Part III, this article agrees with
the ultimate outcome of the Gonzalez-Huerta decision and the analysis of
the fourth element of plain error review. However, the Tenth Circuit's
decision to place the burden on the defendant to satisfy the third element
of plain error review is a mistake given fairness considerations and the
difficulty of establishing prejudice in post-Booker sentence challenges.
Finally, this article will conclude that the Gonzalez-Huerta decision
represents the clearest application of the Supreme Court's intent under
both Booker and the plain error doctrine precedent.
I. BACKGROUND
A. United States Federal Sentencing Guidelines
1. History
Since the founding of the United States of America, federal judges
have been given unfettered discretion when determining an offender's
sentence after a conviction, with the power to impose anything between
parole and the statutory maximum."' Judges' expansive power over sen-
tencing was moderately curtailed by the establishment of a parole com-
mission, which arose in response to a shift towards the rehabilitative
model of criminal punishment.' 2 Although judges still imposed the sen-
tences, the parole commission determined the actual time served through
8. 403 F.3d 727 (10th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 495 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2005) (No. 05-
6407).
9. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 739.
10. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 769.
11. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES
SENTENCING COMMISSION 1 (2005), http://www.ussc.gov/general/USSCoverview.2005.pdf [here-
inafter USSC OVERVIEW].
12. Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 225-28 (1993).
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the discretion to release convicted offenders prior to the expiration of
their sentences. t 3  After an offender had served one-third of his sen-
tence, 14 the parole commission could release the offender upon a finding
that the welfare of society would not be threatened and the offender
would not reviolate the laws. 15  Outside of the creation of the parole
commission, federal judges' sentencing power remained largely un-
checked until the Reagan era.'
6
Extensive criticism was directed at the indiscriminate sentencing
system during the early 1970's. The most persuasive voices in favor of
binding sentencing guidelines were those of Judge Marvin E. Franke1
7
and Senator Edward M. Kennedy. 18 Surprisingly, the main support for
sentencing guidelines originated from liberals who viewed them as anti-
imprisonment and anti-discrimination measures.' 9 Debate over sentenc-
ing guidelines lasted over a decade, and Congress finally responded by
abolishing the indeterminate sentencing structure and passing the Sen-
tencing Reform Act within provisions of the Comprehensive Crime Con-
trol Act of 1984.21 The main goals of the Sentencing Reform Act were to
increase the consistency of sentencing and incorporate the four main
purposes of criminal punishment (i.e., retribution, deterrence, incapacita-
tion, and rehabilitation).22 The structure that replaced indeterminate sen-
tencing was a set of Sentencing Guidelines established by an administra-
tive agency within the judiciary called the United States Sentencing
Commission ("Sentencing Commission").23  The Sentencing Commis-
sion developed the Federal Sentencing Guidelines ("Sentencing Guide-
lines"), which were to provide certainty in sentencing and acceptance of
the four purposes of criminal justice.24 The Sentencing Guidelines went
into effect on November 1, 1987,25 and provided a mandatory range for
13. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 387, 36 Stat. 819, 819 (1910) (subsequently codified at 18
U.S.C. § 4205(a) (1982) (repealed 1984)) (establishing parole commissions at each of the three
existing federal penitentiary systems).
14. Id.
15. Id at 819-20.
16. See Stith & Koh, supra note 12, at 223.
17. Id. at 228-30 (noting that Frankel's book, Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order, earned
him the title of "father of sentencing reform").
18. Id. at 230-36 (noting that Senator Kennedy's main interest was the passage of a bill that
overhauled all federal criminal statutes, but that Kennedy spearheaded a bipartisan movement for
sentencing guidelines).
19. Id. at 223, 232-33 (discussing the participation of Senator John L. McClellan and Profes-
sor Alan Dershowitz in garnering support for the sentencing guidelines).
20. Id. at 223, 225, 228-30.
21. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551 to 3559, 3561 to 3566, 3571 to 3574, 3581 to 3586, & 28 U.S.C. §§ 991 to 998
(1988)).
22. USSC OVERVIEW, supra note 11, at 1. See also Stith & Koh, supra note 12, at 239-43.
23. 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2005) (creating a seven-member commission within the judiciary for the
purpose of establishing sentencing policies and practices).
24. Id.
25. USSC OVERVIEW, supra note 11, at 2.
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sentencing.2 6 The Sentencing Reform Act included a list of factors which
could be considered for increasing or decreasing a sentence.2 7 Any de-
viation from the prescribed range required the judge to detail the specific
reasons for the departure.28
2. Challenges
The Sentencing Guidelines elicited strident reactions from both lib-
eral and conservatives that soon led to legal challenges of the Sentencing
Reform Act. Within two years of enactment of the Sentencing Guide-
lines in 1987, the formation and duties of the Sentencing Commission
were unsuccessfully challenged in Mistretta v. United States,29 based
upon constitutional delegation and separation of powers arguments.3 °
The Court quickly dismissed the delegation issue by describing the his-
torically low bar for administrative delegations, 3' and then addressed the
separation of powers concern that the integrity of the judicial branch may
be threatened by having judges review the constitutionality of mandatory
sentences created by fellow judges.32 The Court analogized the Sentenc-
ing Commission's functions to that of developing the Federal Rules of
Civil and Criminal Procedure,33 labeled those functions as within the
purview of the judicial branch,34 and found the vesting of those functions
within the judiciary to be acceptable under a flexible checks and balances
interpretation of separation of powers.35 Justice Scalia, in a scathing
dissent, viewed the functions of the Sentencing Commission as entirely
legislative and thus inappropriately exercised within the judicial
branch.36
After Mistretta, the Sentencing Guidelines were left undisturbed un-
til a series of Supreme Court cases regarding state criminal sentencing
provided a constitutional basis under the Sixth Amendment 37 for chal-
lenging the federal sentencing structure. An important initial break-
through occurred in Apprendi v. New Jersey,38 in which a slim five to
four majority of the Court established the rule: "any fact that increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must
26. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2005).
27. Id. (describing factors such as nature of the offense, effectuating the four purposes of
criminal punishment, any pertinent policy statement, sentencing consistency, and the need for resti-
tution).
28. Id. (requiring the judge to detail the specific reason for the sentence in a written order).
29. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
30. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 370-71.
31. Id. at 371-80.
32. Id. at 383.
33. Id. at 392-93.
34. Id. at 396-97.
35. Id. at 412.
36. Id. at 413 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
37. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (guaranteeing the right to a "public trial, by an impartial jury of
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed").
38. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt., 39 In Ap-
prendi, the defendant pled guilty to a state weapons offense with a statu-
tory maximum of ten years, among other charges. 40 However, under a
separate bias enhancement statute, the state judge imposed a twelve year
sentence after determining that the defendant was motivated by racial
animus.4 1 The Court struck down the enhanced sentence, finding that the
judge's use of facts not determined by a jury at sentencing violated the
jury trial right because the use of an additional fact is the functional
equivalent of an element, which juries must determine.42
An equally important extension of the Apprendi rule occurred in
Ring v. Arizona43 along the same slim majority. Ring was convicted of
felony murder, and Arizona state law required the judge to consider an
enumerated list of aggravating factors44 in addition to any mitigating
factors presented by the defense.45 The state judge sentenced Ring to
death, but the Court struck down the sentence after applying the Ap-
prendi rule and reasoning that if a "State makes an increase in a defen-
dant's authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that
fact-no matter how the State labels it-must be found by a jury beyond
a reasonable doubt."A
6
The next link in the chain was Blakely v. Washington,47 a case that
some scholars feel was an inevitable result of the Court's broad applica-
tion of the Appendi reasoning in the Ring decision. 48 Blakely pled guilty
to second degree kidnapping, an offense that was limited to a sentencing
range of forty-nine to fifty-three months under Washington's Sentencing
Reform Act.49 However, the judge found Blakely acted with "deliberate
cruelty,, 50 an aggravating factor which allowed the judge to increase the
sentence up to the ten year maximum, 51 and the judge imposed a sen-
tence of ninety months-three years over the suggested range but still
under the statutory maximum. 52 The Court again struck down the sen-
tence stating that the "relevant statutory maximum is not the maximum
sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the
39. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
40. Id. at 469-71.
41. Id. at 471.
42. Id. at 494 n.19, 497.
43. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
44. Ring, 536 U.S. at 592 n.1.
45. Id. at 592-93 (requiring the judge to find the existence of at least one aggravating factor
and no mitigating factors in order to impose the death penalty).
46. Id. at 602.
47. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
48. David Y. Yellen, Reuschlein Lecture: Saving Federal Sentencing Reform After Apprendi,
Ring, Blakely, and Booker, 50 VILL. L. REV. 163, 170 (2005).
49. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.320 (2005).
50. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2535.
51. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.390(2)(h)(iii) (current version at WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 9.94A.535(2)(a) (2005)).
52. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2535.
2006]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
maximum he may impose without any additional findings. 53 Thus, all
facts forming the basis for any sentence exceeding a state sentencing
guideline must be found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury, even if a
determination of that fact is expressly delegated to the judge's discretion
by the legislature.
The reasoning of Apprendi, Ring, and Blakely culminated with the
Court's determination in United States v. Booker54 that mandatory appli-
cation of the federal Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amend-
ment right to a jury trial.55 The combined defendants, Booker and Fan-
fan, faced similar circumstances at the federal level as the defendant in
Blakely, namely an enhancement of their sentences under judicially de-
termined aggravating factors.5 6 The Court reiterated the Apprendi rule
and included an additional caveat that allowed prior convictions to be
considered along with jury-determined facts.
57
In addition to holding that judge-determined sentence enhancement
violated the Sixth Amendment, the Court enacted a "remedial holding"
in which it excised two provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act and
changed the nature of the Sentencing Guidelines from mandatory to ad-
visory.58 The impact of these two separate holdings, the primary and the
remedial, was to create two types of error under Booker. The first type is
called "constitutional Booker error" because it violates the Sixth
Amendment jury trial provision, and it arises when a defendant's sen-
tence was increased to a level above the guideline range based on non-
jury determined facts. 59  The second type of error is called "non-
constitutional Booker error" because mandatory application of the Sen-
tencing Guidelines now violates the express (albeit revised) wording of
the Sentencing Reform Act.60  The subtle point regarding non-
constitutional Booker error is that the sentence itself is fully constitu-
tional, and the only error is the statutorily violative act of mandatory
application as opposed to the advisory application required by the post-
Booker Sentencing Guidelines.
6'
Finally, the Court provided the following significant guidance to aid
lower courts in reviewing Booker challenges to sentences imposed under
the Sentencing Guidelines:
That does not mean that every sentence will give rise to a Sixth
Amendment violation or that every appeal will lead to a new sentenc-
53. Id. at 2537 (quotations omitted).
54. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
55. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756.
56. Id. at 746-47.
57. Id. at 756.
58. Id.
59. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 73 1.
60. Id. at 731-32.
61. See United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1300-03 (11 th Cir. 2005).
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ing hearing. That is because reviewing courts are expected to apply
ordinary prudential doctrines, determining, e.g., whether the issue
was raised below and whether it fails the "plain-error" test. It is also
because, in cases not involving a Sixth Amendment violation,
whether resentencing is warranted or whether it will instead be suffi-
cient to review a sentence for reasonableness may depend upon ap-
plication of the harmless-error doctrine.
62
The reference to plain error review of sentencing cases is crucial to
understanding the subsequent impact of Booker on appellate review of
sentencing and the subsequent disparate treatment of that standard by
various Circuit courts.
B. Plain Error Analysis
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) provides: "plain error that
affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was not
brought to the court's attention., 63 Otherwise known as the "plain error
standard of review," Rule 52(b) allows a court to remedy egregious vio-
lations of justice and fairness even when a party has failed to object to
the issue at trial, and thus has effectively waived the issue on appeal.
64
The procedural rule codified the common law "plain error doctrine"
which allowed appeals courts to notice an error sua sponte regardless of
whether a party properly objected if the error "seriously affect[ed] the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. 65 The
Court later described the purpose of Rule 52(b) as providing an avenue
for redressing miscarriages of justice.66
A complete framework for determining when plain error constituted
grounds for remand didn't develop until 1992 in United States v.
Olano.67 The error alleged in Olano was the trial court's decision to al-
low two alternate jurors to be present in the deliberation room with the
other twelve actual jurors, and the Court established the following four-
part test for analyzing plain error under Rule 52(b): (1) error occurred;
68
(2) the error was plain; 69 (3) the error affected substantial rights; 70 and (4)
62. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 738.
63. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).
64. Id.
65. United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936).
66. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 (1982).
67. 507 U.S. 725 (1993).
68. Olano, 507 U.S. at 732-33 (noting that error is any derivation from a legal rule that is not
waived). The Court also draws a distinction between "waiver" and "forfeiture"; the latter is the
failure to object, while the former is the "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right." Id. Waiver forecloses application of Rule 52(b), while forfeiture satisfies the first element.
Id.
69. Id. at 734 (describing the meaning of "plain" as equivalent to "clear" or "obvious").
70. Id. at 734-35 (further defining the requirement that the error affect the results of the trial
proceedings). Note that, in Olano, Justice O'Connor lists this third element as the final limitation,
but both courts and scholars include O'Connor's guidance regarding when appellate courts should
implement their optional discretion under Rule 52(b) as a fourth element. United States v. Burbage,
2006]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
invocation of the court's discretion under Rule 52(b) would remedy an
error that substantially affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation
ofjudicial proceedings.7'
The Court characterized plain error review as analogous to harmless
error review but with one substantial difference-the burden of persua-
sion rests with the defendant, not the government, under plain error re-
view for both the "substantial rights" and the "judicial integrity" ele-
ments.72 The Court relied on the discrepancy in language between Rules
52(a) and 52(b), the latter authorizing remedy only when the error does
affect substantial rights, as the source of the burden shifting.73 The Court
also placed emphasis on the need for a distinction between plain and
harmless error in order to encourage defendants to object.74 Finally,
based upon the specific facts of Olano, the Court concluded that no sub-
stantial rights were affected and reinstated the jury's verdict without de-
ciding upon the judicial integrity element.75
However, despite the general rule that the burden of persuasion lies
with the defendant, Olano provides a basis for two possible exceptions.
The majority describes a "special category of forfeited errors" and a class
of "errors that should be presumed prejudicial" but the majority specifi-
cally declines to address these categories. 76 Although the Court specifi-
cally declined to address the effect of these exceptions, the implication is
that the Court may exercise its discretion under Rule 52(b) and rectify
easily remedied and presumptively prejudicial errors despite any show-
ing of prejudice or effect on the proceedings.77
The commonly used term for the first of the Olano exceptions is
"structural error" and is defined as a "defect affecting the framework
within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial
process itself., 78 Structural error is limited to very exceptional circum-
stances such as faulty jury instructions, 79 total denial of the right to coun-
sel, 80 and the lack of an impartial judge.8' Furthermore, a strong pre-
sumption against structural error exists when the right to counsel and the
365 F.3d 1174, 1180 (10th Cir. 2004); Jeffery L. Lowry, Plain Error Rule - Clarifying Plain Error
Analysis Under Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 84 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1065, 1072 (1994).
71. Olano, 507 U.S. at 735-37 (refusing to limit application of Rule 52(b) to when the defen-
dant is actually innocent).
72. Id. at 734-35.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 739-41.
76. Id. at 735.
77. Id. at 735-36.
78. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1986) (internal citation omitted).
79. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 280 (1993).
80. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1963).
81. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927).
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right to an impartial adjudicator are satisfied. 2 Consequently, structural
error arguments are rarely successful. However, the existence of these
exceptions provides a point of departure for the federal circuits undertak-
ing review of non-constitutional Booker error, with some courts finding
the exceptions are satisfied and others finding they are not.
One final and important aspect of plain error review is that the Su-
preme Court consistently decides plain error cases by presuming the third
element is satisfied and deciding the case based solely upon the fourth
element.8 3  Since both prongs must be satisfied by the defendant, the
result is usually against the defendant, but the general technique of pre-
suming satisfaction of the third element is important in United States v.
Gonzalez-Huerta.
II. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta
8 4
In United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, the Tenth Circuit addressed
for the first time within its jurisdiction the standard of review applicable
to a defendant who alleged non-constitutional Booker error and raised the
issue for the first time on appeal. Prior to the Gonzalez-Huerta decision,
the Tenth Circuit had established that mandatory application of the Sen-
tencing Guidelines constituted harmful error warranting remand of the
sentence, 5 but now the court was faced with review under the plain error
standard, rather than the harmless error standard. The Tenth Circuit
heard the case en banc due to its importance.8 6
1. Facts
Sergio Gonzalez-Huerta was convicted of burglary in California in
1994 and served a prison term. 7 Six years after his conviction, Mr.
Gonzalez-Huerta was deported to Mexico, but was again apprehended in
New Mexico for possession of a controlled substance.88 While in jail on
the substance charge, federal authorities charged Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta
with illegal reentry by a deported alien convicted of an aggravated fel-
ony.8 9 Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta pled guilty to the charged offense and was
82. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999).
83. See Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 469 (1997) ("[E]ven assuming that the failure
to submit materiality to the jury 'affected substantial rights,' it does not meet the final requirement of
Olano."); United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 632-33 (2002) ("[W]e need not resolve whether
respondents satisfy this element of the plain-error inquiry, because even assuming respondents'
substantial rights were affected, the error did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation ofjudicial proceedings.").
84. 403 F.3d 727 (10th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 495 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2005) (No. 05-
6407).
85. United States v. Labatstida-Segura, 396 F.3d 1140, 1143 (10th Cir. 2005).
86. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 731.
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sentenced to fifty-seven months. 90 When determining the sentence, the
only facts used by the district court included the fact of the prior burglary
conviction and those facts admitted by Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta in his
plea.91 According to the federal Sentencing Guidelines, Mr. Gonzalez-
Huerta's offense level was twenty-one and his criminal history was
Category IV, which mandated a sentence between fifty-seven and sev-
enty-one months for the offense charged.92 The district court imposed
the minimum sentence, and Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta did not object to the
application of the Sentencing Guidelines during the proceedings. 93 The
groundbreaking decisions in Blakely v. Washington94 and United States v.
Booker95 were handed down subsequent to Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta's sen-
tencing but prior to the hearing of his appeal.96
Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta presented three theories for reversal on ap-
peal: the sentence imposed violated the Sixth Amendment as interpreted
by Booker, the district court's use of a prior conviction contravened the
Blakely holding, and a Due Process challenge to the sentence under
Hicks v. Oklahoma.97 The court quickly dismissed the latter two argu-
ments. The prior conviction challenge contravened the jurisprudential
rule that only the Supreme Court can overrule its own precedent,98 and
the Due Process challenge lacked the necessary statutory liberty interest
element.99
In his only remaining argument, Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta argued that
he should be resentenced according to the holdings of Blakely and
Booker.100 The central issue in the case, as framed by the Tenth Circuit,
was whether the mandatory application of the federal Sentencing Guide-
lines constitutes reversible error under plain error review when the only
facts relied upon at sentencing are prior convictions and those admitted
by the defendant.
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit parted ways with its sister circuits and deter-





94. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
95. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
96. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 730.
97. 447 U.S. 343 (1980). Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta argued the legislature created a statutory
liberty interest in sentencing procedures that cannot be removed without due process, but failed to
specify which provision of the Sentencing Reform Act established any statutory interest. Gonzalez-
Huerta, 403 F.3d at 732 n.2.
98. Id. at 731 n. I (discussing the argument that Booker questioned the Supreme Court's ruling
in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998)).
99. Id. at 732 n.2 (discussing Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta's failure to allege the Sentencing Reform
Act created a statutory liberty interest).
100. Id at 730-31.
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itself does not satisfy the fourth element of plain error analysis, namely
the judicial integrity and fairness requirement, and therefore sentences
imposed based solely on prior convictions and admitted facts are not
eligible for remand.'0° The court initiated its analysis by determining
that the present facts represented non-constitutional Booker error,'0 2 the
proper standard of review was plain error,'0 3 and that the first two re-
quirements under Olano were satisfied.10 4 The court then stated that the
real issue in this case was whether Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta could satisfy the
third and fourth Olano elements, namely the substantial rights and judi-
cial integrity requirements.
Turning to the substantial rights element, the court described the
general rule that the defendant holds the burden to demonstrate "a rea-
sonable probability that, but for the error claimed, the result of the pro-
ceeding would have been different."' 1 5 Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta, instead of
addressing the burden directly, invoked the two Olano exceptions.
Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta first argued that mandatory application of the
Sentencing Guidelines is structural error, and thus the burden is shifted to
the government. 0 6 The court held that non-constitutional Booker error is
not structural error for three reasons: (1) structural error must be consti-
tutional error, which non-constitutional Booker error is not; (2) the Neder
strong presumption against structural error exists in this case due to the
presence of counsel and an impartial judge; and (3) the "defining fea-
ture" of structural error isn't present in this case.' 0 7  According to the
court, the defining feature of structural error is that its effect on the pro-
ceedings is unquantifiable, 10 8 and non-constitutional Booker error is read-
ily quantifiable because if it is present, the court can find the substantial
rights element is satisfied.'0 9
Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta then argued the significant change in well-
settled law wrought by Booker for cases on appeal, typically termed an
"intervening decision," created presumptively prejudicial error) ° The
101. Id. at 739.
102. Id. at 732 (discussing that the district court had not enhanced Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta's
sentence based on judicially-determined facts, which would have violated the Sixth Amendment
under the Booker holding).
103. Id. (discussing that the appropriate standard was dictated by Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta's fail-
ure to raise the issue below).
104. Id. (discussing that the district court's mandatory application of the Sentencing Guidelines
was clearly erroneous under the holding of Booker, and the error was clear at the time of appeal).
105. Id. at 733 (quoting United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 82 (2004)).
106. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 733.
107. Id. at 734.
108. Id.
109. Id. The Tenth Circuit points to the Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Shelton,
400 F.3d 1325, 1328, 1332-33 (11 th Cir. 2005), as an example where the effect of prejudice is quan-
tified and then turns to the First Circuit's decision in United States v. Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d 68,
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Sixth Circuit adopted the presumptively prejudicial approach in United
States v. Barnett,I' and Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta asked the Tenth Circuit to
follow the Barnett approach."12 The Tenth Circuit declined the request
because the Supreme Court never used the presumptively prejudicial
exception to remand a case," 3 defendants alleging Booker error can
make an alternative showing of prejudice," 14 mitigating sentencing fac-
tors could and should have been presented to the District Court regard-
less of the Booker decision," 5 and allowing the burden to rest with the
government would substantially confuse the line between plain error
review and harmful error review.'
16
Having concluded that the defendant holds the burden under the
substantial rights prong, the court skipped the analysis of Mr. Gonzalez-
Huerta's satisfaction of that burden and moved directly to the judicial
integrity prong of plain error review." 7 The court emphasized the sepa-
ration between the third and fourth prongs of plain error review, which
had been condensed by some other circuits," 18 and reiterated that the Su-
preme Court had "never shifted the burden to the [government] to estab-
lish that the error did not seriously affect the fairness ... of judicial pro-
ceedings."" 9 The court focused on the impact of intervening decisions
on the integrity of the judicial process, and concluded that mandatory
application of the Sentencing Guidelines did not result in a miscarriage
of justice and therefore Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta had no right to remand.
120
Of importance to the Tenth Circuit were the facts that non-constitutional,
as opposed to constitutional, Booker error occurred, Mr. Gonzalez-
Huerta's sentence was within the national norm, and no mitigating evi-
dence appeared in the record.' 2' The court felt these facts mitigated the
impact of the error on judicial integrity because no "core notions of jus-
tice" were offended. 122 Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta failed his burden, accord-
ing to the court, because he presented no evidence other than a mere reci-
tation that injustice would result, which the court found insufficient.
123
Finally, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the District Court's sentence on the
111. 398 F.3d 516, 526-529 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 33 (2005).
112. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 735.
113. Id. (noting that the Supreme Court had the opportunity to term an intervening decision as
presumptively prejudicial in Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 469-70 (1997), but failed to do
so).
114. Id. (noting several methods of demonstrating prejudice, which defeats the notion that the
defendant cannot make a specific showing of prejudice).
115. Id. (discussing the dissent by Chief Judge Boggs in Barnett, 398 F.3d at 537-38).
116. Id. (noting that an essential distinction between plain error and harmless error is that the
burden rests with the defendant in the former).
117. Id. at 736 (noting that a specific determination under the third prong is unnecessary be-
cause Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta holds the burden under the fourth prong as well).
118. See, e.g., United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 118 (2d Cir. 2005).
119. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 737.
120. Id. at 737-39.
121. Id. at 738-39.
122. Id. at 739.
123. Id. at 737-38.
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basis that Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta had failed to satisfy the fourth prong of
plain error review. 1
24
3. Concurrences
Three concurrences accompanied the majority decision authored by
Chief Judge Tacha, Judge Ebel, and Judge Hartz. Chief Judge Tacha,
joined by Judge Kelly, Judge Murphy, Judge O'Brien, Judge McConnell,
and Judge Tymkovich, wrote separately to conclude that Mr. Gonzalez-
Huerta had failed the third prong of plain error review as well as the
fourth prong. 125  Chief Judge Tacha criticized Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta's
failure to present any mitigating evidence, which left the record devoid
of anything but speculation that suggested a lower sentence would be
imposed on remand. 26 Chief Judge Tacha also took the opportunity to
engage in a statistics battle with the dissent in order to counter the argu-
ment that the third and fourth prongs are satisfied per se by the signifi-
cant number of district judges that were imposing sentences below the
Guidelines range after Booker.127 The United States Sentencing Com-
mission had compiled figures on severity of federal sentences imposed
after Booker,128 which Chief Judge Tacha compared to pre-Booker fig-
ures and concluded that there was only a 1.8 percent increase in the
number of sentences imposed below the Sentencing Guidelines, while
there was also a 1.1 percent increase in the number of sentences imposed
above the Sentencing Guidelines. 129 Consequently, according to Chief
Judge Tacha, there can be no inference drawn from statistics that a lower
sentence is likely because the chance of a higher sentence is roughly
equivalent.
30
Both Judges Ebel and Hartz wrote separately primarily to put forth
additional analysis under the fourth prong. Judge Ebel, who interestingly
agreed with the majority on the fourth prong but sided with the dissent
on the third prong, 13 set forth three factors to be considered under the
judicial integrity element: (1) constitutionality of the error; (2) whether
the defendant's sentence falls within the Guidelines range; and (3)
whether the record on its face suggests the district court was likely to
impose a different sentence. 32 Judge Ebel concluded that all three fac-
tors weighed against Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta and thus his sentence should
be affirmed. 33 Judge Hartz viewed the fourth prong through a wide lens,
124. Id. at 739.
125. Id. at 739-40 (Tacha, C.J., concurring).
126. Id. at 740 (Tacha, C.J., concurring).
127. Id. at 741 (Tacha, C.J., concurring).
128. Linda D. Maxfield, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Data Extract on March 3: Numbers on
Post-Booker Sentencings at 2 (Mar. 22, 2005), http://www.famm.org/pdfs/booker_032205.pdf
129. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 741 (Tacha, C.J., concurring).
130. Id. (Tacha, C.J., concurring).
131. Id. at 742 (Ebel, J., concurring)
132. Id. at 743 (Ebel, J., concurring).
133. Id. at 744 (Ebel, J., concurring).
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stating the "fairness" to be considered is determined according to the
federal justice system as a whole, not just the particular sentence in any
one case. 34 Given the purpose of the Sentencing Guidelines was to cre-
ate uniformity between similarly situated defendants, Judge Hartz stated
that allowing a remand in Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta's case may actually harm
fairness.1 35 Remand of every sentence would result in more disparate
sentences, which undermines the fundamental purpose of the Sentencing
Guidelines and thus results in unfairness to the federal criminal justice
system in general.136 Judge Hartz implied the source of this disparity is
"the disconnect between the constitutional violation and the remedy" in
Booker because it created a unique situation where the constitutional




Judges Briscoe and Lucero dissented separately from the majority
decision, with the former authoring the main dissent. Judge Briscoe
challenged the majority's opinion on the basis that the burden should not
rest with the defendant to show prejudice. 38 Judge Briscoe explained
three paths to accomplish that goal: harmless-error review should be ap-
plied in lieu of plain error, the presumptively prejudicial Olano exception
should apply, or the intervening decision doctrine could be applied in
every non-constitutional Booker error case to shift the burden away from
the defendant.'
39
While conceding that Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta failed to object to the
mandatory application of the Sentencing Guidelines at trial, Judge
Briscoe argued that Booker error does not mesh with the traditional dis-
tinction between harmless and plain error because the defendant had no
true opportunity to object.' 40 Judge Briscoe noted that, at the time of
trial, not one person, ranging from defense counsel to the judge, knew
that an objection to the mandatory application would have any effective-
ness.141  Thus, the mandatory application of the Guidelines "substan-
tially undermined any need or incentive for sentencing courts pre-Booker
to note their objections" and deprived Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta of any mean-
134. Id. at 746-47 (Hartz, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 745-46 (Hartz, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 747 (Hartz, J., concurring).
137. Id. at 745 (Hartz, J., concurring).
138. Id. at 753 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 750, 753-55 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 750-53 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
141. See id. at 747 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
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ingful opportunity to object. 142 Since the defendant had no opportunity
to object, the burden should rest on the government.1
43
Judge Briscoe suggested the application of harmless-error review
and the intervening decision doctrine as possible solutions,' 44 but she
mainly relied on the Olano presumptively prejudicial exception as the
actual solution. 145 Citing the significant number of defendants who were
given below-Guidelines sentences post-Booker and the practical impos-
sibility of showing prejudice outside of fortuitous statements by the
judge, Judge Briscoe fell in line with the Sixth Circuit 146 and concluded
that prejudice should be presumed in non-constitutional Booker error
cases as a matter of course. 14 7 Judge Briscoe then analyzed the applica-
tion of her perception of plain error review to the instant case, which
took on a decidedly different flavor from the majority opinion.148  The
presumption of prejudice automatically satisfied the third prong, and the
accompanying assumption that a lighter sentence was inevitable satisfied
the fourth prong. 1
49
The final dissenting opinion, Judge Lucero's, further exemplified
the diversity of views amongst the Tenth Circuit judges.' 50 Judge Lucero
agreed with Judge Briscoe's analysis of the fourth prong based on the
hypothesis that if the fourth prong could not be satisfied by mandatory
application, then the Supreme Court would have had no reason to remand
Fanfan's sentence for further sentencing.' 51 However, Judge Lucero
wrote separately to express solidarity with the "limited remand" position
of the Second and Seventh Circuits regarding the third prong. 152 The
limited remand would allow the district judge to determine if a lighter
sentence could be imposed, and if needed, impose it. 153
Obviously, there is a wide range of sentiments among the judges
within the Tenth Circuit, which indicates the likely diversity of opinion
among the other federal circuits. The following section explores the dif-
ferent approaches to judicial review by the appellate circuits in regards to
142. Id. at 752 (Briscoe, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Barnett, 398 F.3d 516, 529
(6th Cir. 2005)).
143. See id. at 753 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 749, 755 (Briscoe, J., dissenting) (noting the four main directives that result from the
language in Booker, with application of harmless error review as one of them).
145. Id. at 753 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
146. See Barnett, 398 F.3d at 527-28.
147. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 754 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 756-59 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 757-59 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
150. See id. at 761-63 (Lucero, J., dissenting) (providing the third point of view on the proper
analysis of the substantial rights prong).
151. Id. at 761 (Lucero, I., dissenting).
152. Id. at 762 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 762 (Lucero, J., dissenting) (quoting the Second Circuit's decision in United States
v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 117 (2d Cir. 2005)).
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post-Booker sentencing. The sentiment surrounding the discrepancy
among the circuits was best captured by Judge Lucero's dissent:
The division on this court over the proper approach to Booker cases
pending direct review is replicated among the various circuit courts.
This wide ranging circuit split results in the disparate treatment of
criminal defendants throughout the nation. Such uneven administra-




Below is an overview of the different federal circuit positions:
Position Circuit Decision
Hard-line Approach 1st United States v. Antonakopoulos1
55
Decided on Third Prong 5th United States v. Mares
156
Burden on Defendant 8th United States v. Pirani
157
11Ith United States v. Rodriguez
158
Compromise Approach 10th United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta159
Decided on Fourth Prong
Burden on Defendant
Limited Remand 2d United States v. Crosby
160
7th United States v. Paladino'
61
9th United States v. Ameline
162
D.C. United States v. Coles
163
Presumption of Prejudice 4th United States v. Hughes (Hughes )
164
Burden on Government United States v. Hughes (Hughes 11)165
6th United States v. Barnett
166
No Set Standard 3d United States v. Davis
167
Automatic Remand
154. Id. at 763 (Lucero, J. dissenting).
155. 399 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2005).
156. 402 F.3d 511 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 43 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2005) (No. 04-
9517).
157. 406 F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 266 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2005) (No. 05-
5547).
158. 398 F.3d 1291 (1 1th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2935 (U.S. June 20, 2005) (No.
04-1148).
159. 403 F.3d 727 (10th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 495 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2005) (No. 05-
6407).
160. 397 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2005).
161. 401 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, Peyton v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 106 (U.S.,
Oct. 3, 2005) (No. 04-10402).
162. 409 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2005).
163. 403 F.3d 764 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
164. 396 F.3d 374 (4th Cir. 2005).
165. 401 F.3d 540 (4th Cir. 2005).
166. 398 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 33 (U.S. Sept. 20, 2005) (No. 04-
1690).
167. 407 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2005).
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While each case indicates a particular stance, their fact patterns differ
slightly, which can be outcome-determinative. The analysis will proceed
from the defendant's perspective: harshest to lightest.
1. Burden on the Defendant to Demonstrate Prejudice
The First, Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits each adopted a hard-
line stance towards plain error review, namely the burden rests with the
defendant to satisfy the third prong of Olano.16 8 All four of these circuits
additionally reached determinations that a trial judge's use of sentencing
enhancements not found by a jury, which constitutes Blakely error, does
not warrant remand per se, 169 and neither circuit gave deference to the
argument that remand is more suitable when Blakely error occurs.
In the Eleventh Circuit's Rodriguez decision, which was decided
first, the sentence of a convicted ecstasy dealer was based on the drug
quantity and enhanced due to obstruction of justice, which were both
facts found by the judge instead of the jury.170 The Eleventh Circuit de-
scribed the immense difficulty of overcoming the defendant's burden
under the third prong by stating, "[I]f it is equally plausible that the error
worked in favor of the defense, the defendant loses; if the effect of the
error is uncertain so that we do not know which, if either, side it
helped[,] the defendant loses." 17' Having concluded that the burden was
not satisfied by Mr. Rodriguez, the Eleventh Circuit criticized the pre-
sumed prejudicial and limited remand approaches of the Fourth, Sixth
and Second Circuits. 72 In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit both reiterated
the principle that the mere use of sentencing enhancements is not uncon-
stitutional under Booker' 73 and emphasized that the job of Booker review
lies with the appellate courts, not the trial courts.
74
168. See United States v. Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d 68, 78-79 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v.
Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 522 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 43 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2005) (No. 04-
9517); United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 266 (U.S. Oct.
3, 2005) (No. 05-5547); United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1300 (1 1th Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 125 S. Ct. 2935 (U.S. June 20, 2005) (No. 04-1148).
169. See Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d at 79 (rejecting aper se remand of all cases where sentence
enhancements were used); Mares, 402 F.3d at 521 (agreeing with the Eleventh Circuit's characteri-
zation of Booker error); Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1300 (noting that Justice Breyer's majority opinion
expressly stated the Sentencing Guidelines were constitutional once the mandatory provisions were
excised).
170. See Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1294 (noting the jury failed to make a determination on the
drug quantity and that the pre-sentencing report recommended an enhancement based on lying under
oath).
171. Id. at 1300.
172. Id. at 1301-02.
173. Id. at 1303-04 (noting that both the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Hughes, 396 F.3d
374 (4th Cir. 2005), and the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Oliver, 397 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 2005),
stated the constitutional error was the use of sentencing enhancements that were not found by a
jury).
174. Id. at 1305 ("The determination of plain error is the duty of courts of appeal, not district
courts.").
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Without a substantial degree of analysis, the Fifth Circuit agreed
heavily with the Rodriguez decision and wholly adopted its reasoning in
United States v. Mares, 75 which affirmed the conviction and the sen-
tence of a felon in possession of ammunition. 176 The primary emphasis
for both of these circuits is whether a substantially different result would
have occurred at trial under an advisory guidelines scheme. 177 If the re-
cord is silent or the defendant cannot reasonably show that a different
result is probable, then the defendant loses.
178
The First Circuit reached essentially the same conclusions as the
Eleventh and the Fifth Circuits in United States v. Antonakopoulos,179 but
provided some additional guidance for when remand is appropriate under
Booker. 80 Specifically, the court stated that remand is more appropriate
in the following circumstances: when the district judge misapplies the
guidelines;' 81 when mitigating circumstances existed at trial but could
not be considered under the mandatory regime; 82 when the trial judge
expresses on record that the Sentencing Guidelines were unfair; 183 and
when a reasonable probability exists that the result would have been dif-
ferent.' 84 In the end, the First Circuit used the traditional plain error ap-
proach to affirm the sentence of a bank manager who embezzled from his
employer that was based not only on the jury findings, but also on the
pre-sentence report and sentence enhancements.
85
The Eighth Circuit benefited from deciding United States v. Pi-
rani 86 well after the decisions of most of the sister circuits, and decided
that the proper approach among the splits is that of the First, Fifth, and
Eleventh Circuits. 187 A former sheriffs deputy in Arkansas was con-
victed of making false statements to federal investigators who suspected
that deputies were stealing drug money seized during the course of their
duties.188 The Eighth Circuit agreed that the third Olano factor depended
upon a defendant's showing a reasonable probability that a different sen-
tence would have been imposed, 89 but the court parted ways with the
175. 402 F.3d 511, 522 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 43 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2005) (No. 04-
9517).
176. Mares, 402 F.3d at 521-22.
177. See Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1302; Mares, 402 F.3d at 521.
178. See Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1300; Mares, 402 F.3d at 521.
179. 399 F.3d 68 (lst Cir. 2005).




184. Id. (noting that this final situation can overcome silence by the trial judge).
185. Id. at 84.
186. 406 F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 266 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2005) (No. 05-
5547).
187. Pirani, 406 F.3d at 547.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 551-52 (noting its agreement with the First, Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh
Circuits on this point).
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limited remand circuits on the basis that such a "creative approach" vio-
lates the express command from the Supreme Court in Booker to apply
ordinary prudential doctrines. 190 Consequently, the defendant's sentence
was affirmed after he failed to satisfy the Olano third prong burden. 191
2. Limited Remand
Four circuits have adopted the middle-ground approach of limited
remand for the purpose of determining whether the defendant was preju-
diced by the mandatory application of the Sentencing Guidelines.' 92 The
Second Circuit was the first to articulate this standard in United States v.
Crosby'93 as a "remand to the district court, not for the purpose of a re-
quired resentencing, but only for the more limited purpose of permitting
the sentencing judge to determine whether to resentence, now fully in-
formed of the new sentencing regime, and if so, to resentence."'
194
Crosby involved a felon who pled guilty to possession of a firearm and
was sentenced based on his plea, two prior convictions for violent of-
fenses, and three sentence enhancements for behavior during the act and
subsequent investigation. 95 The Second Circuit agreed that the use of
sentencing enhancements didn't violate the Constitution after Booker
because the enhancements didn't push the defendant over the "statutory
maximum" as required by Apprendi.196  However, the Second Circuit
stated that a proper application of plain error review requires knowing
what the sentencing judge would have done, which wasn't likely under
the pre-Booker regime, and thus limited remand was required.
197
The Seventh Circuit followed the Crosby approach in remanding the
sentences of several defendants in a consolidated appeal in United States
v. Paladino.198 In a colorful opinion, the Seventh Circuit described the
"epistemic fog" of not knowing what course of action the trial judge
would have taken in a discretionary scheme and decided the most ra-
tional approach to Booker review was to simply ask the trial judge. 199 In
reaching this conclusion, the Seventh Circuit determined that the fatal
190. Id. at 552.
191. Id. at 553 (noting that the fourth prong need not be considered because the third prong is
unsatisfied).
192. See United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 117 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Paladino,
401 F.3d 471, 484 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, Peyton v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 106 (2005);
United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Coles, 403 F.3d
764, 768 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
193. 397 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2005).
194. Crosby, 397 F.3d at 117.
195. Id. at 106 (noting that the defendant had recklessly endangered the life of a police officer,
created a substantial risk of injury for a police officer, and had obstructed justice).
196. Id. at 109 n.6.
197. Id. at 118-19.
198. Paladino, 401 F.3d at 485. The court affirmed the convictions of all the defendants and
the sentence of one defendant, Peyton, who challenged his sentence on the basis of a "recidivist"
enhancement, which the Seventh Circuit stated was not affected by Booker. Id at 480.
199. Paladino, 401 F.3d at 482, 484.
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flaw in the presumed prejudice approach is that no prejudice results if the
trial judge would impose the same sentence,2" and the hardline refusal to
remand unjustly "condem[s] some unknown fraction of criminal defen-
dants to serve an illegal sentence.,
20'
Similarly, in United States v. Ameline,20 2 the Ninth Circuit re-
manded a sentence where the defendant pled guilty to possession of
"some methamphetamine.,, 20 3 The trial judge utilized the pre-sentencing
figure of 1,079.3 grams of methamphetamine as the basis for sentencing,
which the Ninth Circuit stated resulted in constitutional error that de-
manded resentencing under Booker.204  The Ninth Circuit expressly
agreed with the limited remand approach.2 °5
Finally, in a relatively short opinion, the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit adopted the Crosby limited remand approach in United States v.
Coles.2 °6 The court remanded the sentence of a former Special Assistant
to the Secretary of the District of Columbia convicted of attempting to
obtain grant money fraudulently because the record was unclear as to
whether the defendant was prejudiced.20 7 The most interesting aspect of
the Coles decision is the D.C. Circuit's criticism of the presumed preju-
dicial approach that "courts employing this approach assess error and
prejudice as if the pre-Booker, mandatory sentencing regime were still in
place, and as if the error were judicial factfinding under that regime."
208
The skewed perspective of the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, according to
the D.C. Circuit, directly conflicts with the Booker guidance by ignoring
what the trial judge would have done.209
3. Presumed Prejudicial
The final prominent position taken by the federal circuits is that of
the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, which remand any sentence which is in-
creased based on any fact not found by a jury, including pre-sentencing
reports and sentencing enhancements.21 0  This position was first de-
scribed by the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Hughes,2 ' which af-
200. Id. at 483 (criticizing the Sixth Circuit's decision in United States v. Oliver, 397 F.3d 369
(6th Cir. 2005)).
201. Id. at 484-85.
202. 409 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2005).
203. Ameline, 409 F.3d at 1075.
204. Id. at 1075, 1078.
205. Id. at 1079-80.
206. 403 F.3d 764, 765 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
207. Coles, 403 F.3d at 765, 769-70.
208. Id. at 768.
209. Id.
210. See United States v. Hughes, 396 F.3d 374, 376 (4th Cir. 2005) [hereinafter Hughes 1];
United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 548 (4th Cir. 2005) [hereinafter Hughes 11]; United States v.
Banett, 398 F.3d 516, 526 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 33 (U.S. Sept. 20, 2005) (No. 04-
1690).
211. 396 F.3d 374 (4th Cir. 2005).
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firmed a defendant's convictions but remanded his sentence. 212 Hughes
was convicted by a jury of bankruptcy fraud and perjury, but the judge
imposed a forty-six month sentence based on five enhancements which
the jury did not find.13 The Fourth Circuit framed the constitutional
violation as judicial action which "imposes a sentence greater than the
maximum authorized by the facts found by the jury alone. 214 There was
neither mention of the statutory maximum nor any reference to the por-
tion of the Booker decision which authorized the use of sentencing en-
hancements.21 5
The Fourth Circuit concluded that plain error review was the proper
standard because Hughes raised his Sixth Amendment challenge for the
first time on appeal,216 but then proceeded to find that plain error had
occurred because each of the four Olano prongs were satisfied.217 The
third prong was satisfied by the discrepancy in the Guidelines range be-
tween Offense Level 10, which the jury facts warranted, and Offense
Level 22, which was the actual level used as enhanced by five judge-
found factors. 218 Likewise, the Fourth Circuit held the fourth prong was
satisfied due to the major change in federal sentencing law that Booker
imposed.219 Oddly enough, the Fourth Circuit, when providing guidance
to the trial judge for resentencing, determined that the "district court cor-
rectly determined the range prescribed by the guidelines, on remand the
court shall consider that range, 22 ° which seems to contradict the deter-
mination that use of sentencing enhancements to increase the guidelines
range violates the Sixth Amendment.22'
The Fourth Circuit reiterated its position in response to stark criti-
cism from other circuits, particularly the Eleventh Circuit, when it
granted a rehearing before a three judge panel.222 In Hughes II, the
Fourth Circuit essentially amended its decision in Hughes I with addi-
tional analysis under the third and fourth Olano prongs.223 Chief Judge
Wilkins, writing for the majority, drew support mainly from Kotteakos v.
United States224 for the proposition that the main goal of the substantial
rights inquiry was not to decide the outcome of an error-free trial, but
rather to determine the reasonable effect the error had on the proceed-
212. Hughes 1, 396 F.3d at 376.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 378.
215. See id. at 379 (noting that the prescribed Guidelines-range for the facts found by the jury
authorized a 12-month maximum sentence, which the 46-month actual sentence clearly exceeds).
216. Id. at 379.
217. Id. at 380-81.
218. Id. at 380.
219. Id. at 380-81.
220. Id. at 385 (noting that the other factors under the Sentencing Guidelines should be consid-
ered as well).
221. 1d. at 378.
222. Hughes 1, 401 F.3d at 543.
223. Hughes 11, 401 F.3d at 548.
224. 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
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ing.225 If the reasonable effect is ambiguous, then the court cannot con-
clude that the defendant's substantial rights were not affected.226 Fur-
thermore, the Fourth Circuit stated that the appropriate examination of
the substantial rights prong is "whether the district court could have im-
posed the sentence it did without exceeding the relevant Sixth Amend-
ment limitation,, 227 which can never be satisfied when sentencing en-
hancements were used because they are not facts found by a jury.228
The Sixth Circuit followed the Fourth Circuit's decision in Hughes I
with its decision in United States v. Barnett.229 The Barnett defendant
was convicted of gun possession and sentenced to 265 months based on
three prior violent felonies. 230  The Sixth Circuit held that prejudice
should be presumed because the defendant may have received a sentence
as low as 180 months, the statutory minimum, and the inherent nature of
Booker error made it exceptionally difficult to make a showing of preju-
dice.231
Finally, the Third Circuit appears to follow the "presumed prejudi-
cial" approach, but has declined to expressly adopt any specific line of
reasoning.232 The Third Circuit consistently remands Booker cases for
resentencing under the rationale that, "[T]he sentencing issues appellant
raises are best determined by the District Court in the first instance, [con-
sequently] we will vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing in
accordance with Booker."233 However, the Third Circuit provides only
cryptic reasoning for its automatic remand approach. In an en banc deci-
sion, Judge Scirica stated in dicta that prejudice should be presumed be-
cause "mandatory sentencing was governed by an erroneous scheme.9
2 34
Furthermore, the court viewed the possibility of stripping discretion from
the trial court as sufficient harm to the integrity of the judicial system.235
III. ANALYSIS
The only undisputed principle in all sentencing challenges after
United States v. Booker2 36 is that plain error occurs through the manda-
tory application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The clarity ends
there, as several unresolved issues regarding plain error review as estab-
225. Hughes 11, 401 F.3d at 548.
226. Id. (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765).
227. Id. at 551.
228. See id. at 548 (noting that the maximum sentence under the facts found solely by the jury
would have been 12 months).
229. 398 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 33 (U.S. Sept. 20, 2005) (No. 04-
1690).
230. Id. at 521.
231. Id. at 526-27.
232. See, e.g., United States v. Bruce, 405 F.3d 145, 150 (3d Cir. 2005).
233. Id. at 150. See also United States v. Davis, 407 F.3d 162, 166 (3d Cir. 2005) (en banc).
234. Davis, 407 F.3d at 165.
235. Id.
236. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
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lished in United States v. Olano2 3 7 have led to a wide-ranging circuit
split. The dispute centers on the prejudice created by mandatory sentenc-
ing, and understanding the pros and cons of each circuit's approach is
crucial to analyzing the effectiveness of the Tenth Circuit's decision in
United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta.23 s Moreover, the limitations of plain
error review, particularly its ability to address sweeping changes in set-
tled law, must also be examined as a contributing source of the disparity
in post-Booker review. Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit reached the correct
outcome in Gonzalez-Huerta through reliance on the judicial integrity
requirement of plain error review, although burdening criminal defen-
dants to demonstrate prejudice is fundamentally unfair and should not be
followed.
A. Requiring the Unknown
The Tenth Circuit incorrectly agreed with the hardline circuits by
placing the burden of satisfying the third Olano prong with the defen-
dant, which requires him to demonstrate a reasonable probability of
prejudice.239 The Fourth and Sixth Circuits presume prejudice in post-
Booker review based on the language in 01ano24 0 and the difficulty of
establishing that a different outcome would result under an advisory sen-
tencing regime. 241 The Tenth Circuit rejected the "presume prejudice"
approach because the Supreme Court had never mentioned nor applied
such a presumption after its mere mention in Olano.242  Specifically,
Chief Judge Tacha cited the Court's decision in Johnson v. United
States,243 which addressed an intervening decision and failed to mention
presuming prejudice in its analysis.244 However, Johnson indirectly pre-
sumed prejudice by "assuming that the failure to submit materiality to
the jury affected substantial rights., 245 Also, reliance on the lack of addi-
tional case support for presuming prejudice is misguided, particularly
given that Olano was decided within the last fifteen years.246 Insufficient
time to develop may be equally culpable for the Supreme Court's failure
to mention presuming prejudice, and thus should not be cited as support
for rejecting such an approach. Finally, if any situation satisfies the in-
tent of the Olano exception, the significant change wrought by Booker's
intervening decision should qualify. The only other Supreme Court case
237. 507 U.S. 725 (1993).
238. 403 F.3d 727 (10th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 495 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2005) (No. 05-
6407).
239. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 736.
240. Olano, 507 U.S. at 735 (noting that some errors "should be presumed prejudicial if the
defendant cannot make a specific showing of prejudice").
241. See United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 548 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Barnett,
398 F.3d 516, 526 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 33 (U.S. Sept. 20,2005) (No. 04-1690).
242. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 735.
243. 520 U.S. 461 (1997).
244. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 735.
245. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 469 (quotations omitted).
246. Olano, 507 U.S. at 725 (decided in 1993).
2006]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
to address the impact of an intervening decision was Johnson, which
considered the change to materiality determinations in United States v.
Gaudin,247 and that decision assumed the prejudice element to be satis-
fied. 24 8
The Tenth Circuit also refused to presume prejudice because a
criminal defendant could possibly demonstrate prejudice based on the
record.249  The most common avenue for demonstrating prejudice is
through judicial comment that a lower sentence is warranted.250 How-
ever, the majority's characterization is essentially a straw man that "ig-
nores the reality of the pre-Booker sentencing landscape ' 251 where judi-
cial comments criticizing the Sentencing Guidelines are unnecessary and
discouraged by existing case law. Guiding principles should not be sup-
ported by their extremes, and the presence of sufficient evidence in the
trial record to establish prejudice is certainly an extreme situation in
post-Booker challenges.
Finally, the Tenth Circuit relied on the need to maintain a distinc-
tion between plain error and harmless error review as support for its posi-
tion.252 The Supreme Court likewise cited concern for distinguishing
plain and harmless error as a reason for placing the burden with the de-
253fendant in plain error review. However, the main policy support for
shifting the burden, which rests with the government in harmless error
review, is the need to encourage defendants to object timely and assert
their rights as a fundamental part of the adversary system.254 Most, if not
all, plain error post-Booker sentencing challenges do not satisfy the pol-
icy of encouraging objections because the affected defendants did not
know at the time of their trial that a legal right to object to mandatory
application of the Sentencing Guidelines existed. As stated by Judge
Briscoe in her dissent, "there was no opportunity or incentive, as there is
now post-Booker, for Gonzalez-Huerta or the government to present evi-
dence or arguments outside of the bounds allowed by the Guidelines. 255
In a similar vein, the Second Circuit stated, "[i]f we were to penalize
defendants for failing to challenge entrenched precedent, we would be
insisting upon an omniscience on the part of defendants ... [and] would
only encourage frivolous objections and appeals. 256 Therefore, the need
for a true distinction between plain and harmless error is minimal, and
247. 515 U.S. 506 (1995).
248. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467.
249. Gonzalez-Huerla, 403 F.3d at 735-36.
250. United States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325, 1328 (11 th Cir. 2005).
251. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 752 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
252. Id. at 736.
253. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734-35.
254. See Lowry, supra note 70, at 1080 (quoting United States v. Silverstein, 732 F.2d 1338,
1349 (7th Cir. 1984)).
255. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 751 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
256. United States v. Viola, 35 F.3d 37,42 (2d Cir. 1994).
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although the failure to object should give rise to plain error review, de-
fendants should not be doubly penalized by a strict enforcement of the
burden, which would otherwise rest with the government under the
common law plain error doctrine.257
Furthermore, general policy arguments support adopting of presum-
ing prejudice under the third prong of Olano. Conceding prejudice
within the context of significant intervening decisions prevents under-
mining the fairness of judicial proceedings. Requiring defendants to
produce the unknown, namely the actions a sentencing judge would have
perused under an advisory regime, is fundamentally unfair. The "limited
remand" approach of the Second, Seventh, Ninth, and District of Colum-
bia Circuits addresses the fairness issue, but it fails to meet the judicial
efficiency goals of plain error review. Assuming prejudice would allow
the appellate courts to decide Booker cases based upon the impact to the
integrity of the judiciary, which is more reliant on policy considerations
which appeals courts are best equipped to handle.
Since the burden under the third Olano prong should rest with the
government in post-Booker review cases, the arguments presented by
Chief Judge Tacha and Judge Briscoe regarding satisfaction of that bur-
den are moot. However, one prominent aspect of Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta's
case that was ignored by both sides of the debate, and indeed every cir-
cuit to address Booker review, is the fact that Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta was
sentenced to the absolute minimum within the proscribed sentencing
258range. Supporters of remand could cite minimum range application as
an implicit statement by the sentencing judge that he would impose a
lower sentence if it were possible. Although the ability of minimum
range application to demonstrate prejudice is tenuous, it provides a valu-
able argument when faced with the alternative of a silent trial record and
may persuade a court to grant limited remand.
B. Preserving Reason
Despite the limitations of the prejudice element analysis, the Tenth
Circuit's analysis and conclusion under the judicial integrity element
provided the saving grace of the Gonzalez-Huerta decision. Even if
prejudice to the defendant is presumed, remand is only warranted if the
prejudice results in a miscarriage of justice.25 9 Thus, the reviewing ap-
pellate court can exercise its discretion under the fourth Olano prong
when the circumstances of the case deserve remedy, but can decline if
the circumstances do not. The Supreme Court followed this exact rea-
soning in Johnson, where it examined the merits of the underlying mate-
riality dispute and declined to remand because the evidence supporting
257. See Lowry, supra note 70, at 1078-80.
258. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 730.
259. Id. at 736-37 (citing United States v. Gilkey, 118 F.3d 702, 704 (10th Cir. 1997)).
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the trial court's ruling was "overwhelming., 260  Likewise in Gonzalez-
Huerta, the judicial integrity element provided a dispositive basis of de-
cision because Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta failed to, and indeed was unable to,
provide evidence that mandatory application of the Sentencing Guide-
lines caused injustice.26'
The fairness of Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta's sentence is, similar to John-
son, overwhelming. The only enhancement used at sentencing was the
prior conviction, 26 which Booker expressly approved. 263 The trial court
imposed the minimum sentence of the corresponding sentencing range.264
Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta presented no mitigating evidence which was re-
jected by the mandatory regime.265 Most importantly, the Sentencing
Guidelines are still used as the national standard and meant to provide
consistency among criminal defendants. 266 Although the recent trend in
sentencing is the increased imposition of below-guidelines sentences,
267
the overwhelming majority of post-Booker sentences are within the Sen-
tencing Guidelines. 268  As a result, Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta's sentence is
conclusively fair because it comports with the national norm and is based
solely on constitutional facts, and as such does not give rise to the neces-
sary "miscarriage of justice" required for plain error remand.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's guidance for handling post-
Booker review expressly stated that not every appeal would lead to re-
sentencing, 269 and that guidance would be vitiated entirely if remand was
granted in Gonzalez-Huerta.27 0 The only possible prejudice to Mr. Gon-
zalez-Huerta was the mandatory application of the Sentencing Guide-
lines.2 7' Therefore, if remand were granted, it would implicitly amount
to a statement that mandatory application alone is sufficient to warrant
resentencing. Since every pre-Booker sentence was statutorily required
to be mandatory, then every sentence would have to be remanded. Such
a result violates the express intent of the Supreme Court and cannot be
rationally sustained. Consequently, the automatic remand approaches of
260. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 469-70.
261. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 737-38.
262. Id. at 730.
263. 125 S. Ct. 738, 756 (2005).
264. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 730.
265. See id at 735-36.
266. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 92 (1996).
267. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SPECIAL POST-BOOKER CODING PROJECT
DATA EXTRACTION DATE: DECEMBER 21, 2005 at 1 (Jan. 5, 2006),
http://www.ussc.gov/Blakely/PostBooker 010506.pdf (noting that only 1.7% of cases sentenced
subsequent to the Booker decision are above the guidelines, while 37.1% of the cases are below the
guidelines, although 24.4% of the below-guidelines sentences are government sponsored).
268. Id. at 1 (noting that 61.2% of cases sentenced subsequent to the Booker decision are
within the guidelines).
269. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 769 (2005).
270. 403 F.3d 727 (10th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 495 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2005) (No. 05-
6407).
271. Id. at 730-31 (noting the basis of sentencing was limited to admitted facts and prior con-
victions).
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the Second, Third, Seventh, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits,
even if limited, cannot be sustained for this reason.272 The Fourth and
Sixth Circuits' "presumed prejudicial" approach also fails under the Su-
preme Court's limits on remand because both circuits compress the sepa-
rate elements under Olano, so instead of merely presuming prejudice to
the defendant, the court also presumes injustice results regardless of the
circumstances in individual cases.2 73 Failure to distinguish between the
third and fourth Olano prongs, when combined with presuming preju-
dice, holds the same effect as the Third Circuit's "automatic remand"
approach. Consequently, the only feasible approaches are those of the
First, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits because they preclude
remand in every case.274
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit's decision in United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta
275
establishes the correct outcome under the holding of United States v.
Booker2 76 and the judicial integrity element of plain error review estab-
lished in United States v. Olano.27 Fairness warrants providing the de-
fendant with leniency regarding prejudicial effect of the plain error, par-
ticularly caused by an intervening decision requiring a defendant to see
the future in order to properly object in good faith. However, unless the
asserted error causes a miscarriage of justice or fails to comport with
appropriate policy considerations, then the reviewing court should refuse
to exercise its discretion under the fourth Olano prong.
One technique the Tenth Circuit would be well-advised to adopt is
avoidance of disparate treatment through broad interpretation of the ob-
jection required to trigger harmless error review. The First Circuit has
supported such an approach in United States v. Heldeman278 and United
States v. Antonakopoulos.279 The Antonakopoulos court viewed any ar-
272. See United States v. Davis, 407 U.S. 162, 166 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Crosby,
397 F.3d 103, 117 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, Peyton v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 106 (U.S., Oct. 3, 2005) (No. 04-10402); United States v.
Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Coles, 403 F.3d 764, 768 (D.C.
Cir. 2005).
273. See United States v. Hughes, 396 F.3d 374, 376 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Hughes,
401 F.3d 540, 548 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Barnett, 398 F.3d 516, 526 (6th Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 33 (U.S. Sept. 20, 2005) (No. 04-1690).
274. See United States v. Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d 68, 78-79 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v.
Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 522 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 43 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2005) (No. 04-
9517); United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 266 (U.S. Oct.
3, 2005) (No. 05-5547); United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 736 (10th Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 495 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2005) (No. 05-6407); United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d
1291, 1300 (11 th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2935 (U.S. June 20, 2005) (No. 04-1148).
275. 403 F.3d 727 (10th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 495 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2005) (No. 05-
6407).
276. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
277. 507 U.S. 725 (1993).
278. 402 F.3d 220 (1st Cir. 2005).
279. 399 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2005).
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gument under Apprendi v. New Jersey,28 0 Blakely v. Washington, or a
general challenge to the constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines as
sufficient to trigger harmless error,282 which typically results in remand
for resentencing.283 Avoidance of customarily applying plain error re-
view would help mitigate the disparate treatment of similarly situated
defendants that are merely separated by the passage of time, during
which the Blakely and Booker arguments became available and provided
defendants with a basis to object. Specifically, the Tenth Circuit could
avoid the disparity exemplified by the cases of Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta and
Mr. Labastida-Segura. Mr. Labastida-Segura pled guilty to reentering
the United States after being deported, and was sentenced based on ad-
mitted facts and a prior felony conviction.284 Despite the striking similar-
ity in circumstances to Gonzalez-Huerta, the Tenth Circuit remanded for
resentencing. 285 The only distinction was that Mr. Labastida-Segura's
trial was not conducted until after the Blakely decision and he prudently
filed a motion to have the Sentencing Guidelines declared unconstitu-
tional,28 6 which entitled him to a harmless error standard of review on
appeal.287 Avoidance through interpretation would allow more defen-
dants to challenge their sentences under harmless error review and would
foster the appearance of equitable treatment of comparable defendants.
The wide-ranging circuit split deserves resolution by the Supreme
Court. Different geographic areas are treating similar defendants differ-
ently-undermining not only the purposes of the Guidelines but also the
spirit of justice in the criminal punishment system. However, given the
fact that the Court has denied certiorari in almost half of the controlling
appellate circuit cases, including Gonzalez-Huerta,288 and the temporary
nature of Booker error, the possibility exists that the Court may simply
wait for the discrepancy to elapse. The discrepancy among the circuits
over Booker review presents an opportunity for the Court to add signifi-
cantly to the plain error review precedent and should not be foregone.
Peter A. Jenkins*
280. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
281. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
282. See Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d at 76. See also Heldeman, 402 F.3d at 224.
283. See, e.g., United States v. Labastida-Segura, 396 F.3d 1140, 1143 (10th Cir. 2005).
284. Id. at 1141-42.
285. Id. at 1143.
286. ld. at 1142.
287. Id. at 1143.
288. See supra Part I1.B (noting that six of the thirteen controlling cases in each respective
circuit have been denied certiorari to date).
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APPROVAL VERSUS APPLICATION: How TO INTERPRET
THE REGISTRATION REQUIREMENT UNDER THE
COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976
If I were required to guess off-hand, and without collusion with
higher minds, what is the bottom cause of the amazing material and
intellectual advancement of the last fifty years, I should guess that it
was the modem-born and previously non-existent disposition on the
part of men to believe that a new idea can have value.
-Mark Twain
INTRODUCTION
While Mark Twain identified the significance of innovation in the
intellectual and social progress of man, perhaps equally important is the
value an innovation has to its creator. American copyright law has rec-
ognized and struggled with this dichotomy between progress and owner-
ship from the time the first copyright statute was enacted in 1790. 2 In an
effort to balance private incentives and public resources from which fu-
ture innovators could draw, Congress implemented a system of proce-
dural formalities.3 Individuals were permitted to exert control over their
creations only if they complied with the registration, notice, and renewal
requirements of the Copyright Act.4 While the current federal system has
relaxed many of these requirements, procedural formalities continue to
play an important role in copyright law. Although an original work is
protected the moment it is fixed in a tangible form,5 certain rights and
benefits accrue only upon copyright registration. These rights and bene-
fits include: the ability to initiate an infringement action in federal court,6
and to recover statutory damages and attorney's fees.7 Therefore, while
an author may own the copyright in his work as soon as his work is cre-
ated, his ability to enforce the copyright depends on compliance with
registration procedures.
1. Jone Johnson Lewis, Wisdom Quotes: Quotations to Inspire and Challenge,
http://www.wisdomquotes.com/catideas.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2006).
2. Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REv. 485, 486-87 (2004).
3. Id. at 487.
4. Id.
5. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (West 2005) ("Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with
this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or
later developed, ,from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device.") (emphasis added).
6. 17 U.S.C.A. § 411 (a) (West 2005).
7. 17 U.S.C.A. § 412 (West 2005).
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In La Resolana Architects v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire,8 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addressed two conflicting
interpretations of the registration requirement under the Copyright Act of
1976.9 The determination of whether a copyright has been properly reg-
istered is the preliminary step to initiating an infringement action in fed-
eral court.10 In a case of first impression for the Tenth Circuit, the court
was faced with the task of determining whether a creator had sufficiently
complied with the Copyright Act's registration requirements, thus pro-
viding the court with proper jurisdiction over the case.1 Copyright
claimants may register their copyright claims by submitting a registration
application.' 2 The court held that registration under the Act required the
Copyright Office's review of a registration application rather than just
the successful submission of an application.' 3 Because the plaintiff in La
Resolana initiated suit after successfully submitting an application but
prior to receiving approval, the court dismissed the claim for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. 14
This article examines the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of the regis-
tration requirement under the Copyright Act in La Resolana. Part I dis-
cusses the origins and evolution of copyright law, the federal registration
system, and recent amendments to the Copyright Act. It also provides an
overview of the disparate application of registration formalities under
current federal law. Part II addresses the circuit split regarding the pre-
requisites of copyright registration and outlines the two competing inter-
pretations of Title 17: (1) the "Application approach"-a policy based
interpretation where registration is satisfied upon the successful submis-
sion of a copyright application; and (2) the "Approval approach"-a
plain language interpretation where an application must either be ap-
proved or rejected to satisfy the Act's registration requirement. 5 Part III
provides a detailed view of the La Resolana decision and the Tenth Cir-
cuit's reliance on the Approval approach. Part IV analyzes this decision
and proposes that the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
8. 416 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2005).
9. La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1197.
10. See id. at 1199.
11. See id. at 1197.
12. 17 U.S.C.A. § 408(a) (West 2005) states:
At any time during the subsistence of the first term of copyright in any published or un-
published work in which the copyright was secured before January 1, 1978, and during
the subsistence of any copyright secured on or after that date, the owner of copyright or
of any exclusive right in the work may obtain registration of the copyright claim by deliv-
ering to the Copyright Office the deposit specified by this section, together with the ap-
plication and fee specified by sections 409 and 708. Such registration is not a condition of
copyright protection.
17 U.S.C.A. § 408(a) (West 2005) (emphasis added). For purposes of this survey, "successful sub-
mission" of a registration application covers submission of the deposit, fee, and application, as well
as receipt by the Copyright Office.
13. La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1197.
14. Id. at 1197-98.
15. Id. at 1202-03.
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cuit incorrectly decided La Resolana by misinterpreting the registration
requirement and improperly relying on a 2005 amendment to support its
statutory interpretation. This article suggests that the statutory scheme is
inconsistent and requires deference to public policy. This article also
suggests that the United States Supreme Court grant certiorari and adopt
the Application approach in order to ensure that the application of copy-
right law comports with the purpose of the Copyright Act-to unify
copyright law and relax procedural formalities.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Copyright Act of 1976
Before the Copyright Act of 1976, a range of common law and
statutory schemes governed infringement actions throughout the coun-
try.16 Copyright law varied from state to state as did the conditions nec-
essary for its enforcement. 17 Although the Constitution vested copyright
protection in the federal government under the Copyright Clause,' 8 copy-
right protection was not the exclusive province of the federal govern-
ment.' 9 For nearly one hundred and fifty years, copyright protection
developed under a dual system of both state and federal law,20 creating
an inconsistent and confusing set of rules. 2' After the implementation of
the current Act on January 1, 1978, state and federal copyright law con-
verged.22 Congress created a uniform federal copyright system "governed
exclusively" by Title 17 of the United States Code, thus preempting most
State copyright law.
16. Id. at 1198 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 219 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5744).
17. Id. See also, Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 857, 858 (1987) (arguing that the ambiguity of the 1909 Copyright Act forced
courts to stretch statutory boundaries and develop a significant amount of common law interpreta-
tion; "[l]ike many bodies of judge-made law, the common law doctrines were often inconsistent and
contradictory, not only among courts but within courts; not only among lines of cases, but within
lines of cases.") (citing B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 79-97 (1967)).
18. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8 cl. 8 (providing that Congress shall have power "to promote the
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited time to authors and inventors the exclu-
sive right to their respective writings and discoveries.").
19. SeeLa Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1198.
20. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, at OV-3 (2005).
21. La Resolana 416 F.3d at 1198.
22. NIMMER, supra note 20, at OV-3.
23. Title 17 states:
On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in
works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within
the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, whether created be-
fore or after that date and whether published or unpublished, are governed exclusively by
this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any
such work under the common law or statutes of any State.
17 U.S.C.A. § 301(a) (West 2005) (emphasis added); La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1198 (citing H. Rep.
No. 94-1476 at 130, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5746 ("The intention of section 301 is to
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In addition to streamlining copyright law, the 1976 Act eliminated a
number of statutory formalities that served as prerequisites to the exis-
tence of copyrights and recognized a creator's automatic copyright in an
"original work of authorship fixed in a tangible medium. 24  Federal
statutory protection was to continue for fifty years25 after the death of the
author regardless of whether the work had been published, registered, or
renewed. 26 The Act also established a "single, centralized, federal regis-
tration system., 27 Under the new system, the existence and maintenance
of copyrights were not dependent upon acquiescence to procedural regis-
tration requirements.2 8 Copyright registration was no longer mandatory,
but voluntary.29
Through the Act, Congress moved from a "conditional" system to
an "unconditional" system and broke with nearly two hundred years of
practice.30  Because authors were no longer required to register their
creations in order to receive copyright protection, Congress implemented
certain registration incentives so as to ensure the continued vitality of an
expansive public record.3' Under the current system, only those authors
who register their copyright may initiate an infringement action in fed-
eral court.32 It is through infringement suits that Title 17's additional
incentives, such as statutory damages, the recovery of attorney's fees,
and injunctive relief function.33 Absent copyright registration, federal
courts shall not exercise jurisdiction and award these remedies. Thus,
authors who have failed to comply with the registration requirement un-
der the Act may have copyrights to their work without any meaningful
way to enforce them.34 Although the Act replaced required formalities
with voluntary formalities, procedural mechanisms remained an integral
part of the American copyright system. In fact, American copyright law
preempt and abolish any rights under common law or statutes of a state that are equivalent to copy-
right.")).
24. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (West 2005).
25. Today protection continues for seventy years after the death of the author. 17 U.S.C.A.
302(a) (West 2005) ("Copyright in a work created on or after January 1, 1978, subsists from its
creation and, except as provided by the following subsections, endures for a term consisting of the
life of the author and 70 years after the author's death.").
26. NIMMER, supra note 20, at OV-3.
27. La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1198.
28. Sprigman, supra note 2, at 488.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See John B. Koegel, Bamboozlement: The Repeal of Copyright Registration Incentives, 13
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 529,534 (1993).
32. Id. at 529.
33. La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1199-1200.
34. But see id. at 1199 n.2 ("Although the Act preempts state copyright law, it does not elimi-
nate all state law actions. For example, conduct that may give rise to a federal suit for copyright
infringement may also give rise to a state law claim in tort for unfair competition, tortuous interfer-
ence, or breach of contract.").
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continued to be characterized by its ministerial focus until the approval
of an important 1988 amendment.35
B. The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988
On March 1, 1989, the Berne Convention Implementation Act of
1988 (BCIA) took effect 36 and further relaxed the procedural require-
ments of American copyright law.37 The BCIA was enacted in order to
"ally the United States with a set of international rules and regulations,
known as the Berne Convention, that protects intellectual property in the
global marketplace and is adhered to by much of the global commu-
nity.' '38 Adherence to the Berne Convention required United States fed-
eral copyright law to focus on the importance of moral rights, self-
execution, and retroactivity, and forced the country to "sacrifice its ob-
session with copyright formalities., 39 In particular, the Berne Convention
forbid registration as a pre-requisite for copyright protection.4 ° Congress,
however, was reluctant to eliminate registration provisions and endorse
an expansive approach to the amendment's enactment. Instead, Con-
gress opted for a "minimalist" philosophy, whereby it could retain the
current registration system without violating international regulations. 41
After a substantial legislative debate between the House of Repre-
sentatives, which fought to maintain the registration requirement, and the
Senate, which argued to eliminate it, delegates agreed upon a statutory
revision of the Act's registration provision.42 Registration would remain
a condition precedent to the initiation of an infringement action for do-
mestic authors only.43 Because registration is a condition of copyright
enforcement rather than copyright existence, and "loss of copyright," the
destruction of an otherwise existent copyright due to ministerial require-
ments, is the standard for determining the existence of a formality in
contravention of Berne, 44 the United States could avoid offending the
Berne Convention with respect to its own authors. 45 But because the
ability to bring a claim or obtain any kind of relief for copyright in-
fringement is dependent upon a procedural mechanism, "the enjoyment"
of copyright mandated by Berne, which "shall not be subject to any for-
35. 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 701[A], at 7-8
(2005).
36. NIMMER, supra note 20, at OV-3, 4; Public Notice 1086, Department of State, 53 Fed.
Reg. 48, 748 (Nov. 22 1988).
37. Id. at OV-5.
38. La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1205.
39. NIMMER, supra note 20, at OV-5.
40. NIMMER, supra note 35, at 7-163.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 7-164.
43. 17 U.S.C.A. § 411 (a) (West 2005) ("[No action for infringement of the copyright in any
United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has
been made in accordance with this title.") (emphasis added).
44. NIMMER, supra note 35, at 7-163.
45. Id. at 7-163 to -65.
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mality, ''46 is severely compromised and therefore inapplicable to foreign
works. The United States had appeared to gain accession at the expense
of its domestic authors. The delegates' compromise created two classes
of works: Berne works of foreign origin which were not subject to any
registration formalities, and all other works which were subject to regis-
tration before obtaining infringement action initiation rights.47
Although charged with "hypertechnical casuistry,' '48 the voluntary
registration system for domestic authors did not invoke proscribed for-
malities. Even upon the Copyright Office's refusal to approve a copy-
right registration application, the Act's registration provision allows a
claimant to file suit.49 Furthermore, the registration provision has been
characterized as a "court filing requirement, much like the fees that must
be paid to file a complaint in a United States district court., 50 Sending an
application and diminutive registration fee is a small imposition upon an
international claimant who is already required to pay a much larger filing
fee.5' In this respect, eliminating the registration requirement is a supere-
rogatory action. The analogy between the court filing requirement and
the registration requirement will be significant later in this analysis. The
comparison not only illustrates the small burden imposed by the provi-
sion, but infers that which should satisfy its conditions.
C. The Federal Registration System and Its Purpose
Copyright functions were centralized in the Library of Congress in
1870.52 In 1897, the first Register of Copyrights was appointed and the
Copyright Office became a separate department of the Library of Con-
gress. 53 The Copyright Office is now one of the Library's foremost ser-
vice units, employing over 500 people and receiving approximately
46. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, (Paris
text 1971), art. 5(2).
47. NIMMER, supra note 35, at 7-165 to -66.
48. Id. at 7-164. See also La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1205-06 ("[Rlegistration... [while] not,
technically speaking, a condition for the existence of copyright, . . . is, however a precondition for
the exercise of any of the . . . rights conferred by copyright... This metaphysical distinction be-
tween the existence of a right.., and the exercise of that right [is not] maintainable under.., our
legal tradition which disfavors . . . rights without remedies." (citing S. Rep. No. 100-352, at 18,
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.A.A.N. 3723).
49. 17 U.S.C.A. § 411 (b) (West 2005).
50. NIMMER, supra note 35, at 7-164.
51. For an international claimant:
Given that even under the Senate bill, a Danish author who wished to sue for infringe-
ment of her copyright in Los Angeles, in 1988, for instance, had to pay $120 to the Clerk
for the Central District of California for the privilege of instituting suit, the question
arises why the Senate bill believed it necessary to relieve that Danish author of the further
small burden of spending an additional $[3]0 and sending a form to the Copyright Office
in Washington, D.C.
Id.
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600,000 applications annually.54 Fifty percent of the Copyright Office's
budget and over sixty percent of its employees are committed to the reg-
istration process, making it the Office's single largest business activity."
The placement of the Office was the result of a strategic decision on
the part of Congress to facilitate the quick and efficient selection of de-
posited works for the Library's collections.56 The Library, which is
"recognized as the national library of the United States" is essential to
the research practices of Congress.5 7 Containing "more than 130 million
items on approximately 530 miles of bookshelves," the Library of Con-
gress is the world's largest library.58 Its expansive stature is the result of
the Copyright registration process through which the Library receives the
majority of its collections. 59 Copyright registration has been and contin-
ues to be vital to the existence of the Library, and consequently, to the
efficiency of Congress. Without a federal registration system whereby
creative works are deposited and recorded, both the national government
and the American people would be deprived of "a comprehensive record
of human creativity and knowledge. 6 °  Therefore, when registration
became voluntary in 1976, Congress found it essential to implement
statutory incentives to ensure that authors continued to register their
copyrights.
D. Registration Requirements
The conditions necessary for copyright registration 61 and the bene-
fits conferred upon those in compliance are codified in chapter 4 of Title
17.62 To register a work, three elements must be sent together to the Li-
brary of Congress: a properly completed application form, a nonrefund-
able filing fee (currently $30) and a nonreturnable deposit of the work
being registered.63 Once these items are received, the Copyright Office
reviews the application and determines if the work is copyrightable. 64
Processing time varies depending on the number of applications the Of-
fice is receiving, but an applicant can expect to receive either a certificate
54. Id.
55. UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, STRATEGIC PLAN 2004-2008 12 (2004),
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/strategic2004-2008.pdf.
56. Id. at 5.
57. The Library of Congress, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.loc.gov/about/faqs
(last visited Jan. 27, 2006).
58. The Library of Congress, Fascinating Facts, http://www.loc.gov/about/facts.htm (last
visited Jan. 27, 2006).
59. Id.
60. The Library of Congress, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 57.
61. The debate as to what these conditions entail is the primary subject of this analysis. See
discussion infra Parts III & IV.
62. See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 408-12 (West 2005).
63. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR i: COPYRIGHT BASICS, REGISTRATION PROCEDURES
7 (Dec. 2004), http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ0l.pdf.
64. U.S. Copyright Office, I've Mailed My Application, Fee, and Copy of My Work to the
Copyright Office. Now What?, http://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/faq-what.html#certificate (last
visited Jan. 27, 2006).
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of registration or a rejection letter within approximately four to five
months.65
Copyright registration has been regarded as a relatively simple proc-
ess.66 However, complications arise when courts are forced to determine
when the benefits of registration are to be conferred. Section 410(d) of
Title 17 explicitly states that, "[t]he effective date of a copyright registra-
tion is the day on which an application, deposit, and fee, which are later
determined by the Register of Copyrights or by a court of competent
jurisdiction to be acceptable for registration, have all been received in the
Copyright Office. 6 7 However, § 410, neither directly confirms nor in-
validates "whether this 'effective date' is indeed effective upon filing or
only once the filer has the copyright certification (or denial) in hand.,
68
Under § 411, authors may only initiate an infringement suit after "prereg-
istration 69 or registration of the copyright claim has been made in accor-
dance with th[e] title" or "where the deposit, application, and fee re-
quired for registration have been delivered to the Copyright Office in
proper form and registration has been refused[.] '' 70 Keeping in mind that
the purpose of statutory remedies and the grant of federal standing is to
encourage copyright owners to register their work, it is important to ask:
Just what exactly satisfies registration "in accordance" with Title 17? If
copyright claimants can file copyright infringement actions regardless of
whether their applications are approved or rejected, is it really necessary
to condition satisfaction of § 411's registration requirements on the
Copyright Office's review of an application, or are these requirements
satisfied more efficiently upon the successful submission of a registration
application?
E. Preregistration
On April 27, 2005 the Artists' Rights and Theft Prevention Act of
2005 (ART), Title I of the Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of
2005 (FECA), took effect, and amended §§ 408, 410, and 411 of Title
17.71 The amendment created a "class of works pending registration
65. Id.
66. Miriam Claire Beezy & Reese A. Pecot, Caveat Emptor or "Let the Buyer Beware":
Applying Diligent Investor Principles to Trademark and Copyright Issues in Mergers and Acquisi-
tions, 17 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 14, 21 (2005) (recommending copyright registration as a "sim-
ple, inexpensive process"); Gordon U. Sanford, 1II, An Intellectual Property Roadmap: The Business
Lawyer's Role in the Realm of Intellectual Property, 19 Miss. C. L. REV. 177, 192 (1998) ("Copy-
right registration is also simple and provides many benefits.").
67. 17 U.S.C. § 410(d).
68. Int'l Kitchen Exhaust Cleaning Ass'n v. Power Washers of N. Am., 81 F. Supp. 2d 70, 72
(D.C. Cir. 2000).
69. See discussion infra Parts II.E & IV.C.
70. 17 U.S.C. § 411 (b).
71. Family Entertainment and Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 109-9, 119 Stat. 218 (2005); In-
terim Regulation for Preregistration of Certain Unpublished Copyright Claims, 70 Fed. Reg. 61,905
(Oct. 27, 2005) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. Pt. 202) available at
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[that] will support an infringement action. ' '72 As amended, § 411 allows
copyright owners to sue for infringement of preregistered works in addi-
tion to registered works.73 Preregistration, however, is not a proxy for
registration.7 4 Preregistered work "must be registered within one month
after the copyright owner becomes aware of infringement but in no case
later than three months after first publication." 75 ART's amendment to §
408 requires that the Register of Copyrights define and create procedures
for preregistration. 76 At the time La Resolana was decided, the Copy-
right Office had not yet issued its preregisration regulations. 77 Yet de-
spite the absence of guidance from the Copyright Office, the Tenth Cir-
cuit relied on the amendment and the new preregistration scheme to sup-
port its statutory interpretation.7 8 It wasn't until October 27, 2005 that
the Copyright Office's interim regulations were issued.7 9
The procedures established by the Register of Copyrights under §
408 pertain to unpublished works "being prepared for commercial distri-
bution." s  Similar to the registration process, the preregistration process
requires that three elements be sent together to the Library of Congress: a
properly completed application form, a nonrefundable filing fee (cur-
rently $100), and a description of the work being registered.1 Once
these items are received, the Copyright Office conducts a limited review
to "ascertain whether the application describes a work that is in a class of
works that the Register of Copyrights has determined has had a history of
infringement prior to authorized commercial release., 82 After reviewing
the application, "the Copyright Office will provide the claimant official
notification by email of the preregistration. ' 3
Much like registration, "[t]he effective date of preregistration is the
day on which an application and fee for preregistration of a work, which
the Copyright Office later notifies the claimant has been preregistered or
which a court of competent jurisdiction has concluded was acceptable for
http://www.copyright.gov/fedreg/2005/70fr619O5.htm [hereinafter Preregistration of Unpub-
lished-Interim].
72. LaResolana, 416 F.3dat 1207.
73. 17 U.S.C.A. § 41 l(b).
74. See Preregistration of Certain Unpublished Copyright Claims, 70 Fed. Reg. 42,286,
42,287 (proposed July 22, 2005) available at http://www.copyright.gov/fedreg/2005/70fr42286.html
[hereinafter Preregistration of Unpublished-Proposed].
75. Id. at 42,290.
76. 17 U.S.C.A. § 408(0(1) ("Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this
subsection, the Register of Copyrights shall issue regulations to establish procedures for preregistra-
tion of a work that is being prepared for commercial distribution and has not been published.").
77. La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1207.
78. Id. ("Whatever the Register of Copyrights eventually determines . . . the adoption of
FECA further confirms our statutory analysis").
79. Preregistration of Unpublished-Interim, supra note 71, at 61,905. See discussion infra
Part I.V.(C).
80. Id. at 1207 n.12.
81. Preregistration of Unpublished-Interim, supra note 71, at 61,907.
82. Id. at 61,908.
83. Id.
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preregistration, have been received in the Copyright Office." 4 Unlike
the registration process, however, the preregistration process is elec-
tronic. 85 Hence, preregistrants are spared the registrants' burden of hav-
ing to wait four to five months before their applications are processed
and quite possibly, before they are afforded the right to enforce their
copyright in federal court. Quick or immediate preregistration process-
ing may very well eliminate the need to ask whether the submission of an
application or the approval of an application satisfies the jurisdictional
prerequisites of preregistration. However, the determination of what
constitutes registration for purposes of federal standing is not yet incon-
sequential. Furthermore, allocating rights based on the practices of busi-
nesses rather than the rule of law seems an unwise approach to interpret-
ing either registration or preregistration requirements under the Copy-
right Act.
II. CIRCUIT SPLIT
Federal circuits are split as to whether it is necessary for the Copy-
right Office to review a copyright application in order for an individual
to satisfy the registration requirement and bring an infringement action,
or if an individual can bring an infringement suit upon the successful
submission of a registration application. Whether the split occurred prior
to the La Resolana Architects v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire8 6 decision or
as a result of the decision, is subject to debate and will be discussed at
the end of this Part. The Tenth Circuit in La Resolana has claimed that
the Fifth and Eleventh circuits have developed two different approaches
to interpreting Title 17 in response to this issue.8 7 The La Resolana court
identified the Fifth Circuit's approach as the "Application approach" and
the Eleventh Circuit's approach as the "Registration approach. 88 For
purposes of this analysis and for reasons explained in Part IV, the "Reg-
istration approach" shall be renamed the "Approval approach."
A. The Application Approach
Courts employing the Application approach have analyzed Title 17
using a "policy-based methodology.8 9  The Fifth Circuit and district
courts in Rhode Island, New York, California, Delaware, and the District
of Columbia have adopted this approach and granted standing to indi-
viduals initiating infringement actions prior to the approval or rejection
of their copyright applications.9" That is, these courts have concluded
that the Act's registration requirement is satisfied once an application has
84. Id.
85. Id. at 61907.
86. 416 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2005).
87. La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1201-05.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1203.
90. Id. at 1203-04.
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been successfully submitted. The courts have supported their conclu-
sions by referring to the leading treatises on copyright law written by
Melville B. Nimmer, 91 and the language of § 410(d), which states, "[t]he
effective date of a copyright registration is the day on which an applica-
tion, deposit, and fee which are later determined by the Register of
Copyrights or by a court of competent jurisdiction to be acceptable for
registration, have all been received in the Copyright Office. '92 Courts
embracing the Application approach have argued that "because a copy-
right owner can sue regardless of whether an application for registration
is ultimately granted or rejected, delaying the date on which a copyright
owner can sue is a senseless formality." 93 By allowing a claimant to
initiate suit while her application is pending approval, the courts using
the Application approach prevent infringers from diluting the copied
work during the five to six months it takes to process the claimant's reg-
istration application.
In Apple Barrel Productions, Inc. v. Beard,94 an infringement suit
involving two country music programs, the Fifth Circuit held that the
only elements necessary to confer federal court jurisdiction were proof of
payment of the required registration fee, deposit of the work in question,
and the receipt of a registration application by the Copyright Office.95 In
Lakedreams v. Taylor,96 the same court held that receipt of materials
sufficient to satisfy § 410's statutory formalities could be "inferred from
the testimony of one of Lakedreams' partners that the Copyright Office
cashed the fee check., 97 By construing the registration requirement more
leniently and adopting the Application approach, the Fifth Circuit ad-
hered to the view endorsed by Nimmer, that "in resolving issues of first
impression as to the formalities required under the 1976 and 1909 Acts,
the courts should refrain from overtechnical constructions. 98
In Foraste v. Brown University,99 a case involving the copyright in-
fringement of a number of photographs, the district court of Rhode Island
held that pending registration applications for ninety-seven of the images
in question were sufficient to satisfy the federal jurisdictional require-
ments of § 411.100 Because § 411 entitles a claimant to bring an in-
fringement suit even upon the rejection of her application, and because §
410 "mandate[s] that the merits of the application materials are 'later
91. Id. at 1203.
92. Id.; see 17 U.S.C. § 410(d).
93. LaResolana, 416 F.3d at 1203.
94. 730 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1984).
95. Apple Barrel Productions, 730 F.2d at 386-87.
96. 932 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1991).
97. Foraste, 932 F.2d at 1108.
98. NIMMER, supra note 35, at 7-9.
99. 248 F. Supp. 2d 71 (D. R.I. 2003).
100. Id. at 76-78. The court further noted that § 411 (a) "confirms that it is the submission of an
application, deposit, and fee (rather than the issuance vel non of a registration certificate) that trig-
gers registration for purposes of conferring standing to sue." Id. at 77 n. 10.
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determined,' that is, determined at some time after the right to sue comes
into being," the court reasoned that application submission was sufficient
to confer federal jurisdiction.'0 ' The court, however, also held that the
plaintiff would not be entitled to damages "until such time as the images
[were] fully registered."' 10 2 While application was sufficient to enable the
initiation of a suit, it did not sufficiently grant a claimant the right to ob-
tain damages under § 412.103 By allowing copyright owners to keep their
case in federal court, yet still maintaining the requirement that an owner
obtain a certificate before acquiring Title 17 remedies, the Application
approach encourages both author protection and statutory compliance.
B. The Approval Approach
Courts applying the Approval approach have analyzed the Act using
the plain language of Title 17 and have determined that a successful ap-
plication submission does not constitute registration for purposes of fed-
eral jurisdiction under § 411.1°4 The Tenth Circuit adopted the Approval
approach in La Resolana.0 5  Before that opinion, no circuit court had
either expressly or clearly championed such an interpretation. However,
in La Resolana, the court concluded that the Eleventh Circuit and district
courts in New York, Maryland, California, Kansas, and South Carolina
had adopted the Approval approach and denied standing to individuals
initiating copyright infringement actions prior to the approval or rejec-
tion of their registration applications. 0 6  Using §§ 410 and 411 of the
Act, the district courts based their opinions on the fact that the "term
application is used in the same section [as the term registration] and is
clearly something separate and apart from registration"'0 7 and the "re-
quirement of 'examination' would be meaningless if filing and registra-
tion were synonymous."' 08 The Eleventh Circuit, however, neglected to
engage in a similar analysis.
In MG.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc.,'0 9 an infringement
case involving two competing home builders, the Eleventh Circuit ac-
101. Id. at 76-77.
102. Id. at 78.
103. As evidenced in Foraste, § 412 has posed a particular problem to photographers. Due to
the nature of their art, the vast number of works created, and inevitable mistakes made on registra-
tion applications, many photographers find it too difficult, expensive, and exhausting to comply with
registration provisions by registering every copyrightable image. Consequently, it may be easy for
defense attorneys to "abuse the registration process, utilizing it as a weapon in infringement litiga-
tion." Charles Ossola, Registration and Remedies: Recovery of Attorney's Fees and Statutory Dam-
ages Under the Copyright Reform Act, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 559, 560 (1995).
104. La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1202.
105. Id. at 1201-02 ("Despite the Act's seemingly plain language, courts construing these
provisions are split into two interpretive camps: The "Registration approach," which we have
adopted, and the "Application approach.") (emphasis added).
106. Id. at 1202.
107. Mays & Assocs. v. Euler, 370 F. Supp.2d 362, 368 (D.Md. 2005).
108. Robinson v. Princeton Review, Inc., No. 96 CIV. 4859(LAK), 1996 WL 663880, *7
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
109. 903 F.2d 1486 (1 1th Cir. 1990).
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knowledged that "[t]he registration requirement is a jurisdictional pre-
requisite to an infringement suit.""O To support its claim, the court cited
eight different district court cases."' In only two of those cases did
courts extrapolate from that argument and state that the receipt or denial
of a registration certificate was a jurisdictional requirement." 2  The
Eleventh Circuit in MG.B. Homes never actually addressed what was
necessary to satisfy the registration requirement." 3  Furthermore, and
contrary to the Tenth Circuit's claim in La Resolana, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit did not dismiss the infringement action as premature. 14 In MG.B.
Homes, the court was faced with the task of determining whether the trial
court's dismissal of a suit for lack of jurisdiction precluded it from enter-
taining a party's motion to amend once the party had been issued a regis-
tration certificate.' The Eleventh Circuit held that the "technical dis-
tinction between filing a new complaint and filing an amended com-
plaint" neither precluded the trial court's nor its own jurisdiction." 16 The
court added that the party "acted within the bounds of an arguably ac-
cepted practice" when it filed a complaint asserting copyright registration
prior to receiving a certificate." 17
Not only did the Eleventh Circuit fail to use the Approval approach
by neglecting to address the meaning of registration, it validated the Ap-
plication approach by affirming the trial court's jurisdiction in an in-
fringement action initiated prior to copyright application approval. Con-
sequently, it was not until the Tenth Circuit's decision in La Resolana
that the federal circuits split and the Approval approach was adopted by
an appellate court.
III. LA RESOLANA ARCHITECTS V. CLAYREALTORS ANGEL FIRE" 18
A. Facts
While visiting a building site in Angel Fire, New Mexico in October
2003, a representative of the Santa Fe architecture firm, La Resolana,
discovered that a local realtor had infringed upon a La Resolana copy-
right." 9 Architectural drawings created by La Resolana had been used to
110. Id.at 1488.
111. Id. n.4 (citing cases in Indiana, New York, Arkansas, and Massachusetts).
112. Id. (citing Demetriades v. Kaufnann, 680 F. Supp. 658, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("Receipt of
an actual certificate of registration or denial of same is a jurisdictional requirement, and this court
cannot prejudge the determination to be made by the Copyright Office."); and International Trade
Management, Inc. v. United States, I Cl. Ct. 39, 41 (1982) ("A suit for copyright infringement is
conditioned on obtaining (or being denied) a certificate of registration.")).
113. See id. at 1486-89.
114. Id. at 1489.
115. Id. at 1488.
116. Id. at 1489.
117. Id. n.6.
118. 416 F.3d 1195 (1Oth Cir. 2005).
119. La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1197.
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build a number of townhouses being sold in the area. 120 Clay Realtors,
who had met with La Resolana in late 1996 in a series of discussions
regarding development plans for townhouses in Angel Fire, happened to
be the seller.' 21 In response to this discovery, La Resolana submitted an
application for registration of the copyrighted drawings on November 6,
2003.122 On November 20, La Resolana sued Clay Realtors for copyright
infringement.'
23
Clay Realtors claimed that the court lacked subject matter jurisdic-
tion and moved to dismiss on March 8, 2004.124 Because La Resolana
had not obtained a certificate of copyright registration from the Copy-
right Office prior to filing their complaint, Clay Realtors argued that La
Resolana did not have standing to sue.1 25 La Resolana responded with a
March 10, 2004 letter from the Copyright Office. 126 The letter stated that
copyright registration had been approved on January 22, 2004, and that
the effective date of registration was November 19, 2003, one day prior
to commencement of the action. 127 The district court refused to admit the
letter into evidence and found that the drawings were not yet regis-
tered.128 It dismissed the case without prejudice based on lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and La Resolana appealed.
129
B. Decision
After engaging in the most comprehensive analysis of the two com-
peting registration interpretations to date, the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the district court's holding. 130 The court adopted the Ap-
proval approach, referring to the method as the "Registration ap-
proach,"'131 and reasoned that the plain language of §§ 408 & 410 "re-
quire[d] a series of affirmative steps by both the applicant and the Copy-
right Office."' 132 Because La Resolana's registration application had nei-
ther been approved nor rejected before initiation of the suit, the court
held that La Resolana did not have standing to sue.
133
The court began its analysis with § 411 (a): "no action for infringe-
ment of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until








127. See id. at 1197-98.
128. Id. at 1198.
129. Id.
130. See id. at 1208.
131. See id. at 1201-02.
132. Id. at 1200 (emphasis added).
133. See id. at 1201-02.
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accordance with this title."' 34  Because the term preregistration was
added to the statute in a 2005 amendment after commencement of the
suit, and had not yet been defined by the Copyright Office, the court held
that the new language did not control the outcome of the case. 135 Next,
the court attempted to determine the meaning of registration under § 411
by looking to § 410: "[w]hen, after examination, the Register of Copy-
rights determines that ... the material deposited constitutes copyright-
able subject matter ... the Register shall register the claim and issue to
the applicant a certificate of registration."' 3  To "examine" ,and "regis-
ter" a copyright application, and "issue" a certificate of registration, the
Register must act affirmatively. Because the Register "shall register the
claim" only "after examination," and La Resolana's suit was initiated
prior to registration, the court reasoned that La Resolana's suit was pre-
mature. 13 7 According to the court, the process required by § 410 failed to
indicate that the filing of an application alone would be sufficient to reg-
ister the work and confer standing.
138
To support its view that registration did not occur upon application,
the court addressed the language of § 408. According to § 408, a copy-
right claimant "may" obtain copyright registration by successful applica-
tion. Because Congress used "may," a discretionary term, indicating that
the claimant does not automatically obtain registration, rather than the
word "shall," which would mandate registration upon application, the
court found that § 411 could require the Register's substantive review of
the material before conferring jurisdiction. 139 Using the Approval ap-
proach and interpreting the Act using the plain language of Title 17, the
Tenth Circuit thus concluded that registration required approval or rejec-
tion of a copyright application.140
The court, however, disagreed with other courts adopting the Ap-
proval approach, concluding that a registration certificate was not a ju-
risdictional requirement.' 4' According to the court, § 411 demonstrates
"that registration is separate from the issuance of a certificate of registra-
tion .. ,,142 Section 411 makes no reference to a certificate at all, and
even under § 410(c) a certificate of registration is only prima facie evi-
dence of the validity of a copyright, not a condition of registration.
43
Therefore, to satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisite of registration under
Title 17, the Tenth Circuit required a copyright claimant to wait for the
134. Id. at 1200.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1201.
137. Idat 1201, 1208.
138. Id. at 1201.
139. Id.
140. Id. ("[R]egistration... does not occur until the Register of Copyrights takes action.").
141. Id. at 1202-03.
142. Id. at 1203.
143. See id.; see also 17 U.S.C.A. § 411 (West 2005).
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Copyright Office to process her application before bringing suit, rather
than requiring her to wait for the Copyright Office to issue or deny a
registration certificate. After reaching this conclusion, the court specu-
lated as to how a litigant might demonstrate her copyright registration to
a court in the absence of a certificate. 44 According to the court, an
"owner can still attempt to prove registration through other means, such
as testimony or other evidence from the copyright office."'145 The court
conceded that the "other evidence," "could be a letter similar to the one
presented by La Resolana ... or perhaps an affidavit from a person with
first-hand knowledge of a copyright's registration."'146 Therefore, had La
Resolana appealed the district court's evidentiary ruling excluding the
March 10th letter, and argued its validity as evidence of registration, the




The Approval approach and the Tenth Circuit's opinion in La Reso-
lana Architects v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire148 are rife with inconsisten-
cies and traps for unwary copyright owners. Not only did the court mis-
interpret the registration requirement, it confused and mischaracterized
the registration issue throughout the case, ignored valid policy considera-
tions, and erected an unnecessary barrier to copyright protection. The
court also incorrectly claimed that a recent amendment to the Copyright
Act's registration provision would address the detrimental implications
of the court's statutory interpretation. Although the amendment in-
creases copyright protection for certain digital works, the new scheme
does not address the copyrights of authors working outside of the enter-
tainment industry. Preregistration is an inequitable and insufficient solu-
tion to copyright infringement that values economic productivity over
creative control. Together, the Approval approach and the preregistra-
tion scheme fail to address the problem presented in La Resolana as suf-
ficiently as would the Application approach. The Application approach
is thus a sounder method for achieving the dual goals of creative protec-
tion and public progress.
A. Confusing the Issue
In La Resolana, the Tenth Circuit attempted to support its view of
Title 17's registration requirement by mischaracterizing the competing
interpretative approaches, obfuscating the issue, and ignoring valid pub-
lic policy concerns in the face of an inconsistent statutory scheme. La
144. Id. at 1207-08.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1207 n.13.
147. See id. at 1208.
148. 416 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2005).
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Resolana essentially required the court to determine the meaning of "reg-
istration" under § 411. By labeling the Approval approach as the "Regis-
tration approach,"' 149 the court presupposed that its interpretation of the
statute was the correct interpretation. An approach with the title of that
which it seeks to prove is inappropriately aligned with the conclusion
before its argument is even propounded. Thus, before the interpretations
were evaluated, the court automatically established the Application ap-
proach as something separate and apart from registration.
Courts adopting the Application approach never denied that regis-
tration was a jurisdictional prerequisite to a copyright infringement ac-
tion; they merely proposed that the successful submission of an applica-
tion satisfied § 411's registration requirement. 15  The "Approval ap-
proach" is therefore a more appropriate characterization of the Tenth
Circuit's interpretation. The "Approval approach," like the "Application
approach,"''5 1 describes that which will constitute registration under its
interpretation and prevents the court from putting the cart before the
horse, so to speak.
The "Registration approach," was the first of many mischaracteriza-
tions that obfuscated the registration issue and devalued the Application
approach. The court also inappropriately used "[s]ubsequent Acts of
Congress" to support its interpretation. 52  In referring to the 1988
amendment, which created a narrow registration exception for Berne
works of foreign origin, 153 the court misrepresented the question at issue
in La Resolana. After evaluating the congressional debate, and discuss-
ing the important purpose of registration incentives, the court stated, "it
is clear that in passing the original Copyright Act of 1976 and the Berne
Act in 1988, Congress sought to create and retain the incentives to regis-
tration, make certain benefits available only to registrants, and, in fact,
condition federal court intervention on registration of the copyright.'
' 54
The court's argument was a subterfuge used to undermine the credibility
of the Application approach and indicate its inconsistency with legisla-
tive intent to maintain registration incentives. The debate between the
Senate and the House of Representatives addressed the abandonment of
149. La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1201-02.
150. See Int'l Kitchen Exhaust Cleaning Ass'n v. Power Washers of N. Am., 81 F. Supp. 2d
70, 72 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Apple Barrel Productions, Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 386-87 (5th Cir.
1984); Lakedreams v. Taylor, 932 F.2d 1103, 1108 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing Apple Barrel Produc-
tions).
151. La Resolana states:
Two conflicting interpretations of the Act's registration requirement have been upheld by
circuit courts: 1) registration occurs when the copyright owner submits an application for
registration to the copyright office, or, conversely 2) registration occurs when the copy-
right office actually approves or rejects the application. We hold that the second interpre-
tation is correct.
La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1197 (emphasis added).
152. Id. at 1205.
153. Id. at 1205-06.
154. Id. at 1206.
2006]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
the registration requirement altogether, not whether application submis-
sion satisfied registration.' 55
Proponents of the Application approach do not propose to eliminate
registration as a pre-requisite for infringement litigation; they merely
suggest that registration involves fewer formalities than those suggested
by proponents of the Approval approach. 56 Claimants are still required
to submit a fee, deposit, and application in order to register their copy-
rights and receive the benefit of federal standing.' 57 Again, the issue in
La Resolana is what registration requires, not whether it is required.,
58
Consequently, the court's reference to the 1988 amendment neither sup-
ported nor addressed their interpretation of the Act.
The court also obscured the actual issue in La Resolana when it cre-
ated and attacked a fictional argument in favor of the Application ap-
proach. The court addressed "the argument that copyright holders are
left without a remedy until registration,"'159 and dismissed it as
"beg[ging] the question,"' 60 once again mischaracterizing the issue and
misrepresenting the Application approach as an interpretation that sepa-
rates application from registration. Courts adopting the Application
approach have not attempted to support their interpretation of § 411's
registration requirement with the conclusion that owners cannot enforce
their copyrights absent registration. These courts have, however, pro-
ceeded upon this assumption, instead arguing what registration under the
Act should entail.' 61 By implying that these courts rely on an argument
that begs the question, the Tenth Circuit erroneously imposed its own
confusion of the registration issue upon those adopting the competing
approach.
B. Ignoring Valid Policy Considerations
In addition to mischaracterizing the interpretive approaches and ob-
fuscating the issue in La Resolana, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
155. Id. at 1205.
156. See generally id at 1205-06.
157. See, e.g., Int'l Kitchen, 81 F.Supp.2d at 72 ("To best effectuate the interests of justice and
promote judicial economy, the court endorses the position that a plaintiff may sue once the Copy-
right Office receives the plaintiff's application, work, and filing fee."); Apple Barrel Productions,
730 F.2d at 386-87 ("In order to bring suit for copyright infringement, it is not necessary to prove
possession of a registration certificate. One need only prove payment of the required fee, deposit of
the work in question, and receipt by the Copyright Office of a registration application.");
Lakedreams, 932 F.2d at 1108 (citing Apple Barrel Productions).
158. La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1197.
159. Id. at 1204.
160. Id.
161. See, e.g., Int'l Kitchen, 81 F.Supp.2d at 72 ("[I]f Kitchen Exhaust indeed filed its copy-
right application, deposited its work, and paid the appropriate fee before filing suit, the court shall
hear its claims .... "); Apple Barrel Productions, 730 F.2d at 386-87 ("In order to bring suit for
copyright infringement, it is not necessary to prove possession of a registration certificate. One need
only prove payment of the required fee, deposit of the work in question, and receipt by the Copyright
Office of a registration application.").
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failed to give deference to public policy in the face of an inconsistent
statutory scheme. The court stated, "[if] the statutory language is not
ambiguous, and the 'statutory scheme is coherent and consistent,' our
inquiry ends."' 162 In La Resolana, the court concluded that both condi-
tions were met, when in fact, neither were satisified. Section 411 entitles
a copyright owner to sue for infringement "where the deposit, applica-
tion, and fee required for registration have been delivered to the Copy-
right Office in proper form and registration has been refused."' 63 Imag-
ine a situation in which two different copyright owners wish to sue for
infringement of their works. The first owner sends in his registration
application, which is subsequently rejected by the Copyright Office, and
then initiates suit. The second author submits his registration applica-
tion, initiates suit, and then receives a certificate of registration indicating
the approval of his application. By adopting the Application approach in
this situation, both authors will be entitled to protect their work in federal
court. By adopting the Approval approach, however, the author with the
claim involving non-copyrightable material will be afforded the opportu-
nity to protect his work, while the author with copyrightable material will
not. The Approval approach thus effectuates an inconsistent statutory
scheme, a scheme affirmed by the Tenth Circuit in La Resolana. Be-
cause a claimant may bring suit regardless of whether his copyright reg-
istration application is rejected, federal standing is not dependent upon
the result of an application's review by the Copyright Office. Therefore,
it makes little sense to force a claimant to wait until approval or rejection
before bringing suit, and to condition his ability to enforce his copyright
in federal court upon the review of his application.
In addition to denying the author with copyrightable material, and
arguably the more credible claim to protection, the Approval approach
ignores "developments in the law, which continues to move in the direc-
tion of increased control."' 64 While it has been argued that the removal
of copyright formalities has reduced copyright's social utility by "ex-
panding the domain of copyright beyond works for which application of
the law is useful,"'165 the Application approach merely removes an un-
necessary step in a formality that remains intact. Furthermore, § 41 1's
grant of federal standing to authors suing for infringement of non-
copyrightable work is much more likely to improperly expand the scope
of copyright law than will the acceptance of the Application approach.
An author's ability to sue upon the submission of his copyright ap-
plication is also more consistent with the purpose behind Title 17's regis-
tration incentives. By conditioning remedies on the approval or rejection
162. La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1200 (quoting Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450
(2002)).
163. 17 U.S.C. § 41 ](a).
164. Sprigman, supra note 2, at 487.
165. Id. at 489.
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of a copyright application, a court employing the Approval approach
makes the crucial act that of the Copyright Register rather than that of
the claimant. If the goal of implementing registration incentives is to
encourage authors to submit their work to the Copyright Office, why
condition remedies on an element over which authors have no control?
Copyright infringement remedies do not encourage the Register to ap-
prove or reject applications; therefore, conditioning remedies upon the
Register's acts is an unnecessary formality. By applying the Application
approach and making registration dependent upon the acts of the author,
the goals of the Copyright Act will be achieved in a manner more consis-
tent with public policy and legislative intent. The Library of Congress
will still continue to expand its collections, and copyright infringers will
be prevented from using a ministerial formality as a weapon to avoid
litigating the merits of an infringement claim. Under the Application
approach, stealing original work and diluting it during the Register's four
to five month processing period will no longer save a copyright infringer
from having to pay for his misdeed.
C. The Preregistration Scheme
Because La Resolana initiated suit prior to the enactment of FECA,
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals did not analyze § 41 1's preregistra-
tion language. 16 6 However, the court claimed that the amendment sup-
ported its statutory interpretation, noting that "the availability of a pre-
registration scheme would in whole or in part address the problem pre-
sented by this case: the need to sue for infringement to prevent dilution
of a copyright but the inability to do so without completed registra-
tion." 167 While the Tenth Circuit was correct in so far as it presupposed
that preregistration would in part address the problem presented by its
decision in La Resolana, the preregistration scheme neither supported the
Approval approach, nor adequately addressed the issue in the case. In-
stead of indicating what might satisfy registration requirements under the
Act, the preregistration scheme added another formality in need of inter-
pretation. Instead of adopting the Application approach and thereby
eliminating the problem of an infringer's opportunity to dilute stolen
copyrights before the commencement of litigation, the court relied on the
possibility that a new amendment would solve the problems it had cre-
ated by adopting the Approval approach.
168
By requiring the review of an application by the Copyright Office
before acknowledging registration under the Act, the court not only de-
nied hearing a meritorious claim, it created an economically dangerous
situation for digital copyright owners. "It's one thing to take someone
else's townhouse blueprints and try to quickly construct them. It's an-
166. La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1200.
167. Id. at 1207.
168. Id.
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other thing to capture digital files and begin electronically distributing
them."' 169 Where it might take a number of months to erect a building, a
digital file may be copied in a matter of minutes. Digital files intended
for publication are also often available online before their completion or
publication and well before their commercial distribution. 170 Under the
Approval approach, the four to five months it takes the Copyright Office
to process an application can be economically destructive to digital con-
tent creators. 71 "Obviously, the increasingly frequent situation of copy-
righted works being distributed illegally via the internet before they are
even made available for sale to the public severely undercuts the ability
of copyright holders to receive fair and adequate compensation for their
works."' 172 The preregistration scheme was enacted in response to this
problem. 73 However, employed in conjunction with the Approval ap-
proach, preregistration serves as a Band-Aid for specified authors only;
an incomplete and inequitable solution that elevates the economic con-
cerns of some over the creative control of all.
The Copyright Office's interim regulations note that
"[p]reregistration serve[s] as a place-holder for limited purposes - nota-
bly where a copyright owner needs to sue for infringement while a work
is still being prepared for commercial release."'174 Although preregistra-
tion is not a proxy for registration and preregistered work "must be regis-
tered within one month after the copyright owner becomes aware of in-
fringement but in no case later than three months after first publication,"
preregistration allows an owner to satisfy the requirements necessary to
initiate an infringement action. 175  The regulations, however, identify
only six classes of works eligible for preregistration under the Act: mo-
tion pictures, sound recordings, musical compositions, literary works
being prepared for publication in book form, computer programs (includ-
ing video games), and advertising or marketing photographs. 7 6 The spe-
cific works were chosen by the Register of Copyrights after movie studio
and record company representatives "persuaded Congress that the exist-
ing rules making copyright registration a prerequisite for suit ... [and]
awards of attorney's fees and statutory damages [were] unduly burden-
some on plaintiffs seeking relief against pre-release infringement ....
Because these specific works were determined to have had a "history of
169. Patrick Ross, When a Copyrighted Work Isn't Copyrighted, Posting to The IPcentral
Weblog, http://weblog.ipcentral.info/archives/2005/08/when-a-copyrigh.html#more (Aug. 5, 2005).
170. Preregistration of Unpublished-Proposed, supra note 74, at 42,286.
171. Ross, supra note 169.
172. Preregistration of Unpublished-Proposed, supra note 74, at 42,286 (citing 151 Cong.
Rec. S495 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2005) statements of Senator Hatch (bill sponsor)).
173. Id.
174. Preregistration of Unpublished-Interim, supra note 71 at 61,905.
175. Preregistration of Unpublished-Proposed, supra note 74, at 42,290.
176. Preregistration of Unpublished-Interim, supra note 71, at 61,905-06.
177. Preregistration of Unpublished-Proposed, supra note 74, at 42,287.
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infringement prior to authorized commercial distribution"' 78 and
"[b]ecause works intended for publication usually are not registered until
they are in final form and are being disseminated to the public,"' 79 the
registration practices of particular copyright owners dictated the preregis-
tration guidelines. The preregistration scheme thus addresses the detri-
mental implications of the La Resolana decision for a select group of
digital copyright owners only. By affording these authors an opportunity
to gain earlier copyright protection, it acknowledges and remedies "dam-
age to the content creator [that] is obviously going to be far greater, far
quicker [for works that can be immediately electronically distrib-
uted.]' 180 The scheme, however, if viewed as a supplement to the Ap-
proval approach and a solution to these detrimental implications, will not
save future copyright owners, like La Resolana, who do not fall within
the protected classes of the new regulation. Because architectural blue-
prints and photographs for artists' exhibitions and portfolios were not
deemed to have a history of pre-release infringement, owners of unpub-
lished work, like La Resolana and Foraste, whose work has been in-
fringed prior to the approval of a registration application, will not likely
be able to initiate an infringement suit at the same time as owners be-
longing to an enumerated pregistration class. This scheme affords
greater protection to certain owners based on the likelihood of immediate
publication and profit realization rather than legitimate copyrights, and
the likelihood of infringement rather than actual infringement.
Again, imagine a situation in which two different copyright owners
wish to sue for infringement of their works. This time, the first owner
wishes to sue for the infringement of a sound recording which falls
within an enumerated preregistration class. The owner preregisters his
work, sues for infringement, and then submits a registration application
for the work within the time required by the new regulation. His regis-
tration application is then approved by the Copyright Office. The second
copyright owner wishes to sue for the infringement of a building plan
which does not fall within an enumerated preregistration class. This
owner successfully submits a registration application, initiates suit, and
then also receives a certificate of registration indicating the approval of
his application. Under the Approval approach, even though both regis-
tration applications will be approved after the owners have initiated suit,
only the owner with the preregistered sound recording will be afforded
the opportunity to protect his work. Under the Approval approach, even
though both copyrights have been infringed, only the copyright which
was more likely to be infringed will be argued in federal court. Thus,
together, the Approval approach and the preregistration scheme facilitate
an inequitable application of the law where not all copyright owners will
178. Preregistration of Unpublished-Interim, supra note 71, at 61,905-06.
179. Preregistration of Unpublished-Proposed, supra note 74, at 42,286.
180. Ross, supra note 169.
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be able to exercise their rights in the same way. If instead, the preregis-
tration scheme were to coexist with the Application approach, all copy-
right owners would receive equal protection under the Act. By adopting
the Application approach, the law will not discriminate between what is
more and what is less likely to be profitable. Those owners whose prac-
tices prevent them from registering until commercial distribution will
still receive protection, and copyright owners with unpublished work will
receive the same benefits as owners with copyrights having a history of
pre-release infringement.
While the preregistration scheme may address the dilution of copy-
rights for certain classes of copyright owners, its enactment does not
support the Tenth Circuit's adoption of the Approval approach. Preregis-
tration was not created to answer whether or not jurisdictional prerequi-
sites were met by an application's submission or an application's ap-
proval or rejection. It was created in response to the pleas of motion
picture studios and record companies whose profits were being siphoned
away through intemet piracy.' 8' Neither does preregistration indirectly
support the Approval approach. Rather, it imposes additional interpre-
tive burdens upon the court. Instead of indicating what might satisfy
registration requirements under the Act, the preregistration scheme adds
another formality in need of interpretation. The new scheme poses a
problem identical to that of registration; what exactly satisfies preregis-
tration, application submission or application approval?
CONCLUSION
If the purpose of the Copyright Act of 1976 was to relax the proce-
dural mechanisms that made it overly cumbersome for authors to protect
their works, the Tenth Circuit's reading of Title 17 in La Resolana bla-
tantly ignores legislative intent. If an additional goal of the Act was to
create a uniform federal copyright system, the recent split among federal
circuits regarding registration formalities requires a remedy from the
United States Supreme Court. If the Tenth Circuit's interpretive ap-
proach goes unchecked and federal circuits continue to embrace the Ap-
proval approach, by engaging in inconsistent and inequitable interpreta-
tions of the Copyright Act's registration requirement, the balance be-
tween creative ownership and cultural progress will be lost.
As federal copyright law endeavors to encourage creative genius by
increasing the control copyright owners may exert over their creations, it
is important to remember that all copyright owners should be able to
exercise their intellectual property rights in the same way. As federal
copyright law endeavors to enrich the public record in the Library of
Congress by preserving registration incentives, it is important to remem-
181. U.S. Copyright Office, Frequently Asked Questions: Registering a Work,
http://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/faq-register.html#length (last visited Jan. 23, 2006).
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ber that procedural formalities should not condition rights or benefits
upon that which the copyright owner has no control. By adopting the
Application approach, the Supreme Court will ensure that public policy
and the interests of justice eclipse statutory inconsistencies. The owner
with copyrightable work who initiates an infringement claim after suc-
cessfully submitting a registration application but before receiving notice
of its review, will be afforded the same rights as the owner who initiates
suit after the rejection of his application, and the owner whose preregis-
tered work has yet to be infringed.
Erin Hogan*
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PUT ON YOUR COAT, A CHILL WIND BLOWS: EMBRACING
THE ExPANSION OF THE ADVERSE EMPLOYMENT ACTION
FACTOR IN TENTH CIRCUIT FIRST AMENDMENT
RETALIATION CLAIMS
INTRODUCTION
"The First Amendment is the bedrock of American Democracy."'
Protection of the First Amendment in the public employment context is
paramount to the livelihood of a thriving democracy. Government em-
ployees must have the opportunity to speak publicly about their employer
without the fear of undue retaliation.
In the recent Tenth Circuit cases of Baca v. Sklar2 and Maestas v.
Segura,3 the court resolved two First Amendment retaliation claims
brought by public employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 4 First Amendment
retaliation claims arise when a government employer takes some undue
adverse employment action against a public employee after he or she
speaks on a matter which concerns the public at large.5 Within these two
cases, the court displayed its tendency toward utilizing a broader stan-
dard of reviewing detrimental actions which employers take against their
employees. However, the court did not explicitly define its standard for
interpreting the adverse employment action factor.
6
In the past, the court has refused to restrict the analysis of the ad-
verse employment action factor to its counterpart in Title VII7 retaliation
claims. In these claims, an employee who is retaliated against for oppos-
ing employment discrimination or filing a charge of discrimination must
prove that the employer's retaliation manifested itself in the form of an
ultimate employment decision such as termination or demotion. 8 Con-
versely, the court has also refused to adhere to the broadest interpreta-
tion, that any action which tends to chill an employee's free speech is
adverse.
9
1. Kary Love, First Amendment Law: Free Speech Rights of Public Employees: A Natural
Resource for Democracy, MICH. B. J., June 2005, at 28, 29.
2. 398 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2005).
3. 416 F.3d 1182 (10th Cir. 2005).
4. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2005).
5. Love, supra note 1, at 29.
6. Baca, 398 F.3d at 1220-2 1; Maestas, 416 F.3d at 1188.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (2005).
8. § 2000e-3(a) (2005); See Nancy Landis Caplinger & Diana S. Worth, Vengeance is Not
Mine: A Survey of the Law of Title VII Retaliation, 73 J. KAN. B. ASS'N 20, 21 (Apr. 2004).
9. Maestas, 416 F.3d at 1188 n.5.
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This article is a survey of the Baca and Maestas cases wherein the
court decided not to assert a position in the circuit split of adverse em-
ployment action interpretation in First Amendment retaliation claims.
Instead, the court chose to "leave that question for another day."' 0 How-
ever, both cases lay the foundation for a discussion of First Amendment
retaliation, the circuit split regarding the adverse employment action fac-
tor of the claim, and how the Tenth Circuit should now embrace the
broad "chilling effect" interpretation of adverse employment actions.
Part I of this article provides the foundation for First Amendment
retaliation claim jurisprudence. Part II analyzes the circuit split, includ-
ing the various circuit court interpretations of adverse employment ac-
tions: strict Title VII adherence, the "individual of ordinary firmness"
model, and the "chilling effect" standard. Part III discusses the facts and
merits of the Tenth Circuit Baca and Maestas cases. Finally, in Part IV
the author argues that the Tenth Circuit should now embrace the "chill-
ing effect" interpretation of adverse employment actions in First
Amendment retaliation claims. By joining the circuits which utilize the
"chilling effect" approach to the adverse employment action factor, the
Tenth Circuit will further protect public employees from employers who
punish them for exposing issues which are a matter of public interest.
I. FIRST AMENDMENT RETALIATION CLAIMS
Generally, the constitutional rights of public employees are pro-
tected under § 1983." Among other claims, this statute gives a public
employee the right to file suit against a government employer for violat-
ing the employee's constitutional right(s).' 2 The statute states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory ... subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States... to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law .... 13
Section 1983 gives public employees a clear advantage over private em-
ployees because it provides a cause of action for claims outside the scope
of Title VII, such as a First Amendment retaliation.' 4 First Amendment
retaliation claims typically arise when an employee speaks out against
the employer and suffers some detrimental action as a result.' 5
10. Id.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2005).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. John R. Williams, Public Employment Litigation Under Section 1983, 715 PRACTISING L.
INST. 441,443 (2004).
15. DAVID L. HUDSON, BALANCING ACT: PUBLIC EMPLOYEES AND FREE SPEECH 31 (2002).
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The Supreme Court has held that a "public employee does not relin-
quish its First Amendment rights to comment on matters of public inter-
est by virtue of government employment."' 6 A series of monumental
Supreme Court cases established the criteria for First Amendment re-
taliation claims. Beginning with Pickering v. Board of Education'7 in
1968, the Court created a balancing test weighing the rights of an em-
ployee to comment on matters of public concern with the rights of an
employer "in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees. ' 8 Following Pickering, in Mount Healthy City
School District v. Doyle,' 9 the Supreme Court enumerated a two part test
requiring that the employee's speech be a substantial motivating factor
for the adverse action taken against him or her.20 Finally, the Supreme
Court concentrated its attention on what constitutes public concern.2' In
Connick v. Myers,22 the Court held that as a matter of law the employee's
speech must involve public issues in order for the employee to have a
cognizable claim.
23
For a First Amendment retaliation claim to prevail in the Tenth Cir-
cuit, an employee must establish that "(1) the speech involved a matter of
public concern, (2) the employee's interest in engaging in the speech
outweighed the employer's interest in regulating the speech, and (3) the
speech was a 'substantial motivating factor' behind the employer's deci-
sion to take an adverse employment action against the employee., 24 If an
employee meets these criteria, the burden shifts to the employer to prove
that he would have acted in the same manner regardless of the em-
ployee's protected speech.
Each element leaves room for discussion and analysis. Through
Pickering, Mt. Healthy, and Connick, the Supreme Court set boundaries
within which the lower Federal courts must operate. But within those
guidelines there is room for interpretation.26 Each circuit has created its
own criteria for the public concern and the employee-employer Pickering
balancing test.27 However, the subject of this article is narrowly drawn
to the third factor: what constitutes an adverse employment action.
There is a split among the circuits regarding interpretation of this factor,
16. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140 (1983).
17. 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
18. Id.
19. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
20. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 283-84.
21. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146-48.
22. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
23. See Rosalie Berger Levinson, Superimposing Title Vii's Adverse Action Requirement on
First Amendment Retaliation Claims: A Chilling Prospect for Government Employee Speech, 79
TuL. L. REv. 669, 694 (2005) (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 145).
24. Maestas v. Segura, 416 F.3d 1182, 1187 (10th Cir. 2005).
25. Id.
26. Levinson, supra note 23, at 687.
27. See generally William Herbert, The First Amendment and Public Sector Labor Relations,
19 LAB. LAW. 325, 337-40 (2004).
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resulting in three approaches: Title VII adherence, the "individual of
ordinary firmness" model, and the "chilling effect" standard.
II. THE SPLIT-HIGH PRESSURE, MODERATE ATMOSPHERE, AND A
CHILLY FRONT
In 1990, the Supreme Court addressed the "adverse employment ac-
tion" of a First Amendment retaliation claim in Rutan v. Republican
Party of Illinois.28 This case blasted the "chilling" wind through the cir-
cuits. 29 In a footnote interpreted as mere dicta by its adversaries, the
Court adhered to the Seventh Circuit's assertion that "even an act of re-
taliation as trivial as failing to hold a birthday party for a public em-
ployee ... when intended to punish her for exercising her free speech"
was an adverse employment action.3° In light of Rutan, the circuit courts
have struggled to define "adverse employment action" in First Amend-
ment retaliation claims.
The range of interpretation spans from the confines of Title VII to
the "chilling effect" mentioned in Rutan. The Eleventh, Eighth, and
Fifth Circuits utilize the structure of Title VII retaliation adverse em-
ployment actions, holding that only "materially adverse change[s] in the
terms or conditions of employment" are actionable. 3' Additionally, there
is the reasonable person of adverse employment actions, the "individual
of ordinary firmness," as categorized by the Second, Third, Sixth, and
D.C. Circuits.32 However, the Seventh, Ninth, and Fourth Circuits have
consistently held that any action that is likely to chill the exercise of free
speech is cognizable. 33 The following subsections provide an explana-
tion of each standard and how each of the circuit courts are applying the
three applications of adverse employment actions in First Amendment
retaliation claims.
A. High Pressure Likely-Title VI Adherence
To assert a successful First Amendment retaliation claim, the public
employee must allege that "an adverse personnel action resulted from the
protected activity. 34 The Eleventh, Eighth, and Fifth Circuits consis-
tently borrow Title VII "adverse employment action" interpretation and
apply it to First Amendment retaliation claims. 35 These circuit courts
adopt a narrow approach, holding that only those actions which "demon-
28. 497 U.S. 62 (1990).
29. Id. at 76.
30. Id. at 76 n.8 (quoting Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 868 F.2d 943, 954 n.4 (7th Cir.
1989)). For an interpretation of Rutan 's footnote eight as "non-controlling dicta" see Lybrook v. Bd.
of Educ., 232 F.3d 1334, 1340 n.2 (10th Cir. 2000).
31. Levinson, supra note 23, at 687.
32. Washington v. County of Rockland, 373 F.3d 310, 320 (2d Cir. 2004).
33. Love, supra note 1, at 31.
34. Herbert, supra note 27, at 341.
35. Levinson, supra note 23, at 692; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e- 17 (2005).
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strate a 'materially adverse' or 'tangible' job action" are recognizable
under the third prong of the First Amendment claim.36
In order to prevent discrimination, Title VII prohibits employers
from discriminating against employees because of their race, color, relig-
ion, sex, or national origin. 37 Included in Title VII is an anti-retaliation
provision which states that employers cannot discriminate against em-
ployees who have "opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this subchapter.,
38
In order to prove discriminatory retaliation the employee must meet
a three part prima facie test.39 The employee must establish: "(1) pro-
tected opposition to Title VII discrimination or participation in a Title
VII proceeding, (2) adverse action by the employer subsequent to or con-
temporaneous with such employee activity, and (3) causal connection
between such activity and the employer's adverse action. ' 4° If all three
elements are met, the burden shifts to the employer to prove that he or
she had a legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for the adverse action
taken against the employee.41
The Eleventh Circuit adheres to the Title VII standard by enumerat-
ing several key employment decisions as adverse actions. These actions
include "discharges, demotions, refusals to hire or promote, and repri-
mands. ' '42 Although the court previously used the "chilling" effect lan-
guage, it consistently utilizes the Title VII standard for interpreting ad-
verse actions in First Amendment retaliation claims.43 In Stavropoulos v.
Firestone,44 the public university employee was subject to a memo criti-
cizing her, the compilation of a file which consisted of faculty letters
criticizing the employee, and the encouraging of other faculty members
at the university to state negative things about her in an employment re-
view.45 Cumulatively, these actions led to an initial faculty vote not to
36. Levinson, supra note 23, at 689.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (2005).
38. Id. at § 2000e-3(a).
39. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
40. Caplinger & Worth, supra note 8, at 24 (citing Pastran v. K-Mart Corp., 210 F.3d 1201,
1205 (10th Cir. 2000)).
41. Id.
42. Stavropoulos, 361 F.3d at 619.
43. Id. The Stavropoulos court stated:
Requiring the First Amendment retaliation claimant to show that the action she complains
of not only was likely to chill her speech but also altered an important condition of em-
ployment insures that she satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement of federal justiciability
law... Show[ing] that the action had an impact on an important aspect of her employ-
ment.
Stavropoulos, 361 F.3d at 620 (emphasis added).
44. 361 F.3d 610 (1 th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1850 (2005).
45. Id. at 620.
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renew the employee's university contract.46 The court held that "taken
together or separately, Firestone's acts fail to rise to the level of an ad-
verse employment action because they had no impact on an important
condition of Stavropoulos's job, such as her salary, title, position, or job
duties."47
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit adheres to the Title VII demand for
material or tangible adverse actions for an employee to have a cognizable
First Amendment retaliation claim.48 In Meyers v. Starke,49 Ms. Meyers
was a monitor of children in state custody who made placement and ther-
apy decisions for the children.50 Shortly after a disagreement with co-
workers about a regimen of treatment for two children and testifying
against the treatment in a court proceeding, Ms. Meyers was transferred
to another department.5 Ms. Meyers resigned her position and filed a
First Amendment retaliation claim, alleging she was demoted to a posi-
tion that did not entail a full workload. 52 Relying on precedent, the court
held that an adverse employment action must be "exhibited by a material
employment disadvantage, such as a change in salary, benefits or respon-
sibilities. 53 The court found that Ms. Meyer's transfer did not rise to the
level of an adverse employment action and therefore she did not have a
cognizable First Amendment retaliation claim under § 1983.
54
Finally, the Fifth Circuit applies a slightly modified Title VII ad-
verse employment action standard. While the court does not require an
"ultimate employment decision," it repeatedly adheres to the same stan-
dard enumerated by the Eleventh Circuit.55 The court has refused to ex-
pand the First Amendment retaliation adverse employment action prong
to those acts which are trivial in nature.5 6 For instance, in Foley v. Uni-
versity of Houston System, 57 the court denied a professor's First Amend-
ment retaliation claim in part because she failed to demonstrate that she
46. Id. at 613.
47. Id. at 621 (emphasis added).
48. Levinson, supra note 23, at 690.
49. 420 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2005).
50. Meyers, 420 F.3d at 738.
51. Id. at 740.
52. Id. at 741,744.
53. Id. at 744 (quoting Duffy v. McPhillips, 276 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir. 2002)). See also
Fischer v. Pharmacia & Upjohn, 225 F.3d 915, 919 (8th Cir. 2000); Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122
F.3d 1142, 1144 (8th Cir. 1997). "Other Eighth Circuit cases similarly discuss the need to show
significant alteration in the conditions of employment or 'a material change in the terms and condi-
tions of employment' in order to establish a First Amendment violation." Levinson, supra note 23,
at 691.
54. Meyers, 420 F.3d at 744.
55. Levinson, supra note 23, at 689-90.
56. See Terrence S. Welch, A Primer on Texas Public Employment Law, 56 BAYLOR L. REV.
981,991 (2004).
57. 355 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 2003).
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suffered an adverse employment action.58 The court relied on the prece-
dent of Harrington v. Harris59 in its determination.60
In Harrington, the court rejected the "chilling effect" interpretation,
holding that "actions such as 'decisions concerning teaching assign-
ments, pay increases, administrative matters, and departmental proce-
dures,' while extremely important... do not rise to the level of a consti-
tutional deprivation.",6' The court held that those actions which merely
chill protected speech are not actionable.62 This explicit rejection was
accompanied by language consistently used in Title VII retaliation
claims: "[a]dverse employment actions are discharges, demotions, refus-
als to hire, refusals to promote, and reprimands. 63
While the Eleventh, Eighth, and Fifth circuits apply the Title VII
"material" adverse employment action standard, several circuit courts
have shied away from the strict standard.64 These circuits have adopted a
compromise of interpretation in First Amendment retaliation claims.
B. Gray Skies of Moderation-The Individual of Ordinary Firmness
The Second, Third, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits established the great
compromise of First Amendment retaliation claims through the "individ-
ual of ordinary firmness" standard. 65 This "sensible standard," as articu-
lated by the D.C. Circuit, is implicated when the acts against the em-
ployee "would chill or silence a 'person of ordinary firmness' from fu-
ture First Amendment activities. 66
In 2005, the Second Circuit stated in Burkybile v. Board of Educa-
tion67 that it would continue to apply the "individual of ordinary firm-
ness" standard and reiterated that "an adverse employment action is one
that 'would deter a similarly situated individual of ordinary firmness
from exercising his or her constitutional rights.' '6 8  The employee in
Burkybile was subject to the threat of suspension and possible termina-
58. Foley, 355 F.3d at 341.
59. 118 F.3d 359 (5th Cir. 1997).
60. Foley, 355 F.3d at 342.
61. Harrington, 118 F.3d at 365.
62. Id.
63. Id. (quoting Pierce v. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice Inst. Div., 37 F.3d 1146, 1149 (5th
Cir. 1994)).
64. Levinson, supra note 23, at 697-98.
65. See Burkybile v. Bd. of Educ., 411 F.3d 306, 313 (2d Cir. 2005); Farmer v. Cleveland
Pub. Power, 295 F.3d 593, 599 (6th Cir. 2002); Suppan v. Dadonna, 203 F.3d 228, 235 (3d Cir.
2000); Crawford-El v. Britton, 93 F.3d 813, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
66. Love, supra note 1, at 31 (citing Crawford-El, 93 F.3d at 826).
67. 411 F.3d 306 (2d Cir. 2005).
68. Burkybile, 411 F.3d at 313 (quoting Washington v. County of Rockland, 373 F.3d 310,
320 (2d Cir. 2004)). In Washington, the employee was threatened with administrative proceedings
and a thirty-day suspension without pay which the court determined could deter individuals within
the police department from speaking out against discrimination practices and polices. Washington,
373 F.3d at 320.
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tion as a result of a disciplinary hearing.69 The court determined that the
looming consequences of the hearing, as well as the inconvenience of
litigation costs were "clearly deterrents for even a person of ordinary
firmness. 7 °
Similarly, the Third and Sixth Circuits have fashioned their own
"individual of ordinary firmness" standards. In Suppan v. Dadonna,
7
1
the Third Circuit recognized that the strength of the First Amendment
would be diluted if "harassment for exercising the right of free speech
was always actionable no matter how unlikely to deter a person of ordi-
nary firmness from that exercise .... ,,72 Mirroring Suppan, the Sixth
Circuit in Farmer v. Cleveland Public Power73 held that First Amend-
ment retaliation claims require "that the defendant's adverse action
caused the plaintiff to suffer an injury that would likely chill a person of
ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that [constitutionally
protected] activity. 74 In Farmer, the employee was subject to reduction
in supervisory, management, and policy-making tasks.75 The court found
that these changes, though not materially adverse to her employment
status, were enough to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercis-
ing her free speech rights.76
These cases establish a precedent of compromise among the circuits
and lay the foundation for a fact-based inquiry which does not rely on a
strict enumeration of materially adverse actions, but respects the serious
nature of First Amendment claims. They utilize the "chilling" effect but
remain wary of allowing any deterrents to be actionable.77 While the
Second, Third, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits hold a compromising interpreta-
tion of "adverse employment actions," several circuits have adopted a
broad understanding of the third prong of First Amendment retaliation
claims.
C. Grab A Coat, It's Chilly Out There-The "Chilling Effect"
The Ninth, Seventh, and Fourth Circuits consistently hold that less
severe actions which deter or "chill" speech are adverse in First Amend-
ment retaliation claims.78 Within these circuits, "adverse actions need
not be great where First Amendment rights are involved to allow public
69. Burkybile, 411 F.3d at 314.
70. Id.
71. 203 F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2000).
72. Suppan, 203 F.3d at 235 (citing Bart v. Telford, 677 F.2d 622, 625 (7th Cir. 1982)).
73. 295 F.3d 593 (6th Cir. 2002).
74. Farmer, 295 F.3d at 602 (quoting Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 678 (6th Cir. 1998)).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Suppan, 203 F.3d at 235.
78. See Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 976 (9th Cir. 2003); Power v. Summers,
226 F.3d 815, 820 (7th Cir. 2000); Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Co., 218 F.3d 337,
352 (4th Cir. 2000).
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employees to proceed with a retaliation case., 79 Any detrimental action
against a public employee need not be significant but must chill, ever so
slightly, the employee from exercising his or her right to speak in the
future.80
In Coszalter v. City of Salem,81 the Ninth Circuit stated that the goal
of First Amendment retaliation claims is to "prevent, or redress, actions
by a government employer that 'chill the exercise of protected' First
Amendment rights." 82 In Coszalter, the employee was transferred to new
and sometimes unpleasant job duties, subjected to several unwarranted
disciplinary investigations, and placed on two reviews of work product
quality for his public disclosure of information about health and safety
standards in the City's public works department.83 The court determined
that these actions were adverse and also held that "various kinds of em-
ployment actions may have an impermissible chilling effect .
[whereby] even minor acts of retaliation can infringe on an employee's
First Amendment rights. 80 Thus, the threshold in Ninth Circuit adverse
employment claims is minimal deterrence of an employee's First
Amendment rights.
The Seventh Circuit is the Federal court system's greatest proponent
of a broad interpretation of adverse employment actions in First
Amendment retaliation claims. In fact, the Seventh Circuit "does not
buy into the idea that adverse employment action is a necessary element
of a First amendment case in the public employment context." 86 Accord-
ing to Judge Posner, "any deprivation under color of law that is likely to
deter the exercise of free speech, whether by an employee or anyone else,
is actionable. 87
The Seventh Circuit holds that a constitutionally-based retaliation
claim is not comparable to federal employment discrimination statutes
because in constitutional claims, any deterrence of the exercise of free
speech is actionable. 88 In Spiegla v. Major Eddie Hull,89 the court held
that a transfer to more physically demanding job which required less skill
and a change in schedule constituted an adverse employment action.90
The court specifically stated that a "§ 1983 case does not require an ad-
79. Love, supra note 1, at 31.
80. Section 1983 First Amendment Claims, 5 EMP. COORD. EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES § 1:16
(2005).
81. 320 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 2003).
82. Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 974-75.
83. Id. at 970-72.
84. Id. at 975 (emphasis added).
85. Id. See also Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 2000); Allen v. Scrib-
ner, 812 F.2d 426, 435 n.17 (9th Cir. 1987).
86. Williams, supra note 14, at 457.
87. Power, 226 F.3d at 820 (emphasis added).
88. Spiegla v. Major Eddie Hull, 371 F.3d 928, 941 (7th Cir. 2004).
89. 371 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2004).
90. Spiegla, 371 F.3d at 928.
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verse employment action within the meaning of the antidiscrimination
statutes, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. ''91
Finally, the Fourth Circuit also adheres to the "chilling effect" stan-
dard for adverse employment actions in First Amendment retaliation
claims. To establish retaliation an employee must prove "that he was
deprived of a valuable government benefit or adversely effected in a
manner that, at the very least, would tend to chill his exercise of First
Amendment rights. 92 In the Fourth Circuit the public employee does
not have to show that the action was the equivalent of a dismissal.93
These three circuits embrace the notion that any action which deters
or chills an employee from exercising his or her constitutional right to
free speech is sufficiently recognizable as an adverse employment action.
Where "[m]ore subtle forms of punishment are available" to an em-
ployer, the Ninth, Seventh, and Fourth Circuits will readily stand guard
against the chilling adverse actions.
94
III. BACA AND MAESTAS
The Tenth Circuit currently wavers in its interpretation of adverse
employment actions in First Amendment retaliation claims. In Baca and
Maestas the Tenth Circuit again refused to choose an approach for inter-
preting adverse employment actions within the circuit.
A. Baca v. Sklar
95
1. Case
In Baca, Peter Baca alleged that David Sklar and the University of
New Mexico had discriminated against him based on ethnicity and retali-
ated against him for "exercising his First Amendment rights. 96  The
defendants removed to federal district court and moved for summary
judgment. 97 The district court granted the defendants' motion for sum-
mary judgment holding that Baca had failed to raise a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether his statements had motivated the defendant to
take adverse actions against him.98
Baca began employment with the University of New Mexico in
March 2001 in the Center for Injury Prevention Research and Education
91. Id. (emphasis added).
92. Goldstein, 218 F.3d at 352 (4th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added). See also Edwards v. City of
Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 246 (4th Cir. 1999).
93. Goldstein, 218 F.3d at 356 (citing DiMeglio v. Haines, 45 F.3d 790, 806 (4th Cir. 1995)).
94. Michael L. Wells, Section 1983, The First Amendment, and Public Employee Speech:
Shaping the Right to Fit the Remedy (And Vice Versa), 35 GA. L. REv. 939, 971 (2001).
95. 398 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2005).
96. Baca, 398 F.3d at 1210, 1215.
97. Id. at 1215.
98. Id. at 1216.
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(CIPRE). 99 Shortly thereafter Baca encountered a series of discrepancies
in university funding and hiring practices.' 00 Baca reported this informa-
tion to his supervisor, Sklar.'0 ' A few weeks later Baca again raised the
issue to Sklar and his assistant. 1
02
Shortly thereafter, two employees began directly communicating
with Sklar, which allegedly usurped Baca's supervisory role.10 3 In June
2001 Baca met with university human resources and attorneys to discuss
the funding and hiring concerns.' 4 From then on Baca faced several
irregularities on the job, including employee transfers from his depart-
ment which resulted in large budget cuts and a reprimand from Sklar
about his attitude. 0 5 Additionally, and without deference to human re-
sources protocol, Sklar sent Baca a letter reprimanding him for a vacancy
announcement he had published. 1
06
Baca suffered through an unfounded employee investigation after
which Sklar demanded his resignation, which Baca refused to tender.
0 7
In early 2002, a mediation was scheduled where, after some dispute,
Baca agreed to resign.
0 8
2. Decision
The court applied the following test to determine whether the uni-
versity's action against Baca constituted a prima facie First Amendment
retaliation violation:109 whether:
(1) the speech in question involves a matter of public concern; (2) his
interest in engaging in the speech outweighs the government em-
ployer's interest in regulating it; and (3) that the speech was a sub-
stantial motivating factor behind the government's decision to take
an adverse employment action against the employee."l
0
The court determined that Baca's statements regarding the funding and
hiring practices met the initial requirement that the "speech in question
involve[d] a matter of public concern.' Utilizing the Pickering balanc-
99. Id. at 1213.







107. Id. at 1215.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1218.
110. Id. at 1218-19.
111. Id. at 1219.
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ing test, 112 the court found that Baca's interest in making his statements
outweighed the university's interest in regulating Baca's speech."13
The court then turned to the third element: whether Baca's "pro-
tected speech substantially motivated CIPRE to take adverse employ-
ment actions against him."'" 4 The court began by discussing whether the
discipline constituted an adverse employment action. The court stated,
"[a]lthough we have never delineated what actions constitute 'adverse
employment actions' in the First Amendment context, we have repeat-
edly concluded that a public employer can violate an employee's First
Amendment rights by subjecting an employee to repercussions that
would not be actionable under Title VII.' '5
The court noted that actions short of constructive or actual employ-
ment decisions, such as employee reprimands, transfers, and the removal
of job duties, could be adverse employment actions in instances of First
Amendment retaliation. 1 6 The court commented that if Baca's allega-
tions of university improprieties were true, then those actions could be
adverse. "17
The court then discussed whether Baca's protected speech "substan-
tially motivated the employer to administer such adverse conse-
quences."' 1 8 Consequently the court held that Baca had raised a suffi-
cient issue of material fact regarding Sklar's motivation to survive sum-
mary judgment." 9 As such, the court reversed the district court's grant
of summary judgment to the defendants and remanded the case. 1
20
B. Maestas v. Segura
12
1. Case
Plaintiff Bennie Maestas filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging
that David Segura and Dennis Pratt, in their official capacities, retaliated
against him "for speaking out on matters of public concern in violation of
the First Amendment."' 122 The district court granted the defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment holding that Maestas had met the first three
112. See supra Part 1.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1220.
115. Id. (citing Morfin v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 906 F.2d 1434, 1437 n.3 (10th Cir. 1990);
Schuler v. City of Boulder, 189 F.3d 1304, 1310 (10th Cir. 1999)).
116. Id. (citing Schuler, 189 F.3d at 1310).
117. Baca, 398 F.3d at 1221 (enumerating Baca's assertions of the removal of supervisory
authority, procedural discrepancies, and the filing of unfounded employment investigations as feasi-
bly adverse).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1222.
120. Id.
121. 416 F.3d 1182 (10th Cir. 2005).
122. Maestas, 416 F.3d at 1182.
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elements of the prima facie case but it "ultimately concluded Defendants
would have reached the same decision absent Plaintiff's speech."',
23
Maestas began employment with the City of Albuquerque in 1987,
and in 1994 became "material manager" at the Vehicle Maintenance De-
partment (VMD), a division of the Solid Waste Management Department
(SWMD).124 Over the next several years Maestas repeatedly complained
to the city and local media about deficiencies within the SWMD.2 5
Thereafter, reports and internal audits revealed improprieties within the
department including verification of Maestas' concerns.
26
Throughout the next couple of years, Maestas continued to com-
plain about department protocol. 27 In 2001 and 2002 the city mayor
required every department to make budget cuts. 28 In April 2002, Maes-
tas was informed of the City's proposal to cut his position. 129 Maestas
was reassigned to SWMD's Central Service Division (CSD) and his pre-
vious position at VMD was left vacant.1 30 At CSD Maestas "retained the
same salary, benefits, and job title.",
131
2. Decision
Judge Baldock began his analysis with an exhortation to govern-
ment employers that they may not "as a condition of employment, com-
pel an employee to relinquish carte blanche his First Amendment right to
comment on matters of public concern."' 32 The judge then set forth the
prima facie case for First Amendment retaliation claims. The employee
must establish that the speech was a matter of public concern, the em-
ployee's interest in voicing the speech must outweigh the employer's
interest in regulating it, and "the speech [must be] ... a 'substantial mo-
tivating factor' behind the employer's decision to take an adverse em-
ployment action against the employee."' 33 The court analyzed the third
element by placing the adverse employment discussion in a lengthy foot-
note and concentrating on the substantial motivating factor.
34
Within the footnote, the court discussed the circuit split regarding
what constitutes adverse actions in First Amendment retaliation
claims. 35 The court referenced Baca, stating that some retaliation may
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1184.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1185.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1186.
130. Id. at 1185.
131. Id. at 1187.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1188 n.5.
135. Id.
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be actionable under § 1983 and the First Amendment, though not under
Title VII. 3 6 Addressing the actionable range of adverse procedures, the
court stated that employment decisions that do not amount to termination
or dismissal could be adverse.1 37 However, the court was quick to men-
tion that the Tenth Circuit has "never held employment actions which
may tend to chill free speech [as] necessarily adverse." 138 Additionally,
the court refused to determine if Maestas' transfer constituted an adverse
employment action: "[g]iven our conclusion that Plaintiffs' speech was
not a substantial motivating factor ... we continue to leave that question
[whether a chilling effect on free speech is an adverse employment ac-
tion] for another day."'
' 39
The court then took considerable time in explaining its stance on the
substantial motivating factor.140 The court concluded that Maestas failed
to establish a link between his speech and Segura's decision to transfer
him to CSD. 14' The court held that Maestas failed to establish a prima
facie case and the court affirmed the district court's judgment.1
42
3. Dissent
In his dissent, Judge Briscoe disagreed with the court's analysis of
adverse employment actions in Tenth Circuit First Amendment retalia-
tion claims.143  Judge Briscoe argued that the court already held that
those actions which tend to chill free speech are adverse.'"a Referencing
Belcher v. City of McAlester, 145 the judge stated that the court already
applied the Seventh Circuit's "chilling effect" to Tenth Circuit adverse
employment jurisprudence. 1
46
IV. ANALYSIS-HIGH PRESSURE DISSIPATING, GRAY SKIES
COMPROMISING, AND CHILLS RISING
The Tenth Circuit should adopt the approach asserted by the Ninth,
Seventh, and Fourth Circuits which hold that actions which have a "chill-






140. Id. at 1188-89. "what constitutes a substantial motivating factor evades precise defini-
tion." Id. at 1188. However, the court stated that it was something less than "but-for" causation or
the sole reason for the employer's action, but more than mere speculation or "hunches amidst rumor
and innuendo." Id. at 1188-89.
141. Id. at 1189.
142. Id. at 1192.
143. Id. at 1195 n.2 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
144. Id.
145. 324 F.3d 1203 (10th Cir. 2003).
146. Maestas, 416 F.3d at 1195 n.2 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
147. See Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 975 (9th Cir. 2003); Power v. Summers,
226 F.3d 815, 820-21 (7th Cir. 2000); Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Co., 218 F.3d
337, 352 (4th Cir. 2000).
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While each standard for interpreting adverse employment actions has
advantages, the "chilling effect" approach rises above the rest because it
effectively advances employee protection in First Amendment retaliation
claims. The Title VII standard held by the Eleventh, Eighth, and Fifth
Circuits attempts to dam the proverbial flood of litigation but its statutory
status is not the proper measure for interpreting a constitutional claim. In
addition, the "individual of ordinary firmness" approach is appealing for
its compromising nature but its application varies among the Second,
Third, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits.
Subsections A and B below expand on the reasoning behind the au-
thor's assertion that the Title VII and the "individual of ordinary firm-
ness" interpretations should not be utilized in the Tenth Circuit. In Sub-
section C, the author argues for the Tenth Circuit's adoption of the
"chilling effect" approach to interpreting adverse employment actions in
First Amendment retaliation claims.
A. Title VlI's High Pressure System
The First Amendment retaliation adverse employment action ap-
proach held by the Eleventh, Eighth, and Fifth Circuits derives from Title
VII retaliation claims. 48  These circuits restrict adverse employment
actions to significant alterations of the conditions of employment
amounting to a material or tangible change.149 There are three reasons
why the Title VII approach to adverse employment actions should not be
utilized by the Tenth Circuit in First Amendment retaliation claims.
First, the Supreme Court's precedent in these claims broadly protects
public employees' free speech. Second, the Circuits which utilize the
"ultimate employment decision" standard in First Amendment retaliation
claims are applying an interpretation which is flawed in its original ap-
plication to Title VII. Third and finally, the statutory Title VII approach
to retaliation claims should not be used to interpret constitutional First
Amendment claims.
1. Supreme Court Precedent
The Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear that it will protect
an employee's freedom of speech, "absent strong countervailing inter-
ests."' 50 Beginning with Pickering v. Board of Education'' the Court
has consistently held that First Amendment rights are paramount and that
the employer ultimately has the burden to prove that his actions were not
retaliatory.' 52 An adoption of the Title VII approach to interpreting ad-
148. Levinson, supra note 23, at 687.
149. Id. at 674.
150. Id. at 692.
151. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
152. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 678-80.
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verse employment actions is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
broad protection of employee's rights.
153
2. The "Ultimate Employment Decision" Interpretation
The circuits which adopt the "ultimate employment decision" inter-
pretation of adverse employment action in Title VII claims are adopting
an approach which disproportionately favors employers who retaliate
against their employees. 154 This approach is flawed in its application to
Title VII and should not be imposed on employees with First Amend-
ment retaliation claims, thereby promoting the initial error. The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) Compliance Manual,
which has not been adopted by all the circuits, broadly construes Title
VII retaliation claims.155 Contrary to the interpretation held by the Elev-
enth, Eighth, and Fifth Circuits, the EEOC states that "[t]he statutory
retaliation clauses prohibit any adverse treatment that is based on a re-
taliatory motive and is reasonably likely to deter the charging party or
others from engaging in protected activity."' 56  The EEOC explicitly
states that it does not agree with the circuits that require ultimate em-
ployment decisions to prove the adverse employment action prong of
retaliation claims. 157 Conversely, the agency believes that this interpreta-
tion undermines the effectiveness of employment statutes and harms the
public "by deterring others from filing a charge."'
5 8
The circuits which adhere to the "ultimate employment action" ap-
proach limit the remedies available to employees that are retaliated
against and adopt a flawed view of adverse employment actions. 59 It is
important for the Tenth Circuit to refuse to apply this defective approach
to adverse employment action interpretation in both the Title VII and
First Amendment retaliation contexts. While discrimination is an evil
unto itself, an infringement on the ability to exercise one's constitutional
right to free speech is an infringement on an essential aspect of American
153. See infra Part IV.C.I (discussing the Supreme Court's recent cases expanding employee
protection in First Amendment retaliation claims).
154. The Fifth and Eighth Circuits utilize the "ultimate employment decisions" standard requir-
ing an adverse action relating to hiring, discharging, granting leave, promoting and wage adjust-
ments for the employee to succeed in a Title VII retaliation claim. See Mattem v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997); Davis v. KARK-TV Inc., 421 F.3d 699, 706 (8th Cir. 2005)
(holding that only tangible changes in working conditions such as termination or reduced pay consti-
tute adverse employment actions in Title VII retaliation claims).
155. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Compliance Manual § 8-II(D)(3)
(1998), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/retal.pdf. The Tenth Circuit has already adopted a broader
interpretation of adverse employment actions in Title VII retaliation claims and has refused to apply
the narrow approach to First Amendment retaliation claims. See Maestas v. Segura, 416 F.3d 1182,
1188 n.5 (10th Cir. 2005).




159. Levinson, supra note 23, at 687-88.
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democracy. 60  In furtherance of the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII
adverse employment actions, this strict approach should be avoided when
constitutional rights are at stake.' 
6'
3. Standards for Constitutional Claims
The statutory text of Title VII should not be used when deciding
claims arising under the constitutional protection of the First Amend-
ment.1 62 Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit asserts that First Amend-
ment retaliation claims should not be measured or interpreted by the
statutory provisions of Title VII. 163  Retaliation suits brought under §
1983 are not comparable to discriminatory retaliation suits brought under
Title VII.164 According to Judge Posner, Title VII forbids "invidious
discrimination in employment" and limits "protection to victims of 'ad-
verse employment action,' which is judicial shorthand (the term does not
appear in the statutes themselves) for the fact that these statutes require
the plaintiff to prove that the employer's action ... altered the terms or
conditions of his employment.'
165
No such limitation is required in § 1983 or the constitutional provi-
sions it enforces. 166 Indeed, § 1983 does not necessitate that the claim
arise in an employment context. 67 It only demands that a deprivation
occur "under color of law" and "is likely to deter the exercise of free
speech" or any other constitutional deprivation which is claimed.
68
Unlike Title VII, § 1983 creates government liability when the govern-
ment deprives a person of his or her constitutional rights. 169 The context
and content of Title VII and § 1983 constitutional deprivation claims are
so dramatically different it is incorrect to use the one (Title VII) to inter-
pret the other (§ 1983).
4. Summary-Title VII Interpretation
These three reasons establish why Title VII adverse employment ac-
tion interpretation should not be applied to First Amendment retaliation
160. Love, supra note 1, at 29.
161. On December 5, 2005, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Burlington Northern &
Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 797 (2005), in which it will decide what type of adverse
employment action a plaintiff must establish to support a Title VII retaliation claim. This case has
far reaching implications in the Title VII and First Amendment retaliation contexts because of the
"ultimate employment decision" standard's application to both causes of action. If the strict stan-
dard is rejected by the Supreme Court, the circuits which apply it to Title VII, and First Amendment
retaliation claims will have to adopt a less stringent test.
162. Levinson, supra note 23, at 676.
163. Spiegla v. Major Eddie Hull, 371 F.3d 928, 941 (7th Cir. 2004).
164. Power, 226 F.3d at 820.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Harvey Brown and Sarah Kerrigan, 42 U.S.C. § 1983: The Vehicle For Protecting Public
Employees' Constitutional Rights, 47 BAYLOR L. REv. 619, 622 (1995).
168. Power, 226 F.3d at 820. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2005).
169. Love, supra note 1, at 31.
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claims. However, even if the standard were adopted by the Tenth Cir-
cuit, the court's Title VII retaliation jurisprudence would not require
strict adherence to the "material" or "significant alteration of employ-
ment conditions" interpretation.
1 70
In the unlikely event that the Tenth Circuit adopts the Title VII in-
terpretation, the court already holds a broad interpretation of adverse
employment action, liberally construing each action on a case-by-case
basis.' 7' Generally, the Tenth Circuit holds that those employer actions
which do "not rise to the level of ultimate employment decisions such as
discharge, demotion, or failure to hire, may be actionable."' 72 The Tenth
Circuit's case-by-case approach is much less threatening than its coun-
terparts' interpretation in the Eleventh, Eighth, and Fifth Circuits.
173
Adherence to the Title VII approach may not be severely detrimen-
tal to Tenth Circuit public employees; however, applying this strict Title
VII approach to First Amendment retaliation claims may have far-
reaching implications. 174 A decision to further restrain the now liberally
construed adverse employment action factor in the Title VII context
could deter free speech if applied to First Amendment retaliation
claims. 175 However, the Tenth Circuit will not likely adopt this position.
As they stated in Baca, "we have repeatedly concluded that a public em-
ployer can violate First Amendment rights by subjecting an employee to
repercussions that would not be actionable under Title VII.'
176
B. Weak Gray Skies of the Individual of Ordinary Firmness
The "individual of ordinary firmness" standard in First Amendment
retaliation claims, though appealing as the middle ground between the
strict standard of Title VII and the broader "chilling effect" interpreta-
tion, is too fickle an approach to be adopted by the Tenth Circuit.
While the "individual of ordinary firmness" is a "sensible stan-
dard,"' 77 the interpretation varies from circuit to circuit, creating uncer-
170. Caplinger, supra note 8, at 27.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See supra Part II.A (discussing the circuits' adherence to a strict "materially adverse"
interpretation of what constitutes an adverse employment action).
174. See Caplinger, supra note 8, at 20 (asserting that there has been a steady increase of
retaliation claims in the past decade possibly stemming from the ease of surviving summary judg-
ment in Title VII retaliation claims as opposed to Title VII discrimination claims).
175. See Tran v. Trustees of the State Colleges in Colo., 355 F.3d 1263, 1267 (10th Cir. 2004).
This case discussed the Supreme Court's definition of adverse employment action in Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998). The court held that the "tangible employment
action" is the standard in the 10th Circuit for purposes of Title VII retaliation claims, perhaps imply-
ing a move in a more restrictive direction. See also Caplinger, supra note 8, at 28.
176. Baca v. Sklar, 398 F.3d 1210, 1220 (10th Cir. 2005).
177. Crawford-El v. Britton, 93 F.3d 813, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1996). See also Love, supra note 1,
at 31 (explaining the D.C. Circuit's approval of the district court's holding in Crawford-El which
stood for the proposition that the person of ordinary firmness was a "sensible standard," which was
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tainty for public employees and employers. 178 For instance, the Second
Circuit, in Deters v. Lafuente, 179 required the "combination of seemingly
minor incidents to form the basis of a constitutional retaliation claim...
[to] reach a critical mass" in retaliation claims based on a hostile work
environment.18 0 Those incidents which are minor and infrequent, though
retaliatory, are not considered deterrent to the "individual of ordinary
firmness" in the Second Circuit.'
18
For example, in Deters, two police officers were subject to depart-
ment disciplinary proceedings after being acquitted of criminal assault
charges. 82 The employees asserted that several hostile and retaliatory
actions were taken against them, including false accusations of failure to
respond and playing games on the police radio, as well as failure to pro-
mote. 183 However, "[l]ooking at plaintiffs' hostile environment allega-
tions in the most favorable light," the court held "that [the allegations]
[weire insufficient to raise a constitutional claim of retaliation.''
184
Conversely, in the Third Circuit case of Suppan v. Dadonna,I8 5 po-
lice officers were subject to a variety of similar retaliatory actions includ-
ing questionable employee "rankings and the failure to promote."' 8 6 The
court held that this retaliatory conduct was enough to deter an individual
of ordinary firmness from exercising his First Amendment rights in the
future. 187 In contrast to the Second Circuit's similarly worded standard,
the Third Circuit's "individual of ordinary firmness" seems weak.
The discrepancy between circuits which hold the same standard ex-
emplifies the ambiguity of the term and the feeble nature of this com-
promise between the Title VII and "chilling effect" interpretations. Ad-
ditionally, the Second Circuit's need for a "critical mass" of actions
while "understandable to ensure that minor incidents of retaliation do not
flood the courts, deviates from the core question" of deterrence of free
speech and weakens the conciliatory nature of the approach.18 8  While
this interpretation of adverse employment action, held by the Second,
Third, Sixth and D.C. Circuits, allows employees a greater breadth of
actionable claims, it does not provide public sector employees with the
subsequently left alone by the Supreme Court). Crawford-El, 951 F.2d at 1322, vacated and re-
manded en banc, 93 F.3d 813 (D.C. Cir. 1996), vacated and remanded, 523 U.S. 747 (1998).
178. See Levinson, supra note 23, at 691; Love, supra note 1, at 31.
179. 368 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2004).
180. Deters, 368 F.3d at 189 (quoting Phillips v. Bowen, 278 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir. 2002)).
181. Deters, 368 F.3d at 189.
182. Id. at 186.
183. Id. at 187.
184. Id. (emphasis added).
185. 203 F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2000).
186. Suppan, 203 F.3d at 234.
187. Id. at 235.
188. Levinson, supra note 23, at 692.
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"sensibility" it purports and therefore should not be adopted by the Tenth
Circuit.
C. "Chilling Effect" Cools Retaliation and the Tenth Circuit
The Ninth, Seventh, and Fourth Circuits have adopted the broadest
interpretation of First Amendment retaliation adverse employment ac-
tions.189 While the Title VII and "individual of ordinary firmness" inter-
pretations may serve the "laudable goal of filtering out insubstantial
claims," the "chilling effect" approach most effectively protects First
Amendment rights.' 90 The Supreme Court has held that First Amend-
ment retaliation claims must stop "the government, except in the most
compelling circumstances, from wielding its power to interfere with its
employees' freedom to believe and associate, or to not believe and not
associate."' 91 By decisively embracing the "chilling effect" approach,
the Tenth Circuit will further restrain public employers from retaliating
against employees who exercise their constitutionally ordained rights.
Adoption of the "chilling effect" approach is proper because this in-
terpretation protects employees who suffer discrete actions which in-
fringe on their constitutional rights. Additionally, both the Supreme
Court and the Tenth Circuit are already embracing a broader protection
of employees' rights in this context. 192 Finally, the protection of public
employees' speech benefits both the employees and the American public
at large.
The "chilling effect" interpretation of adverse employment actions
protects public employees where "any deprivation that is likely to deter
the exercise of free speech" occurs. 193 Thus, "a government act of re-
taliation need not be severe and it need not be of a certain kind.' ' 194 Per-
haps as a result of the constitutional deprivation, the actions do not have
to be great to be adverse; the slightest wariness to speak freely may be
enough.' 9 By their nature, demotions and discharges are adverse actions
if based upon an employee's protected speech. 196 However, "the courts'
limits on what counts as an [adverse action] have the effect of enabling
sophisticated government supervisors to keep their employees in line
189. See supra Part I1.C (discussing the "chilling effect" standard adopted in these three cir-
cuits).
190. Wells, supra note 94, at 972.
191. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 76 (1990).
192. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 76; Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996);
United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 477 (1995); Belcher v. City of
McAlester, 324 F.3d 1203, 1207 (10th Cir. 2003); Schuler v. City of Boulder, 189 F.3d 1304, 1308
(I0th Cir. 1999).
193. Levinson, supra note 23, at 699.
194. Section 1983 First Amendment Claims, 5 EMP. COORD. EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES § 1:16
(2005).
195. Love, supra note 1, at 3 1.
196. MARCY EDWARDS, ET AL., FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE PUBLIC WORKPLACE 91 (1998).
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without risking the loss of a lawsuit."' 197 Retaliatory acts need not be
monstrous but must create the potential to chill an employee's speech.1
98
"A campaign of petty harassment may achieve the same effect as an ex-
plicit punishment" and therefore chill free speech. 199 According to the
Seventh circuit, even a small effect-a chill--on freedom of speech can
be actionable because there is no justification for harassing people for
exercising their constitutional rights.2 °0
Additionally, the Supreme Court utilizes the lower courts' "chilling
effect" adverse employment action standard. This positively chilling
trend was acclaimed in Rutan and further expanded in two decisive
cases.
20 1
1. The Supreme Court's Positively Chilling Front
The Supreme Court's expansion of First Amendment retaliation
claims indicates the Court's desire to broadly protect individuals. In
several politically charged cases regarding party patronage, public em-
ployee honoraria, and government contracting, the Supreme Court has
liberally protected public employees' free speech.20 2 It is likely the Su-
preme Court will fully embrace the "chilling effect" approach in the fu-
ture, as evidenced by its expansion of public employees' First Amend-
ment rights under § 1983. Following the Supreme Court's lead, the
Tenth Circuit should adopt the "chilling effect" approach to adverse em-
ployment action interpretation and secure free speech rights for govern-
ment employees.
a. Rutan
In 1990, the Supreme Court decided Rutan, a case involving the
constitutionality of adverse employment actions based on a public em-
ployee's party affiliation.2 3 In holding that political patronage practices
such as promotion, transfer, layoff recall, and hiring could be adverse if
improperly directed at non-affiliated parties, the Supreme Court further
protected employees from actions effected to deter their free speech.2°
The Court soundly rejected the respondents' assertion that because the
197. Wells, supra note 94, at 973.
198. Levinson, supra note 23, at 699.
199. Id. (quoting Walsh v. Ward, 991 F.2d 1344, 1345 (7th Cir. 1993)).
200. Ban v. Telford, 677 F.2d 622, 625 (7th Cir. 1982).
201. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 75; See also Levinson, supra note 23, at 682-87.
202. See Rutan, 497 U.S. at 64; Nat'l Treasury, 513 U.S. 454 (1995); Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668
(1996).
203. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 64. In Rutan, the governor of Illinois issued a hiring freeze on several
departments under his control. Id. at 65. No exceptions were allowed without the express consent of
the Governor. Id. According to the petitioners, the Governor utilized the freeze to benefit those
individuals loyal to the Republican party. Id at 66. As a result, petitioners argued that they were
denied promotions, transfers to locations nearer to home, and recalls after layoffs. Id. at 67. See also
Nancy Oxfeld, Free Speech for Public Employees: Justice Holmes Had It Wrong, 45 KAN. L. REV.
1299, 1310 (1997).
204. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 64.
2006]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
actions were not punitive they could not "chill the exercise of protected
belief and association by public employees. 20 5
The Court held that "[e]mployees who find themselves in dead end
positions because of their political backgrounds are adversely af-
fected., 20 6 The Court found that if an employee feels obligated to asso-
ciate with the party in power his First Amendment right to affiliate with
whichever political party he prefers is impermissibly infringed.20 7 By
being denied transfers or being laid off, an employee may feel compelled
to change patronage, thereby being deprived a constitutionally protected
freedom. 208 In turn, the Court increased the depth of First Amendment
retaliation claims and furthered the noble goal of protecting public em-
ployees' rights.
b. National Treasury v. Treasury Employees Union
209
Several years later the Supreme Court continued its course and
struck down a federal employee honoraria ban because it infringed on a
public employee's speech. 210  The Ethics Reform Act of 1989 banned
public employees of all three branches from receiving honoraria for any
speech, appearance, or article. 21 1 In National Treasury v. Treasury Em-
ployees Union, the Court "recognized that preventing compensation for
speech may deter, and thus infringe on, protected speech rights."
212
Here, the Court expanded the "chilling effect" recognized in Rutan.
"Unlike an adverse action taken in response to actual speech, this ban
chills potential speech before it happens. 21 3  The restraint of speech,
appearance, or written word imposes such a serious burden on the pub-
lic's right to read and hear and the employee's right to express that it
"abridges speech under the First Amendment." 214 Acknowledgment that
the ban chilled potential speech further solidified the Court's desire to
protect public employee speech without evidence of a significant, nar-
rowly-tailored government interest.
215




209. 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
210. Nat'l Treasury, 513 U.S. at 457.
211. Id. at 459-460.
212. Id. at 466-67.
213. Id. at 468 (emphasis added).
214. Id. at 470.
215. See Ian H. Morrison, The Case for Minimal Regulation of Pubic Employee Free Speech: A
Critical Analysis of the Federal Honoraria Ban Controversy, 48 WASH. U. J. URB. CONTEMP. L.
141,164-65 (1995).
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c. Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr
216
Finally, in Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr, a case ac-
cepted from the Tenth Circuit, the Supreme Court established that em-
ployees contracted by the government are protected against adverse ac-
tions resulting from First Amendment retaliation.217  The Court again
utilized the "chilling effect" language regarding adverse employment
actions.218 "As in Rutan, the Supreme Court focused on whether certain
government conduct chilled speech, not on whether the adverse action
could be characterized as a material or substantial employment ac-
tion.
''219
Citing several precedential cases, the Court held that "constitutional
violations may arise from the deterrent, or 'chilling,' effect of govern-
mental [efforts] that fall short of a direct prohibition against the exercise
of First Amendment rights., 220 The Court determined that a bright line
rule distinguishing government contractors from employees would "give
the government carte blanche to terminate independent contractors for
exercising First Amendment rights.",22' The Court firmly established its
support for the "chilling effect" approach to adverse actions in First
Amendment retaliation claims by holding that contractors' First
Amendment rights should be protected.222 Once again the Court found
that "[t]he threat of the loss of which in retaliation for speech may chill
speech on matters of public concern" was enough to constitute an ad-
verse employment action in First Amendment retaliation claims.223
In light of Rutan, National Treasury, and Umbehr, the Tenth Circuit
should follow the Supreme Court's lead, adopt the "chilling effect" stan-
dard and broadly protect public employees' speech in First Amendment
retaliation claims.
2. Chilly Air Covers the Tenth Circuit
At the heart of the argument in favor of adopting the "chilling ef-
fect" standard is the Tenth Circuit's own utilization of the "chilling ef-
fect" language, its willingness to reject the Title VII approach,224 and its
expansion of the actions it deems adverse. In several cases, including
216. 518 U.S. 668 (1996).
217. Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 673.
218. Id. at 674.
219. Levinson, supra note 23, at 685 (citing Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 674-76).
220. Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 674 (alteration in original) (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11
(1972)); see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.,
431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977).
221. Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 679.
222. See Levinson, supra note 23, at 685.
223. Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 674 (quoting Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661,674 (1994)).
224. See supra Part V.A.
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Baca, the court expanded protection of public employees' free speech
rights and inched towards embracing the "chilling effect" approach.22 5
First, the Tenth Circuit has previously used the "chilling effect" lan-
22627guage. For example, in Belcher v. City of McAlester,227 the plaintiff
suffered adverse actions when he received a written reprimand for con-
tacting city councilmen without following procedure.2 8  Additionally,
the plaintiff was told that more procedural violations would result in se-
vere disciplinary action which could include dismissal.229  The court
found that: "[i]n reprimanding Belcher, the fire department chilled any
future attempts to contact Council members outside of a public meeting.
We conclude that this chilling effect is real, and that Belcher has shown
that he was subject to adverse employment action as a result of his
speech. 2 30 The court's own use of the "chilling effect" language implies
that at least three of the circuit court judges are in favor of adopting this
approach.
In addition to express use of the language, the court has broadened
its protection of public employees by finding many actions less severe
than dismissal as adverse. In Baca, the court found that, if true, the re-
moval of some supervisory authority, reprimands outside of procedure,
and the filing of an unfounded employment charge constituted an adverse
employment action.2 3' These actions do not constitute significant em-
ployment decisions, and yet the court found them adverse.
Similarly, in Schuler v. City of Boulder,232 the court found that the
removal of job duties, a written reprimand, a low evaluation score, and
an involuntary lateral transfer constituted an adverse employment action
in First Amendment retaliation claims.233  Additionally, the court
strengthened employee protection by finding that Schuler's subsequent
enjoyment of her new position did not matter in light of the retaliatory
234actions. Relying on Rutan the court stated its desire to protect em-
ployees from those "deprivations less harsh than dismissal which never-
theless violated a public employee's rights under the First Amend-
ment.
235
In Maestas, and in direct contrast to Judge Baldock's stated that the
court had not yet decided on the matter, Judge Briscoe asserted that the
225. Baca v. Sklar, 398 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2005); Belcher v. City of McAlester, 324 F.3d
1203 (10th Cir. 2003); Schuler v. City of Boulder, 189 F.3d 1304 (10th Cir. 1999).
226. Maestas, 416 F.3d at 1195 n.2 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
227. 324 F.3d 1203 (10th Cir. 2003)
228. Belcher, 324 F.3d at 1205.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 1207 n.4 (emphasis added).
231. Baca, 398 F.3d at 1221.
232. 189 F.3d 1304 (10th Cir. 1999).
233. Schuler, 189 F.3d at 1310.
234. Id. at 1310 n.3.
235. Id. at 1309.
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Tenth Circuit has already adopted the "chilling effect" approach.236
While the honorable judges may disagree, it is now time for the court to
firmly decide the issue and embrace the "chilling effect" approach to
adverse employment actions in First Amendment retaliation claims.
Subsequent to the rulings in Baca, Belcher, and Schuler the court should
follow the protectionist lead of the Ninth, Seventh, and Fourth Circuits
and adopt the "chilling effect" interpretation.
3. Chilling Climate Benefits Public
Finally, the Tenth Circuit should embrace the "chilling effect" ap-
proach to interpreting adverse employment actions in First Amendment
retaliation claims because it benefits both employees and the public at
large. By broadly interpreting this element, the general public will be in
a superior position to make intelligent decisions while voting on issues
and electing officials.237 Public employees have unique access to infor-
mation not readily available to the public as a whole. Society does not
benefit when government employers retaliate against their employees for
speaking out on matters affecting the public. Above all, government
employees are "often in the best position to know what ails the agencies
for which they work.,
238
For example, the employee in Baca was exercising his First Amend-
ment rights when he spoke against alleged fiscal and hiring improprieties
within the state university system.239 Without the ability to speak freely
about these matters, employees like Baca will not be able to inform the
public of government abuses. Government employees have unique ac-
cess to information regarding the inner workings of the democratic sys-
tem and their ability to speak on these matters should not be infringed
upon for fear of retaliation.240 Additionally, the public employee already
has a high threshold to meet because Pickering and Mt. Healthy estab-
lished that the matter spoken on must be of public concern. 24' By em-
bracing a broad interpretation of what constitutes an adverse employment
action in First Amendment retaliation claims the Tenth Circuit will fur-
ther protect this "bedrock of American democracy. 242 The court has an
obligation to protect the public and safeguard "the public's right to re-
ceive critical information" by embracing the "chilling effect" approach to
interpreting adverse employment actions in First Amendment retaliation
claims.243
236. Maestas, 416 F.3d at 1195 n.2 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
237. Love, supra note 1, at 32.
238. Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 674 (citing Waters, 511 U.S. at 674).
239. Baca, 398 F.3d at 1217-20.
240. Levinson, supra note 23, at 693.
241. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. Doyle,
429 U.S. 274, 284 (1977).
242. Love, supra note 1, at 29.
243. Levinson, supra note 23, at 693.
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CONCLUSION
Retaliation against public employees for exercising their First
Amendment right to comment on matters of public concern is unaccept-
able. The Tenth Circuit should not condone retaliatory acts by refusing
to adopt the "chilling effect" approach to adverse employment action
interpretation. The First Amendment retaliation claim has three elements
which protect government employers from unfounded actions against
them.244 The employee must establish that "(1) the speech involved a
matter of public concern, (2) the employee's interest in engaging in the
speech outweighed the employer's interest in regulating the speech, and
(3) the speech was a 'substantial motivating factor' behind the em-
ployer's decision to take an adverse employment action against the em-
ployee., 245 By adopting the broad "chilling effect" approach to interpret-
ing this third factor, the Tenth Circuit will insure the protection of the
public employee's constitutional right to free speech. In turn, actions
which are "intended to punish" an employee for free speech on issues of
public interest will not be tolerated if the court adopts the "chilling ef-
fect" standard.246 Additionally, both the Supreme Court and the Tenth
Circuit utilize the "chilling effect" language which provides support for
its wholehearted adoption in the Tenth Circuit. Finally, a broader inter-
pretation of adverse employment actions in First Amendment retaliation
claims benefits government employees and the public at large. By ac-
cepting the "chilling effect" approach to interpreting adverse employ-
ment actions the court will protect employees from retaliation and give
the public access to "an unequalled source of information concerning
public matters." 247 The Tenth Circuit must join the Ninth, Seventh, and
Fourth Circuits and embrace the "chilling effect" approach to interpret-
ing adverse employment actions in First Amendment retaliation claims.
Elizabeth J Bohn*
244. Maestas v. Segura, 416 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2005).
245. Maestas, 416 F.3d at 1187.
246. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 76 n.8.
247. Love, supra note 1, at 29.
* J.D. Candidate, May 2007, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. The author
would like to thank her beloved family, Catherine Smith, Assistant Professor of Law at the Univer-
sity of Denver Sturm College of Law, and the Denver University Law Review board and staff.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past several years, I have investigated the attitudes of ap-
pellate judges regarding various components of lawyers' advocacy on
appeal. This article reports on the results of my survey in the federal
First, Second, and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeal. I mailed my survey,
which consisted of eighty-six questions divided into seven sections, to all
of the state and federal appellate judges in New England, New York, and
the Mountain West in the hope of determining whether state and federal
judges look at different aspects of appellate practice differently.' Overall,
I received responses from 138 judges, which amounts to over forty-nine
percent of those who received the survey. I received twenty-three re-
sponses from federal appellate judges, which equaled just over forty-two
percent of the federal appellate judges who received the survey.
t David Lewis is a partner in the appellate law firm of Lewis & Malone, LLP, in Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts. His practice includes civil and criminal appeals in state and federal court. He
can be reached at (617) 621-1551 or dlewis@appellatepracticegroup.com. Mr. Lewis wishes to thank
his brother Geoffrey and his law partner Patricia Campbell Malone for their assistance with this
article.
I. This survey, substantially based on one conducted several years ago in California, was
conducted under the auspices of the American Bar Association's Council of Appellate Lawyers. See
Charles A. Bird & Webster Burke Kinnard, Objective Analysis of Advocacy Preferences and Preva-
lent Mythologies in One California Appellate Court, 4 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 141 (2002).
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Some earlier results of the survey were presented last year in the
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process.2 But that article only re-
flected some of the responses, and it included none from the judges in the
Mountain West. All of the survey's results, both federal and state and
including the Mountain West courts, were presented this year in the
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process.
3
The responses from each of the three federal appellate courts, how-
ever, were combined into a single "federal" response in that article. The
graphs shown here, in comparison, present the responses of each individ-
ual federal Circuit Court of Appeal to every question in the survey.
I. METHODOLOGY
Each of the seven sections of the survey covered a different topic
relevant to appellate advocacy:
A. The Structural Elements of Briefs;
4
B. Writing Style and Advocacy;
5
C. Use of Authority and the Record;
6
D. Typography of Briefs;
7
E. Physical Characteristics of Appellate Work Product;
8
F. Frequency of Certain Errors; 9 and
G. Oral Argument1°
The questions in each section sought to discover not only the advo-
cacy preferences of the judges on those topics, but also the strength of
their feelings. To accomplish this, the questions in six of the sections
provided the judges with a Likert scale consisting of five ranked answer
choices ranging from strongly agreeing with a question asked (indicated
by the judge's choosing "1") to strongly disagreeing with a question
asked (indicated by the judge's choosing "5"), with no preference in the
middle (indicated by the judge's choosing "3"). The remaining two
choices were basic agreement or disagreement (indicated by the judge's
choosing "2" or "4," respectively). Mean values as well as standard de-
viations were calculated for each individual federal court.
2. David Lewis, Common Knowledge about Appellate Briefs: True or False? 6 J. APP. PRAC.
& PROCESS 331 (2004).
3. David Lewis, What's the Difference? Comparing the Advocacy Preferences of State and
Federal Appellate Judges, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS (forthcoming 2005).
4. For results on this topic, see infra Part I11.A (pages 896-903; questions #1-15).
5. For results on this topic, see infra Part I1I.B (pages 904-12; questions #16-32).
6. For results on this topic, see infra Part IIl.C (pages 913-16; questions #33-39).
7. For results on this topic, see infra Part 1I.D (pages 917-25; questions #40-56).
8. For results on this topic, see infra Part 1I.E (pages 926-30; questions #57-65).
9. For results on this topic, see infra Part IIF (pages 931-35; questions #66-74).
10. For results on this topic, see infra Part Il1.G (pages 936-41; questions #75-86).
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The questions in the lone non-Likert scale part of the survey, how-
ever, sought a different type of information. In Section F ("Frequency of
Certain Errors"), the judges were given nine particular attributes of ap-
pellate briefs that appellate judges, research attorneys, staff attorneys,
and advocates would all generally agree are errors. The questions then
provided the judges with three categories of cases: General Civil, Crimi-
nal, and Family. The judges were then asked to estimate how often the
particular error occurred in that category of case by choosing a percent-
age for each category of case: from zero to ten percent, eleven to twenty
percent, twenty-one to thirty percent, thirty-one to forty percent, forty-
one to fifty percent, or over fifty percent.
II. UNDERSTANDING THE GRAPHS
The survey results presented here remain in their original sections,
and they are in order, so the article shows the results in the same context
in which the judges saw the questions. The graphs in all of the sections
other than section six (which was measured using a different scale), show
how strongly the judges agreed or disagreed with the premise underlying
a particular question. In each graph, the column height reflects the mean
response of the judges.
The graphs generated from judges' answers to Section F of the sur-
vey" are somewhat different. They indicate through percentages how
often an error appeared to the judges to be occurring for each type of
case. The graphs in this Section are not broken out to reflect any differ-
ences among the three Circuits; for this section-but only for this sec-
tion-all of the judges' responses are presented together.
While the total number of responses to each question varies slightly
because some judges did not answer every question, in general the
graphs reflect the advocacy preferences of about twenty-three federal
appellate judges. I believe that the graphs generally speak for them-
selves, so I do not provide any comments about individual graphs.
I recognize as well that some of the survey questions are not par-
ticularly germane to federal practice either because the issue is addressed
in the federal rules of appellate procedure or the practice area is not liti-
gated in federal court. In short, this was the by-product of conducting a
multi-jurisdictional survey that was not tailored to any one jurisdiction.
III. SURVEY RESULTS
The survey results are summarized beginning on the following
page.
11. See infra Part I1.F.
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A. The Structural Elements of Briefs
Question #1: It helps me when the table of contents of a brief tells





Question #2: The "statement of the case" in a brief should provide




10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit
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Question #3: The "statement of the case" and "statement of




Strongly Agree - I
10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit
Question #4: The "statement of the facts" in a brief should provide
the case's critical facts.
Strongly Disagree
No Preference
Strongly Agree - -
10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit
2006]
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Question #5: The "statement of the case" in a brief should identify




10th Circuit 1 st Circuit 2d Circuit
Question #6: The "statement of the case" in a brief should argue
the merits in addition to stating the context.
Strongly Disagree
No Preference ''K




Question #7: An appellant's opening brief should state the




10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit
Question #8: If the respondent's brief does not state the





10th Circuit 1st Circuit
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Question #9: The conclusion to an appellant's opening brief should




10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit
Question #10: The conclusion to a respondent's brief should
state precisely the outcome the respondent seeks.
Strongly Disagree
No Preference
Strongly Agree l (Mean Score = 1)
10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit
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Question #11: The conclusion to a brief should forcefully sum up




10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circu
Question #12: A long brief should have a separate section titled
"summary of argument" in which the lawyer summarizes the








DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Question #13: A "summary of the argument" section provides
an opportunity to persuade me, different and separate from a




10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit
Question #14: A "summary of the argument" should not
simply repeat the issue headings.
Strongly Disagree
No Preference
Strongly Agree 1 -
10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit
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Question #15: A "summary of the argument" should be included
even if the rules do not require it.
Strongly Disagree
No Preference
Strongly Agree I .E
10th Circuit 1st Circuit
2006]
2d Circuit
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
B. Writing Style and Advocacy
Question #16: While it depends on the specific case, in general





10th Circuit 1st Circuit
U
2d Circuit
10th Circuit 1st Circuit
Question #17: While it depends on the specific case, in general
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Question #18: I tend to skim blocked quotations longer than 6 or 7




10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit
Question #19: Long blocked quotations tend to lose the reader; I
prefer short quotations or paraphrased text.
Strongly Disagree
No Preference
Strongly Agree f I
10th Circuit 1st Circuit
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Question #20: It bothers me when a brief or writ petition




10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit









10th Circuit 1st Circuit
Question #22: It bothers me when a brief uses throat-clearing





10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit
Question #23: It bothers me when a lawyer writes in first person
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Question #24: It bothers me when a brief uses adverbs like




10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit
Question #25: Sometimes long sentences are distracting
or confusing even if they are grammatically correct.
Strongly Disagree
No Preference
Strongly Agree U. .
10th Circuit Ist Circuit 2d Circuit
2006] FEDERAL AD VOCA CY PREFERENCES 909
Question #26: Lawyers should try to use shortened names rather





10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit
Question #27: I notice, and it bothers me, when arguments




10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit
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Question #28: I'm bothered when statements of facts or of the case





10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit





10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit
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1st Circuit 2d Circuit
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Question #32: I prefer a party to place the full text of a statute in a




10th Circuit Ist Circuit
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C. Use ofAuthority and the Record
Question #33: String citations with short bracketed quotations
or summaries are a useful way to deal with multiple similar




10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit
Question #34: Citations of more than three cases





10th Circuit 1st Circuit
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10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit
Question #36: I am suspicious about whether the authority
stands for the proposition asserted when a case citation lacks




10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit
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Question #37: I prefer that record references follow each sentence




10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit
Question #38: Even if a whole paragraph reports facts from only a





10th Circuit 1st Circuit
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Question #39: Whenever a clerk's transcript, reporter's
transcript, appendix, or set of exhibits includes multiple volumes, I
prefer the record references in briefs to include volume numbers
Strongly Disagree as well as page numbers.
No Preference
Strongly Agree -(Mean Score = 1)
10th Circuit Ist Circuit 2d Circuit
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D. Typography of Briefs
Question #40: Briefs can be produced with "ragged right"
justification, which looks more like typing than printing, or
"full justification," which makes every line except the last line




10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit
10th Circuit 1st Circuit
Question #41: It affects the credibility of a brief when the
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Question #42: 1 do not have a preference for which style manual an
attorney should use as long as the method used is consistent
throughout the brief and allows me to quickly and accurately




10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit





10th Circuit 2d Circuit1st Circuit
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Question #44: 1 prefer italics to underlining for emphasis, Latin




10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit
Question #45: I prefer that, other than what a style manual or blue
book requires, no words in the text of a brief be emphasized by




10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit
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Question #46: 1 prefer titles of major parts of the brief (e.g.




10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit
Question #47: I prefer main headings of the legal argument
(e.g., THE JUDGMENT IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL




10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit
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Question #48: 1 find that main headings of more than one line in all




10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit
Question #49: 1 prefer that the names of parties appear in all




10th Circuit Ist Circuit
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Question #50: Some lawyers use a traditional outline structure,
indenting each tier of headings an additional five spaces. Others




10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit
Question #51: Briefs are easier to read when headings are




10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit
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Question #52: 1 prefer the brief to be in double spacing, though




10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit





10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit
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Question #54: When a brief contains a list, I like bullet points




10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit
Question #55: I like charts, diagrams, and other visual aids,
especially when they can substitute for long textual explanations.
Strongly Disagree
No Preference
Strongly Agree I I I
10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit
FEDERAL AD VOCACYPREFERENCES
Question #56: I'm distracted by paragraphs that begin with





10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit
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E. Physical Characteristics of Appellate Work Product




10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit





10th Circuit 1st Circuit
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10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit
2d Circuit




10th Circuit 1st Circuit
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Question #61: Attorneys do not sufficiently proofread briefs




10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit
10th Circuit 1st Circuit







Question #63: It negatively affects the credibility of an appeal when
I believe that the appellant failed to make a good faith effort to




Strongly Agree ye lI
10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit
Question #64: I prefer a party to include all exhibits in an
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Question #65: I appreciate it when a party attaches documents
with the brief that are important to the resolution of the appeal





10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit
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M
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F. Frequency of Certain Errors
12
Justices, research attorneys, and advocates would all agree that the
attributes of briefs listed in this section are errors. The justices saw these
errors in the following percentage of briefs filed in civil and criminal
cases.
12. See supra Part I for a detailed discussion of this information.
Question #66: Briefs are unusually long in relation to the
complexity of the issues.
0-10% 11-20% 21-30% 31-40% 41-50% 51%+
Question #67: Case authority does not stand for the
proposition asserted.
14







0-10% 11-20% 21-30% 31-40% 41-50% 51%+
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0-10% 11-20% 21-30% 31-40% 41-50% 51%+
0-10% 11-20% 21-30% 31-40% 41-50% 51%+
Question #69: Statements of facts violate the standard
of review (e.g., in a substantial evidence appeal,
appellant presents the side of conflicting evidence
favorable to appellant).
2006] FEDERAL ADVOCACY PREFERENCES 933
0-10% 11-20% 21-30% 31-40% 41-50% 51%+
Question #71: Briefs make personal attacks on the trial court.
0-10% 11-20% 21-30% 31-40% 41-50% 51%+
Question #70: Briefs make personal attacks on opposing
counsel.
934 DENVER UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW [Vol. 83:3








0-10% 11-20% 21-30% 31-40% 41-50% 51%+
0-10% 11-20% 21-30% 31-40% 41-50% 51%+
Question #73: Briefs contain improper grammar,
punctuation, or use of apostrophes.
FEDERAL AD VOCA CY PREFERENCES
Question #74: Volumes of the record do not stay bound.
30





0-10% 11-20% 21-30% 31-40% 41-50% 51%+
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G. Oral Argument









Question #77: I expect counsel to strictly abide by their time




10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit
Question #78: I appreciate it when counsel ceases argument
upon making all planned and responsive necessary points even
though his or her available time has not yet expired.
Strongly Disagree
No Preference
Strongly Agree (Mean Score = 1)
10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit
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Question #79: I appreciate a candid response (e.g., "I don't know")
when counsel does not know the answer to a question, rather than
avoiding the question or answering non-responsively.
Strongly Disagree
No Preference
Strongly Agre( (Mean Score = 1) (Mean Score = 1)
10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit
Question #80: I believe argument is more effective when it is
narrowly focused as opposed to attempting to address all
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Question #81: It bothers me when counsel uses oral argument




10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit
Question #82: The traditional opening ("May it please the Court")




10th Circuit 1st Circuit
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Question #83: An informal opening ("Good morning") is a good




10th Circuit 1st Circuit 2d Circuit
Question #84: Directly launching into your argument is a good way
to start when I'm on the panel.
Strongly Disagree
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Question #86: When responding to my questions, I prefer counsel
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CONCLUSION
I conclude by expressing my thanks once again to all of the judges
who took the time to respond to the survey. They are all extremely busy
people who took a few minutes out of their day to read through and an-
swer these questions. I hope their responses and these graphs, as well as
the graphs presented in the Journal of Appellate Practice and Process,
13
will benefit both appellate lawyers and judges and result in briefs that are
both more clear and better written, and advocacy that is conducted at a
higher level overall.
13. See supra, notes 2-3.
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